AKZ18 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

AKZ18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1284

File number: MLG 473 of 2018
Judgment of: JUDGE CHAMPION
Date of judgment: 28 November 2024
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Protection visa – Where the Authority did not make an error as to its treatment of “new information” under ss. 473DC and 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 – Where the Authority did not misinterpret the terms “real chance” and “real risk” as provided under the Act – Application dismissed   
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss. 5H, 5J, 36, 473CB, 473DC, 473DD, 473FA
Cases cited:

AFG20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 585

AUS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2020) 269 CLR 494; [2020] HCA 37

AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 261 FCR 503; [2018] FCAFC 89

BQG21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 865

BTK19v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 658

BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 CLR 29, [2019] HCA 34

BZD17 v Minister for Immigration (2018) 263 FCR 292

Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379; [1989] HCA 62

Craig v South Australia (1994) 184 CLR 163

Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21

DNQ18 v Minister for Immigration (2020) 275 FCR 517; [2020] FCAFC 72

LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12

M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 217

Minister for Home affairs v DUA16 (2020) 271 CLR 550; [2020] HCA 46

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541; [2018] HCA 30

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611; [2010] HCA 16

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR 505, [2013] FCAFC 3

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 575

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 74 ALJR 405; [2000] HCA 1

Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) ALJR 497; [2022] HCA 17

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 87
Date of last submissions: 20 November 2024
Date of hearing: 20 November 2024 
Place: Melbourne
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Anthony Krohn
Solicitor for the Applicant: Ravi James Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms Kylie McInnes
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz

ORDERS

MLG 473 of 2018

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

AKZ18

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE CHAMPION

DATE OF ORDER:

28 NOVEMBER 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is dismissed.

2.The Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $8,371.30.

Note: The…

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Details
Case
[2024] FedCFamC2G 1284
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of AKZ18 v Minister for Home Affairs involved the applicant, who sought a protection visa, challenging the decision made by the Authority to refuse his visa application. The applicant contested the Authority’s decision on several grounds, including that the Authority misinterpreted the new information provided under sections 473DC and 473DD of the Migration Act 1958, and that it misconstrued the terms “real chance” and “real risk” as stipulated by the Act. The court was required to determine whether the Authority's decision was legally unreasonable and whether it had failed to consider relevant considerations.

The legal issues at the heart of the case revolved around whether the Authority’s decision was legally unreasonable and whether it failed to consider relevant considerations as required by the principles discussed in AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Plaintiff M1/2021 cases. The applicant argued that the Authority did not sufficiently engage with his claims, particularly regarding the risk he faced as a journalist and the new information submitted. The court had to assess the Authority's approach, reasoning, and whether it had logically connected the material before it with its conclusions.

The court found that the Authority had not erred in its interpretation of the new information or the terms “real chance” and “real risk.” It determined that the Authority had brought its mind to bear on the applicant’s claims, including his work as a journalist, and had provided adequate reasoning for its conclusions. The court held that the Authority's decision was not legally unreasonable and that it had properly considered the relevant considerations. Consequently, the application was dismissed, and the Authority's decision was upheld.

The final orders of the court confirmed the dismissal of the applicant’s application for judicial review. The court rejected the applicant’s grounds for challenging the Authority’s decision, affirming that the Authority had not made any legal errors in its assessment of the case.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Authority grappled directly with these issues in the sense that the decision maker brought his mind to bear upon them. It did not fail to consider this integer of the Applicant’s claim as to whether there would be a real chance of serious harm consequent on his detention on his return to Sri Lanka.(4) WAS THE AUTHORITY’S DECISION LEGALLY UNREASONABLE (GROUND 4)?Legal principles Unreasonableness may arise in respect of irrational findings or reasoning along the way to a conclusion (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611; [2010] HCA 16, [132]; followed in BZD17 v Minister for Immigration (2018) 263 FCR 292, [34]). The Full Court’s statement of principle in Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21 at [34] is pertinent to the Applicant’s submissions. In Djokovic, the Full Court said that the conclusion of legal unreasonableness is about the characterisation of the approach of the decision-maker and the reasoning process. It concerns:the ascertainment, through understanding the approach of the decision-maker and characterising the reasoning process, of whether the decision (or state of satisfaction) is so lacking a rational or logical foundation that the decision (or relevant state of satisfaction) was one that no rational or logical decision-maker could reach, such that it was not a decision (or state of satisfaction) contemplated by the provision in question….[Emphasis added] In BQG21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 865 Mortimer CJ at [41] referred to legal unreasonableness as an “umbrella concept” with “irrational reasoning going to the material parts of the way in which a conclusion was reached and therefore a power is exercised, being described as one manifestation of legal unreasonableness”. Her Honour said that there must be a “logical connection” between the material that was before the decision-maker and the conclusions drawn but “the strength of the logical connection is not material; as long as there was some logical connection, then that is all that was required” (BQG21, [30]).Was the Authority’s refusal to accept the Applicant’s claim that he did not publish the October 2012 article unreasonable in the legal sense [particulars (a) –(d)]? The Authority accepted that in May 2012 the Applicant’s friend used his byline without his permission to publish an article in Vidivelli about the “violent, corrupt and illegal activities” of Pilliyan and his supporters. The Authority deployed circumspect language in accepting the Applicant’s account. Although the Authority was “concerned that the applicant has not provided a hard copy of the article” it was “willing to give the Applicant the benefit of the doubt and accept that the article was published as claimed and that he had argued with his friend after the publication” (Reasons, [8]). Noting that the Authority accepted the Applicant’s account of the publication of the May 2012 article in Vidivelli the Applicant submits that:The Second Respondent was then legally unreasonable when, without any evidence and by supposition, it refused to accept the applicant’s claim that the second article was also written in the Applicant’s name by his friend that although the applicant had made his unhappiness very clear to his friend on the first occasion. As the Authority had accepted that the Applicant’s by-line was used by another person in May 2012, and therefore using it again in October 2012 was plausible. (CB 308, [13]-[15])

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Ground 2 has not been made out.(3) DID THE AUTHORITY FAIL TO CONSIDER RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS (GROUND 3)? By Ground 3 the Applicant seeks to impugn the Tribunal’s decision because it failed to consider relevant considerations in accordance with the principles discussed in AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 261 FCR 503; [2018] FCAFC 89. In AYY17, a Full Court said the review function “requires [the Tribunal] to consider all claims made by an applicant and its essential components or integers”. The Full Court also said at [18]: The Tribunal is only required to consider such claims where they are either: (a) the subject of substantial clearly articulated argument, relying on established facts; or (b) clearly emerge from the materials: In Plaintiff M1/2021 at [24] a High Court plurality said that a decision-maker must read, identify, understand and evaluate each of the arguments and their component integers. The decision-maker must “bring their mind to bear upon the facts stated in them and the arguments or opinions put forward.” Under Ground 3, the Applicant identifies 5 claims [particulars (a)–(e)] he says that he made and which he says the Authority did not consider in accordance with the prescripts of AYY17 and Plaintiff M1/2021.(a) Did the Authority fail to consider that the Applicant was at risk because he was a journalist? The Applicant submitted that the Authority made a jurisdictional error because it did not consider “whether the Applicant may wish to return to work as a journalist and consequently suffer harm as a journalist in the reasonably foreseeable future, either by being prevented, or deterred through fear from acting as a journalist…” I referred to the Authority’s reasons as to whether there was a “real chance” of persecution because the Applicant was a journalist in my discussion of Ground 2. The Authority brought its mind to bear on the Applicant’s work as a journalist under the heading “loss of freedom of expression” at [23]–[26] of its Reasons. I set out above (and do not repeat here at [25]–[26]) that the Authority concluded that there was not a real chance of persecution because the Applicant was a journalist because historical attacks on journalists were reducing. As the High Court said in Plaintiff M1/2021:The requisite level of engagement – the degree of effort needed by the decision-maker – will vary, among other things, according to the length, clarity and degree of relevance of the representations The Applicant had primarily advanced his claim on the basis not that he was a journalist per se but on the basis that he had suffered a personal attack because of a particular article critical of Pilliyan being attributed to him. Having regard to how his claims were framed, the Authority had the requisite level of engagement with the Applicant’s claim that he faced a real chance of persecution because he was a journalist.(b) Did the Authority fail to consider the new country information?