DMH17 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (No 2)

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

DMH17 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC2G 1488

File number(s): SYG 2450 of 2017
Judgment of: JUDGE GIVEN
Date of judgment: 10 September 2025 
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Whether it can be inferred from lack of reference to letters in reasons of Immigration Assessment Authority that the documents were overlooked – whether failure to consider claim squarely raised on materials
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 472 CB, 473DA, 477
Cases cited:

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593

AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 261 FCR 503

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 12

Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 233 FCR 136

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v EEI17 (2018) 261 FCR 461

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323

SZSZW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 150 ALD 465

VAAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 117

XFKR v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs (2020) 280 FCR 535

Division: General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 42
Date of hearing: 6 May 2025
Place: Sydney
Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr D Moya, Moya Migration Law
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr G Johnson
Solicitor for the Respondents: Clayton Utz

ORDERS

SYG 2450 of 2017

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

DMH17

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE GIVEN

DATE OF ORDER:

10 SEPTEMBER 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the first respondent is amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.

2.The Affidavit of Kym Fraser made on 5 May 2025 must be filed by the solicitors for the first respondent by 4:00pm on 11 September 2025.

3.The application filed on 2 August 2017, as amended, is dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE GIVEN:

  1. Before the Court is an application filed on 2 August 2017, by which the applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority) affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (delegate) not to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise visa (visa).

    BACKGROUND

  2. On 13 November 2024, the Court delivered reasons for judgment…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 1488
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

DMH17 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) involved a Sri Lankan Tamil citizen who sought judicial review of the Immigration Assessment Authority's (IAA) decision to refuse his application for a visa on the basis of non-credible claims about his political activities and associations. The applicant argued that the IAA failed to consider certain letters which would have supported his claims. The case proceeded through several stages, including an interlocutory application seeking reinstatement after the applicant's initial application was dismissed for failure to appear at a scheduled hearing.

The central legal issue in this case was whether the IAA's failure to mention specific letters in its reasons indicated an oversight, and if so, whether this constituted a jurisdictional error warranting the setting aside of the IAA's decision. The applicant contended that the omission demonstrated the IAA had failed to properly consider the letters, which would have bolstered his credibility. Conversely, the Minister argued that the letters were not critical to the decision, and even if overlooked, it did not lead to a jurisdictional error. The court needed to determine whether the applicant had discharged the burden of proving that the IAA had indeed overlooked the letters.

The court found that the obligation to provide reasons did not equate to an obligation to consider all review material. The court adopted a commonsense and realistic approach to interpreting the IAA's reasons, noting that the reasons sufficiently explained the basis for the decision. The court concluded that the IAA had adequately explained its findings regarding the applicant's political activities, and there was no basis to infer that the letters had been overlooked. Therefore, the applicant had not satisfied the burden of proving the IAA had failed to consider the letters, and the application for reinstatement was dismissed.

The final orders included setting aside the previous orders for the dismissal of the application for an extension of time and costs against the applicant, but not varying the orders that the application for an extension of time be dismissed and that the applicant pay costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 13 November 2024, the Court delivered reasons for judgment in an interlocutory application in these proceedings, seeking reinstatement after their dismissal in the circumstances discussed at [3] below: DMH17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1194 (interlocutory judgment). The factual and procedural background to these proceedings is sufficiently set out at [3] to [22] of the interlocutory judgment and it is sensible to reproduce them here to adopt the defined terms in those reasons, for the purpose of this judgment also: 3.The background to this matter is derived from the submissions of the parties and, unless otherwise indicated, does not appear to be in dispute. 4.The applicant is a Sri Lankan citizen of Tamil ethnicity and Hindu faith who arrived in Australia on 21 October 2012, as an unauthorised maritime arrival (CB 39 and 44). 5.On 2 February 2016, the applicant applied for the visa (Court Book (CB) 22 to 108). The applicant claimed to fear harm as a Tamil from Sri Lanka who was involved with the Eelevar Democratic Front (Popular Front EROS) (EROS), and that he had faced previous harm from unknown Tamil paramilitary groups.6.A delegate of the Minister interviewed the applicant on 2 May 2016, before making a decision on 13 October 2016 to refuse to grant the applicant the visa (CB 170 to 186). The delegate’s decision was referred to the Authority for review on 19 October 2016 (CB 187 to 188).The Authority’s decision 7.The Authority said that in making the decision it had taken into account the DFAT country report on Sri Lanka dated 24 January 2017, which post-dated the delegate's decision (CB 191 at [5]). 8.The Authority did not accept as credible the applicant's claims regarding his political opinion and activities, for reasons including that the applicant: a.claimed that his brother's father-in-law (Mr X) asked the applicant to campaign for him, but that Mr X had not faced any difficulties due to his work. The Authority took the view that the absence of harm to Mr X undermined the applicant's claims to fear harm because of his pro-EROS political opinion (CB 193 at [12]);b.gave inconsistent evidence about when he became a member of EROS, the identity of the people who allegedly targeted him, why he was targeted and what occurred the night he was threatened (CB 193 at [13] to [14]); andc.raised a new claim at the end of the SHEV interview that he was involved in a petrol-bombing. The Authority considered a petrol-bombing to be a memorable event and accordingly, not one which the applicant would genuinely have forgotten to raise earlier (CB 194 at [15]).9.The Authority was willing to accept that the applicant had been harassed and assaulted in the past by Sri Lankan security forces, as part of general security operations. Referring to country information which indicated that the overall situation for Tamils has improved since the end of civil conflict in 2009, and noting that the applicant did not claim that he or his family had any links to the LTTE, the Authority was not satisfied that the applicant has a profile which would bring him to the attention of the Sri Lankan authorities as someone connected to the LTTE (CB 195 at [22] to [23]).10.The Authority found that, if returned to Sri Lanka, the applicant would likely be fined under the Sri Lankan “Immigrants and Emigrants Act” and might, as a result, be briefly detained in poor conditions. However, the Authority found that such treatment would be pursuant to a non-discriminatory law of general application and did not rise to serious or significant harm. In coming to this conclusion, the Authority relied on a finding that any harm would not be intended by the authorities (CB 195 at [41]).APPLICATION TO THIS COURT 11.As noted above, these proceedings were commenced by the filing of the EOT application. At the time the EOT application was filed, the applicant appeared to be unrepresented, albeit the footer to the application form indicates that the application itself was prepared by a third party. By the EOT application the applicant provided a postal address in New South Wales and a particular Gmail address as being his email address for service (first Gmail address). Procedural history12.The proceedings were initially docketed to another Judge of the Court (first primary Judge). On 15 September 2017, the applicant appeared before the first primary Judge for directions, on which occasion the Court made orders for the preparation of the hearing of the EOT application for hearing. The applicant was granted leave to file any amended application by 27 October 2017 with the proceedings listed for callover before the first primary Judge on 16 March 2018. 13.On 12 March 2018, the first primary Judge vacated the callover fixture and stood the matter over generally to be further called-over, or given a hearing date in due course. The proceedings were later transferred to the central migration docket. 14.On 16 March 2018, the applicant filed a Notice of Address for Service (2018 NOAS) which provided a postal address in South Australia and a different Gmail address as being the applicant’s email address for service (second Gmail address). 15.On 22 December 2021, the proceedings were docketed to me and a Registrar of the Court made orders listing them for hearing of the EOT application on time on 28 April 2022, together with ancillary orders for the preparation of that application for hearing (2022 Orders). The 2022 Orders, together with a listing notice with details of the hearing date and time, were sent to the parties by the Registry on 19 January 2022. To the applicant, those documents were sent both by post to the applicant’s South Australian address and email to the second Gmail address, by reference to the 2018 NOAS. The parties were advised by the listing notice that the mode and location of hearing would be notified to them closer to the date of hearing. This was because, following the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions, many hearings were still being facilitated online. Ultimately, because the applicant appeared to be located in South Australia, and the Court would be presiding from Sydney, the Court determined that the best method of hearing would be online, using Microsoft Teams (MS Teams). 16.On 27 April 2022, my Associate sent the parties the link to the MS Teams hearing for use the next day. While initially that email was sent by email to the first Gmail address, the error was rapidly identified and the MS Teams link was re-sent a very short time later, to the second Gmail address. 17.On 28 April 2022, the applicant failed to attend the hearing. An interpreter in the Tamil language was present in the MS Teams forum throughout. Counsel who appeared for the first respondent on that occasion sought orders for the dismissal of the proceedings for want of appearance pursuant to r 13.06(1)(c) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law)Rules 2021 (Cth) (Rules), and an order for costs. 18.Being satisfied that the applicant had been properly made aware of the time, date and mode of hearing by both the Court and the first respondent, and that the solicitor for the first respondent had also foreshadowed the applicant of the consequences should he fail to attend, the Court acceded to the first respondent’s application and made the following orders: 1.The name of the first respondent is amended to “Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs”.2.The application for an extension of time filed on 2 August 2017 is dismissed pursuant to r 13.06(1)(c) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (“Rules”). 3. The first must respondent serve: a. a sealed copy of these orders; and b. a copy of rule 17.05 of the Rules; on the applicant by close of business on 29 April 2022. 4. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements, of and incidental to these proceedings, fixed in the amount of $3,737. REINSTATEMENT APPLICATION 19.On 16 August 2023, the reinstatement application was filed for the applicant by his current solicitors. By the reinstatement application, the applicant seeks orders that the Court set aside or vary the orders referred to in the preceding paragraph (presumably pursuant to r 17.05(2)(a) of the Rules). Curiously, an additional order sought to dispense with r 15.14(3)(b) of the Rules, which rule pertains to the requirement for a non-English speaking jurat to be used for persons who do not have an adequate command of the English language. 20.The reinstatement application was initially listed for hearing on 20 March 2024, with orders made for the filing of submissions in advance of that date. That hearing event was facilitated by MS Teams, this time because the applicant’s legal representatives were located in South Australia and the Court was again presiding from Sydney. 21.At the first hearing of the reinstatement application each of the parties was represented by their respective Counsel. The first hearing of the reinstatement application adjourned in circumstances where there appeared to be anomalies in the dates on which various Affidavits had been executed. It is not necessary to detail those matters because, after further evidence was filed and enquiries made of the Registry by the Court, I am satisfied the anomalies were adequately explained and do not otherwise affect the matters which the Court must resolve in determining the reinstatement application. 22.On 17 May 2024, the hearing of the reinstatement application proceeded to finality. Each party was again represented by their respective Counsel who, in addition to having prepared written submissions in advance of the hearing, made further submissions at hearing. I have been assisted by all the submissions made for the parties.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In respect of the issue at [18(b)] above the first respondent submits that the letters did not constitute “definitive proof” of the applicant’s association with the organisation or the veracity of his protection claims. Therefore the first respondent says that, even assuming the Authority did fail to consider the letters, they were not of an important or critical nature to the review (citing VAAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 117 per Hill, Sundberg and Stone JJ at [77] and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99 per Robertson J at [77], [98], [111], [112] and [117] to [122]) and as such the failure to consider them would not result in jurisdictional error. Consideration The applicant bears the onus of establishing that the Authority overlooked the letters. For the reasons which follow, I am satisfied that he has not discharged that burden. In EEI17 (supra) the Full Court of the Federal Court observed as follows at [49]: …The obligation to give reasons is not commensurate with the obligation to consider the review material. Section 25D of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) applies to s 473EA of the Act; BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 114 (per Flick, Markovic and Banks-Smith JJ) at [47]-[49]. The IAA is not required to do more than set out the findings on material questions of fact and refer to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based. The fact that a matter is not mentioned in a statement of reasons does not mean that it was not considered; see Minister for Immigration v SZGUR [2011] HCA 1; (2011) 241 CLR 594 at [32], [32] (French CJ, Kiefel J, Heydon J and Crennan J agreeing); BVD17 at [45]; AQR17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 901 at [14]-[15]. In XFKR v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs (2020) 280 FCR 535 per Perry, Banks‐Smith and Anderson JJ observed at [27] that a beneficial construction is to be adopted in construing the reasons of the decision‐maker, saying (footnote omitted):…In this regard, it is well established that the reasons of an administrative decision‐maker “are not to be construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error”: Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259 at 271 –272 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ (quoting with approval Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic [1993] FCA 456; 43 FCR 280 at 287 )). As such, when it is said that such reasons should be read beneficially, ultimately this means that “a commonsense and realistic approach should be taken to understanding the reasons as a whole to see what it was that the Tribunal was saying”: Wang v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs[2003] FCA 1044 at [14] –[15] (Allsop J (as his Honour then was)). Undertaking the requisite, beneficial reading of the Authority’s reasons for decision, and bearing in mind the aforementioned principles in EEI17 about the giving of reasons (specifically in an Authority context), it is tolerably clear that by the time the Authority reached its findings about the applicants’ alleged involvement in EROS, the matters upon which it based its decision had been explained. In this regard I accept the first respondent’s submission as summarised at [20] and [21] above and am not satisfied that the Authority has, in fact, overlooked the letters.