FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
DMH17 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC2G 1488
File number(s): SYG 2450 of 2017 Judgment of: JUDGE GIVEN Date of judgment: 10 September 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Whether it can be inferred from lack of reference to letters in reasons of Immigration Assessment Authority that the documents were overlooked – whether failure to consider claim squarely raised on materials Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 472 CB, 473DA, 477 Cases cited: AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 261 FCR 503
Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 12
Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 233 FCR 136
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v EEI17 (2018) 261 FCR 461
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323
SZSZW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 150 ALD 465
VAAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 117
XFKR v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs (2020) 280 FCR 535
Division: General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 42 Date of hearing: 6 May 2025 Place: Sydney Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr D Moya, Moya Migration Law Counsel for the Respondents: Mr G Johnson Solicitor for the Respondents: Clayton Utz ORDERS
SYG 2450 of 2017 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: DMH17
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE GIVEN
DATE OF ORDER:
10 SEPTEMBER 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the first respondent is amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.
2.The Affidavit of Kym Fraser made on 5 May 2025 must be filed by the solicitors for the first respondent by 4:00pm on 11 September 2025.
3.The application filed on 2 August 2017, as amended, is dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE GIVEN:
Before the Court is an application filed on 2 August 2017, by which the applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority) affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (delegate) not to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise visa (visa).
BACKGROUND
On 13 November 2024, the Court delivered reasons for judgment…
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- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 1488
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue in this case was whether the IAA's failure to mention specific letters in its reasons indicated an oversight, and if so, whether this constituted a jurisdictional error warranting the setting aside of the IAA's decision. The applicant contended that the omission demonstrated the IAA had failed to properly consider the letters, which would have bolstered his credibility. Conversely, the Minister argued that the letters were not critical to the decision, and even if overlooked, it did not lead to a jurisdictional error. The court needed to determine whether the applicant had discharged the burden of proving that the IAA had indeed overlooked the letters.
The court found that the obligation to provide reasons did not equate to an obligation to consider all review material. The court adopted a commonsense and realistic approach to interpreting the IAA's reasons, noting that the reasons sufficiently explained the basis for the decision. The court concluded that the IAA had adequately explained its findings regarding the applicant's political activities, and there was no basis to infer that the letters had been overlooked. Therefore, the applicant had not satisfied the burden of proving the IAA had failed to consider the letters, and the application for reinstatement was dismissed.
The final orders included setting aside the previous orders for the dismissal of the application for an extension of time and costs against the applicant, but not varying the orders that the application for an extension of time be dismissed and that the applicant pay costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In respect of the issue at [18(b)] above the first respondent submits that the letters did not constitute “definitive proof” of the applicant’s association with the organisation or the veracity of his protection claims. Therefore the first respondent says that, even assuming the Authority did fail to consider the letters, they were not of an important or critical nature to the review (citing VAAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 117 per Hill, Sundberg and Stone JJ at [77] and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99 per Robertson J at [77], [98], [111], [112] and [117] to [122]) and as such the failure to consider them would not result in jurisdictional error. Consideration The applicant bears the onus of establishing that the Authority overlooked the letters. For the reasons which follow, I am satisfied that he has not discharged that burden. In EEI17 (supra) the Full Court of the Federal Court observed as follows at [49]: …The obligation to give reasons is not commensurate with the obligation to consider the review material. Section 25D of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) applies to s 473EA of the Act; BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 114 (per Flick, Markovic and Banks-Smith JJ) at [47]-[49]. The IAA is not required to do more than set out the findings on material questions of fact and refer to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based. The fact that a matter is not mentioned in a statement of reasons does not mean that it was not considered; see Minister for Immigration v SZGUR [2011] HCA 1; (2011) 241 CLR 594 at [32], [32] (French CJ, Kiefel J, Heydon J and Crennan J agreeing); BVD17 at [45]; AQR17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 901 at [14]-[15]. In XFKR v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs (2020) 280 FCR 535 per Perry, Banks‐Smith and Anderson JJ observed at [27] that a beneficial construction is to be adopted in construing the reasons of the decision‐maker, saying (footnote omitted):…In this regard, it is well established that the reasons of an administrative decision‐maker “are not to be construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error”: Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259 at 271 –272 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ (quoting with approval Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic [1993] FCA 456; 43 FCR 280 at 287 )). As such, when it is said that such reasons should be read beneficially, ultimately this means that “a commonsense and realistic approach should be taken to understanding the reasons as a whole to see what it was that the Tribunal was saying”: Wang v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs[2003] FCA 1044 at [14] –[15] (Allsop J (as his Honour then was)). Undertaking the requisite, beneficial reading of the Authority’s reasons for decision, and bearing in mind the aforementioned principles in EEI17 about the giving of reasons (specifically in an Authority context), it is tolerably clear that by the time the Authority reached its findings about the applicants’ alleged involvement in EROS, the matters upon which it based its decision had been explained. In this regard I accept the first respondent’s submission as summarised at [20] and [21] above and am not satisfied that the Authority has, in fact, overlooked the letters.