FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v EEI17 [2018] FCAFC 166
Appeal from: EEI17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2018] FCCA 527 File number(s): NSD 490 of 2018 Judge(s): MCKERRACHER, GLEESON AND BURLEY JJ Date of judgment: 28 September 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – where the primary judge quashed the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority to refuse the first Respondent’s protection visa on the basis that the Immigration Assessment Authority failed to identify particular errors in the delegate’s reasoning – whether the Immigration Assessment Authority’s obligations to provide reasons pursuant to s 473EA(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and consider the review material pursuant to s 473DB(1) of the Migration Act requires the Immigration Assessment Authority to engage with the delegate’s reasoning and in particular identify incorrect findings – appeal allowed Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 25D
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5H, 36, 65, 415, 430, 473BA, 473CA, 473CB, 473CC, 473DB, 473DC, 473EA
Cases cited: AQR17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 901
BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 114
Minister for Immigration v SZGUR [2011]
AQR17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 901 HCA 1; (2011) 241 CLR 594
Minister for Immigration v Yusef [2001] HCA 30; (2001) 206 CLR 323
Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16; (2018) 353 ALR 600
Date of hearing: 28 August 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 53 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr H Bevan Solicitor for the Appellant: DLA Piper Australia Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr V A Kline Solicitor for the First Respondent: Human Rights for All Pty Ltd Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting appearance save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 490 of 2018 BETWEEN: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Appellant
AND: EEI17
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGES:
MCKERRACHER, GLEESON AND BURLEY JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
28 SEPTEMBER 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is allowed.
2.The orders dated 9 March 2018 in proceeding SYG2931/2017 in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia be set aside.
3.In lieu of the orders referred to in Order 2 above, the application to review the decision of the second respondent dated 22 August 2017 be dismissed.
4.The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of this appeal and in the Court below.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
1. INTRODUCTION
The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Minister) appeals from a decision and orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) quashing a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA). The grounds of appeal raise the question of the correct approach of the IAA to…
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- Case
- [2018] FCAFC 166
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were primarily concerned with the interpretation of the IAA's obligations under sections 473EA(1)(b) and 473DB(1) of the Migration Act. Specifically, the court needed to determine whether the IAA was required to engage with and identify errors in the delegate's reasoning, or if its role was limited to considering the review material and making its own independent decision. The Minister contended that the IAA was not required to address or correct errors in the delegate's decision, while the respondent argued that without addressing the errors, the IAA could not properly review the decision or provide meaningful guidance to the delegate.
The court found that the IAA's role was indeed limited to conducting a de novo review of the application, without the need to correct errors in the delegate's reasoning. The court held that the primary judge had incorrectly imposed a higher threshold on the IAA by requiring it to engage with and identify errors in the delegate's decision. The court emphasised that the IAA's function was to make its own independent assessment of the application, based on the review material, rather than to act as a corrector of the delegate's errors. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the orders of the Federal Circuit Court were set aside.
In conclusion, the court's decision clarified that the IAA's obligations under the Migration Act did not require it to engage with or correct errors in the delegate's reasoning. Instead, its role was confined to conducting a de novo review of the application. This decision provides important guidance for both the IAA and applicants in understanding the scope of the IAA's review function. The Minister's costs of the appeal and the Court below were to be paid by the first respondent.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is allowed.
2. The orders dated 9 March 2018 in proceeding SYG2931/2017 in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia be set aside.
3. In lieu of the orders referred to in Order 2 above, the application to review the decision of the second respondent dated 22 August 2017 be dismissed.
4. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of this appeal and in the Court below.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
These statements leave no room for doubt as to the nature of the decision of the IAA. The obligation of the IAA is to consider the materials and provide its decision as to whether or not the visa applicant is entitled to the grant of a visa. The IAA is not concerned with the correction of error on the part of the delegate but is engaged in a de novo consideration of the merits of the decision that has been referred to it. The task of the IAA under s 473CC(1) of the Act is to consider the application for a protection visa afresh. This was not a matter of dispute between the parties. 7. CONSIDERATION7.1 The submissions The Minister contends that the primary judge wrongly imposed on the IAA a higher threshold or burden as to what it must do in order to discharge its obligations of review than is warranted by the legislative scheme and authorities applying it. He submits that the primary judge erred by finding that the IAA was required to actively engage with what the delegate had said about the claims extends beyond the review task, in circumstances where the obligation of the IAA is not to correct error on the part of the delegate but to consider the claims made by the visa applicant afresh as a hearing de novo, citing M174/2016. In oral submissions in support of the appeal, Mr Bevan placed most emphasis on ground 2 of the appeal. Ground 2 draws attention to the primary judge’s reasoning at [50] – [52], which emphasises a requirement on the part of the IAA to consider and refer to the delegate’s incorrect findings that the respondent was of Arab/Bidoon ethnicity, rather than Arab/Bedouin ethnicity, and the evidence concerning the respondent’s ethnicity. The Minister submits that the primary judge effectively held that the IAA had properly considered all of the claims advanced on behalf of the respondent, and yet he required the IAA to go further and explain an apparent inconsistency or anomaly in the delegate’s reasons. The Minister submits that there is no obligation on the part of the IAA to set out in its reasons an analysis of the delegate’s decision. Furthermore, the Minister contends that the primary judge’s conclusion ignores parts of the IAA’s reasons where it makes clear that it had regard to the “review material”. In this regard the Minister refers to the IAA decision at [3], where it states explicitly that it has had regard to the material given by the Secretary under s 473CB of the Act, and other parts of the IAA reasons where it is apparent that the IAA did have regard to the decision of the delegate. Having done so, and determined the merits of the respondent’s claims, the Minister submits there was nothing that the IAA omitted to do. The respondent submits that the fast track review process under Part 7AA of the Act is fundamentally different to Part 7 of the Act. In the latter, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal), upon review, may exercise all of the powers of the original decision maker and substitute a new decision; s 415 of the Act. Furthermore, the Tribunal may invite the applicant to appear before it. In the case of the IAA, subject to the provisions of Part 7AA concerning “new information”, it is limited to reviewing the decision of the delegate on the materials sent to it by the Secretary which are confined to two species of information; the delegate’s decision; and the material provided by the applicant to the delegate for the purpose of making that decision. The IAA is limited in its role to affirming the original decision or remitting the matter back to the original decision maker for reconsideration. The respondent submits that given these limitations, it is difficult to conceive of the IAA being able to affirm the original decision or, on remittal, to afford any benefit to the original decision maker in its reconsideration, without the IAA having relevantly addressed the delegate’s decision.