FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
FIG17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1105
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read FIG17 v Minister for Home Affairs and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2019] FCA 1105
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the principles concerning irrationality as a ground for judicial review. The appellant claimed that the Authority fell into the third category of error, which involves an irrational or illogical step in reasoning that affects a material conclusion. However, the court found that there was no logical contradiction in the Authority's decision. The Authority's decision indicated that while the appellant was an atheist, there was no evidence to suggest that he would be viewed as an apostate or face harm in Iran based on the country information provided. The court concluded that the Authority's decision was logical and rational based on the evidence and information presented.
The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant must pay the first respondent's costs, to be assessed if not agreed. The costs order is in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The appellant must pay the first respondent's costs, to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the application for judicial review on 6 December 2018, with the primary judge delivering ex tempore reasons.Ground 1 - irrationality The first ground of appeal and ground of review alleges that a finding that the Authority reached, namely, that it was not satisfied that the appellant 'would be viewed as an apostate' was irreconcilable with an earlier finding that he was an atheist and no longer practised Islam. The appellant claims that this is affected by jurisdictional error because it was irrational. In MZZGE v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 72 at [22] the Full Court summarised the principles concerning irrationality as a ground of judicial review as follows:A decision might be shown to be affected by jurisdictional error if:(1)no rational or logical decision-maker could have arrived at the decision on the same evidence; this cannot be made out if different minds might reach different conclusions: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [130], [131] (Crennan and Bell JJ);(2)there is no logical connection between the evidence and the inferences drawn: Fattah v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 31 at [45] (Perram, Farrell and Thawley JJ);(3)there is an irrational or illogical step in reasoning, at least where that faulty step can be shown to have affected a material conclusion: SZMDS at [132]. It appears here that the appellant claims that the Authority fell into the third category of error summarised by the Full Court. The error is said to have occurred in paragraph 52 of the Authority's decision, which reads as follows:I accept that that [sic] applicant may no longer practise Islam on his return to Iran and is an atheist. On country information referred to above I am not satisfied that he would be viewed as an apostate or that his non observance of Islamic practices will give rise to a real risk of harm on his return. In my view there is no logical contradiction between the first and the second sentences of this paragraph. The second sentence does not say that the appellant would not be an apostate, it says that he would not be viewed as one. A fair reading of that in the context of the rest of the paragraph and the reasons as a whole is that it is saying that despite his atheism, the appellant would not be of sufficient interest to the authorities to lead to persecution or harm. That is confirmed by the reference to the country information that the Authority had already summarised, which was to the effect that atheists who do not express their views in public are able to lead normal lives in Iran without facing any further restrictions. In the context of referring to that information, the Authority said that while it was satisfied that the appellant was an atheist, based on the country information it was not satisfied that he would be persecuted on his return to Iran. Other country information referred to was to the effect that political opponents of the Iranian regime could be charged with apostasy. But the Authority found that the appellant was not a political opponent of the regime. The Authority also referred to a DFAT report which indicated that it was unlikely that individuals would be prosecuted on charges of apostasy, that perceived apostates are only likely to come to the attention of Iranian authorities through public manifestations of their beliefs or attempts at proselytisation, and that atheists are unlikely to come to the attention of security authorities unless they seek to publicise their views. In that context, the Authority recorded that it was not satisfied that the appellant would publicise his views if he returned to Iran and was not satisfied that he faced a real chance of harm arising from his lack of religious beliefs.