FJW17 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FJW17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 881

Appeal from: FJW17 v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCCA 3000
File number: NSD 2077 of 2018
Judge: MARKOVIC J
Date of judgment: 12 June 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing the appellant’s application for judicial review – where the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority) affirmed the decision of a delegate not to grant the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise visa – whether the Authority misunderstood the appellant’s evidence resulting in jurisdictional error – whether the Authority misapplied s 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 473DC, 473DD
Cases cited:

AQU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 162 ALD 442; [2018] FCAFC 111

BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 254 FCR 221

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 353 ALR 600; [2018] HCA 16

Date of hearing: 8 April 2019
15 May 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 54
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr G Foster
Solicitor for the Appellant: Sentil Solicitor & Barrister
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr N Swan
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 2077 of 2018
BETWEEN:

FJW17

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MARKOVIC J

DATE OF ORDER:

12 JUNE 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MARKOVIC J:

  1. This is an appeal from orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Federal Circuit Court) dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority): FJW17 v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCCA 3000 (FJW17).  The Authority had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) refusing to grant the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visa (Visa). 

    BACKGROUND

  2. The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka of Tamil ethnicity and Hindu religion.  He arrived in Australia on 23 April 2013 as an unauthorised maritime arrival.  On 5 July 2016 he applied for the Visa.

  3. In support of his application for the Visa the appellant made the following claims:

    (1)when he was 18 or 19 his parents received a letter from the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) requiring them to attend a meeting.  They did not do so.  As a result, the appellant was abducted by the TMVP (Karuna) and…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 881
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, FJW17 (the appellant) appealed against orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia that dismissed his application for judicial review. The appeal focused on the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority) to affirm the delegate’s decision not to grant the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise visa. The appellant argued that the Authority misunderstood his evidence, resulting in a jurisdictional error, and misapplied section 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The court was required to determine whether the Authority's interpretation of the appellant’s evidence was erroneous and if the application of section 473DD was appropriate.

The court examined the Authority’s decision-making process and its handling of the appellant's evidence. It found that the Authority had before it a range of material, including the transcript of the appellant's interview with the delegate, his statement of claims, and other documents provided by the Secretary. The court concluded that the Authority's characterisation of the appellant's evidence was consistent with the material available to it, including the recording of the interview. The court emphasised that the reasons of an administrative decision-maker should not be scrutinised in an overly meticulous manner, and the appellant's argument for a detailed error in the Authority's interpretation was not substantiated. Additionally, the court found that the Authority correctly applied section 473DD in deciding not to consider new information provided by the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs as agreed or taxed. The Federal Circuit Court’s decision was upheld, and the appellant's application for judicial review was dismissed with the specified costs order.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 16 November 2017 the Authority affirmed the delegate’s decision.THE AUTHORITY’S DECISION The Authority first addressed the information that was before it. It noted that it had regard to the material provided by the Secretary pursuant to s 473CB of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act). The Authority referred to the Submission, observing that it contained argument about the findings and basis of the delegate’s decision and that much of the information referred to in it was already before it in the materials that had been provided by the Secretary. The Authority concluded that, to the extent the Submission contained argument and material which was already before it, it did not consider it to be new information. The Authority then considered two documents that were included with the Submission: a letter from Mr A. Wijayaratnum JP, a member of the Kalmunai Municipal Council and president of the Illankai Tamil Arasu Kadchy, dated 23 March 2017 (March 2017 Letter) and a copy of an Australian interim Medicare card for the appellant’s brother. Only the Authority’s consideration of the March 2017 Letter is relevant to the appeal. In relation to that document, at [5] of its decision record the Authority said:As part of the submission, the representative referred to and included a letter in support of the applicant’s claims by Mr A. Wijayaratnum JP, a member of the Kalmunai Municipal Council and President of the lllankai Tamil Arasu Kadchy, dated 23 March 2017. The letter was not before the delegate and is new information. As the letter post-dates the date of the delegate’s decision, I am satisfied the letter was not in existence and could not have been provided to the delegate prior to their decision. The information contained in the letter refers to his status as a candidate for the EDF in the Council elections of 2011 and other claimed activities undertaken by the applicant to destroy votes. I note that this information relates to events that occurred a number of years before the letter was written and was referred to by the applicant in his claims for protection before the delegate. The applicant has not satisfied me that the new information could not have been provided to the delegate prior to their decision. There is no indication in the referred materials that the applicant is personally known to the author and it appears the author is attesting to the applicant’s activities on the basis of having it reported to him, rather than through personal knowledge of the events. The applicant has not satisfied me that the letter is credible personal information which was not previously known, and had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the applicant’s claims. I do not consider that s.473DD(b) is met. The applicant was represented by a legally qualified registered migration agent who provided detailed post-interview submissions to the delegate on his behalf. I consider that the applicant had adequate opportunity to provide information in support of his claims for protection prior to the delegate’s decision. On this basis, I am also not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant submitted that the Authority relied on its mischaracterisation to draw its conclusion at [27] of its decision record (see [15] above). As I understand the submission put by the appellant, he says that the primary judge considered it was open to the Authority to find that the appellant did not hold a profile that would place him at risk of the authorities despite the fact that he did not give any evidence to that effect to the Department. He contended that the primary judge erred in not finding that the Authority erred when it misunderstood the evidence before the delegate.Consideration In addressing the appellant’s claims the Authority had before it the material given to it by the Secretary under s 473CB of the Act and the appellant’s submissions. That is, it had a range of material, including the recording of the appellant’s interview with the delegate. Insofar as the appellant’s claim to have spent time in Jaffna was concerned that material included:(1)the transcript of the appellant’s “enhanced screening interview” which included:How long did you stay in Jaffna for?1 year.(2)the record of the appellant’s unauthorised maritime arrival and induction interview in which the only reference to time spent in Jaffna was in response to the question “what do you think will happen to you if you return to your country of nationality (residence)?” as follows: A I will be killed if I go backQ: Why?A: Because of what already happened to me – it could happen to me againQ: Why not live in a safer area of Sri Lanka?A:I lived on Jaffna for 1 year and went back to my village. You might think it is safe but it is not. You don’t know when they will come for you. We are not protected in Jaffna.(3)the appellant’s statement of claims provided to the Department under cover of an email dated 5 July 2016 in which the appellant said:I was treated for my injuries for about a month. After staying home for a month, I travelled to Jaffna as I was scared that Karuna group will kidnap me again and kill me. I stayed in Jaffna for about one year but due to war had to return to Batticaloa, my home. None of the other material provided by the appellant referred to time spent by him in Jaffna and, to the extent the material set out above referred to the appellant’s time spent in Jaffna, it did not suggest that he was in hiding while there. At the interview with the delegate, in the appellant’s answers to questions on the topic of his time spent in Jaffna, the appellant said that he did not register with or report to the police in Jaffna as he was required to do because to do so would mean that they would know where he lived; at the time the Sri Lankan Army was undertaking checks of homes and rounding people up; and he was in a “safe place” in the basement of his father’s friend’s home and shop during the day and came up to the shop at night when the shop was closed. The Authority’s characterisation of the appellant’s evidence must be considered in light of all the matters that were before it including the recording of the interview with the delegate. When that is done the appellant’s assertion of mischaracterisation of his evidence cannot be accepted. It is a settled principle that the reasons of an administrative decision-maker, such as the Authority, are not to be construed minutely with an eye keenly attuned to error or scrutinised in an overzealous manner in an attempt to discern some error: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ. But that is what the appellant urges the Court to do in this case.