Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CQW17

Link copied
Case Copied 32 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CQW17 [2018] FCAFC 110

Appeal from: CQW17 v Minister for Immigration & Another [2017] FCCA 2378
File number(s): NSD 1848 of 2017
Judge(s): MCKERRACHER, MURPHY AND DAVIES JJ
Date of judgment: 13 July 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – fast track reviewable decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority) under Pt 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – appeal from judicial review of Authority decision by the Federal Circuit Court – extension of time in which to file notice of contention – whether Authority entitled to consider “new information” under s 473DD – whether Authority erred in construction of s 473DD – where Minister’s appeal ground made out but decision upheld on grounds contained in notice of contention – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited:

AGA16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 628

ARK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 825

AWT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 512

BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCA 958

CHF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 192

CQW17 v Minister for Immigration & Another [2017] FCCA 2378

Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 185 CLR 163

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 77 ALJR 1088

DYS16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 33

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16

SZUTM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 241 FCR 214

Tickner v Chapman [1995] FCA 1726; (1995) 57 FCR 451

VAAD v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 117

Date of hearing: 21 May 2018
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 76
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr B D Kaplan
Solicitor for the Appellant: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms D M Bampton
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Legal Aid Commission of NSW
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

 

ORDERS

NSD 1848 of 2017
BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Appellant

AND:

CQW17

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent

JUDGES:

MCKERRACHER, MURPHY AND DAVIES JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

13 JULY 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The First Respondent be granted an extension of time within which to file the Notice of Contention dated 31 January 2018.

2.The appeal be dismissed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

INTRODUCTION

  1. The appellant, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the Minister), appeals from a judgment of the Federal…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CQW17 and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2018] FCAFC 110
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CQW17, the respondent sought to appeal a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) regarding a fast-track reviewable decision under Part 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appeal was from the judicial review of the IAA decision by the Federal Circuit Court. The primary issue before the court was whether the IAA was entitled to consider new information under s 473DD, and if so, whether the IAA erred in its construction of s 473DD. Furthermore, the court had to decide whether the Minister's appeal ground was made out, but the decision was upheld on the grounds contained in the notice of contention.

The court considered the arguments presented by the respondent, CQW17, who contended that the IAA misconstrued the statutory test and made a jurisdictional error by not considering whether "exceptional circumstances" existed under subpara (a) of s 473DD. The court acknowledged that the primary judge had erred in understanding the decision in BVZ16, as well as BBS16, and CHF16, as providing that the IAA's failure to consider subpara (a) constituted jurisdictional error. The court found that the present case involved a different question than the cases mentioned above, and that the Authority had not misunderstood the breadth of "exceptional circumstances". The court held that the Minister's appeal was made out, but on a narrower basis than that contended for by the Minister. The court found that the IAA did not address the question of whether exceptional circumstances existed under subpara (a) and that it did not think it necessary to consider this limb of s 473DD in light of its conclusion that it was not satisfied as to the requirements under subparas (b)(i) and (ii).

The court granted the respondent an extension of time within which to file the Notice of Contention and dismissed the appeal. The court held that the IAA's failure to consider subpara (a) did not amount to jurisdictional error, and therefore, the decision was upheld on the grounds contained in the notice of contention. The court also noted that the extension of time was appropriate, as the delay in filing the notice was for reasons largely beyond the control of the respondent, and the Minister had suffered no material prejudice. Furthermore, the notice of contention raised a serious question as to whether the IAA's decision was made according to law, and it was in the interests of justice to ensure that an administrative decision arguably affected by jurisdictional error is not carried into effect.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The First Respondent be granted an extension of time within which to file the Notice of Contention dated 31 January 2018.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

His Honour, however, concluded (at [18]-[19]):…The difference between the IAA’s reasoning in para.5 of its decision record and its reasoning in para.6, where the possible existence of exceptional circumstances was expressly considered, lies in the fact that in the latter s.473DD(b) had been satisfied and so s.473DD(a) had to be addressed squarely, whereas in the former s.473DD(b) had not been satisfied. I infer, in that circumstance, that the IAA believed that it was not necessary for it to also consider s.473DD(a) in the context of the discussion in para.5 of its decision record.The question then is whether such a failure amounts to jurisdictional error. On appeal in BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCA 958, White J found at [36] and [37] that it does. There his Honour found that as the trial judge I had erred by not finding that the IAA had erred by only considering s.473DD(a) and not s.473DD(b) too. As a result, I must conclude in this case that the IAA’s failure to consider s.473DD(a) amounts to a similar reviewable error.(Emphasis added.) His Honour made orders quashing the Authority’s decision and remitted the review application to the Authority to be determined according to law. The Minister appealed to this Court on 20 October 2017. On 31 January 2018 CQW17 sought leave to file a notice of contention out of time.THE NOTICE OF CONTENTION Having regard to our decision it is convenient to commence with the notice of contention. It contains four grounds other than those relied on by the primary judge, on the basis of which CQW17 contends the decision of the primary judge should be upheld.The extension of time application Pursuant to r 36.24 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) CQW17 had 21 days to file any notice of contention following service of the notice of appeal from the FCC decision. The date upon which CQW17 was served with the notice of appeal is not clear, but it is uncontentious that he did not file a notice of contention within the 21 day period allowed. On 31 January 2018, through Legal Aid New South Wales, CQW17 filed an application for an extension of time to file the notice. The application is supported by an affidavit of Katie Wrigley, the solicitor with the carriage of the application, which attaches the notice of contention sought to be filed. Ms Wrigley’s unchallenged evidence is that the delay in filing the notice of contention resulted from the fact that CQW17 cannot afford a lawyer and is in immigration detention. Because he is in detention the task of seeking legal assistant has fallen to his wife who has experienced significant difficulties and delay in obtaining pro bono legal representation. It is appropriate to allow an extension of time because; (a) the delay in filing the notice was for reasons largely beyond the CQW17’s control. He and his wife attempted to obtain legal assistance at an early date and the delay resulted from the (apparently) limited capacity of Salvos Legal to progress the matter in a timely way. Once the matter was referred to Legal Aid New South Wales, the notice and extension of time application were filed expeditiously; (b) the Minister has suffered no material prejudice and does not oppose the extension of time; and (c) the notice of contention raises a serious question as to whether the Authority’s decision was made according to law. It is in the interests of justice to ensure that an administrative decision arguably affected by jurisdictional error is not carried into effect, especially where the affected person may suffer real prejudice: ARK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 825 at [25] per Mortimer J.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

On CQW17’s submission, the reasoning in BVZ16 and BBS16 applies in the reverse circumstance: that is, consideration as to whether “exceptional circumstances” exist may contribute to the Authority’s satisfaction as to whether the New Religious Information is credible personal information that was not previously known under subpara (b)(ii). He submits that the Authority’s failure to turn its mind to this question means that it misconstrued the statutory test and made a jurisdictional error.Consideration The appeal is made out, but on a narrower basis than that contended for by the Minister. As we have said, the cumulative structure of s 473DD(a) and (b) means that the Authority is prohibited from considering new information unless it is satisfied of the matters in subparas (a) and (b)(i) or (ii). Having said this, the Minister’s contention that the Authority is not required to consider whether exceptional circumstances exist under subpara (a) if it has decided that (b) is not made out misses the point. As the Full Court said in CHF16 “[i]n a formal sense the Minister’s submission is correct but, as a matter of substance, it has a tendency to sidestep the real issue”: at [46]. The primary judge found, as do we, that on a fair reading of its decision the Authority did not address the question of whether exceptional circumstances existed under subpara (a). His Honour inferred, as would we, that the Authority did not think it necessary to consider this limb of s 473DD in light of its conclusion that it was not satisfied as to the requirements under subparas (b)(i) and (ii). However, in our respectful view the primary judge erred in understanding the decision in BVZ16 (later affirmed in BBS16) as providing that he was bound to conclude that the Authority’s failure to consider subpara (a) constitutes jurisdictional error. The present case involves a different question than that before the Court in BVZ16 (as well as BBS16 and CHF16). The question in those cases was whether, on a fair reading of the Authority’s decisions, the confined nature of the Authority’s consideration as to whether exceptional circumstances exist including its failure to consider the narrower matters in subpara (b)(i) and/or (ii), showed that it had misunderstood the breadth of “exceptional circumstances”. As the plurality in Plaintiff M174 acknowledged, what will amount to exceptional circumstances is incapable of exhaustive statement: at [30]. BVZ16 and the subsequent cases stand for the proposition that the matters under subparas (b)(i) and (ii) are potentially relevant in considering whether exceptional circumstances exist under subpara (a), and the Authority had erred in failing to consider them before concluding the requirements in s 473DD(a) were not satisfied. The Minister’s appeal in this case essentially involves the reverse position. CQW17 contends that whether exceptional circumstances exist under subpara (a) was a matter capable of informing the Authority’s decision as to whether the new information was credible personal information pursuant to subpara (b)(ii).