FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CQW17 [2018] FCAFC 110
Appeal from: CQW17 v Minister for Immigration & Another [2017] FCCA 2378 File number(s): NSD 1848 of 2017 Judge(s): MCKERRACHER, MURPHY AND DAVIES JJ Date of judgment: 13 July 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – fast track reviewable decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority) under Pt 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – appeal from judicial review of Authority decision by the Federal Circuit Court – extension of time in which to file notice of contention – whether Authority entitled to consider “new information” under s 473DD – whether Authority erred in construction of s 473DD – where Minister’s appeal ground made out but decision upheld on grounds contained in notice of contention – appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Cases cited: AGA16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 628
ARK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 825
AWT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 512
BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCA 958
CHF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 192
CQW17 v Minister for Immigration & Another [2017] FCCA 2378
Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 185 CLR 163
Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 77 ALJR 1088
DYS16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 33
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16
SZUTM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 241 FCR 214
Tickner v Chapman [1995] FCA 1726; (1995) 57 FCR 451
VAAD v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 117
Date of hearing: 21 May 2018 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 76 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr B D Kaplan Solicitor for the Appellant: Clayton Utz Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms D M Bampton Solicitor for the First Respondent: Legal Aid Commission of NSW Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice
ORDERS
NSD 1848 of 2017 BETWEEN: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Appellant
AND: CQW17
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGES:
MCKERRACHER, MURPHY AND DAVIES JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
13 JULY 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The First Respondent be granted an extension of time within which to file the Notice of Contention dated 31 January 2018.
2.The appeal be dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
INTRODUCTION
The appellant, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the Minister), appeals from a judgment of the Federal…
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- Case
- [2018] FCAFC 110
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the arguments presented by the respondent, CQW17, who contended that the IAA misconstrued the statutory test and made a jurisdictional error by not considering whether "exceptional circumstances" existed under subpara (a) of s 473DD. The court acknowledged that the primary judge had erred in understanding the decision in BVZ16, as well as BBS16, and CHF16, as providing that the IAA's failure to consider subpara (a) constituted jurisdictional error. The court found that the present case involved a different question than the cases mentioned above, and that the Authority had not misunderstood the breadth of "exceptional circumstances". The court held that the Minister's appeal was made out, but on a narrower basis than that contended for by the Minister. The court found that the IAA did not address the question of whether exceptional circumstances existed under subpara (a) and that it did not think it necessary to consider this limb of s 473DD in light of its conclusion that it was not satisfied as to the requirements under subparas (b)(i) and (ii).
The court granted the respondent an extension of time within which to file the Notice of Contention and dismissed the appeal. The court held that the IAA's failure to consider subpara (a) did not amount to jurisdictional error, and therefore, the decision was upheld on the grounds contained in the notice of contention. The court also noted that the extension of time was appropriate, as the delay in filing the notice was for reasons largely beyond the control of the respondent, and the Minister had suffered no material prejudice. Furthermore, the notice of contention raised a serious question as to whether the IAA's decision was made according to law, and it was in the interests of justice to ensure that an administrative decision arguably affected by jurisdictional error is not carried into effect.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The First Respondent be granted an extension of time within which to file the Notice of Contention dated 31 January 2018.
2. The appeal be dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
On CQW17’s submission, the reasoning in BVZ16 and BBS16 applies in the reverse circumstance: that is, consideration as to whether “exceptional circumstances” exist may contribute to the Authority’s satisfaction as to whether the New Religious Information is credible personal information that was not previously known under subpara (b)(ii). He submits that the Authority’s failure to turn its mind to this question means that it misconstrued the statutory test and made a jurisdictional error.Consideration The appeal is made out, but on a narrower basis than that contended for by the Minister. As we have said, the cumulative structure of s 473DD(a) and (b) means that the Authority is prohibited from considering new information unless it is satisfied of the matters in subparas (a) and (b)(i) or (ii). Having said this, the Minister’s contention that the Authority is not required to consider whether exceptional circumstances exist under subpara (a) if it has decided that (b) is not made out misses the point. As the Full Court said in CHF16 “[i]n a formal sense the Minister’s submission is correct but, as a matter of substance, it has a tendency to sidestep the real issue”: at [46]. The primary judge found, as do we, that on a fair reading of its decision the Authority did not address the question of whether exceptional circumstances existed under subpara (a). His Honour inferred, as would we, that the Authority did not think it necessary to consider this limb of s 473DD in light of its conclusion that it was not satisfied as to the requirements under subparas (b)(i) and (ii). However, in our respectful view the primary judge erred in understanding the decision in BVZ16 (later affirmed in BBS16) as providing that he was bound to conclude that the Authority’s failure to consider subpara (a) constitutes jurisdictional error. The present case involves a different question than that before the Court in BVZ16 (as well as BBS16 and CHF16). The question in those cases was whether, on a fair reading of the Authority’s decisions, the confined nature of the Authority’s consideration as to whether exceptional circumstances exist including its failure to consider the narrower matters in subpara (b)(i) and/or (ii), showed that it had misunderstood the breadth of “exceptional circumstances”. As the plurality in Plaintiff M174 acknowledged, what will amount to exceptional circumstances is incapable of exhaustive statement: at [30]. BVZ16 and the subsequent cases stand for the proposition that the matters under subparas (b)(i) and (ii) are potentially relevant in considering whether exceptional circumstances exist under subpara (a), and the Authority had erred in failing to consider them before concluding the requirements in s 473DD(a) were not satisfied. The Minister’s appeal in this case essentially involves the reverse position. CQW17 contends that whether exceptional circumstances exist under subpara (a) was a matter capable of informing the Authority’s decision as to whether the new information was credible personal information pursuant to subpara (b)(ii).