FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
DBJ17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 590
File number(s): SYG 2151 of 2017 Judgment of: JUDGE MANSINI Date of judgment: 1 July 2024 Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection visa – reinstated application for judicial review of decision of Immigration Assessment Authority – where the Authority did not misconstrue the “exceptional circumstances” threshold in deciding not to consider new information not before the delegate – where the Departmental Secretary’s failure to provide certain material to the Authority was material – jurisdictional error established – application allowed with costs. Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss. 36, 65, 473CA, 473CB, 473DA, 473DB, 473DC, 473DD, 473DE, 473EA, 474
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021(Cth) rr.13.06
Cases cited: AUS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] HCA 37
BIJ18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 443
Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58
EVS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 20
Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 75 Date of hearing: 30 April 2024 Place: Sydney Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Chia Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr Knackstredt Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz ORDERS
SYG 2151 of 2017 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: DBJ17
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE MANSINI
DATE OF ORDER:
1 JULY 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the First Respondent be amended in the title of the proceeding to Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs.
2.The application as reinstated on 14 August 2023 is allowed.
3.A writ of certiorari issue bringing the record of the decision of the Second Respondent dated 13 June 2017 in file number IAA16/01363 affirming the decision of a delegate of the First Respondent not to grant the Applicant a protection visa into this Court and quashing it.
4.A writ of mandamus issue directing the Second Respondent to re-determine, according to law, the Applicant’s application to it for review.
5.The First Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs fixed in the amount of $8,371.30.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS…
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- Case
- [2024] FedCFamC2G 590
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the court were whether the IAA misconstrued the threshold for "exceptional circumstances" in s.473DD(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and whether the Departmental Secretary's failure to provide certain material to the IAA constituted a material error affecting the decision. The court also needed to assess whether the IAA provided adequate reasons for its decision, as required by s.473DD(b).
The court found that the IAA did not misconstrue the "exceptional circumstances" threshold, as it was possible to infer from the IAA's reasons that the requisite assessment under s.473DD(b) had occurred. However, the court did identify a jurisdictional error due to the Departmental Secretary's failure to provide certain material to the IAA. This omission was deemed material because it affected the IAA's decision-making process. Consequently, the court allowed the application for judicial review and ordered the Minister to pay the applicant's costs.
The court's decision established that while the IAA is not required to provide a formulaic analysis of the statutory criteria in s.473DD(b), its reasons must be sufficient for a court on judicial review to infer that the necessary assessment has taken place. Furthermore, the court clarified that s.473DD is a procedural power, and the IAA is not obligated to give reasons for its exercise or non-exercise. The case underscores the importance of ensuring that all relevant material is presented to the IAA to prevent jurisdictional errors in its decisions.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Whilst a written statement of the Authority’s decision on review and the reasons for the decision is required, the Authority’s role is not to engage in a “formulaic” analysis of the statutory criterion at s.473DD(b). Depending on the particular circumstances, it may be sufficient if a Court on judicial review is able to infer from the Authority’s reasons that the requisite assessment has occurred: APH17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 23 at [79]. Further, s.473DD is a procedural power and the Authority is therefore not obliged to give reasons for its exercise or non-exercise: BDF17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 401 at [68].Consideration Subject of this first ground was the Applicant’s written submission to the Authority dated 7 December 2016, which included new claims about his son’s involvement with paramilitary groups. Specifically, the alleged error was said to relate to the information contained therein comprising the Applicant’s claims that his son had been forcibly recruited to the LTTE, that the Applicant’s son had escaped and surrendered to the leader of the TMVP who threatened to hand the son over to the Sri Lankan army if he did not help them. The Authority’s written statement canvassed whether to consider the new claims subject of this first ground at [5] to [9] of the Authority’s reasons. There, the Authority commenced by summarising the Applicant’s stated reasons for not providing the new claims during the application process and at the interview with the delegate on 31 August 2016 in terms that he had been afraid to provide his actual claims and evidence during the application process and at the delegate’s interview but was now able to provide the true story: at [5]. The Authority considered the transcript of the Applicant’s entry interview and the other referred materials and recorded its satisfaction that the new claims in the Applicant’s written submission of 7 December 2016 constituted new information: at [6]. The Authority then considered the guidance provided to the Applicant about the procedure and the importance of making full and accurate claims and possible limitation on raising new claims at a later stage, if his application was refused: at [7] and [8]. Further, the opportunity afforded to amend or add to the claims and provide additional information: at [8]. At [9], the Authority concluded, in relation to whether to consider this new information, as follows:I am satisfied that even though the applicant was not represented, the importance of the process was explained clearly and he was given every opportunity to make his claims to the Department. I do not accept the applicant’s explanation of why he did not raise these significant claims before. I am not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering these new claims. As will be apparent from the above, the Authority recorded brief written reasons for not considering the new claims subject of this first ground. That said, in doing so, the Authority did not disclose its reasons for declining to consider the new information subject of this first ground by precise reference to the limbs of ss.473DD(b)(i), (ii) and, in turn, s.473DD(a). On the authority to which the Court was taken in AUS17, there was no obligation on the Authority to do so provided that the Court can discern that the substance of the criteria prescribed by s.473DD(b) has been considered prior to the consideration of whether exceptional circumstances exist for the purposes of s.473DD(a). The inference contemplated in APH17 was not an adverse inference to be drawn on the basis of what is not said, but rather a positive inference to be drawn (that the requisite assessment has occurred) with regard to the substance of the criteria at s.473DD(b).