SZUTM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZUTM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 45

Appeal from: SZUTM v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 1212
File number(s): NSD 766 of 2015
Judge(s): MARKOVIC J
Date of judgment: 5 February 2016
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in failing to consider a claim said to arise on the materials before it – whether the Tribunal constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction – whether the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error for reaching conclusions which were illogical or not supported by evidence
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 438(1), 476
Cases cited:

Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural (2003) 216 CLR 473

Applicant NAFF of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 221 CLR 1

Australasian Meat Employees’ Union v Fair Work Australia (2012) 203 FCR 389

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSWB [2014] FCAFC 106

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No2) (2004) 144 FCR 1

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152

SZSSC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 317 ALR 365

SZTAD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1256

Date of hearing: 18 November 2015
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 76
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr R Chia
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr D Hume
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 766 of 2015
BETWEEN:

SZUTM

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MARKOVIC J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 FEBRUARY 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Appeal dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.

3.The name of the second respondent be changed to “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MARKOVIC J:

  1. This is an appeal from a judgement of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (the Federal Circuit Court) dismissing an application for judicial review pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) (the Tribunal): see SZUTM v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 1212 (SZUTM). The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (the Minister) to refuse to grant a Protection (Class XA) visa to the appellant.

    BACKGROUND

  2. The appellant is a Sri Lankan national of Tamil ethnicity.  On 14 May 2013 she applied…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 45
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SZUTM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved an appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which had upheld a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The appellant, SZUTM, contested the AAT's decision to dismiss her application for a protection visa, arguing that the Tribunal had failed to properly consider a claim arising from her status as a war widow from Sri Lanka. The central issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had fallen into jurisdictional error by not considering this claim, which the appellant argued emerged clearly from established facts.

The court examined whether the Tribunal had constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction by not addressing the claim. The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection contended that the claim was not clearly made and did not arise from established facts. The court agreed with the primary judge that the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) country assessment, which was part of the evidence before the Tribunal, supported its findings that there was no official discrimination against Sri Lankans on ethnic grounds. Although the appellant argued that the DFAT assessment was qualified, the court found that the Tribunal's conclusions were neither illogical nor unsupported by evidence.

In dismissing the appeal, the court held that the Tribunal had not fallen into jurisdictional error. The Minister's submission that the Tribunal should have considered the claim was rejected, as the Guidelines from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) did not unequivocally state that being a war widow was a risk factor for persecution or significant harm. The court concluded that the Tribunal's decision was within its jurisdiction and did not amount to a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the Minister's costs. The name of the second respondent was also corrected to "Administrative Appeals Tribunal."

ORDERS:
1. Appeal dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.
3. The name of the second respondent be changed to “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.

3. The name of the second respondent be changed to “Administrative Appeals Tribunal”.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of SZUTM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection revolves around an appeal from a decision made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The appellant, Ms SZUTM, is a Sri Lankan national who sought protection in Australia. The primary issue is whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) fell into jurisdictional error by not considering a specific claim said to arise from the materials before it. The claim in question pertains to Ms SZUTM's status as a war widow from the north of Sri Lanka and the alleged risk of harm due to her status. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) country assessment, included in the Tribunal's decision, indicated that there were no official laws or policies that discriminated against Sri Lankans, including Tamils, on the basis of ethnicity. It also noted that while people in the north faced challenges, these were due to the effects of conflict and general economic conditions rather than discrimination based on ethnicity.

The matter came before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on appeal from a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The Tribunal had previously reviewed the decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to refuse Ms SZUTM's application for a protection visa. The Tribunal upheld the delegate's decision, finding that Ms SZUTM did not satisfy the criteria for a protection visa. Ms SZUTM appealed this decision to the Federal Circuit Court, arguing that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by failing to consider her claim as a war widow from the north of Sri Lanka. The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection cross-appealed, arguing that the Tribunal did not fall into jurisdictional error. The Federal Circuit Court subsequently dismissed the appeal and ordered that Ms SZUTM pay the costs of the first respondent.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In that regard, it cannot be said that there was no evidence to support the findings complained of at [49] and [59] of the Tribunal's decision. In my view, the primary judge was correct to accept, as he did at [53] of his decision, that the findings were supported by the DFAT country assessment which was extracted and included as attachment B to the Tribunal's decision. That included at [82] that "today there are no official laws or policies that discriminate against Sri Lankans (including Tamils) on the basis of ethnicity …" and that "DFAT further assesses that there is no government-sanctioned discrimination in the implementation of laws and policies". The appellant submits that this evidence was qualified in that it went on to say that people in the north may receive fewer opportunities to access education and employment. However, the relevant part of [82] referred to by the appellant in that regard goes on to say that this is due to "the effects of the conflict" and "general economic conditions, and not as a result of discrimination on the basis of ethnicity". Even if the evidence is "qualified" as the appellant asserts, as the primary judge observes at [53], the fact that there may have been evidence before the Tribunal upon which a different conclusion may have been formed does not mean that the Tribunal fell into error. There was no illogicality in the Tribunal's decision in coming to its findings at [49] and [59] of its decision.CONCLUSION In light of the matters set out above, I will order that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the Minister's submission, the alleged claim did not emerge clearly from established facts. Nor was there any other reason why such a matter should have been considered by the Tribunal. Further, the Minister contends that the primary judge's reasons at [37] are correct because:(1)the claim in question was not clearly made by the appellant, the Tribunal did not accept as a fact that the matters stated at p 33 of the 2012 UNHCR Guidelines were correct, it was not obliged to accept those Guidelines and, in that sense, any claim did not arise from "established facts";(2)the Tribunal had before it DFAT country information, to which it was obliged to have regard, which indicated that the security situation in Sri Lanka had greatly improved since the end of the military conflict and that, while people in the north faced challenges, the cause of those challenges was the effect of the conflicts and general economic conditions. This country information, which the Tribunal was entitled to accept, cut against any contention that war widows remained particularly vulnerable;(3)the UNHCR Guidelines were qualified in their language. They did not state that being a war widow was a risk factor for persecution or significant harm; rather they stated it was a risk factor for "increased insecurity and vulnerability". This is not the clear, unqualified language necessary to classify a claim that clearly or squarely emerges;(4)the delegate did not consider a claim arising from the appellant's status as a widow, nor was such a claim the subject of the delegate's decision. The delegate accepted that young widows were a vulnerable group but then identified why that risk did not apply to the appellant. The appellant did not dispute those findings before the Tribunal;(5)it is not to the point that the Tribunal accepted that the appellant was a widow from the north of Sri Lanka. That would only matter if the Tribunal's satisfaction as to those facts triggered some duty to consider. The appellant does not explain how those facts trigger a duty to consider where the appellant did not in fact contend that those facts gave rise to a risk of harm, the delegate did not consider that those facts gave rise to a risk of harm and no matters accepted by the Tribunal established that those facts gave rise to a risk of harm.Consideration The starting point for consideration of grounds 1 and 2 is the decision in NABE. In that case a Full Court of this Court considered the effect of a failure to deal with a claim. It said at [55]:Although the discussion in S20 did not set any precise limit upon the scope of factual error which may amount to or indicate jurisdictional error there is, in the case of Refugee Review Tribunal decisions, one circumstance in which it is clearly established that the absence of a finding of a relevant fact may amount to jurisdictional error. Where the Tribunal fails to make a finding on “a substantial, clearly articulated argument relying upon established facts” that failure can amount to a failure to accord procedural fairness and a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction: Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 77 ALJR 1088 at [24] per Gummow and Callinan JJ, Hayne J agreeing at [95]….