FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
DBR18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 499
File number: SYG 1641 of 2018 Judgment of: JUDGE D HUMPHREYS Date of judgment: 5 June 2024 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – Protection (Subclass 866) visa – Application for an extension of time – Where the substantive application has no merit - Application dismissed. Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5H, 5J, 36, 476, 477
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) sch 2
Cases cited: Minister for Immigration v Li (2013) 297 ALR 225
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11
Minister for Immigration v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 195
SZRIQ v Federal Magistrates Court of Australia [2013] FCA 1284
SZTSU v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2015] FCA 224
SZUTM v Minister for Immigration and BorderProtection (2016) 241 FCR 214; [2016] FCA 45
WZAVW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 760
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 51 Date of last submission/s: 27 May 2024 Date of hearing: 27 May 2024 Place: Parramatta Solicitor for the Applicant: Applicant appearing in person Solicitor for the Respondents: Clayton Utz ORDERS
SYG 1641 of 2018 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: DBR18
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRA
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE D HUMPHREYS
DATE OF ORDER:
5 JUNE 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Application for an extension of time is refused.
2.The Application is dismissed.
3.The Applicant is to pay the First Respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $4189.38
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE D HUMPHREYS
INTRODUCTION
The applicant is a citizen of Malaysia. The applicant first arrived in Australia on a visitor’s visa on 20 September 2015. The applicant applied for a Protection (Subclass 866) visa (“the visa”) on 16 December 2015.
A delegate of the Minister for Immigration (“the delegate”) refused to grant the visa on 21 April 2016. The applicant sought merits review at the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”). On 25 July 2017, the Tribunal affirmed the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
The applicant now seeks judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision in this Court. For the reasons set out below, the application must be dismissed.
PRELIMINARY ISSUE - APPLICATION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME
The applicant did not apply to this Court for judicial review until…
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- Case
- [2024] FedCFamC2G 499
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court found that the applicant's claims of harm and persecution were not supported by the evidence before the AAT. The applicant had not demonstrated that he had a legitimate fear of returning to Malaysia, as he had arrived in Australia for a holiday and there was no evidence that he had departed Malaysia illegally. The Court also found that the AAT had properly considered the relevant criteria and policy guidelines in reaching its decision. The applicant's claims of legal unreasonableness were therefore rejected, as they were mere assertions without particulars and lacked supporting evidence.
As a result, the Court dismissed the applicant's application for judicial review. The Court found that the AAT's decision was not legally unreasonable, and that the applicant's substantive application for a protection visa had no merit. The Court also noted that the applicant had not demonstrated any real prejudice to the respondent if leave were granted, which slightly favoured the grant of leave. However, the Court ultimately found that the proposed grounds of judicial review were insufficient to establish legal unreasonableness.
In conclusion, the Court dismissed the applicant's application for judicial review and affirmed the AAT's decision to dismiss the applicant's application for an extension of time to lodge a protection visa application. The Court found that the AAT's decision was legally sound and that the applicant's substantive application for a protection visa had no merit. The Court also noted that the applicant's claims of harm and persecution were not supported by the evidence before the AAT, and that the AAT had properly considered the relevant criteria and policy guidelines in reaching its decision.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The first respondent submits that grounds five to eight cannot stand as valid grounds of judicial review. They fail to identify any error on the part of the Tribunal and consist of mere assertions.CONSIDERATION OF THE GROUNDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW The applicant’s grounds of judicial review read as bare assertions of jurisdictional error and allegations towards the Tribunal’s failings to consider the issue of complementary protection in the event the applicant is sent back to Malaysia. There is a lack of supporting evidence in relation to these claims. The applicant contends within ground one that he would suffer significant or serious harm if he is “sent back to Malaysia for leaving Malaysia illegally.” The material before the Court regarding the visa application does not indicate that the applicant held legitimate fears of returning to Malaysia on the basis that he allegedly departed illegally. In his visa application, he stated he arrived in Australia as he wanted to go on a holiday. There is no evidence the applicant departed Malaysia illegally. The Tribunal were not required to consider a claim that was neither expressly made nor squarely arose before it (SZTUM). Ground one has no merit. In relation to grounds two and three, the Court agrees they are mere assertions without particulars. For this reason alone, they are liable for dismissal: (see; WZAVW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 760 at [35]). These grounds in their current form are incapable of a meaningful response by the first respondent. They have no merit. Ground four is an assertion of legal unreasonableness. Unreasonableness is where a decision-maker has come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker could have come to it; (see: Minister for Immigration v Li (2013) 297 ALR 225 (“Li”) at [28]), or where a decision has been made that lacks an “evident and intelligible justification”; (see: Li at [76]). The test for unreasonableness is “stringent” and will only arise in rare cases. Unreasonableness is not a means for challenging a decision on the basis that the Court disagrees with the consideration of matters, or the evaluative judgements made by the decision-maker; (see: Li at [30], [113]). In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11 at [11], Allsop CJ said the following concerning a review of a decision for legal unreasonableness:The task is not definitional but one of characterisation: the decision is to be evaluated, and a conclusion reached as to whether it has the character of being unreasonable, insufficiently lacking rational a foundation, or an evident or intelligible justification, or in being plainly unjust arbitrary capricious or lacking common sense having regard to the terms, scope and purpose of the statutory source of the power, such that it cannot be said to be within the range of possible lawful outcomes as to the exercise of that power. The descriptions of a lack of quality used above are not exhaustive or definitional, they are explanations or explications of legal unreasonableness, of going beyond the source of power.