Australian Postal Corporation v D'Rozario

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Australian Postal Corporation v D’Rozario [2014] FCAFC 89

Citation: Australian Postal Corporation v D’Rozario [2014] FCAFC 89
Appeal from: Fair Work Commission: C2011/6623; and Vice President Lawler of the Fair Work Commission: C2011/6623
Parties: AUSTRALIAN POSTAL CORPORATION v SHANE D'ROZARIO, KRIS CLARKE, MICHAEL BRAMBLEBY and FAIR WORK COMMISSION
File number: VID 1082 of 2013
Judges: BESANKO, JESSUP AND BROMBERG JJ
Date of judgment: 23 July 2014
Corrigenda: 30 October 2014
Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – jurisdictional error – application to quash decision and orders of the Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission – where first and second respondents were granted permission to appeal to Full Bench against decision of Commissioner at first instance with respect to alleged unfair dismissal – where Full Bench must not grant permission to appeal unless it is satisfied  that it is in the public interest to do so – whether there was no evidence to support the decision that it was in the public interest to grant permission to appeal to the first and second respondents – difference between a requirement for the existence of a relevant fact, or a requirement for the decision-maker to hold an opinion, state of satisfaction or belief as to the existence of a relevant fact, as a precondition to the exercise of power –– whether a finding of fact made to satisfy a precondition to the exercise of power in the absence of evidence may be jurisdictional error – meaning of “evidence” with respect to decision of the Fair Work Commission – whether the decision to grant permission to appeal was irrational, illogical or not based on findings or inferences of fact supported by logical grounds – whether an irrational or illogical decision with respect to a precondition to the exercise of power may be jurisdictional error – Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 400, 590, 604, 613.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – jurisdictional error – application to quash decision and orders of the Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission – where third respondent was granted permission to appeal to Full Bench against decision of Commissioner at first instance with respect to appropriate remedy for unfair dismissal – where Full Bench must not grant permission to appeal unless it considers that it is in the public interest to do so – whether Full Bench granted permission to third respondent to appeal without considering whether it was in the public interest to do so – whether the Full Bench failed to identify any error in the reasons of the Commissioner at first instance – Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 400, 604, 613.

Held: The Full Bench did not err in granting permission to appeal to the first and second respondents. Application dismissed insofar as it relates to the first and second respondents. With respect to the third respondent, the Full Bench failed to consider whether it was in the public interest to grant permission to appeal. Application allowed, and decision and orders of the Full Bench…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCAFC 89
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Australian Postal Corporation v D'Rozario involved the Australian Postal Corporation challenging decisions of the Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission. The Full Bench had granted permission for appeals against decisions made by a Commissioner regarding alleged unfair dismissal. The court was required to determine whether the Full Bench had erred in its jurisdictional determinations when granting permission for the appeals. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the Full Bench erred in finding that it was in the public interest to grant permission to appeal for the first and second respondents, and whether it failed to consider the public interest when granting permission to the third respondent.

The court's reasoning began with the statutory framework provided by the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), particularly sections 604, 613, and 607. These sections detail the conditions under which permission to appeal must be granted, and the process for conducting appeals. The court noted that the grant of permission to appeal is a jurisdictional requirement, meaning the Full Bench must consider whether it is in the public interest to grant permission. The court examined the difference between a jurisdictional fact, which a court can independently verify, and a criterion that depends on the decision-maker's opinion. It concluded that the latter case, which depends on the Full Bench's opinion, required the court to assess whether the Full Bench had genuinely formed the requisite opinion in a legally sound manner. The court applied principles from previous cases, such as City of Enfield and Connell, to determine that if the Full Bench's opinion was not formed correctly, it constituted a jurisdictional error.

The court found that the Full Bench did not err in granting permission to appeal for the first and second respondents as there was evidence to support the finding that it was in the public interest. However, it did find error in the Full Bench's decision concerning the third respondent, as the Full Bench had failed to consider whether it was in the public interest to grant permission. Consequently, the application was dismissed in relation to the first and second respondents, while the decision and orders concerning the third respondent were quashed.

ORDERS:
1. A writ of certiorari be issued directed to the Fair Work Commission to quash the decision and orders of the Full Bench and Vice President Lawler, insofar as they relate to matter number U2010/15319.
2. The applicant’s Amended Originating Application For Relief under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) be otherwise dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. A writ of certiorari be issued directed to the fourth respondent (the Fair Work Commission) to quash the decision and orders of:

(a) the Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission made on 28 August 2013 in matter number C2011/6623; and

(b) Vice President Lawler of the Fair Work Commission made on 26 November 2013 in matter number C2011/6623,

insofar as and only insofar as those decisions and orders relate to matter number U2010/15319.

2. The applicant’s Amended Originating Application For Relief under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) be otherwise dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 613(1) provides for how the Full Bench is to proceed in hearing the question of permission to appeal and, if permission is granted, the appeal. It is subject to an exception in s 613(2), but that exception is not relevant for present purposes. Section 613(1) is in the following terms:613 Appeal of Decisions(1)A Full Bench must (except as provided by subsection (2)):(a)decide under section 604 whether to grant permission to appeal a decision; and(b)if the Full Bench decides to grant the permission hear—the appeal in accordance with section 607. Section 607 deals with the conduct of an appeal. Subsection (1) provides for circumstances in which an appeal may be heard without a hearing. Subsection (2) gives the FWC the power to admit further evidence and take into account any other information or evidence. Subsection (3) gives the FWC a range of powers in connection with the disposition of an appeal, including the power to confirm, quash, or vary the decision. The effect of these sections is to make the grant of permission to appeal a precondition to the hearing of an appeal (ss 604(1), 613(1)). Self‑evidently, the hearing of the appeal is a precondition to the exercise of the powers on the appeal including, for example, the power to confirm, quash or vary the decision (s 607(3)). It follows that the grant of permission to appeal is a precondition to the exercise of the appellate power by the FWC. In other words, it is a jurisdictional requirement. In this case, the jurisdictional requirement is that the FWC considers that it is in the public interest to grant permission to appeal. In terms of legal analysis, a convenient starting point is the decision of the High Court in the Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135 (“City of Enfield”). In that case, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ referred (at 149-150, [32]‑[34]) to the difference between a jurisdictional fact and a criterion which turns on a decision‑maker’s opinion or state of satisfaction as to whether a relevant fact or matter exists. In the former case, a party may call evidence on an application for judicial review and a court will decide for itself whether the relevant fact exists. If the court finds that the fact does not exist, then jurisdictional error has been established and, subject to any relevant discretionary considerations, relief will be granted (see Parisienne Basket Shoes Proprietary Limited and Others v Whyte (1938) 59 CLR 369, at 391 per Dixon J (as his Honour then was); Beyazkilinic v Manager, Baxter Immigration Reception and Processing Centre (2006) 155 FCR 465). In the latter case, different grounds of challenge arise. In this case, the Court is concerned with the latter type of case, that is to say, the criterion depends on whether the decision‑maker has formed the view that a particular fact or matter has been established. In The King v Connell; ex parte The Hetton Bellbird Collieries Ltd (1944) 69 CLR 407 (“Connell”), the High Court considered a power in an industrial authority to alter a rate of remuneration where it was satisfied that the rate of remuneration was anomalous. Chief Justice Latham said (at 430 and 432):Thus, where the existence of a particular opinion is made a condition of the exercise of power, legislation conferring the power is treated as referring to an opinion which is such that it can be formed by a reasonable man who correctly understands the meaning of the law under which he acts. If it is shown that the opinion actually formed is not an opinion of this character, then the necessary opinion does not exist. A person acting under a statutory power cannot confer power upon himself by misconstruing the statute which is the source of his power....It is therefore well settled that if a statute provides that a power may be exercised if a person is of a particular opinion, such a provision does not mean that the person may act upon such an opinion if it is shown that he has misunderstood the nature of the opinion which he is to form. Unless such a rule were applied legislation of this character would mean that the person concerned had an absolutely uncontrolled and unlimited discretion with respect to the extent of his jurisdiction and could make orders which had no relation to the matters with which he was authorized to deal. It should be emphasized that the application of the principle now under discussion does not mean that the court substitutes its opinion for the opinion of the person or authority in question. What the court does do is to inquire whether the opinion required by the relevant legislative provision has really been formed. If the opinion which was in fact formed was reached by taking into account irrelevant considerations or by otherwise misconstruing the terms of the relevant legislation, then it must be held that the opinion required has not been formed. In that event the basis for the exercise of power is absent, just as if it were shown that the opinion was arbitrary, capricious, irrational, or not bona fide.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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