Merhi v Commonwealth of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Merhi v Commonwealth of Australia [2021] FCA 181

Review of: Application for Judicial Review:  Linda Merhi v Commonwealth of Australia, represented by Services Australia (formerly the Department of Human Services) [2020] FWCFB 3523
File number: NSD 946 of 2020
Judgment of: KATZMANN J
Date of judgment: 5 March 2021
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW —application for judicial review of decision of Full Bench of Fair Work Commission under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) — where relief only available for jurisdictional error or error of law on the face of the record — whether, in refusing application for permission to appeal from decision of Commission to refuse to extend time to apply for an order granting a remedy for unfair dismissal under s 394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), Full Bench committed reviewable error
Legislation:

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 394, 400, 562, 604, 613(1)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 23

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Cases cited:

Australian Postal Corporation v D’Rozario (2014) 222 FCR 303

Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v ALS Industrial Australia Pty Ltd (2015) 235 FCR 305

Baker v Patrick Projects Pty Ltd (2014) 226 FCR 302

Coal and Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd v Lawler (2011) 192 FCR 78

Coal and Allied Operations Pty Limited v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194

Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Industrial Relations Commission and Another (2007) 157 FCR 260

EnergyAustralia Yallourn Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union and Another: (2014) 218 FCR 316

Ex parte Hebburn Ltd; Re Kearsley Shire Council (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 416

House v King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531

Menzies v Fair Work Commission [2020] FCA 36; 293 IR 301

O’Sullivan v Farrer (1989) 168 CLR 210

Toms v Harbour City Ferries Pty Ltd (2015) 229 FCR 537

Wan v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2001) 116 FCR 481

WZASS v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 19

Division: Fair Work Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Employment and Industrial Relations
Number of paragraphs: 55
Date of hearing: 3 March 2021
Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr M Ayache of OneGroup Legal
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms P Bindon
Solicitor for the Respondents: King & Wood Mallesons

ORDERS

NSD 946 of 2020
BETWEEN:

LINDA MERHI

Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, REPRESENTED BY SERVICES AUSTRALIA

First Respondent

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

KATZMANN J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 MARCH 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

KATZMANN J:

Introduction

  1. Linda Mehri was an employee of Services Australia, an agency of the Commonwealth.  On 23 January 2018 she was taken into custody.  She was held on remand in a maximum…

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Details
Case
[2021] FCA 181
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Merhi v Commonwealth of Australia, the applicant, Ms Merhi, sought judicial review of a decision by the Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission. The Full Bench had refused her application for permission to appeal from the Commission’s decision to refuse to extend the time for her to apply for an order granting a remedy for unfair dismissal. The central legal issues before the court were whether the Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission had committed a reviewable error in refusing Ms Merhi’s application for permission to appeal and whether the Full Bench had erred in its assessment of the factors under section 394(3) of the Fair Work Act 2009.

The court found that the Full Bench had not committed a reviewable error in refusing Ms Merhi’s application for permission to appeal. The court observed that the Full Bench had carefully considered the factors outlined in section 394(3) of the Fair Work Act, including Ms Merhi's awareness of the dismissal, the reason for the delay, action taken to dispute the dismissal, the merits of the application, and the prejudice to the Commonwealth. The Full Bench concluded that the delay following Ms Merhi’s release from custody weighed heavily against her and that there was no acceptable reason to extend the time beyond 15 December 2019. The court accepted the Full Bench’s reasoning and found no error in its assessment of the statutory factors.

As a result of this finding, the court dismissed the application for judicial review. The Full Bench’s decision to refuse permission to appeal was upheld as there was no basis for the court to interfere on the grounds of jurisdictional error or error of law.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

A person who is aggrieved by a decision of the Commission may appeal, but only with the permission of a Full Bench: FW Act, s 604(1) read with s 613(1). Generally speaking, there are no express limitations to the exercise of the discretion to grant permission and the Commission must grant permission if the Commission is satisfied that it is in the public interest to do so: s 604(2). In the case of a decision relating to an unfair dismissal application, however, the rules are different. In such a case, the Commission must not grant permission unless the Commission considers that it is in the public interest to do so: s 400(1). Furthermore, despite s 604(1), to the extent that the appeal is on a question of fact, an appeal from a decision made by the Commission can only be made on the ground that the decision involved a significant error of fact: s 400(2).The original decision The Deputy President dealt with each of the matters listed in s 394(3). On the subject of her awareness of the dismissal (para (b)), he found that Ms Merhi did not become aware of her termination until her release from prison on 23 November 2019. With respect to the reason for delay (para (a)), he considered that even if she had been informed of the termination while she was in prison it would have been “extremely hard, if not completely impossible” for her to have made an application and said he would have had “no difficulty” in granting her an extension of 21 days from the time of her release (that is until 15 December 2019). But the Deputy President found there was “no good reason” for the subsequent delay and “no acceptable reason” to extend the time beyond 15 December 2019. He had regard to evidence about her mental state and accepted that after her release from custody she had difficulty adjusting to life in the community, was poorly motivated, and had withdrawn from day-to-day activities. He discussed the opinion of a psychologist whom Ms Mehri was referred. Nevertheless, the Deputy President concluded that Ms Mehri was not incapacitated from making an application, referring to correspondence with her employer, and noted that she had a lawyer acting for her. He felt that the delay following Ms Mehri’s release from custody weighed heavily against her. On the question of action taken to dispute the dismissal (para (c)), the Deputy President acknowledged that Ms Mehri had contacted her employer in early December 2019 but observed that she did not thereby put the Commonwealth on notice of her intention to make a claim. He said that this circumstance therefore weighed only slightly in her favour. The Deputy President noted that the merits of the application (para (e)) were contested and said that he was therefore unable to find that the application had “significant merit”. For this reason he said that the question of merits was a neutral consideration. He also said that the prejudice to the Commonwealth (para (d)) was a neutral consideration. The Deputy President gave no weight to the final consideration — fairness as between her and others in a similar position (para (f)) — since neither party had made “a material submission on the issue” or referred him to any relevant decision of the Commission where the facts were similar.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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