FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Ittyerah v Coles Supermarkets (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2021] FCA 412
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- Case
- [2021] FCA 412
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the submissions made by Mr Ittyerah regarding the alleged errors made by the Deputy President and the Full Bench. The court found that the Deputy President had properly considered the arguments put by the parties and that none of the factors relied upon by Mr Ittyerah exposed anything other than the Deputy President making various findings considered to be warranted by the facts presented and by the application of accepted legal principles to those facts. The court also found that the Full Bench had properly considered the grounds of appeal and that there was no basis to contend that there had been a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction.
The court dismissed the application and noted that entry of orders was dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application is dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Third, as to the alleged irrelevant consideration in respect of a medical condition, the applicant’s submissions relating to his “state of mind” could reasonably be regarded as a submission that the reasons for delay involved a medical condition, particularly having regard to the applicant’s various claims that he suffered from symptoms of a “psychiatric injury”. In any event, the Deputy President rejected this submission at [21] and therefore the alleged error is of no consequence. This submission was clearly addressed and rejected by the Full Bench.Consideration The applicant’s submissions cannot be accepted. First, it is reasonably apparent that the statement by the Deputy President at [20], that “a conscious decision to file on 14 August 2019, being one day outside the prescribed period”, when read in context of the reasons and material before her, is referring to the fact that the applicant made a conscious decision to prioritise other matters (namely his studies), knowing that the deadline for filing existed. The Deputy President had summarised the applicant’s submissions in this regard in the passages immediately above at [9]-[14], with reference at [11] to the applicant’s submission that he needed to prioritise has examinations. There was plainly evidence in respect to that position. This was one of a number of alleged factual errors addressed in the applicant’s written submission before the Full Bench, although not the focus of his oral submissions before that Bench. It was unnecessary for the Full Bench to expressly refer to the applicant’s argument about this statement, particularly given its meaning as explained above. The Full Bench at [23] did state, inter alia, that the applicant’s “prime reasons for delay were said to be due to his forthcoming examinations and the complexity” of his application, with a reference to the transcript of the hearing before the Deputy President. That passage accurately reflects the transcript, where the applicant submitted that “the primary reasons for delay that [he] has submitted is that he had to prioritise his examinations. He made a conscious decision to prioritise his examinations…because the application was complex he was delayed by one day” in filing it. Second, and aligned with that, the Deputy President did not ignore the applicant’s primary submission for delay being “his ‘state of mind’ caused by a cumulative set of circumstances”. As is apparent from the passage of transcript referred to by the Full Bench, the submission is inconsistent with that advanced before the Deputy President and, at best, is a re-characterisation by him of what occurred below. In any event, as [12]-[13] of the reasons reflect, the Deputy President did consider the applicant’s submission as to his state of mind. Third, again, properly read, the Deputy President did not misconstrue the applicant’s submission by referring to a medical condition at [21]. Nor did she fail to consider the applicant’s submission as a result. Again, it is plain from the recitation by the Deputy President of the applicant’s submission at [12]-[13], that the applicant relied on inter alia, a psychiatric injury. The statements at [21]-[22] are referring to those submissions. That can reasonably be described as a medical condition. In any event, the reasons immediately after the impugned passage reflect that the applicant’s submission made in this regard were lengthy and involved a number of aspects. The Deputy President recognised as much. It was unnecessary to recite all the details of the submission or evidence, as contended by the applicant. The Deputy President observed that the applicant had filed lengthy written submissions and supporting documents in support of his application. The summary as to this factor in the reasons at [9]-[14], albeit brief, accurately reflects the material. Given the reasons of the Deputy President, there is no reason to suggest that her statement immediately following that observation at [4] that she had “given careful consideration to all the material he filed” reflects other than her approach to the application. That the applicant chose to file lengthy material does not necessarily require the reasons to recite all the details contained in that material. The Full Bench addressed the applicant’s submission on both the misstatement and failure to consider his submission, rejecting both contentions at [24]-[25]. No jurisdictional error is established with that conclusion. There is no basis to contend that there has been a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction.