Ittyerah v Coles Supermarkets (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Ittyerah v Coles Supermarkets (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2021] FCA 412  

File number: NSD 212 of 2020
Judgment of: ABRAHAM J
Date of judgment: 23 April 2021
Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW – unfair dismissal – where single member of the Fair Work Commission dismissed application for an extension of time – where Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission dismissed permission to appeal – whether a jurisdictional error was made – whether there was a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction – whether there was an error of law   
Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AB

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1997 (Cth)

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 394, 562

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Cases cited:

Abebe v The Commonwealth of Australia [1999] HCA 14; (1999) 197 CLR 510

Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (Northern Territory) [2009] HCA 41; (2009) 239 CLR 27

Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union v ALS IndustrialAustralia Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 123; (2015) 235 FCR 305

Coal & Allied Mining Services Pty Ltd v Lawler [2011] FCAFC 54; (2011) 192 FCR 78

Flightdeck Geelong Pty Ltd v All Options Pty Ltd [2020] FCAFC 138; (2020) 147 ACSR 227

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344

Ittyerah v Coles Supermarkets (Australia) Pty Ltd [2020] FWCFB 407

Ittyerah v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd [2019] FWC 7404

Linfox Australia Pty Ltd v Fair Work Commission [2013] FCAFC 157; (2013) 240 IR 178

Lodhi v Attorney-General (Cth) [2020] FCA 1383

Menzies v Fair Work Commission [2020] FCA 36; (2020) 293 IR 301

Merhi v Commonwealth of Australia [2021] FCA 181

Miller v DPV Health Ltd [2019] FWC 3979

Miller v DPV Health Ltd [2019] FWCFB 6890

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited [1986] HCA 40; (1986) 162 CLR 24

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259

Morphett v Pearcedale Egg Farm [2015] FWC 8885

Mwango v Fair Work Commission [2019] FCA 1274

Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd [2011] FWAFB 975; (2011) 203 IR 1

NWWJ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 176

Ozsoy v Monstamac Industries Pty Ltd [2014] FWCFB 2149

Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355

R v JS [2007] NSWCCA 272; (2007) 230 FLR 276

Re Bolton; Ex parte Beane [1987] HCA 12; (1987) 162 CLR 514

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; (2017) 262 CLR 362

Trustee for TheMTGI Trust v Johnston [2016] FCAFC 140

WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) FCR 593

Woolworths Ltd vLin [2018] FWCFB 1643; 273 IR 380

Division Fair Work Division
Registry New South Wales
National Practice Area: Employment and…
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Details
Case
[2021] FCA 412
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the court was an application by Mr Ittyerah seeking to appeal the decision of the Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission, which had dismissed his appeal against the decision of a Deputy President of the Fair Work Commission who had refused his application for an extension of time to file an unfair dismissal application. The primary issue for the court was whether the Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission made a jurisdictional error or a constructive failure to exercise its jurisdiction in dismissing Mr Ittyerah’s appeal. The Full Bench had concluded that the grounds of appeal were not sufficiently arguable and that there was no substantial injustice that may result if permission to appeal was refused.

The court considered the submissions made by Mr Ittyerah regarding the alleged errors made by the Deputy President and the Full Bench. The court found that the Deputy President had properly considered the arguments put by the parties and that none of the factors relied upon by Mr Ittyerah exposed anything other than the Deputy President making various findings considered to be warranted by the facts presented and by the application of accepted legal principles to those facts. The court also found that the Full Bench had properly considered the grounds of appeal and that there was no basis to contend that there had been a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction.

The court dismissed the application and noted that entry of orders was dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons below the application is refused.Factual background As noted above, the applicant was employed by the respondent as a store cleaner from September 2015 until he was dismissed on 22 July 2019, which took effect from 23 July 2019. The applicant was dismissed for performance and conduct issues, including failing to follow lawful and reasonable directions to attend meetings with his line manager, failing to attend a medical assessment and for directing foul language towards his manager. The applicant takes issue with those assertions, and the underlying claim to which the extension of time is sought relates to those matters. Although the applicant is unrepresented in these proceedings, as he was in the FWC, he gave evidence in the FWC that he was a qualified legal practitioner in India, and is undertaking the Diploma in Law course administered by the Legal Profession Admission Board to qualify for admission to practice in Australia. On 22 July 2019, after his termination, the applicant wrote an email to his area manager stating that he would “file an appropriate action with the Fair Work Commission within the statutory time frame seeking reinstatement and back pay”. On 14 August 2019, the applicant filed an unfair dismissal application pursuant to s 394 of the FW Act, which was one day outside of the prescribed 21 day period. An explanation for that delay was provided in his application to the FWC: I have been delayed by one (1) day in making the application.I have two examinations of the Legal Profession Admission Board Diploma in Law (for the subjects ‘Commercial Transactions’ and ‘Law of Evidence’) in the first week of September. I have been significantly delayed in studying for these exams due to disciplinary proceedings commenced by Coles Supermarkets (Australia) Pty Ltd, including delays due to the time spent in responding to the allegations and issuing notices to retain CCTV footage and other evidence. I had to prioritize finishing some part of my studies before I could focus on this unfair dismissal application. If I fail or do not take an exam, it will result in the course fees and time / costs of 6 months being wasted and will delay the completion of the course by 6 months.Further, I am not an expert in employment law. It has been time consuming to go through the relevant employment law aspects relating to this complaint of unfair dismissal and applying the law to a complex set of facts so that I can make a coherent and legally sound application. On 26 August 2019, the respondent filed a response in which it objected to the applicant’s application on the ground that it was out of time. Various procedural steps were undertaken. On 18 September 2019, the FWC wrote to the applicant referring to his need to seek an extension of time and invited him to provide a written statement explaining any relevant exceptional circumstances. In response to this request, on 24 September 2019, the applicant filed a written statement. On 13 October 2019, the applicant filed a witness statement which provided further information in support of his application for an extension of time. On 15 October 2019, the applicant filed an outline of submissions in support of his application for an extension of time. On 18 October 2019, the respondent filed an outline of submissions in response. On 25 October 2019, the applicant filed an outline of submissions in reply. On 28 October 2019, the application for an extension of time was heard before Deputy President Dean. On 14 November 2019, the Deputy President dismissed the applicant’s application. On 4 December 2019, the applicant filed a notice of appeal.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Having considered all the matters she was directed to by the FW Act, the Deputy President concluded at [39] that the applicant’s circumstances considered individually and together were not exceptional. The extension of time was accordingly refused. Decision of the Full Bench The Full Bench commenced its reasons by detailing the chronology of events at [1]-[4] and summarising the reasons of the Deputy President at [5]-[12]. The Full Bench identified the grounds of appeal and pithily summarised an overview of the applicant’s claims at [13]-[15]. The Full Bench identified its task at [16]-[22]. I note the applicant does not appear to challenge this summary. The Full Bench then addressed the grounds of appeal at [23]-[43]. As to the factor of delay, the Full Bench concluded at [23]:Regarding the reasons for delay, we do not accept, as was put by Mr Ittyerah, that there is any arguable case of appealable error, let alone significant factual error, that the Deputy President misconstrued the applicant’s reasons for the delay. Mr Ittyerah’s prime reasons for his delay were said to be due to his forthcoming examinations and the complexity of his unfair dismissal application. These reasons were addressed by the Deputy President and were found not to favour a finding of exceptional circumstances. The Full Bench then analysed the reasons at [24]-[27]. The issue of the applicant’s awareness of the dismissal is addressed at [28]-[32]. Whether any action had been taken is addressed at [33]-[34]. Prejudice to the employer is addressed at [35]-[38]. The issue of the merits of the application is addressed at [39]-[41]. The issue of a person in a similar position is dealt with at [42]. There was also an allegation of bias against the Deputy President, on which the Full Bench concluded at [43]:Finally, Mr Ittyerah submits that the Deputy President’s decision reflects actual or apprehended bias. We consider that the Deputy President properly considered the arguments put by the parties. None of the factors relied upon by Mr Ittyerah exposes anything other than the Deputy President making various findings considered to be warranted by the facts presented and by the application of accepted legal principles to those facts. The fact that the Deputy President’s decision was adverse to Mr Ittyerah and he does not agree with it does not demonstrate actual or apprehended bias. Finally, on the issue of public interest, the Full Bench concluded at [44]:Having regard to what Mr Ittyerah has put regarding the public interest of his appeal, we do not consider that permission to appeal in this matter should be granted. This is because the grounds of appeal are not sufficiently arguable. We do not consider that his appeal raises any issue of importance or general application, or that there is any relevant disharmony in first instance decisions that requires resolution at the appellate level. Nor are we persuaded that a substantial injustice may result if permission to appeal is refused.Section 394(3) of the FW Act

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Third, as to the alleged irrelevant consideration in respect of a medical condition, the applicant’s submissions relating to his “state of mind” could reasonably be regarded as a submission that the reasons for delay involved a medical condition, particularly having regard to the applicant’s various claims that he suffered from symptoms of a “psychiatric injury”. In any event, the Deputy President rejected this submission at [21] and therefore the alleged error is of no consequence. This submission was clearly addressed and rejected by the Full Bench.Consideration The applicant’s submissions cannot be accepted. First, it is reasonably apparent that the statement by the Deputy President at [20], that “a conscious decision to file on 14 August 2019, being one day outside the prescribed period”, when read in context of the reasons and material before her, is referring to the fact that the applicant made a conscious decision to prioritise other matters (namely his studies), knowing that the deadline for filing existed. The Deputy President had summarised the applicant’s submissions in this regard in the passages immediately above at [9]-[14], with reference at [11] to the applicant’s submission that he needed to prioritise has examinations. There was plainly evidence in respect to that position. This was one of a number of alleged factual errors addressed in the applicant’s written submission before the Full Bench, although not the focus of his oral submissions before that Bench. It was unnecessary for the Full Bench to expressly refer to the applicant’s argument about this statement, particularly given its meaning as explained above. The Full Bench at [23] did state, inter alia, that the applicant’s “prime reasons for delay were said to be due to his forthcoming examinations and the complexity” of his application, with a reference to the transcript of the hearing before the Deputy President. That passage accurately reflects the transcript, where the applicant submitted that “the primary reasons for delay that [he] has submitted is that he had to prioritise his examinations. He made a conscious decision to prioritise his examinations…because the application was complex he was delayed by one day” in filing it. Second, and aligned with that, the Deputy President did not ignore the applicant’s primary submission for delay being “his ‘state of mind’ caused by a cumulative set of circumstances”. As is apparent from the passage of transcript referred to by the Full Bench, the submission is inconsistent with that advanced before the Deputy President and, at best, is a re-characterisation by him of what occurred below. In any event, as [12]-[13] of the reasons reflect, the Deputy President did consider the applicant’s submission as to his state of mind. Third, again, properly read, the Deputy President did not misconstrue the applicant’s submission by referring to a medical condition at [21]. Nor did she fail to consider the applicant’s submission as a result. Again, it is plain from the recitation by the Deputy President of the applicant’s submission at [12]-[13], that the applicant relied on inter alia, a psychiatric injury. The statements at [21]-[22] are referring to those submissions. That can reasonably be described as a medical condition. In any event, the reasons immediately after the impugned passage reflect that the applicant’s submission made in this regard were lengthy and involved a number of aspects. The Deputy President recognised as much. It was unnecessary to recite all the details of the submission or evidence, as contended by the applicant. The Deputy President observed that the applicant had filed lengthy written submissions and supporting documents in support of his application. The summary as to this factor in the reasons at [9]-[14], albeit brief, accurately reflects the material. Given the reasons of the Deputy President, there is no reason to suggest that her statement immediately following that observation at [4] that she had “given careful consideration to all the material he filed” reflects other than her approach to the application. That the applicant chose to file lengthy material does not necessarily require the reasons to recite all the details contained in that material. The Full Bench addressed the applicant’s submission on both the misstatement and failure to consider his submission, rejecting both contentions at [24]-[25]. No jurisdictional error is established with that conclusion. There is no basis to contend that there has been a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction.