Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte MIAH

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
GAUDRON, McHUGH, KIRBY AND HAYNE JJ

RE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS & ANOR  RESPONDENTS

EX PARTE MD ATAUL HAQUE MIAH   PROSECUTOR

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah
[2001] HCA 22
3 May 2001
S199/1999

ORDER

1.   Order absolute for a writ of prohibition directed to the first respondent prohibiting him from acting upon or giving effect to or proceeding further upon the decision of the first respondent by his delegate the second respondent dated 13 May 1997.

2.   Order absolute for a writ of certiorari directed to the first and second respondents to quash the decision of the first respondent by his delegate the second respondent dated 13 May 1997.

3. Order absolute for a writ of mandamus directed to the first respondent requiring him to determine the prosecutor's application for a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) according to law.

4.   First respondent to pay the costs of the prosecutor.

Representation:

P Roberts SC with T Reilly for the first respondent (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

No appearance for the second respondent

J Basten QC with D H Godwin for the prosecutor (instructed by Ron Kessels)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. GLEESON CJ AND HAYNE J.   The prosecutor is a citizen of Bangladesh.  He entered Australia on 9 March 1996.  On 1 April 1996 he applied to the first respondent ("the Minister") for a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act"). By virtue of s 65 of the Act, he was entitled to such a visa if the Minister was satisfied that the criteria for such a visa had been satisfied. The relevant criterion was whether the prosecutor was a person to whom Australia had protection obligations under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol ("the Convention"). That, in turn, depended upon whether he had a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, if he returned to Bangladesh. The task of dealing with the application was delegated to the second respondent ("the delegate"). On 13 May 1997 the delegate refused the application.

  2. The Act provided for a merits review of such a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal"). The prosecutor had retained a firm of solicitors, in May 1996, to act for him in relation to his immigration matters. The firm, on 29 May 1996, advised him about a number of matters, including the protection visa application he had already lodged. Between May 1996 and May 1997 the solicitors took various steps on the prosecutor's behalf, including obtaining access to certain folios from his immigration file. On 23 May 1997 the prosecutor instructed his solicitors to apply to the Tribunal for a review of the delegate's decision. The solicitors prepared a form of…

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Details
Case
[2001] HCA 22
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an application for constitutional writs by Mr Md Ataul Haque Miah against the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and his delegate. The dispute arose from the delegate's decision to reject Mr Miah's application for a protection visa, which Mr Miah alleged was made in denial of procedural fairness and without applying the correct legal test.

The primary legal issues before the Court were whether the delegate's failure to provide Mr Miah with an opportunity to comment on a change of circumstances constituted a denial of procedural fairness, and whether the relevant provisions of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) created a code that excluded such procedural fairness requirements. Additionally, the Court was asked to determine if the delegate had constructively failed to exercise jurisdiction by failing to apply the correct test for assessing the protection visa application.

The Court reasoned that the constitutional writs available under s 75(v) of the Constitution are discretionary remedies, but where a want or excess of jurisdiction is established, prohibition will issue almost as of right. The Court found that the delegate's decision was flawed due to a denial of procedural fairness, specifically the failure to afford Mr Miah an opportunity to respond to adverse information that had come to light regarding changed political circumstances in Bangladesh. The delegate's reasoning, which relied on the ousting of the BNP government and the reduced parliamentary representation of the fundamentalist party, constituted a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction because it did not adequately address Mr Miah's specific claims and fears in light of the delegate's own findings of past harassment and the historical alliance between the BNP and fundamentalists. Despite the significant delay in prosecuting the application, the Court determined that discretionary considerations favoured granting relief, partly due to delays attributable to the Minister's department.

Consequently, the High Court made absolute orders for writs of prohibition, certiorari, and mandamus. Prohibition was directed to prevent the Minister from acting on the delegate's decision, certiorari was issued to quash that decision, and mandamus required the Minister to determine Mr Miah's protection visa application according to law. The Minister was also ordered to pay Mr Miah's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Order absolute for a writ of prohibition directed to the first respondent prohibiting him from acting upon or giving effect to or proceeding further upon the decision of the first respondent by his delegate the second respondent dated 13 May 1997.

2. Order absolute for a writ of certiorari directed to the first and second respondents to quash the decision of the first respondent by his delegate the second respondent dated 13 May 1997.

3. Order absolute for a writ of mandamus directed to the first respondent requiring him to determine the prosecutor's application for a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) according to law.

4. First respondent to pay the costs of the prosecutor.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

GLEESON CJ HAYNE J GAUDRON J
He answered that question partly by reference to then current political circumstances. He said he believed that the political group in power, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), was in league with fundamentalists. He set out some of the history of its relationship with Jamat-i-Islam. He said the BNP would not provide protection to a prejudice-free, progressive-minded, person like him. The fundamentalists regarded him as an atheist who had no right to live in a Muslim country. He said he was definite that the present government (the BNP) could not and would not protect him. The delegate's reasons for decision Because of the nature of the grounds upon which the prosecutor relies, it is desirable to set out in full the delegate's reasons for refusing the application for a protection visa. After referring to the prosecutor's claim that he feared Convention-based persecution if he returned to Bangladesh, the delegate went on: "3.1To be well founded, there must be a real chance of persecution should the applicant be returned to Bangladesh.3.2Claims3.2.1The applicant's father was a progressive, unorthodox and cultural minded person. His belief did not please the fundamentalists and his family was harassed. During the War of Independence, he was murdered by a group composed of fundamentalists and people opposed to independence.3.2.2The applicant was brought up according to the ideas and beliefs of his late father. In school, he became involved with cultural organisations. When he was in year 9, he became the organiser of the literary and cultural functions of the school. On one occasion, his group clashed with the student wing of the Jamat-i-Islam Party. It was this party who was responsible for his father's death.3.2.3The applicant became involved in cultural presentations and he tried to educate the people through the theatre. Through a theatrical group, he staged dramas critical of the fundamentalists and the anti-independence people who were still influential in the society. He also protested through artistic forms against the teachings of the Mullahs. This invited the ire of the fundamentalists and many attempts were made on the applicant's life.3.2.4The applicant went to Dhaka and took a job in a film making organisation. The fundamentalists traced his presence in Dhaka and a hand made bomb was hurled in his office. The office was damaged and the owner of the company politely asked him to quit his job.3.2.5Because of threats from the fundamentalists and their party, the Jamat-i-Islam, the applicant went to Thailand in September 1993. In December 1995, he returned to Bangladesh but was constantly in clash with the fundamentalists. He soon married a Hindu lady. The Muslim Mullahs became furious at him and he and his wife were given 101 lashes each. The pair were given seven days to leave the village or else they will [sic] be killed.3.2.6The applicant cannot expect protection from the authorities as the fundamentalists were in alliance with the BNP government. It was a BNP leader who established a state religion and who restored the citizenship of a fundamentalist leader.3.3Specific evidence3.3.1In making my assessment, I considered the following material:All materials in Part B.3.4Reasons3.4.1I accept that the applicant may have experienced harassment from the Muslim fundamentalists. I also accept that the BNP government may have some form of an alliance with the fundamentalists. However, during the recent elections, the BNP government was ousted from power and the party which the applicant described as pro-independence, the Awami League, took over. More significantly, the fundamentalist party only managed to retain a few seats in the Parliament and their popular vote dropped in comparison to what they got during the previous elections.3.4.2The electoral loss of the fundamentalist political party during the last elections is viewed as an indication that the people in Bangladesh are basically religious moderates who shun the radical brand of Islam (evidence 6). This suggests that Bangladeshis in general are tolerant and that the extremists whom the applicant fears make up a tiny minority of the population.3.4.3The Bangladeshi Constitution provides for the right to practice the religion of one's choice. The current government respects this provision in practice (evidence 4). While the government has reportedly failed at times to denounce, investigate or prosecute the Islamic extremist attacks on religious minorities and women, there is no indication that it is totally powerless to stop those violations of other people's rights. The current government can still be said to be capable of offering persons like the applicant effective protection against the religious fundamentalists.3.5Findings of fact3.5.1I find that Mr Md Ataul Haque Miah does not have a real chance of Convention based persecution if returned to Bangladesh and that his fear of persecution on return is consequently not well founded.PART D CONCLUSION – PROTECTION OBLIGATIONS NOT IDENTIFIED4.1I find that Mr Md Ataul Haque Miah is not a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as there is not a real chance of Convention based persecution if he is returned to Bangladesh and that his fear of persecution on return is consequently not well founded."

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GLEESON CJ, HAYNE J, GAUDRON J

This expression of the availability of the constitutional writs referred to in s 75(v) makes it unnecessary, in these proceedings, to explore this issue any further. Unless denied relief for a discretionary reason, the prosecutor is entitled to have the order nisi made absolute.Discretionary considerations favour relief The Minister submitted that, even if all, or a sufficient number, of the foregoing issues were decided in favour of the prosecutor, this Court should refuse relief in the exercise of its discretion. Principally, this submission was based upon the great delay in prosecuting the application in this Court. Time began to run when the prosecutor was first notified of the decision of the delegate. This was no later than 23 May 1997 when the prosecutor met his then solicitor whom he instructed to lodge his "appeal" to the Tribunal. As the proceedings in this Court were not commenced for a further two and a half years, the Minister argued that the order nisi should be discharged to emphasise that such remedies must be invoked quickly. He submitted that, in effect, the prosecutor was seeking to repair his failure to follow the ordinary form of review contemplated by the Act. Even when it became clear that he had failed to apply to the Tribunal in time for such review, additional substantial and unnecessary delay had ensued. The recent decision in Aala establishes that, whatever may have been the differential availability of the prerogative writs of prohibition and mandamus in English law, the writs provided by s 75(v) of the Constitution are discretionary remedies[183]. It is equally clear, as stated by Gibbs CJ in R v Ross‑Jones; Ex parte Green[184], that where a party aggrieved establishes a want or excess of jurisdiction, the writ of prohibition will issue "almost as of right". This dictum was approved in Aala[185]. This Court therefore retains a discretion to grant or refuse relief. However, it is a discretion to be exercised judicially, with a clear appreciation that the constitutional remedy exists not simply to uphold the private rights of the party invoking it but also to ensure obedience to the law by officers of the Commonwealth, which is a matter of wider concern.[183]Aala (2000) 75 ALJR 52 at 54 [5] per Gleeson CJ, 64‑65 [54] per Gaudron and Gummow JJ, 81‑82 [145]‑[148] of my own reasons, 86 [172] per Hayne J, 93 [217] per Callinan J; 176 ALR 219 at 221, 236, 259, 265, 275.[184](1984) 156 CLR 185 at 194.[185](2000) 75 ALJR 52 at 54 [5]‑[6] per Gleeson CJ, 64 [51] per Gaudron and Gummow JJ, 82 [149] of my own reasons; 176 ALR 219 at 221, 235, 259‑260. There has been an extremely long delay in the finalisation of the prosecutor's application under the Act. However, a considerable period of the lost time should be levelled at the Minister. Even before the delegate reached the decision that is now challenged, thirteen and a half months passed whilst the primary application was being processed. A further eight months elapsed before the prosecutor was informed that the first request to file an application under s 48B was refused. An additional eight months elapsed whilst the second request was considered and before it was ultimately denied. In such circumstances, I do not consider the entire delay can be blamed on the prosecutor's side, still less on the prosecutor personally[186].[186]Comcare v A'Hearn (1993) 45 FCR 441.