HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GLEESON CJ,
GAUDRON, McHUGH, KIRBY AND HAYNE JJRE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS & ANOR RESPONDENTSEX PARTE MD ATAUL HAQUE MIAH PROSECUTOR
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah
[2001] HCA 22
3 May 2001
S199/1999ORDER
1. Order absolute for a writ of prohibition directed to the first respondent prohibiting him from acting upon or giving effect to or proceeding further upon the decision of the first respondent by his delegate the second respondent dated 13 May 1997.
2. Order absolute for a writ of certiorari directed to the first and second respondents to quash the decision of the first respondent by his delegate the second respondent dated 13 May 1997.
3. Order absolute for a writ of mandamus directed to the first respondent requiring him to determine the prosecutor's application for a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) according to law.
4. First respondent to pay the costs of the prosecutor.
Representation:
P Roberts SC with T Reilly for the first respondent (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
No appearance for the second respondent
J Basten QC with D H Godwin for the prosecutor (instructed by Ron Kessels)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
GLEESON CJ AND HAYNE J. The prosecutor is a citizen of Bangladesh. He entered Australia on 9 March 1996. On 1 April 1996 he applied to the first respondent ("the Minister") for a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act"). By virtue of s 65 of the Act, he was entitled to such a visa if the Minister was satisfied that the criteria for such a visa had been satisfied. The relevant criterion was whether the prosecutor was a person to whom Australia had protection obligations under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol ("the Convention"). That, in turn, depended upon whether he had a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, if he returned to Bangladesh. The task of dealing with the application was delegated to the second respondent ("the delegate"). On 13 May 1997 the delegate refused the application.
The Act provided for a merits review of such a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal"). The prosecutor had retained a firm of solicitors, in May 1996, to act for him in relation to his immigration matters. The firm, on 29 May 1996, advised him about a number of matters, including the protection visa application he had already lodged. Between May 1996 and May 1997 the solicitors took various steps on the prosecutor's behalf, including obtaining access to certain folios from his immigration file. On 23 May 1997 the prosecutor instructed his solicitors to apply to the Tribunal for a review of the delegate's decision. The solicitors prepared a form of…
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- Case
- [2001] HCA 22
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the Court were whether the delegate's failure to provide Mr Miah with an opportunity to comment on a change of circumstances constituted a denial of procedural fairness, and whether the relevant provisions of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) created a code that excluded such procedural fairness requirements. Additionally, the Court was asked to determine if the delegate had constructively failed to exercise jurisdiction by failing to apply the correct test for assessing the protection visa application.
The Court reasoned that the constitutional writs available under s 75(v) of the Constitution are discretionary remedies, but where a want or excess of jurisdiction is established, prohibition will issue almost as of right. The Court found that the delegate's decision was flawed due to a denial of procedural fairness, specifically the failure to afford Mr Miah an opportunity to respond to adverse information that had come to light regarding changed political circumstances in Bangladesh. The delegate's reasoning, which relied on the ousting of the BNP government and the reduced parliamentary representation of the fundamentalist party, constituted a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction because it did not adequately address Mr Miah's specific claims and fears in light of the delegate's own findings of past harassment and the historical alliance between the BNP and fundamentalists. Despite the significant delay in prosecuting the application, the Court determined that discretionary considerations favoured granting relief, partly due to delays attributable to the Minister's department.
Consequently, the High Court made absolute orders for writs of prohibition, certiorari, and mandamus. Prohibition was directed to prevent the Minister from acting on the delegate's decision, certiorari was issued to quash that decision, and mandamus required the Minister to determine Mr Miah's protection visa application according to law. The Minister was also ordered to pay Mr Miah's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Order absolute for a writ of prohibition directed to the first respondent prohibiting him from acting upon or giving effect to or proceeding further upon the decision of the first respondent by his delegate the second respondent dated 13 May 1997.
2. Order absolute for a writ of certiorari directed to the first and second respondents to quash the decision of the first respondent by his delegate the second respondent dated 13 May 1997.
3. Order absolute for a writ of mandamus directed to the first respondent requiring him to determine the prosecutor's application for a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) according to law.
4. First respondent to pay the costs of the prosecutor.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GLEESON CJ, HAYNE J, GAUDRON J
This expression of the availability of the constitutional writs referred to in s 75(v) makes it unnecessary, in these proceedings, to explore this issue any further. Unless denied relief for a discretionary reason, the prosecutor is entitled to have the order nisi made absolute.Discretionary considerations favour relief The Minister submitted that, even if all, or a sufficient number, of the foregoing issues were decided in favour of the prosecutor, this Court should refuse relief in the exercise of its discretion. Principally, this submission was based upon the great delay in prosecuting the application in this Court. Time began to run when the prosecutor was first notified of the decision of the delegate. This was no later than 23 May 1997 when the prosecutor met his then solicitor whom he instructed to lodge his "appeal" to the Tribunal. As the proceedings in this Court were not commenced for a further two and a half years, the Minister argued that the order nisi should be discharged to emphasise that such remedies must be invoked quickly. He submitted that, in effect, the prosecutor was seeking to repair his failure to follow the ordinary form of review contemplated by the Act. Even when it became clear that he had failed to apply to the Tribunal in time for such review, additional substantial and unnecessary delay had ensued. The recent decision in Aala establishes that, whatever may have been the differential availability of the prerogative writs of prohibition and mandamus in English law, the writs provided by s 75(v) of the Constitution are discretionary remedies[183]. It is equally clear, as stated by Gibbs CJ in R v Ross‑Jones; Ex parte Green[184], that where a party aggrieved establishes a want or excess of jurisdiction, the writ of prohibition will issue "almost as of right". This dictum was approved in Aala[185]. This Court therefore retains a discretion to grant or refuse relief. However, it is a discretion to be exercised judicially, with a clear appreciation that the constitutional remedy exists not simply to uphold the private rights of the party invoking it but also to ensure obedience to the law by officers of the Commonwealth, which is a matter of wider concern.[183]Aala (2000) 75 ALJR 52 at 54 [5] per Gleeson CJ, 64‑65 [54] per Gaudron and Gummow JJ, 81‑82 [145]‑[148] of my own reasons, 86 [172] per Hayne J, 93 [217] per Callinan J; 176 ALR 219 at 221, 236, 259, 265, 275.[184](1984) 156 CLR 185 at 194.[185](2000) 75 ALJR 52 at 54 [5]‑[6] per Gleeson CJ, 64 [51] per Gaudron and Gummow JJ, 82 [149] of my own reasons; 176 ALR 219 at 221, 235, 259‑260. There has been an extremely long delay in the finalisation of the prosecutor's application under the Act. However, a considerable period of the lost time should be levelled at the Minister. Even before the delegate reached the decision that is now challenged, thirteen and a half months passed whilst the primary application was being processed. A further eight months elapsed before the prosecutor was informed that the first request to file an application under s 48B was refused. An additional eight months elapsed whilst the second request was considered and before it was ultimately denied. In such circumstances, I do not consider the entire delay can be blamed on the prosecutor's side, still less on the prosecutor personally[186].[186]Comcare v A'Hearn (1993) 45 FCR 441.