Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte P T
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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
KIRBY J
RE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS RESPONDENT
EX PARTE P T APPLICANT
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte P T [2001] HCA 20 7 March 2001 P2/2001
ORDER
Application dismissed with costs.
Representation:
M T Ritter for the respondent (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
H N H Christie for the applicant (instructed by Henry Christie)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
KIRBY J. Yet another case is before this Court, in part because of restrictions imposed by the Parliament on access by applicants for refugee status to the Federal Court of Australia[1].
[1]See Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham(2000) 74 ALJR 405 at 407-408 [7]-[15]; 168 ALR 407 at 409‑411; Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala(2000) 75 ALJR 52 at 77 [124]; 176 ALR 219 at 253.
The course of the proceedings
Mrs P T ("the applicant") seeks the making of an order nisi for the constitutional writ of prohibition and an associated writ of certiorari to render prohibition effective. Because of an expressed concern of retaliation against her were this application refused, a request was made that she be identified only by initials. The Australian public has no interest in knowing her identity. I therefore agreed to that request. The applicant will be so described. There may be a problem with respect to the applicant's request for the writ of certiorari in that the delegate has not been named as a party to the proceedings[2]. However, I pass that technical problem by for the application has larger problems to which I must now refer.
[2]cf Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah unreported, High Court of Australia, 17 January 2000, transcript of proceedings at 5, line 155 per McHugh J.
The applicant claims relief against the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs ("the Minister"). She does so on the basis that the Minister, acting under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act"), by his delegate, failed to accord the applicant natural justice in the making of a decision on 11 July 2000 and otherwise in making a decision which involved jurisdictional error of law. On that day the delegate decided that the applicant should be denied refugee status. She refused the applicant a protection visa.
Normally, following rejection of such relief by a delegate, a disappointed applicant could seek review before the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal"). The Tribunal could then hear the application on its merits and substitute its own decision for that of the primary decision-maker[3]. By s 425 of the Act, the Tribunal is obliged to conduct a hearing at which the applicant has an opportunity to be heard. It must do so unless the Tribunal has decided to make a determination in favour of the applicant.
[3]The Act, s 415.
By a series of misadventures, explained in the evidence,…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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This matter concerned an application by P T, a national of Sri Lanka of Tamil ethnicity, for a protection visa. P T arrived in Australia on a visitor's visa and subsequently applied for a protection visa, claiming she was a refugee due to experiences in Sri Lanka, including fear of extortion by criminals and lack of protection by authorities due to her race. The Minister's delegate refused the application, finding that the fear of extortion was not a Convention reason and that P T had not demonstrated a genuine fear of persecution. P T sought judicial review of this decision, arguing, among other things, that the delegate's failure to afford her an interview breached the rules of natural justice. The case was heard by Kirby J in the High Court of Australia.
The primary legal issues before the Court were whether the Minister's delegate breached the rules of natural justice by failing to grant P T an interview, and whether this failure, or any other aspect of the delegate's decision-making process, deprived the delegate of jurisdiction to make the decision, thereby warranting the issue of a constitutional writ of prohibition. Additionally, the Court considered whether P T's asserted fear of extortion by criminals and lack of protection from authorities due to her race constituted a fear of persecution for a Convention reason under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and the Refugees Convention, and whether such a fear had been proven.
Kirby J determined that while there was no statutory obligation for the delegate to conduct an interview, evidence suggested it was the normal practice to afford applicants such an opportunity. However, his Honour found that the applicant had not established a reasonably arguable case that the failure to interview her amounted to a breach of the common law rules of natural justice in the context of the legislative framework. The Court also considered the applicant's claims of fear, noting that the delegate had accepted her claims at face value but found them inconsistent with a genuine fear of persecution, particularly given her ability to travel and the delay in her application. His Honour concluded that the applicant had not demonstrated a reasonably arguable case for the grant of an order nisi for a constitutional writ.
The application was dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Application dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
The principle governing the issue of an order nisi is not in doubt. If the applicant can show a reasonably arguable case, she is entitled to the relief that she seeks[5]. The question is, therefore, whether her case falls within that class.[5]Re Carmody; Ex parte Glennan (2000) 74 ALJR 1148 at 1149-1150 [2]-[5]; 173 ALR 145 at 146-147.The facts In support of the applicant's case three affidavits were read. These were, first, an affidavit of the applicant herself; secondly, an affidavit of the applicant's solicitor, Mr Henry Christie (who appeared before the Court on her behalf), and, thirdly, an affidavit by Ms Vanessa Moss, also a solicitor who works with Legal Aid in Perth. For the Minister an affidavit by Mr P J Corbould was read. Reference will be made to that affidavit later. From these affidavits the following facts emerge. The applicant is a national of Sri Lanka. She is of Tamil ethnicity. She arrived in Australia on 7 May 1999 to visit her daughter who lives in this country. She travelled to Australia on a visitor's visa. The visitor's visa was valid for a year. Two days short of the expiry of that year, namely on 5 May 2000, the applicant made an application for a protection visa. She claimed that Australia owed her obligations under the Act and pursuant to the Refugees Convention which is relevantly incorporated into Australian law by force of the Act[6]. She claimed that she was a refugee. [6]The Act, s 36(2) referring to the Refugees Convention: the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951, (1954) Australia Treaty Series No 5 (entered into force 22 April 1954) ("the Refugees Convention"). The applicant complained of experiences which she said she had undergone in Sri Lanka as a member of the Tamil community during and after racial riots which broke out there in 1983. She claimed to have been a victim of those riots. She said that they had forced her to flee from the capital, Colombo, where she lived to take refuge in Jaffna, an area to the north of the island where there is an ethnic Tamil majority. Subsequently, the applicant returned to Colombo for her daughter's wedding. She became stranded there after fresh fighting broke out. Thereafter, she claimed to have spent time travelling between Sri Lanka, India, the Maldive Islands and Australia. She said that this was necessary "to avoid the thugs tracing me and intimidating my life". She alleged that she had been intimidated in Colombo by Sinhalese thugs who demanded money from her because her family had property in Colombo of great value. This property has apparently now been transferred to her children, one of whom, as I have said, lives in Australia. In her application, the applicant claimed that the security situation in Sri Lanka was bad and deteriorating, that arbitrary arrests were taking place and that the authorities were not able to protect innocent civilians of Tamil ethnicity, like herself. She expressed fear for her life because of the criminal element in Colombo and as a result of the security problem more generally. She also expressed concern that the authorities in Sri Lanka either could not, or would not, defend her from such criminal elements who were subjecting her to extortion. It was upon this basis that she claimed an entitlement to be treated as a refugee. The delegate's decision
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Finally, the delegate suggested that the applicant's concern about the criminal element in Colombo amounted to a fear of extortion rather than a fear for a Convention reason, as contemplated by s 36(2) of the Act. She rejected the applicant's claim, not being satisfied that the applicant met the criteria for a protection visa. The supplementary evidence The applicant annexed to her affidavit a detailed statement. It contained materials which she had not previously provided to the Minister and hence to the delegate. In this statement the applicant explained her default in filing an application to the Tribunal and her failure to provide at an earlier time all of the information contained in the statement. She explained the latter on the basis that she had hoped "it would not be necessary to state the details of what had happened to me much of which I had found deeply shaming and distressing to recall and repeat to others". The statement included assertions about an attempted rape of the applicant at an unspecified time after 1983. It contained a statement that her daughter and son-in-law would take care of her and that she would not be a burden on Australia if permitted to stay in this country as a refugee. The applicant's statement concluded with a complaint that she had "not been granted the opportunity to date to personally explain my plight to the Australian authorities". Under the Act, the delegate is not obliged to conduct an oral hearing or to permit a person, in the position of the applicant, to make an oral statement before the delegate. However, in her affidavit, Ms Moss points out that the provision of a personal interview is ordinarily afforded before such decisions are made by delegates of the Minister. On the basis of extensive experience in working with refugees and in connection with their litigation, Ms Moss states: "Since the commencement of my work in the area of refugee law in March 1992 to the present day it has been my experience that the delegate of the Minister for Immigration making the primary decision on the application for refugee status invites the refugee applicant to attend an interview. I know of the case of only one family (in which three adult members of it had their own claims to refugee status) for whom the Department of Immigration rejected their applications for protection visas without inviting the applicants to attend an interview. In this case the applications for the family members were not supported by any claims setting out the basis as to why they claimed to be refugees." No mention is made in the affidavit of Mr Corbould about the practice of delegates in this regard. This fact makes it easier for me to accept as accurate the statement of Ms Moss[7]. I will therefore proceed on the basis that the evidence establishes that it is the normal practice of delegates to invite persons in the position of the applicant to an interview to make an oral statement. The applicant did not receive such an invitation. [7]Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 308.Approach: general propositions
Decision
Reasons for decision
KIRBY J
In her application, the applicant claimed that the security situation in Sri Lanka was bad and deteriorating, that arbitrary arrests were taking place and that the authorities were not able to protect innocent civilians of Tamil ethnicity, like herself. She expressed fear for her life because of the criminal element in Colombo and as a result of the security problem more generally. She also expressed concern that the authorities in Sri Lanka either could not, or would not, defend her from such criminal elements who were subjecting her to extortion. It was upon this basis that she claimed an entitlement to be treated as a refugee. The delegate's decision Upon the making of her application, on a form which was provided to her, the applicant was granted a bridging visa. She was informed of her rights. Her application was ultimately decided, as the Act permits, by the Minister's delegate, Ms K Corkill, on 11 July 2000. The power of delegation from the Minister to the delegate is afforded by s 496(1) of the Act. The delegate's decision recounts the details of the application. It notes certain "country information" about Sri Lanka. This information reported large‑scale arbitrary arrests of Tamils in the year between December 1997 and November 1998, just prior to the applicant's departure for Australia. However, the decision continues that human rights groups report that the number of arrests under the emergency regulations and the Prevention of Terrorism Act in Colombo had "decreased over the last few months". Nevertheless, the decision acknowledges that the "tamils [sic] are targeted at checkpoints because the present insurgency is tamil-based". The delegate concluded: "Having considered the detailed statement of the applicant, in the light of available country information, I accept her claims at face value. …Whilst the applicant is Tamil, she would have a low profile and no known connections to the LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam] or anyone of interest to the Sri Lankan authorities.…I note that the applicant has been free to travel in and out of Sri Lanka in 1995, in 1998 (twice) and in 1999 (in January and again when departing Sri Lanka for Australia). The applicant has not claimed any difficulty with the authorities on any of these occasions." After noting the reports that persons returning to Sri Lanka following a failed refugee application were "generally speaking … safe", the delegate remarked that the applicant had delayed virtually a year in making her application. The delegate went on: "This behaviour is generally inconsistent with that of people with a genuine fear of persecution on return to their country of origin. I also note that the applicant's passport was issued in 1994 and was extended by the Sri Lankan authorities as recently as 22nd October 1999. The applicant also states that she receives or is entitled to receive a 'widow pension'. … In view of all of the above, I am unable to conclude that the applicant is of adverse interest to the authorities."