NAAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NAAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
[2002] FCA 263

APPLICANT NAAX and APPLICANT NAAV v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

N 1467 OF 2001 and N 1468 OF 2001

GYLES J
SYDNEY
15 MARCH 2002


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

BETWEEN:

APPLICANT NAAX     N 1467 OF 2001
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

BETWEEN

APPLICANT NAAV  N 1468 OF 2001
APPLICANT

AND

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

GYLES J

DATE:

15 MARCH 2002

PLACE:

SYDNEY

CORRIGENDUM

The last sentence in paragraph 46 should read:

“If my views as to s 474 are confirmed, there will be no need to go through this time-consuming process.”

I certify that the preceding paragraph is a true copy of the Corrigendum of the Honourable Justice Gyles.

Associate:

Dated:            15 March 2002


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NAAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
[2002] FCA 263

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – judicial power of the Commonwealth – whether decision to grant or refuse protection visa is exercise of judicial power of the Commonwealth – whether privative clause excludes breach of natural justice from grounds of judicial review is inconsistent with s 75(v) of the Constitution – validity of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 474

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – operation of privative clause – whether breach of rules of natural justice by denial of procedural fairness grounds relief notwithstanding privative clause – Hickman principles – whether Hickman principles exhaustive – whether rules concerning procedural fairness fall within Hickman principles – whether decision made absent procedural fairness made “under the Act” within Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 474(2)

MIGRATION – protection visas – whether use of undisclosed independent information by Refugee Review Tribunal in a manner adverse to applicant constituted breach of procedural fairness – whether provision of such information governed by Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 424A

Commonwealth Constitution ss 71, 75(v)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2), 52-59, 62, 65, 359A, 359B, 415, 420, 424A, 425, 430, 474, 476(2)
Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth)
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs;  Ex parte Miah (2001) 75 ALJR 889 applied
Re Refugee Review Tribunal;  Ex parte Aala (2001) 204 CLR 82 referred to
Walton v Ruddock [2001] FCA 1839 referred to
SAAA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 101 referred to
R v Hickman;  Ex parte Fox & Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 followed
R v Coldham;  Ex parte Australian Workers’ Union (1983) 153 CLR 415 followed
O’Toole v Charles David Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 232 followed
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Richard Walter Pty Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 168 followed
Darling Casino Ltd v NSW Casino Control Authority (1997) 191 CLR 602 followed
Re Australian Bank Employees Union;  Ex parte Citicorp Australia Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 513 distinguished
Vanmeld Pty Ltd v…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 263
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of NAAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs involved applications for judicial review of decisions of the Refugee Review Tribunal, which had upheld the refusal of protection visas to the applicants. The applicants, NAAV and NAAX, both from Burma, claimed political persecution if returned to their home country and had been represented by the same migration agent in their applications. The applicants argued that the Tribunal had failed to provide procedural fairness by not disclosing adverse information to them and that this was a jurisdictional error not excluded from review by s 474 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The legal issues before the court were whether s 474 operated to exclude judicial review of decisions of the Tribunal and, if not, whether the Tribunal’s failure to provide procedural fairness constituted a jurisdictional error warranting review.

The court considered that s 474(1) was a privative clause that made decisions of the Tribunal final and conclusive, and not subject to review on various grounds. However, the court found that there was no inconsistency between s 474 and other provisions of the Act as argued by the applicants. The court referred to previous decisions which had outlined the operation of s 474 and held that it did not exclude review of jurisdictional errors such as breaches of natural justice unless expressly excluded by the legislature. The court also found that there was a debatable question as to whether the Tribunal had breached the rules of natural justice by not disclosing adverse information to the applicants and providing information to them. The court concluded that it was appropriate to determine the constitutional issue of the effect of s 474 before considering the merits of the applications.

The court ultimately dismissed the applications, finding that s 474 did not exclude judicial review of jurisdictional errors such as breaches of natural justice, and that there was no breach of natural justice in this case. The applicants were ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the application, limited to one set of costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Each application be dismissed.

2. The applicants pay the respondent’s costs of the application, limited to one set of costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

These applications relate to decisions of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) made on 11 September 2001 but handed down on 2 October 2001, which confirmed the decision of a delegate of the respondent Minister to refuse the applicants protection visas pursuant to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). No point has been taken about the delay in handing down the decision, the effect of which was to ensure that these applications to the Court would be governed by the amendments to the Act made by the Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth). That amendment inserted new Parts 8 and 8A into the Act which substantially alter the provisions for judicial review of Tribunal decisions. The applications were filed and heard together before the Tribunal as the applicants were married upon their arrival in Australia. Despite the subsequent separation of the applicants (and the filing of two applications for review in this Court), the interrelated factual circumstances of each allowed for the applications to be heard concurrently before me. As required by the new legislative regime, this application proceeds pursuant to s39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).SHORT FACTS The applicant NAAV was born in 1972 in Taunggok, Arakan in Burma, and claims Arakan ethnicity and Buddhist religion. He arrived in Australia on 2 November 1995 pursuant to a visitor visa issued in Rangoon, holding a current Burmese passport. He was accompanied by his wife, applicant NAAX, and their young daughter. On 31 January 1996 he applied for a protection (Class A2) visa. He was represented at all material times by a migration agent, who prepared and presented the statement and statutory declaration upon which his claim to protection was based. He claimed to have been a political activist from 1988. He gave an account of his activities which included three arrests and subsequent incarceration and interrogation, including one two-year period in jail. He said:“If I return to Burma, I will be arrested for sure at the airport and my passport confiscated. I am a known political offender and I cannot afford to be arrested one more time, it would mean the end of me.”He also claimed later to have been active in anti-government circles in Australia. The applicant NAAX was born in 1972 in Maung Daw in Burma. She arrived in Australia with her husband, applicant NAAV, on 2 November 1995, with their daughter. She also had a visitor visa and a current Burmese passport. She made an application for a protection visa on 31 January 1996 and appointed the same migration agent as applicant NAAV, who prepared and presented a statement and statutory declaration in support of the application. She claimed to have been a political activist who had attracted the attention of the authorities. She said:“If we go back, I am sure we would be arrested as soon as we set down at the airport in Burma. I fear torture and worse, for myself and my husband.”She later also claimed to have been active in Australia.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GYLES J
A “privative clause decision” is defined by s 474(2):“(2) In this section:Privative clause decision means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not), other than a decision referred to in subsection (4) or (5).”The decision under review before me in this case falls within the definition in s 474(2), and is not excluded by subsections (4) or (5). Before turning to the substance of this issue, I should note that counsel for the applicants claims there was an inconsistency between s 474 and other parts of amended Pt 8 and an inconsistency between s 474 and other provisions of the Act. In my view, there is no substance to these claims. The way in which the provisions operate has been outlined by Merkel J in Walton v Ruddock [2001] FCA 1839 and Mansfield J in SAAA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 101. It is submitted on behalf of the applicant that a denial of natural justice, being jurisdictional error which has not been validly excluded from judicial review by “plain words of necessary intendment”, is not immune from review because of s 474. It is submitted that the provision of natural justice, or procedural fairness, is a fetter on the lawful exercise of a power and unless it is expressly excluded by the legislature, obedience to its requirements is a necessary and indispensable prerequisite to the making of a valid decision. A denial of procedural fairness is an error going to jurisdiction for which prohibition will be granted. As I have outlined, the breach of the rules of natural justice alleged is failure by the Tribunal to accord procedural fairness in taking into account information adverse to, but not disclosed to, the applicants, but which did not involve breach of the express provisions of the Act governing the procedure of the Tribunal, and the provision of information by it to an applicant (particularly s 424A). The decision of the High Court in Aala establishes a starting point for these submissions if, for the purposes of the exercise, I assume that it was a breach of the rules of natural justice not to apprise the applicants of the particular information referred to in the reasons of the Tribunal. The Solicitor General submits that s 474(1) is in substantially similar form to the privative clause considered in R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox & Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598, where, in an oft-quoted passage, Dixon J, at 615, said:“The particular regulation is expressed in a manner that has grown familiar. Both under Commonwealth law, and in jurisdictions where there is a unitary constitution, the interpretation of provisions of the general nature of [the privative clause] is will established. They are not interpreted as meaning to set at large the courts or other juridical bodies to whose decision they relate. Such a clause is interpreted as meaning that no decision which is in fact given by the body concerned shall be invalidated on the ground that it has not conformed to the requirements governing its proceedings or the exercise of its authority or has not confined its acts within the limits laid down by the instrument giving it authority, provided always that its decision is a bona fide attempt to exercise its power, that it relates to the subject matter of the legislation, and that it is reasonably capable of reference to the power given to the body.” (emphasis added)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GYLES J

The Solicitor General, who appeared for the Minister, made it clear that he wished to take the opportunity to test the validity and effect of s 474 of the Act. However, he did not concede that there was a breach of the rules of natural justice in the case of either applicant. The constitutional issue must be decided. I regard the questions as to the operation of s 474 and as to whether there was a breach of the rules of natural justice as debatable. It is therefore appropriate that I deal with both. When the operation of s 474 is settled, no doubt a different course will be taken. I will deal first with that issue.OPERATION OF SECTION 474 Section 474(1) of the Act provides:“(1) A privative clause decision : (a) is final and conclusive; and(b)must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called into question in any court; and(c)is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account.” A “privative clause decision” is defined by s 474(2):“(2) In this section:Privative clause decision means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not), other than a decision referred to in subsection (4) or (5).”The decision under review before me in this case falls within the definition in s 474(2), and is not excluded by subsections (4) or (5). Before turning to the substance of this issue, I should note that counsel for the applicants claims there was an inconsistency between s 474 and other parts of amended Pt 8 and an inconsistency between s 474 and other provisions of the Act. In my view, there is no substance to these claims. The way in which the provisions operate has been outlined by Merkel J in Walton v Ruddock [2001] FCA 1839 and Mansfield J in SAAA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 101. It is submitted on behalf of the applicant that a denial of natural justice, being jurisdictional error which has not been validly excluded from judicial review by “plain words of necessary intendment”, is not immune from review because of s 474. It is submitted that the provision of natural justice, or procedural fairness, is a fetter on the lawful exercise of a power and unless it is expressly excluded by the legislature, obedience to its requirements is a necessary and indispensable prerequisite to the making of a valid decision. A denial of procedural fairness is an error going to jurisdiction for which prohibition will be granted. As I have outlined, the breach of the rules of natural justice alleged is failure by the Tribunal to accord procedural fairness in taking into account information adverse to, but not disclosed to, the applicants, but which did not involve breach of the express provisions of the Act governing the procedure of the Tribunal, and the provision of information by it to an applicant (particularly s 424A). The decision of the High Court in Aala establishes a starting point for these submissions if, for the purposes of the exercise, I assume that it was a breach of the rules of natural justice not to apprise the applicants of the particular information referred to in the reasons of the Tribunal.