FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NAAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
[2002] FCA 263APPLICANT NAAX and APPLICANT NAAV v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N 1467 OF 2001 and N 1468 OF 2001
GYLES J
SYDNEY
15 MARCH 2002
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
BETWEEN:
APPLICANT NAAX N 1467 OF 2001
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTBETWEEN
APPLICANT NAAV N 1468 OF 2001
APPLICANTAND
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
GYLES J
DATE:
15 MARCH 2002
PLACE:
SYDNEY
CORRIGENDUM
The last sentence in paragraph 46 should read:
“If my views as to s 474 are confirmed, there will be no need to go through this time-consuming process.”
I certify that the preceding paragraph is a true copy of the Corrigendum of the Honourable Justice Gyles. Associate:
Dated: 15 March 2002
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NAAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
[2002] FCA 263CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – judicial power of the Commonwealth – whether decision to grant or refuse protection visa is exercise of judicial power of the Commonwealth – whether privative clause excludes breach of natural justice from grounds of judicial review is inconsistent with s 75(v) of the Constitution – validity of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 474
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – operation of privative clause – whether breach of rules of natural justice by denial of procedural fairness grounds relief notwithstanding privative clause – Hickman principles – whether Hickman principles exhaustive – whether rules concerning procedural fairness fall within Hickman principles – whether decision made absent procedural fairness made “under the Act” within Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 474(2)
MIGRATION – protection visas – whether use of undisclosed independent information by Refugee Review Tribunal in a manner adverse to applicant constituted breach of procedural fairness – whether provision of such information governed by Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 424A
Commonwealth Constitution ss 71, 75(v)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2), 52-59, 62, 65, 359A, 359B, 415, 420, 424A, 425, 430, 474, 476(2)
Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth)
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah (2001) 75 ALJR 889 applied
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2001) 204 CLR 82 referred to
Walton v Ruddock [2001] FCA 1839 referred to
SAAA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 101 referred to
R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox & Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 followed
R v Coldham; Ex parte Australian Workers’ Union (1983) 153 CLR 415 followed
O’Toole v Charles David Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 232 followed
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Richard Walter Pty Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 168 followed
Darling Casino Ltd v NSW Casino Control Authority (1997) 191 CLR 602 followed
Re Australian Bank Employees Union; Ex parte Citicorp Australia Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 513 distinguished
Vanmeld Pty Ltd v…
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- Case
- [2002] FCA 263
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered that s 474(1) was a privative clause that made decisions of the Tribunal final and conclusive, and not subject to review on various grounds. However, the court found that there was no inconsistency between s 474 and other provisions of the Act as argued by the applicants. The court referred to previous decisions which had outlined the operation of s 474 and held that it did not exclude review of jurisdictional errors such as breaches of natural justice unless expressly excluded by the legislature. The court also found that there was a debatable question as to whether the Tribunal had breached the rules of natural justice by not disclosing adverse information to the applicants and providing information to them. The court concluded that it was appropriate to determine the constitutional issue of the effect of s 474 before considering the merits of the applications.
The court ultimately dismissed the applications, finding that s 474 did not exclude judicial review of jurisdictional errors such as breaches of natural justice, and that there was no breach of natural justice in this case. The applicants were ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the application, limited to one set of costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Each application be dismissed.
2. The applicants pay the respondent’s costs of the application, limited to one set of costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GYLES J
The Solicitor General, who appeared for the Minister, made it clear that he wished to take the opportunity to test the validity and effect of s 474 of the Act. However, he did not concede that there was a breach of the rules of natural justice in the case of either applicant. The constitutional issue must be decided. I regard the questions as to the operation of s 474 and as to whether there was a breach of the rules of natural justice as debatable. It is therefore appropriate that I deal with both. When the operation of s 474 is settled, no doubt a different course will be taken. I will deal first with that issue.OPERATION OF SECTION 474 Section 474(1) of the Act provides:“(1) A privative clause decision : (a) is final and conclusive; and(b)must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called into question in any court; and(c)is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account.” A “privative clause decision” is defined by s 474(2):“(2) In this section:Privative clause decision means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not), other than a decision referred to in subsection (4) or (5).”The decision under review before me in this case falls within the definition in s 474(2), and is not excluded by subsections (4) or (5). Before turning to the substance of this issue, I should note that counsel for the applicants claims there was an inconsistency between s 474 and other parts of amended Pt 8 and an inconsistency between s 474 and other provisions of the Act. In my view, there is no substance to these claims. The way in which the provisions operate has been outlined by Merkel J in Walton v Ruddock [2001] FCA 1839 and Mansfield J in SAAA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 101. It is submitted on behalf of the applicant that a denial of natural justice, being jurisdictional error which has not been validly excluded from judicial review by “plain words of necessary intendment”, is not immune from review because of s 474. It is submitted that the provision of natural justice, or procedural fairness, is a fetter on the lawful exercise of a power and unless it is expressly excluded by the legislature, obedience to its requirements is a necessary and indispensable prerequisite to the making of a valid decision. A denial of procedural fairness is an error going to jurisdiction for which prohibition will be granted. As I have outlined, the breach of the rules of natural justice alleged is failure by the Tribunal to accord procedural fairness in taking into account information adverse to, but not disclosed to, the applicants, but which did not involve breach of the express provisions of the Act governing the procedure of the Tribunal, and the provision of information by it to an applicant (particularly s 424A). The decision of the High Court in Aala establishes a starting point for these submissions if, for the purposes of the exercise, I assume that it was a breach of the rules of natural justice not to apprise the applicants of the particular information referred to in the reasons of the Tribunal.