FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Singh v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 485
MIGRATION – MIGRATION ACT – Deportation of non-citizens who have committed serious crimes – Minister made a deportation order under s 200 of the Act following the applicant’s conviction for supplying heroin – Minister also declared the applicant to be an excluded person under s 502 which excluded merits review of the deportation decision – the sentencing judge found that the applicant had been coerced into committing the offence– the constitutional validity of s 502 certificates – whether the Minister failed to take relevant considerations into account – whether the Minister took irrelevant considerations into account – whether the Minister applied departmental policy without regard to the merits of the case – Wednesbury unreasonableness.
Migration Act1958 (Cth), ss 200, 201, 253, 502
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act1977 (Cth), ss 5, 13Attorney-General (Cth) v Breckler (1999) 163 ALR 576 considered
The Queen v The Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd (1970) 123 CLR 361 considered
Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1 followed
Harris v Caladine (1990) 172 CLR 84 considered
Minister forImmigration and Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 31 ALR 666 followed
Ousley v The Queen (1997) 192 CLR 69 referred to
N44 v Minister forImmigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1127 referred to
Marshood v Minister forImmigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1415 referred to
Li v Minister for Immigration andMulticultural Affairs [2000] FCA 19 referred to
Lu v Minister for Immigration and MulticulturalAffairs [2000] FCA 40 referred to
Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 followed
Minogue v Williams [2000] FCA 125 referred to
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko Wallsend Ltd (1985) 162 CLR 24 followed
Croft v Minister for Health (1983) 45 ALR 449 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Tagle (1983) 48 ALR 566 referred to
Ahern v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1983) 50 ALR 177 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 162 ALR 577 followed
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Gunner (1988) 84 FCR 400 followed
Botany Bay City Council v Minister of State for Transport and Regional Development (1996) 66 FCR 537 consideredKARM SINGH v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
NG 992 of 1999MATHEWS J
18 APRIL 2000
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NG 992 of 1999
BETWEEN:
KARM SINGH
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
MATHEWS J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 APRIL 2000
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NG 992 OF 1999
BETWEEN:
KARM SINGH
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND…
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- Case
- [2000] FCA 485
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the legal issues raised by the applicant, including whether the Minister had taken into account irrelevant considerations and failed to consider relevant ones. The court held that the Minister was not bound to take into account the applicant's potential detention under section 253 of the Act as an alternative to deportation, as the statute did not imply any such limitation on the Minister's discretion. The court also rejected the applicant's argument that the Minister had taken into account irrelevant considerations, such as a matter of national interest that was not a matter of security interest. The court found that the Minister's reasons for the decision were based on the seriousness of the applicant's offences and the significant harm caused by the illicit drug trade to the Australian community. The court held that the Minister's decision was legally sound and that the applicant's rights under the ADJR Act had been properly considered.
In light of the above, the court dismissed the applicant's application and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs. The court held that the Minister's decision to declare the applicant an excluded person under section 502 of the Act was valid and that the applicant's challenge to the decision was without merit. The court also held that the applicant's arguments regarding irrelevant considerations and failure to consider relevant ones were not well-founded and that the Minister had acted within the scope of his discretion under the Act.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: MATHEWS J
The applicant’s submission under this head, based on paragraphs 5(1)(e) and 5(2)(a) of the ADJR Act, is integrally connected with the ground I have just rejected, and must similarly fail. It is that the Minister, in making a declaration under s 502, took into account an irrelevant consideration namely, a “matter of national interest” which was not a matter of “security interest”. The arguments in favour of this submission are based on the interpretation of Article 13 of the ICCPR referred to above. For the reasons I have already given this ground must fail.Section 502 Certificate – Failing to take a relevant consideration into account It is submitted on behalf of the applicant that the Minister failed to take a relevant consideration into account, namely that any risk to the community which the applicant posed whilst he was at large, could have been averted by his being taken into custody pursuant to s 253 of the Act. In order to understand this submission it is necessary to quote the reasons given by the Minister for declaring the applicant to be an excluded person under s 502 of the Act. These reasons, as contained in the s 13 statement, are as follows:“3. Reasons for the decisionsI considered the seriousness of the particular offences, in particular the fact that Mr Singh was in contact with principals in the drug trade and may have become, if not arrested, a conduit for the supply of significant amounts of heroin. I considered also the significant harm which the illicit drug trade causes to the Australian community. I noted that Mr Singh is not in custody and considered that, because of the risk which I found that he poses, there should be a speedy resolution to this matter. Having regard to those matters I decided that it was in the national interest that my decision to deport Mr Singh be final, and that he be precluded from seeking merits review of my decision at the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.” Section 253 of the Act enables a person against whom an order for deportation is in force to be taken without warrant into detention and be detained until he or she is deported. The applicant submits that, in failing to consider this alternative of placing the applicant into custody under s 253, the Minister failed to take a relevant consideration into account. There are, as the respondent’s submissions point out, various answers to this submission. The first and most basic is that the Minister was not bound to take this matter into consideration. The law on this subject was definitively expressed by Mason J in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko Wallsend Ltd (1985) 162 CLR 24 at pp39-40:“(a) The ground of failure to take into account a relevant consideration can only be made out if a decision-maker fails to take into account a consideration which he is bound to take into account in making that decision: Sean Investments Pty Ltd v MacKellar; CREEDNZ Inc v Governor-General; Ashby v Minister of Immigration. The statement of Lord Green MR in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation, that a decision-maker must take into account those matters which he ‘ought to have regard to’ should not be understood in any different sense in view of his Lordship’s statement on the following page that a person entrusted with a discretion ‘must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider’.(b) What factors a decision-maker is bound to consider in making the decision is determined by construction of the statute conferring the discretion. If the statute expressly states the considerations to be taken into account, it will often be necessary for the court to decide whether those enumerated factors are exhaustive or merely inclusive. If the relevant factors – and in this context I use this expression to refer to the factors which the decision-maker is bound to consider – are not expressly stated, they must be determined by implication from the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the Act. In the context of judicial review on the ground of taking into account irrelevant considerations, this Court has held that, where a statute confers a discretion which in its terms is unconfined, the factors that may be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion are similarly unconfined, except in so far as there may be found in the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the statute some implied limitation on the factors to which the decision-maker may legitimately have regard: see Reg v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte 2HD Pty Ltd, adopting the earlier formulations of Dixon J in Swan Hill Corporation v Bradbury, and Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (NSW) v Browning. By analogy, where the ground of review is that a relevant consideration has not been taken into account and the discretion is unconfined by the terms of the statute, the court will not find that the decision-maker is bound to take a particular matter into account unless an implication that he is bound to do so is to be found in the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the Act.” (footnotes omitted)