Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Singh v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 485

MIGRATION – MIGRATION ACT – Deportation of non-citizens who have committed serious crimes – Minister made a deportation order under s 200 of the Act following the applicant’s conviction for supplying heroin – Minister also declared the applicant to be an excluded person under s 502 which excluded merits review of the deportation decision – the sentencing judge found that the applicant had been coerced into committing the offence– the constitutional validity of s 502 certificates – whether the Minister failed to take relevant considerations into account – whether the Minister took irrelevant considerations into account – whether the Minister applied departmental policy without regard to the merits of the case – Wednesbury unreasonableness.

Migration Act1958 (Cth), ss 200, 201, 253, 502
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act1977 (Cth), ss 5, 13

Attorney-General (Cth) v Breckler (1999) 163 ALR 576 considered
The Queen v The Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd (1970) 123 CLR 361 considered
Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1 followed
Harris v Caladine (1990) 172 CLR 84 considered
Minister forImmigration and Ethnic Affairs v Pochi (1980) 31 ALR 666 followed
Ousley v The Queen (1997) 192 CLR 69 referred to
N44 v Minister forImmigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1127 referred to
Marshood v Minister forImmigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1415 referred to
Li v Minister for Immigration andMulticultural Affairs [2000] FCA 19 referred to
Lu v Minister for Immigration and MulticulturalAffairs [2000] FCA 40 referred to
Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 followed
Minogue v Williams [2000] FCA 125 referred to
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko Wallsend Ltd (1985) 162 CLR 24 followed
Croft v Minister for Health (1983) 45 ALR 449 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Tagle (1983) 48 ALR 566 referred to
Ahern v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1983) 50 ALR 177 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 162 ALR 577 followed
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Gunner (1988) 84 FCR 400 followed
Botany Bay City Council v Minister of State for Transport and Regional Development (1996) 66 FCR 537 considered

KARM SINGH v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
NG 992 of 1999

MATHEWS J
18 APRIL 2000
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NG 992 of 1999

BETWEEN:

KARM SINGH
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MATHEWS J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 APRIL 2000

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NG 992 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

KARM SINGH
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 485
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involved the applicant, an Indian national who had entered Australia and later obtained a permanent resident visa, challenging the Minister's decision to declare him an excluded person under section 502 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which removed his right to apply to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for review of the Minister's decision. The applicant, who had been involved in drug-related activities, argued that the Minister's decision was flawed on several grounds, including that the Minister had taken into account irrelevant considerations and failed to consider relevant ones. The court was required to determine whether the Minister's decision was legally sound and whether the applicant's rights under the ADJR Act had been properly considered.

The court examined the legal issues raised by the applicant, including whether the Minister had taken into account irrelevant considerations and failed to consider relevant ones. The court held that the Minister was not bound to take into account the applicant's potential detention under section 253 of the Act as an alternative to deportation, as the statute did not imply any such limitation on the Minister's discretion. The court also rejected the applicant's argument that the Minister had taken into account irrelevant considerations, such as a matter of national interest that was not a matter of security interest. The court found that the Minister's reasons for the decision were based on the seriousness of the applicant's offences and the significant harm caused by the illicit drug trade to the Australian community. The court held that the Minister's decision was legally sound and that the applicant's rights under the ADJR Act had been properly considered.

In light of the above, the court dismissed the applicant's application and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs. The court held that the Minister's decision to declare the applicant an excluded person under section 502 of the Act was valid and that the applicant's challenge to the decision was without merit. The court also held that the applicant's arguments regarding irrelevant considerations and failure to consider relevant ones were not well-founded and that the Minister had acted within the scope of his discretion under the Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The effect of the Minister’s decision under s 502 was to remove the applicant’s right (which he would otherwise have had by virtue of s 500 of the Act) to apply to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the AAT”) for review of the Minister’s decision under s 200 and s 201. This means that the Minister’s decision cannot be subject to merits review. The only course available to the applicant in these circumstances is to seek judicial review from this Court under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act1977 (Cth) (“the ADJR Act”). Hence the present proceedings. The Minister’s decisions are challenged on a number of grounds which I shall enumerate later. In the meantime it is appropriate to describe the applicant’s background and the circumstances in which this matter arose for Ministerial decision.Applicant’s Background The applicant was born on 1 March 1959 in the Punjab, India. He lived with his family at Amritsae, a short distance from the Pakistan border. After completing his schooling the applicant obtained an electrician’s diploma. He assisted his father on his farm and held various other forms of employment in the Punjab. The applicant’s father was an active supporter of the Sikh separatist movement. This sometimes placed him and his family into conflict with the Indian authorities. In about 1983 or 1984 the applicant’s brother disappeared. It later transpired that he had been killed, probably murdered. The applicant spent a great deal of time investigating his brother’s disappearance. During this period he became the target of threats and harassment by local police and from other sources, apparently because of the inquiries he was making about his brother. The harassment became so serious that in 1985 the applicant left the Punjab and went to Delhi. In 1987 he flew to New Zealand where he remained for about six months. Finally, on 15 May 1988, he came to Australia from New Zealand. He found employment almost immediately and remained in work until 1994 when his employment was terminated after he suffered a back injury at work. In 1979 the applicant had married Harjeet Kaur in India. They had two sons, Jagmohan born in 1981 and Manpreet born in 1984. The applicant and his wife were separated in 1985 when he left the Punjab, and they were later divorced. In the meantime, from 1985 until they came to Australia, the two boys lived with the applicant’s parents in Amritsae. In about 1990 the applicant met Penelope Austin, an Australian citizen who was a nurse at the Royal North Shore Hospital. They were married on 20 October 1990. On 12 December 1994 the applicant received a permanent resident visa. Since then he has returned to India on two occasions. The first was between January and March 1995, and the second between December 1995 and April 1996. The purpose of both trips was to arrange for his sons to come and live in Australia. On both occasions he remained in Delhi. He was not prepared to return to the Punjab, which he continued to regard as too dangerous for him.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

MATHEWS J
Mr Kessels’ submission concluded in the following terms:“CONCLUSIONThe overriding considerations in this matter are the best interests of the children and the expectations of the Australian community. For the reasons already outlined, the best interests of the children can only be served if the applicant is not deported. The attitude of the Australian community is a matter of conjecture, but it might be suggested that decent compassionate people would see that the applicant is an honest and hardworking family man who became involved in a serious crime out of fear for his children’s safety. He was not motivated principally by financial gain or to feed a drug habit. No drugs actually went on to the street and he not only confessed his involvement and saved the cost of a trial, but gave information to the police about others that has now put his and his family’s lives at risk. The risk to the community is low and there could be no real deterrence benefit in deporting such a person. In such circumstances, it is hard to imagine that the Australian community would demand deportation in this case and we submit that it is a more appropriate case for a warning.” Mr Kessels’ submission was accompanied by a lengthy statement of the applicant setting out details of his background, in India and Australia, and describing the circumstances in which he was coerced into committing the offences. The applicant expressed extreme remorse and stressed he would never offend again. The final paragraph of his statement was in the following terms:“46. I beg that the Minister give me one chance to prove myself. I promise that I will not re-offend. I have learnt my lesson and will never again be involved in criminal activities. If my family is ever threatened in this was [sic] again I would go straight to the police because I now know that they can help to protect me and keep me out of trouble. I know I should have done that last time but I was extremely scared what would happen to my children. They are now in Australia and I can protect them. D Singh has fled the country and I cannot imagine him returning as the police are looking for him. If he were ever arrested, I would assist the police to convict him. Please give me one last chance to be with my family and start again. I will make a real contribution to the community will raise my boys to be law abiding citizens.” Also enclosed with Mr Kessels’ submission were statutory declarations sworn by each of the applicant’s sons and by two friends, Kawaljit Kaur and Jagdish Raj. It will be remembered that Mr Raj had been interviewed by a departmental officer on 12 April 1999. In his statutory declaration dated 22 April 1999, Mr Raj gave details of the matters he had alluded to during the interview. In particular, he described an incident in September 1996, not long before the applicant’s arrest, when the applicant and his co-offender came to Mr Raj’s restaurant accompanied by two other men. These men were clearly D Singh and his brother. They were introduced to Mr Raj as the “Captain” and his “Brother”. Mr Raj overheard enough of their conversation to enable him to confirm that these men were making threats against the applicant and/or his family. Mr Raj gave evidence of this incident at the applicant’s sentencing proceedings. He said that later, in January 1999, he received a telephone call from the “Captain” saying that he knew that Mr Raj had given evidence against his brother. Mr Raj was asked to pass a message on to the applicant and his co-offender that he (the “Captain”) was returning permanently to India and if either of the applicant or his co-offender went to India they would not come back alive.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MATHEWS J

The applicant’s submission under this head, based on paragraphs 5(1)(e) and 5(2)(a) of the ADJR Act, is integrally connected with the ground I have just rejected, and must similarly fail. It is that the Minister, in making a declaration under s 502, took into account an irrelevant consideration namely, a “matter of national interest” which was not a matter of “security interest”. The arguments in favour of this submission are based on the interpretation of Article 13 of the ICCPR referred to above. For the reasons I have already given this ground must fail.Section 502 Certificate – Failing to take a relevant consideration into account It is submitted on behalf of the applicant that the Minister failed to take a relevant consideration into account, namely that any risk to the community which the applicant posed whilst he was at large, could have been averted by his being taken into custody pursuant to s 253 of the Act. In order to understand this submission it is necessary to quote the reasons given by the Minister for declaring the applicant to be an excluded person under s 502 of the Act. These reasons, as contained in the s 13 statement, are as follows:“3. Reasons for the decisionsI considered the seriousness of the particular offences, in particular the fact that Mr Singh was in contact with principals in the drug trade and may have become, if not arrested, a conduit for the supply of significant amounts of heroin. I considered also the significant harm which the illicit drug trade causes to the Australian community. I noted that Mr Singh is not in custody and considered that, because of the risk which I found that he poses, there should be a speedy resolution to this matter. Having regard to those matters I decided that it was in the national interest that my decision to deport Mr Singh be final, and that he be precluded from seeking merits review of my decision at the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.” Section 253 of the Act enables a person against whom an order for deportation is in force to be taken without warrant into detention and be detained until he or she is deported. The applicant submits that, in failing to consider this alternative of placing the applicant into custody under s 253, the Minister failed to take a relevant consideration into account. There are, as the respondent’s submissions point out, various answers to this submission. The first and most basic is that the Minister was not bound to take this matter into consideration. The law on this subject was definitively expressed by Mason J in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko Wallsend Ltd (1985) 162 CLR 24 at pp39-40:“(a) The ground of failure to take into account a relevant consideration can only be made out if a decision-maker fails to take into account a consideration which he is bound to take into account in making that decision: Sean Investments Pty Ltd v MacKellar; CREEDNZ Inc v Governor-General; Ashby v Minister of Immigration. The statement of Lord Green MR in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation, that a decision-maker must take into account those matters which he ‘ought to have regard to’ should not be understood in any different sense in view of his Lordship’s statement on the following page that a person entrusted with a discretion ‘must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider’.(b) What factors a decision-maker is bound to consider in making the decision is determined by construction of the statute conferring the discretion. If the statute expressly states the considerations to be taken into account, it will often be necessary for the court to decide whether those enumerated factors are exhaustive or merely inclusive. If the relevant factors – and in this context I use this expression to refer to the factors which the decision-maker is bound to consider – are not expressly stated, they must be determined by implication from the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the Act. In the context of judicial review on the ground of taking into account irrelevant considerations, this Court has held that, where a statute confers a discretion which in its terms is unconfined, the factors that may be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion are similarly unconfined, except in so far as there may be found in the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the statute some implied limitation on the factors to which the decision-maker may legitimately have regard: see Reg v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte 2HD Pty Ltd, adopting the earlier formulations of Dixon J in Swan Hill Corporation v Bradbury, and Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (NSW) v Browning. By analogy, where the ground of review is that a relevant consideration has not been taken into account and the discretion is unconfined by the terms of the statute, the court will not find that the decision-maker is bound to take a particular matter into account unless an implication that he is bound to do so is to be found in the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the Act.” (footnotes omitted)