FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Li v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 19
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - whether Refugee Review Tribunal impermissibly exercised judicial power
MIGRATION LAW - whether Refugee Review Tribunal made an error of law within s 476(1)(a), (1)(c), (1)(e) and (1)(f) the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) - requirements for the breach of each of these - whether there can be a breach of s 476(1)(a) where circumstances of the case require the Tribunal to seek out information on a particular issue of relevance to its decision
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 65, 420, 476
Judiciary Act 1901 (Cth) ss 78B
Constitution s 51
Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 1998 (Cth)Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1 cited
The Queen v Quinn; Ex parte Consolidated Foods Corporation (1977) 138 CLR 1 cited
Daubigny v Davallon (1794) 2 Anst 46; 145 ER 935 cited
Nolan v Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 165 CLR 178 cited
Robtelmes v Brenan (1906) 4 CLR 395 cited
Ex parte Lo Pak (1888) 9 NSWLR 221 cited
N44 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1127 applied
Marshood v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1415 applied
Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 cited
Lek v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1993) 45 FCR 418 cited
Commonwealth Banking Corporation v Percival (1988) 82 ALR 54 cited
Buljeta v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (Katz J, 4 December 1998, unreported) cited
Sun v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 81 FCR 71 cited
Sarbjit Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (Lockhart J, 18 October 1996, unreported) cited
Jia Le Geng v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs 52 ALD 20 and, on appeal, at [1999] FCA 951 cited
Minogue v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1999) 84 FCR 438 cited
Kopalapillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (O’Connor, Branson and Marshall JJ, 8 September 1998, unreported) cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (1997) 74 FCR 553 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 162 ALR 577; [1999] HCA 21 cited
Yilan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 854 citedBlay et al Public International Law - an Australian Perspective 1997
Plender International Migration Law 2nd ed (rev)LI YUQIN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N 67 OF 1999DRUMMOND J
19 JANUARY 2000
BRISBANE (HEARD IN SYDNEY) (VIA VIDEO LINK)
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 67 OF 1999
BETWEEN:
LI YUQIN
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
DRUMMOND J
DATE:
19 JANUARY 2000
PLACE:
BRISBANE (HEARD IN SYDNEY) (VIA VIDEO LINK)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application to review a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal which affirmed the decision…
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- Case
- [2000] FCA 19
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal had correctly interpreted and applied the law to the facts as found. Mr Li contended that the Tribunal failed to properly consider his claims regarding the denial of his right to work due to his political activities. He also argued that the Tribunal incorrectly applied the law by not considering other reasons for his unemployment, specifically his imprisonment for political activities. The court had to determine if the Tribunal's decision involved an error of law that warranted judicial review.
The court held that the Tribunal had indeed understood and considered the relevant law concerning the denial of work rights as a form of persecution. It found that the Tribunal had made explicit findings regarding Mr Li's attempts to find employment and his circumstances after release from imprisonment. The Tribunal's decision was based on these findings, and the court concluded that there was no reviewable error of law in the Tribunal's interpretation or application of the law to the facts as found. The court emphasized that the principle of fact-finding lies within the Tribunal's jurisdiction, and the error of law must relate to the application of the law to the facts as determined by the Tribunal.
The court dismissed Mr Li's appeal, affirming the Tribunal's decision. The Federal Court of Australia found that the Tribunal had correctly applied the relevant law to the facts as determined and that the application for review did not disclose any error of law warranting intervention.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by:
The applicant suggested that the Tribunal had failed to perform its duty of review in that it disposed of the case on the basis of a hypothetical factual scenario arrived at by rejecting the applicant as a credible witness and by then assuming, but not finding as established, a range of facts which did not reflect the totality of the applicant’s evidence. But it is, I think, clear from the Tribunal’s reasons that it did not avoid the necessary task of making the factual findings which it considered the evidence justified and equally clear that it disposed of the case on the basis of those factual findings.The claims to relief based on s 476(1) the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Section 476(1)(e): The applicant claims that the decision of the Tribunal involved an incorrect application of the law to the facts. Firstly, it is said that though the applicant gave evidence that after his imprisonment and dismissal from the police, the Communist Party did not allow him to work, the Tribunal “did not consider whether the denial of Mr Li’s right to work amounted to persecution for a political reason”. Secondly, it is said that, by finding that the refusal to give the applicant his father’s job did not indicate discrimination against him for a Convention reason in view of the abandonment of the practice of giving preference to children of former employees of State-run enterprises, the Tribunal incorrectly applied the law by failing to give consideration to whether the refusal of employment was due to another reason, viz, his imprisonment because of his political activities. Denial of work rights may constitute persecution for the purposes of the Convention. See, eg, Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 at 430 - 431; Lek v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1993) 45 FCR 418. There can be little doubt that the Tribunal understood this, given the attention it paid to the applicant’s claims that he was denied work because of his pro-democracy activities and the findings it made on those claims. Neither complaint is made out in so far as it may allege a reviewable error within the first limb of s 476(1)(e), viz, an error involving an incorrect interpretation of the applicable law. The main thrust of these complaints appears to be that the Tribunal’s decision involves reviewable error of law within the second limb of s 476(1)(e). But that ground of review is only available where the Tribunal has found certain facts and has incorrectly applied the law to those particular facts. The narrowness of this ground of review reflects the principle that fact finding is the province of the Tribunal, not the Court. Error of law within s 476(1)(e) is not made out by pointing to the Tribunal’s failure to find facts just as it is not shown by pointing to errors in fact-finding by the Tribunal. Cf Commonwealth Banking Corporation v Percival (1988) 82 ALR 54 at 60. The Tribunal made a precise finding with respect to the applicant’s attempts to find employment after his release from imprisonment:“After his dismissal and detention, he had to report to the Authorities for a time, he was demoralised, and he did not seek a job, apart from his father’s job which, consistent with the country information that there is no longer job preference given to children of employees in state-run enterprises, he was refused.”