Dabarera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Dabarera v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1390

MIGRATION ­– visa – protection visa – applications by two brothers for review of decisions not to grant visas – applications made one year apart but heard by one RRT member on same day – evidence of each brother in his case not taken into account in other brother’s case – whether cases required to be joined – whether RRT failed to look to the future – whether RRT ignored issue of membership of a particular social group – whether RRT dealt with cases on the basis on which they were put – whether RRT misapprehended the source of the violence feared by the applicants – whether error of law not to take into account evidence of each brother in relation to the other brother’s case – whether RRT found nonexistent fact that applicants bound to set out their whole case at the earliest stage – whether statement that there was “no evidence” about a matter when applicant had given evidence about it a finding of a particular fact – whether findings of lack of knowledge when evidence about matters had been given were findings of particular facts – whether decisions affected by actual bias – unfairness to applicants not within grounds for judicial review – whether applicants should be ordered to pay costs

WORDS AND PHRASES – “in respect of the same non-citizen”

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5(1), 36(1), 36(2), 65, 363(2), 411(1)(c), 420(2)(b), 424A, 425, 427(1), 427(2), 430(1), 475(1)(b), 476(1)(a), 476(1)(b), 476(1)(c), 476(1)(d), 476(1)(e), 476(1)(f), 476(3), 496(1)
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act1977 s 5

Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shang Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 cited
Eshetu v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1997) 71 FCR 300 cited
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611 cited
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Singh [2000] FCA 845 (2000) 98 FCR 469 cited
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30 (2001) 180 ALR 1 applied
Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia [1999] HCA 14 (1999) 197 CLR 510 cited
ReMinister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Epeabaka [2001] HCA 23 (2001) 179 ALR 296 cited
Sun Zhan Qui vMinister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1997) 81 FCR 71 cited Thevendram vMinister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1910 cited

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Al-Miahi [2001] FCA 744 cited
Al-Asam vMinister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1361 cited

Fernando v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 962 cited
Vichlenkova v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1338 cited
Kathiresan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (Federal Court of Australia, Gray J, 4 March 1998, unreported) cited
Applicant “F” vMinister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 304 cited

Win vMinister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 56 (2001) 105 FCR 212 cited

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 1390
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Dabarera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involved the applicants, Lionel Dabarera and another individual, who sought judicial review of decisions made by the Migration Review Tribunal (the Tribunal). The applicants challenged the Tribunal's findings and conclusions on several grounds, including the Tribunal's use of evidence, the notion of a "no evidence" ground, and the Tribunal's overall approach and bias. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with examining the merits of the applicants' claims.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal erred in its use of evidence, whether it based its decisions on nonexistent facts, and whether the Tribunal exhibited bias in its approach. The applicants argued that the Tribunal did not give them a fair hearing and that the Tribunal's decisions were influenced by its predisposition to find against the applicants. Additionally, the applicants claimed that the Tribunal erred in its handling of evidence and in its interpretation of the "no evidence" ground.

In examining the applicants' arguments, the court found that while the Tribunal's approach raised concerns, it did not amount to invincibly biased decision-making. The court held that the Tribunal's approach was more that of a contradictor rather than an impartial investigator. However, the court was limited in its ability to set aside the Tribunal's decisions based on the narrow grounds available under section 476 of the Migration Act. Consequently, the court was unable to grant relief to the applicants on any of the grounds presented.

The court dismissed the applicants' applications for judicial review, finding that the Tribunal's decisions were not tainted by invincibility of bias or other errors warranting intervention. The court did not order costs against the applicants, considering it inappropriate to further compound the unfairness they had experienced.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. There be no order as to costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Tribunal was using the information it obtained to evaluate the truth of the applicants’ claims as to what had happened to them. The information was relevant to that issue. Counsel was unable to point to any obligation on the Tribunal to seek out, or to act upon, more recent information.The “no evidence” ground In three respects, counsel for the applicants attempted to argue that the Tribunal based its decision on nonexistent facts, and therefore that the “no evidence” ground in s 476(1)(g) was made out. First, the Tribunal in some instances rejected the evidence of the applicants as recent invention, saying that it would have expected the particular allegations to have been raised at an earlier stage if they had been true. Counsel for the applicants argued that this process amounted to a finding of fact that the applicants were required to articulate the whole of their cases prior to the hearing. That fact did not exist, because the whole point of a hearing is to enable an applicant for review to expand upon the material provided in his or her case. The applicants relied on Guden v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 236 (2000) 58 ALD 352. In that case, a Full Court concluded that the Tribunal had found a nonexistent fact, namely that the particular applicant for review was required to set out, in effect, the whole of his case which bore upon the issue of his persecution. That case can be distinguished from the present on the basis of fact. In the present case, the Tribunal made no such finding. Nothing that it said gave any indication that it expected that the applicants would have set out their whole case earlier. All it did was to evaluate some specific aspects of each applicant’s evidence, taking into account its view that the nature of the evidence suggested that, if true, it would have seen the light of day earlier. It was open to the Tribunal to adopt this course. Second, counsel for the applicants referred to instances in which the Tribunal said that there was “no evidence” of a particular fact when it had the evidence of the applicant concerned in relation to that fact. In so doing, the argument went, the Tribunal based its decision on the nonexistent fact that there was no evidence of the claimed fact that it rejected. Plainly, this argument cannot succeed. The use of the phrase “no evidence” was perhaps unfortunate when the Tribunal really meant no corroborating evidence. The use of the phrase “no evidence” cannot amount to a finding of fact that there was no evidence. In its context, the phrase was clearly used to indicate that the Tribunal was evaluating the evidence of the applicant concerned. Third, the Tribunal found that Lionel Dabarera displayed a lack of knowledge in relation to an issue described as the taxi wars electorate. Counsel for the applicants attempted to contend that there was no evidence to support this finding. This argument is nothing more than an attempt to engage in merits review. The finding was open to the Tribunal. It may have been wrong, but the Court does not have the power to correct wrong findings of fact. In any event, even if there were a finding of a nonexistent fact, the Tribunal did not base its decision on that fact.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GRAY J
There is no doubt that an examination of the Tribunal’s reasons, and of the way in which it conducted its hearings, gives rise to considerable disquiet about the approach of the Tribunal. It is clear that neither applicant had what could be regarded as a fair hearing. If it were open to the Court to set aside the decisions of the Tribunal on the ground that a reasonable bystander might apprehend that the Tribunal was not approaching the cases of the applicants impartially, there would be little doubt that the applicants would succeed. As I have said, that is not the test. I am not able to go so far as to say that the Tribunal’s approach gives rise to a finding that it was invincibly biased. Rather, my impression is that the Tribunal set out to ensure that each applicant would be found not to be a person to whom Australia owes protection obligations, if it could reach such a conclusion. This leaves open the possibility that the Tribunal would have found in favour of the applicants if it had been persuaded, against its inclination, that their cases were good. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the Tribunal was invincibly biased.Conclusion I am therefore forced to find that neither applicant has made out a case for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision relating to him on any ground available under s 476 of the Migration Act. It causes me no happiness to reach this conclusion. It is plain to me that the Tribunal did not give either applicant a fair go. It strayed from the role of impartial investigator of the applicants’ claims into the role of contradictor. Under the principles of law applying to other tribunals, its decisions would have been set aside. It is only the narrowness of the grounds available under s 476 of the Migration Act that prevents this from occurring. This is not a situation in which a judge is able to feel comfortable with the result. It may be a case in which it would be appropriate for the Minister to exercise his power under s 48B of the Migration Act to permit a further application for a protection visa to be made by each applicant. The order of the Court will be that each application be dismissed. In the circumstances, I do not think that it would be proper to award costs against the applicants. Such an order would only compound the unfairness to them.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GRAY J

Full text does not contain this section.