FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 836
MIGRATION – Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether paragraph 65(1)(b) invalid as conferring judicial power contrary to Chapter III of Constitution – whether paragraph 415(2)(a), as applies to decision to refuse to grant protection visa, invalid as conferring judicial power contrary to Chapter III of Constitution – whether Migration Act gives refugee right to enter or remain in Australia – nature of regulation of entry of non-citizens – whether Refugees Convention incorporated into municipal law – need for satisfaction of Minister – whether interpretation of laws and instruments exclusively judicial function – whether Refugee Review Tribunal exercises judicial power of Commonwealth
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
T v Immigration Officer [1996] AC 742, referred to
Nolan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 165 CLR 178, cited
Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1, cited
Reg v Kirby; ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, cited
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273, followed
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade v Magno (1992) 37 FCR 298, cited
Attorney-General (Cth) v Breckler (1999) 163 ALR 576, cited
Re Cram; Ex parte Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co Pty Ltd (1987) 163 CLR 140, followed
Re Ranger Uranium Mines Pty Ltd; Ex parte Federated Miscellaneous Workers’ Union of Australia (1987) 163 CLR 656, followed
N44 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1127, cited
Marshood v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1415, cited
Li v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 19, cited
Lu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 40, cited
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 485, citedSZ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, AUSTRALIAN CUSTOMS SERVICE, DIRECTOR, AUSTRALIAN PROTECTIVE SERVICE, COMMISSIONER OF THE AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE, PRINCIPAL MEMBER OF THE REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
N 190 of 2000BEAUMONT, BRANSON & LEHANE JJ
SYDNEY
22 JUNE 2000
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 190 of 2000
BETWEEN:
SZ
ApplicantAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First RespondentSECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Second RespondentCHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, AUSTRALIAN CUSTOMS SERVICE
Third RespondentDIRECTOR, AUSTRALIAN PROTECTIVE SERVICE
Fourth RespondentCOMMISSIONER OF THE AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE
Fifth RespondentPRINCIPAL MEMBER OF THE REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Sixth RespondentJUDGES:
BEAUMONT, BRANSON and LEHANE JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
22 JUNE 2000
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The questions reserved for the consideration of the Full Court be answered as follows:
Question:Is paragraph 65(1)(b) of the [Migration Act 1958 (Cth)] invalid as conferring judicial power contrary to Chapter III of the Constitution?
Answer: No.
Question:Is paragraph 415(2)(a), in so far as it applies…
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- Case
- [2000] FCA 836
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues addressed in the case concern the validity of paragraphs 65(1)(b) and 415(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Paragraph 65(1)(b) relates to the Minister’s power to refuse a protection visa, while paragraph 415(2)(a) pertains to the powers of the Refugee Review Tribunal in reviewing such decisions. The Court was required to determine whether these provisions improperly confer judicial power on non-judicial bodies, thereby contravening the separation of powers doctrine enshrined in the Constitution.
The Court found that neither paragraph 65(1)(b) nor paragraph 415(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) is invalid as conferring judicial power contrary to Chapter III of the Constitution. The Court reasoned that the provisions do not contravene the separation of powers doctrine as they do not impose judicial functions on non-judicial bodies. The Tribunal’s role in reviewing visa decisions is administrative, not judicial, and the powers conferred by the Act are consistent with the legislative framework. The Court also noted that the Refugees Convention does not create a right of asylum, and Australia retains the discretion to decide which non-citizens it allows to remain within its territory.
The Full Court has provided its answers to the reserved questions as follows: both paragraph 65(1)(b) and paragraph 415(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) are valid and do not confer judicial power in a manner that contravenes Chapter III of the Constitution. The decisions of the delegate and the Tribunal, therefore, remain intact, affirming the Minister’s power to refuse a protection visa and the Tribunal’s limited role in reviewing such decisions.
Orders
Orders of the court
The questions reserved for the consideration of the Full Court be answered as follows:
Question: Is paragraph 65(1)(b) of the [Migration Act 1958 (Cth)] invalid as conferring judicial power contrary to Chapter III of the Constitution?
Answer: No.
Question: Is paragraph 415(2)(a), in so far as it applies to a decision to refuse to grant a protection visa, invalid as conferring judicial power contrary to Chapter III of the Constitution?
Answer: No.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Section 411 of the Act provides that certain decisions made under the Act, including a decision to refuse to grant a protection visa, are reviewable by the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”). The powers of the Tribunal when conducting a review are specified by s 415 of the Act which provides:“(1)The Tribunal may, for the purposes of the review of an RRT-reviewable decision, exercise all powers and discretions that are conferred by this Act on the person who made the decision.(2)The Tribunal may:(a)affirm the decision; or(b)vary the decision; or(c)if the decision relates to a prescribed matter – remit the matter for reconsideration in accordance with such directions or recommendations of the Tribunal as are permitted by the regulations; or(d)set the decision aside and substitute a new decision.(3)If the Tribunal:(a)varies the decision; or(b)sets aside the decision and substitutes a new decision;the decision as varied or substituted is taken (except for the purpose of appeals from decisions of the Tribunal) to be a decision of the Minister.(4)To avoid doubt, the Tribunal must not, by varying a decision or setting a decision aside and substituting a new decision, purport to make a decision that is not authorised by the Act or the regulations”CONSIDERATION The contentions of the applicant were unequivocally based on the assumption that if he is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention he has a right of asylum in Australia. This assumption is not well founded. The Refugees Convention provides a definition of the term “refugee” in Article 1, but does not create any general right in a refugee to enter and remain in the territory of a Contracting State. This was recognised by Lord Mustill in T v Immigration Officer [1996] AC 742 at 754 where his Lordship observed:“… although it is easy to assume that the appellant invokes a ‘right of asylum’, no such right exists. Neither under international law nor English municipal law does a fugitive have any direct right to insist on being received by a country of refuge. Subject only to qualifications created by statute this country is entirely free to decide, as a matter of executive discretion, what foreigners it allows to remain within its boundaries.” The position is the same in Australia under both international law and municipal law. The position under the Refugees Convention is mentioned above. As is explained below, the Act does not give to a person who falls within the definition of “refugee” in the Refugees Convention any right to enter or remain in Australia. The applicant understandably has not sought to challenge the constitutional validity of the Act generally. By s 51(xix) of the Constitution the Commonwealth Parliament is given power, subject to the Constitution, to make laws with respect to “aliens”. The term “alien” within the meaning of the Constitution is synonymous with the term “non-citizen” within the meaning of the Act (Nolan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 165 CLR 178).