NABM v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NABM of 2001 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 335

MIGRATION – application for review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal affirming a decision of Minister’s delegate not to grant a protection visa – whether Tribunal committed reviewable error of law in failing to consider previous determinations of the Tribunal – where applicant Ukraine citizen of Greek Catholic faith – no reviewable error disclosed

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth)
Migration Legislation Amendment (Procedural Fairness) Bill 2002 (Cth)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)

Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510 cited
Ahamed v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1325 cited
Darling Casino Ltd v NSW Casino Control Authority (1997) 191 CLR 602 cited
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Richard Walter Pty Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 168 cited
Foxtel Management Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2000) 173 ALR 362 cited
Grain Elevators Board (Vic) v Dunmunkle Corporation (1946) 73 CLR 70 cited
Luu v Renevier (1989) 91 ALR 39 cited
Luu v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1875 cited
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah (2001) 75 ALJR 889 cons
NAAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 263 followed
NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 281 cited
NACA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 63 cited
Prasad v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155 followed
R v Commonwealth Rent Controller;  Ex parte National Mutual Life Association of
Australasia Ltd (1947) 75 CLR 361 cited
R v Hickman;  Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 followed
Rahman v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1277 cons
Randhawa v MILGEA (1994) 52 FCR 437 cons
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2001) 204 CLR 82 cons
SAAA v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 101 cons
SBBM v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 183 cons
SZ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 101 FCR 342 followed
Vanmeld Pty Ltd v Fairfield City Council (1999) 46 NSWLR 78 cited
Walton v Philip Ruddock, The Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1839 cons
R v Coldham; Ex parte Australian Workers’ Union (1983) 153 CLR 415 cited
O’Toole v Charles David Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 232 cited

NABM OF 2001 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
NO. N 1515 OF 2001

BEAUMONT J
26 MARCH 2002
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1515 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

NABM OF 2001
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

BEAUMONT J

DATE OF ORDER:

26 MARCH 2002

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 335
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of NABM v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, a non-citizen, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The central dispute was whether the RRT's decision, which was subject to a privative clause, could be reviewed by the court on the basis that it failed to consider relevant evidence or provided inadequate reasons. The respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, argued that the privative clause precluded any court review of the RRT's decision, except in limited circumstances.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the privative clause in s 474 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) precluded judicial review of the RRT's decision in the present case. The court considered whether the RRT's decision was beyond power or not a bona fide attempt to act within its authority, and whether the failure to consider certain evidence constituted a jurisdictional error. The respondent submitted that the RRT's decision was valid and that the privative clause effectively precluded judicial review unless the decision was clearly beyond power.

The court, in its reasoning, held that the privative clause in s 474 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) did preclude judicial review of the RRT's decision, except in limited circumstances where the decision was beyond power or not a bona fide attempt to act within its authority. The court found that the RRT's decision was a bona fide attempt to exercise its power and was not beyond power. The applicant's argument that the RRT failed to consider relevant evidence did not amount to a jurisdictional error or an error of law sufficient to invalidate the decision. Consequently, the court dismissed the applicant's application and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

BEAUMONT J
Despite the literal breadth of the wording of s 474, the respondent acknowledges that the provision cannot operate fully according to those terms. In its written submissions the respondent discusses the effect of the privative clause on the current proceedings in the following terms:“Privative Clause Decision13.The decision of the Tribunal is subject to the regime in Part 8 of the Act enacted by the Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001, which commenced on 2 October 2001.14.The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to s39B of the Judiciary Act, and no jurisdiction is provided for by any other statute: see ss 475A, 477.15.The Tribunal’s decision is a privative clause decision within the meaning of s474(2) of the Act. The effect is that s474(1) provides that the decision is final and conclusive, cannot be challenged or reviewed or called in question in any court and is not subject to prohibition mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account.16.Despite the literal breadth of this provision and its formulation as a clause ousting the jurisdiction of the courts, review may nevertheless take place, albeit in limited circumstances. The scope of such review is limited by the principles enunciated by Dixon J in R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 at 616:‘It is, of course, quite impossible for the Parliament to give power to any judicial or other authority which goes beyond the subject matter of the legislative power conferred by the Constitution. […] It is equally impossible for the legislature to impose limits upon the quasi-judicial authority of a body which it sets up with the intention that any excess of that authority means invalidity, and yet, at the same time, to deprive this court of authority to restrain the invalid action of the court or body by prohibition. But where the legislature confers authority subject to limitations, and at the same time enacts a [privative clause], it becomes a question of interpretation of the whole legislative instrument whether transgression of the limits, so long as done bona fide and bearing on its face every appearance of an attempt to pursue the power, necessarily spells an invalidity. In my opinion, the application of these principles [in this case] means that any decision given by a Local Reference Board which upon its face appears to be within power and is in fact a bona fide attempt to act in the course of its authority, shall not be regarded as invalid.’17.In R v Murray; Ex parte Proctor (1949) 77 CLR 387, at 399-400, Dixon J elaborated on the principles relevant to a privative clause in the following terms:‘We are familiar with the distinction between provisions that are directory and those that are mandatory. The distinction supplies an analogy which may help to explain the effect of [the relevant privative clause]. For construed in the traditional manner it must be taken to mean that strict compliance with at least some of the provisions [regulating the conduct of the relevant Board] is not an indispensable condition to the jurisdiction of the Board and to its authority to make a valid and binding award, order or determination. There is necessarily an appearance of inconsistency between a provision which defines and restricts the power of a tribunal and prescribes the course it must pursue and a provision which says that the validity of its decrees shall not be challenged or called in question on any account whatsoever.The apparent inconsistency should be resolved by an attempt to arrive at the true intention of the legislative document containing the two provisions considered as a whole. The first step in such a process of interpretation is to apply to [the privative clause] the traditional or established interpretation which makes the protection it purports to afford inapplicable unless there has been an honest attempt to deal with a subject matter confided to the tribunal and to act in pursuance of the powers of the tribunal in relation to something that might reasonably be regarded as falling within its province. There is nothing artificial in such an interpretation. For it could hardly be supposed, to take perhaps an extreme example, that it was intended that [the relevant privative clause] should give validity and protection to the awards of a tribunal established in relation to one industry when the tribunal intentionally stepped outside its allotted industrial field and proceeded to regulate an entirely different industry. A second step in interpreting the whole legislative instrument must be to consider whether particular limitations on power and specific requirements as to the manner in which the Tribunal shall be constituted or shall exercise its power are so expressed that they may be taken to mean that observance of the limitations and compliance with the requirements are essential to valid action. For a clearly expressed specific intention of this kind can hardly give way to the general intention indicated by [a privative clause]’.18.For the Applicant to successfully impugn the Tribunal’s decision, she must therefore establish one of three conditions. The first, which is clearly not satisfied in the present case, is that the constitutional authority of the Parliament to define the powers of the decision-maker has been overstepped. Alternatively, it must be shown that the exercise of power was unrelated to the subject matter of the legislation. That condition is also clearly not satisfied in this case: the Tribunal was dealing with a review of a decision of a delegate refusing to grant a protection visa. That is clearly related, indeed, integral to the relevant subject matter of the legislation. The third alternative is to show that the decision made was, on its face, beyond power or was not a bona fide attempt to act in the course of the delegate’s authority. There is no basis for such a proposition to be put.19.The ‘second step’ enunciated by Dixon J in Ex parte Proctor raises an issue of validity. It reflects the terminology often associated with the establishment of ‘jurisdictional error’ on the part of a tribunal (see for example, Re Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000)74 ALJR 405, McHugh J at [29]-[31]; City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ at [20]; and Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte HB [2001] HCA 34, Kirby J at [10]). In Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 74 ALJR 1348, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Hayne JJ stated, at [31]:‘There would only have been jurisdictional error on the part of the Full Bench if it had misconceived its role or if, in terms used by Jordan CJ in Ex parte Hebburn Ltd; Re Kearsley Shire Council, it ‘misunder[stood] the nature of [its] jurisdiction […] or misconceive[d] its duty’ or ‘[failed] to apply itself to the question which [s45 of the Act] prescribes’ […] or ‘[misunderstood] the nature of the opinion which it [was] to form’ ’. (footnotes omitted)20.It is, however, misleading to simply adopt statements in relation to jurisdictional error made in the context of applications for constitutional writs or prerogative relief absent any privative clause. The description of an exercise of power as involving jurisdictional error means merely that it is beyond power. In dealing with the effect of a privative clause, the question is much narrower, namely whether, despite the general terms of the privative clause, compliance with the obligation in question must have been intended to be an essential precondition to the exercise of power. In the present case, no failure of compliance with any essential requirement has been identified.21.…22.It is submitted that if the Hickman principles are applied to the facts of this case, there is no basis for intervention by the Court.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BEAUMONT J

As noted above, before this Court, the applicant now also seeks to rely on the former s 476(1)(e) of the Act, in that the Tribunal failed to take into account, or to refer in its reasons, to certain relevant considerations to be found in material apparently not before the Tribunal at the time the decision was made. In order to understand the issues which now arise, it will be necessary to set out the submissions, dated 27 February 2002, now relied upon by the applicant, as follows:“1.The Tribunal accepted that I have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention-related reason (see p. 10 of the decision).2.The Tribunal’s negative decision was based on its finding that I would be able to relocate within the Ukraine.3.I would like to refer to the Tribunal’s decision of 17 October 2000 (RRT File No: N99/29809). In ‘Independent evidence’ it was mentioned the following:‘The Ukrainian Constitution provides for freedom of movement within the country, foreign travel, relocation. However, the Government has not yet fulfilled its pledge to abolish mandatory registration – the ‘propiska’ system and to replace it with an information residence register. Under the current registration system, all internal passports contain a stamp indicating residence and matrimonial status’.‘Human rights groups reported an increasing number of cases of persons being stripped of their residence registration, evicted from their homes, and made homeless through criminal fraud or court error. Police also arbitrary [sic] detain persons for extensive documents [sic] checks and vehicle inspections (source: 1999 Country Report on Human Rights Practices)’.The Tribunal member also stated:‘…were the applicant to return to Ukraine, no matter where she chose to live, she would be obliged by law to register her whereabouts with the militia in order to obtain a ‘propiska’. Given the militia’s previous treatment of her, which included regular personal harassment, it is not unreasonable to expect that, upon her return and her whereabouts becoming known, such actions would not continue. The Tribunal is therefore satisfied that the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of a political opinion attributed to her by the militia’.4.I would also like to refer to another Tribunal’s decision of 15 August 2001 (RRT File No: N00/32102). The Tribunal stated:‘…that the requirement for propiska, registration of residence with the Ukraine Government, remains current in Ukraine (source – US State Department Report on Human Rights practices, 2000. Published in February 2001), which means that the applicant would be required to return to his former registered place of residence, where he would be quite well-known by the authorities, or to apply for a new propiska. Given these circumstances the Tribunal was satisfied that there was a real chance that the applicant on return would be questioned by the authorities…’The Tribunal concludes:‘… there is a real chance that he would be subjected again to harassment from the authorities which would again be sufficiently serious as to amount to persecution in a convention sense’.5.In my case the Tribunal was clearly in error in stating that ‘relocation to another part of the Ukraine is reasonable’. All Tribunal’s reasons outlined in p 11 of the decision are irrelevant. It is irrelevant whether I have relatives in other part of the Ukraine; or that I am not restricted by the nature of my qualification; or that I previously moved to another city to undertake studies and etc. The relevant issue is – there is a registration system (propiska) in place in the Ukraine, which might be obtained only through militia, e.g. authority which was the main threat to my safety.6.The Tribunal failed to refer in any detail to the material mentioned above. Therefore, the decision of the Tribunal involved an error of law contrary to s 476(1)(e) of the Act, in that it failed to provide a written statement of its decision and reasons, setting out its findings on material questions of fact and referring to the evidence or any other material on which those findings were based, contrary to s 430.”RECENT AMENDMENTS TO THE MIGRATION ACT