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Grain Elevators Board (Vic) v Dunmunkle Corporation

Grain Elevators Board (Vic) v Dunmunkle Corporation

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Case Copied 31 May 1946 45 min read

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73 CLR 70

GRAIN ELEVATORS BOARD (VICTORIA)

PRESIDENT, COUNCILLORS AND RATE-

PAYERS OF THE SHIRE OF DUN- MUNKLE

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF Local Government (Vict.)-Rating-Exemption- Land the property of His Majesty

used for public purposes -Land owned and occupied by statutory corporation--Functions of corporation-Grain Elevators Acts 1934- MELBOURNE,

1943 (No. 4270-No. 4946) (Vict.)-Local Government Act 1928 (No. 3720) May 14, 31.

Under the Grain Elevators Act 1934 (Vict.) a Board was constituted as a body corporate, capable of suing and being sued and of taking and disposing of real and personal property, for the purpose of "the handling of grain in bulk by means of the elevator system." It was subject in some respects to executive control, but it also had independent discretionary powers. The members of the Board were appointed, and could be removed from office, by the Governor in Council. The Board had power to appoint and dismiss its own officers, none of whom (nor the members of the Board) were to be subject to the Public Service Act 1928 (Vict.). It had its own separate fund into which it was to pay all moneys received by it; its accounts were audited in accord- ance with the statutes relating to the audit of public accounts. It had power to borrow on overdraft up to a specified limit, and a further power, with the consent of the Governor in Council, to borrow moneys on the security of its revenues by the issue of debentures. It had power, with the approval of the Minister of Agriculture, to acquire existing grain elevators and appurtenances, to construct elevators and appurtenances, and to operate, maintain and control the same. It was empowered to acquire land, by agreement or com- pulsorily, for the purposes of the Act and to store in elevators under its control all grain of prescribed quality offered for that purpose it was required to

73 CLR 71

afford all reasonable, proper and equal facilities for the storage of grain in elevators under its control and for the receiving, forwarding and delivery of grain SO stored, and was empowered to sell surplus grain, to buy grain and to do such other acts as were incidental to the exercise of any of its powers. It also had power to make by-laws (subject to confirmation by the Governor in Council) for the purposes of the Act generally and, in particular, for the opera- tion, management, control and maintenance of its elevators, and for scales of charges for the handling and storage of grain in its elevators.

Held, by Latham C.J., Starke, Dixon, McTiernan and Williams JJ. (Rich J. dissenting), that land acquired by the Board for the purposes of the Act was not "land the property of His Majesty SO as to come within the exemption from rating provided by S. 249 (1) of the Local Government Act 1928 (Vict.).

Decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Herring C.J.): Dunmunkle V. Grain Elevators Board, (1946) V.L.R. 190, affirmed.

APPEAL from…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [1946] HCA 13
Decision Date: 31 May 1946

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Grain Elevators Board (Victoria) appealed to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The dispute concerned the Shire of Dunmunkle's right to levy rates on land owned and occupied by the Board, which housed grain elevators and associated machinery. The Board contended that the land was exempt from rating under section 249(1) of the Local Government Act 1928 (Vic.) as "land the property of His Majesty which is used for public purposes."

The legal issues before the High Court were whether the land owned and occupied by the Grain Elevators Board was "land the property of His Majesty" and, if so, whether it was used for public purposes. The Board argued that its functions were governmental and that it acted as a trustee for the Crown, thus making the land Crown property. The Shire contended that the Board was an independent statutory body with its own discretionary powers, not merely an agent of the Crown.

A majority of the High Court (Latham C.J., Starke, Dixon, McTiernan, and Williams JJ.) held that the land was not the property of His Majesty for the purposes of the exemption. The Court reasoned that while the Board had extensive powers and was subject to some governmental oversight, it operated with significant independent discretion in its day-to-day functions, particularly in the storage and handling of grain. The Court noted that the Board was a body corporate with its own fund, capable of suing and being sued, and that its powers were not directly controlled by a Minister. The existence of specific exemptions for other statutory bodies in section 249(3) of the Local Government Act, and the absence of a similar exemption for the Board, along with the limited nature of a later statutory exemption, further supported the conclusion that the Board was not acting as an agent of the Crown in a way that would render its land Crown property.

The appeal was dismissed, affirming the decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria. Rich J. dissented, finding that the Board was sufficiently under the control of the Minister to be considered a branch or department of the Government, and therefore its land was the property of His Majesty used for public purposes.

Orders