Workers' Compensation Regulator v Langridge

Case [2025] ICQ 8

INDUSTRIAL COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Workers’ Compensation Regulator v Langridge [2025] ICQ 008

PARTIES:

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION REGULATOR

(appellant)
v
MICHAEL PAUL LANGRIDGE

(respondent)

FILE NO:

C/2021/15

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

DELIVERED ON:

17 June 2025

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

21 October 2021

MEMBER:

Davis J, President

ORDERS:

1.    Appeal allowed.

2.    The decision of the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission is set aside.

3.    The parties file and exchange submissions on cots by 4 pm on 25 June 2025.

4.     Each party may apply for leave to make oral submissions on costs by filing and serving such an application by 4 pm on 9 July 2025, failing which the question of costs will be determined without further oral hearing.

CATCHWORDS:

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION – ALTERNATIVE RIGHTS AGAINST EMPLOYER AND/OR THIRD PARTIES AND CONSEQUENCES THEREOF – ACTIONS FOR DAMAGES AGAINST EMPLOYER – STATUTORY CONSTRAINT ON ACTIONS FOR DAMAGES – PROCEDURAL MATTERS – GENERALLY – where the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 limited a right to action for common law damages to a “worker” who had an “injury” that was assessed – where the insurer would refer an injury for assessment upon application by the “worker” – where the respondent made application for assessment of an injury – where the respondent applied for assessment in the prescribed way – where the insurer determined that the injury was not an “injury” as defined by the legislation – where the insurer refused to refer the injury for assessment – where the respondent asserted that it was no part of the insurer’s role to determine whether he had an “injury” – where the respondent asserted that the insurer was obliged to refer the injury if the respondent applied in the prescribed way – where the Workers’ Compensation Regulator affirmed the decision of the insurer – where the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission set aside that decision – where the Regulator appealed the decision of the Commission – whether the function of the insurer included determining whether a “worker” had suffered an “injury”   

Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld), s 9, s 11, s 32, s 108, s 131, s 132, s 132A, s 134, s 179, s 180, s 184, s 185, s 237, s 257, s 258, s 275, sch 6

Allina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 28 FCR 203; [1991] FCA 87, considered
City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135; [2000] HCA 5, cited
Gates v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 1; [1986] HCA 3, cited
Grain Elevators Board (Vic) v Dunmunkle Shire (1946) 73 CLR 70; [1986] HCA 3, cited
Interlego AG v Croner Trading Pty Ltd (1992) 39 FCR 348; [1992] FCA 992, considered
Langridge v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2019] QIRC 048, related
Langridge v Workers’ Compensation Regulator [2021] QIRC 251, related
Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Thornton (2023) 276 CLR 136; [2023] HCA…

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Workers' Compensation Regulator v Langridge [2025] ICQ 8
Case
[2025] ICQ 8
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Workers' Compensation Regulator brought an appeal against the decision of the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission, which had set aside a decision of the Regulator. The appeal concerned the interpretation of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003. The central issue was whether the Regulator was required to refer Mr Langridge's injury for assessment, thereby enabling him to seek common law damages. The appeal hinged on whether the function of the insurer included determining whether a "worker" had suffered an "injury" as defined in the legislation. Mr Langridge argued that once he had applied to WorkCover in the prescribed manner, WorkCover was obliged to refer his injury for assessment. The Regulator contended that the insurer was entitled to determine whether an injury fell within the definition of "injury" in the legislation.

The court considered the statutory language and legislative history to ascertain the meaning of the relevant provisions. It held that the statutory language made it clear that the insurer had a role in determining whether an applicant qualified as a "worker" who had suffered an "injury" within the meaning of the Act. This was because the insurer was required to make a decision on the application, and to reject it if the insurer was satisfied that the applicant was not a "worker" or had not sustained an "injury". The court held that the 2013 amendments to the legislation did not alter this position. The court held that the Commission had erred in its construction of the relevant provisions. The court set aside the decision of the Commission and allowed the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. The decision of the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission is set aside.

3. The parties file and exchange submissions on cots by 4 pm on 25 June 2025.

4. Each party may apply for leave to make oral submissions on costs by filing and serving such an application by 4 pm on 9 July 2025, failing which the question of costs will be determined without further oral hearing.

Background

Background to the litigation

If Mr Langridge’s position is the correct one, then once he has lodged an application with WorkCover in a form prescribed by s 132A(3), WorkCover must refer his injury for assessment without further consideration, thus opening the gateway to the right to claim common law damages in court proceedings.Background In 2014, Mr Langridge was employed by the State as a Building Construction Labourer with the Department of Transport and Main Roads. He claims that while working in August or September 2014 he suffered a “cervical spine C5/C6/C7 cord compression” injury. He claims that the injury left him with a degree of permanent impairment. Mr Langridge lodged an application with WorkCover in reliance upon s 132A of the WCR Act, as it stood at the time of the injury. That section then provided:“132A Applying for assessment of DPI[7] before applying for compensation[7]“DPI, for an injury of a worker, means an estimate, expressed as a percentage of the degree of the worker’s permanent impairment assessed and decided in accordance with the GEPI” and “GEPI means the Guidelines for the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment made under section 183”; Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003, Reprint current as at 1 July 2014, sch 6, definition of “DPI” and “GEPI”. (1)This section applies to a worker who has not made an application under section 132.(2)The worker may apply to the insurer to have the worker’s injury assessed under section 179 to decide if the worker’s injury has resulted in a DPI.(3)An application under subsection (1) must be—(a) lodged with the insurer; and(b) in the approved form; and(c) accompanied by—(i)a certificate in the approved form given by a doctor who attended the worker; and(ii)any other evidence or particulars prescribed under a regulation.(4)A registered dentist may issue the certificate mentioned in subsection (3)(c)(i) for an oral injury.(5)If the worker can not complete an application because of a physical or mental incapacity, someone else may complete it on the worker’s behalf.”[8][8]Reprint current as at 1 July 2014. Section 132A(1) refers to s 132. It is common ground that Mr Langridge had not made an application for compensation under s 132. He only made his application for assessment of permanent impairment pursuant to s 132A. WorkCover rejected Mr Langridge’s application on the basis that the injury alleged did not arise from his employment. In other words, he had not suffered an “injury” as defined in the WCR Act. When making its initial assessment, WorkCover relied upon s 132A as it appeared after amendments were made in 2015.[9] Section 132A, as it appeared after the 2015 amendments contained subsection (7). That provided:“(7)The insurer may reject the application only if satisfied the worker—(a) was not a worker when the injury was sustained; or(b) has not sustained an injury.”[10][9]Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2015; section 132A in that form appears in paragraph [42] of these reasons.[10]Reprint current as at 31 January 2015.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 134 provided for WorkCover to make a decision on any application:“134 Decision about application for compensation (1)A claimant’s application for compensation must be allowed or rejected in the first instance by the insurer.(2)The insurer must make a decision on the application within 20 business days after the application is made.(3)The insurer must notify the claimant of its decision on the application. (4)If the insurer rejects the application, the insurer must also, when giving the claimant notice of its decision, give the claimant written reasons for the decision and the information prescribed under a regulation. (5)Subsection (6) applies if the insurer does not make a decision on the application within the time stated in subsection (2).(6)The insurer must, within 5 business days after the end of the time stated in subsection (2), notify the claimant of its reasons for not making the decision and that the claimant may have the claimant’s application reviewed under chapter 13.”[27][27]Reprint current as at 1 July 2014 As can be seen from s 134(6), there were rights to review a decision by WorkCover to decline an application for compensation. Those review procedures were contained in Chapter 13. As earlier observed, while claims for common law damages are not “compensation” within the terms of the WCR Act, the legislation does regulate common law claims. As also already observed, the 2013 amendments introduced a DPI threshold for permanent disablement claims. This lead to consequential amendments to sections regulating claims for common law damages. Section 237 before the 2013 amendments provided:“237 General limitation on persons entitled to seek damages (1) The following are the only persons entitled to seek damages for an injury sustained by a worker— (a) the worker, if the worker— (i)has received a notice of assessment from the insurer for the injury; or (ii)has not received a notice of assessment for the injury, but— (A) has received a notice of assessment for any injury resulting from the same event (the assessed injury); and (B) for the assessed injury, the worker has a WRI[28] of 20% or more or, under section 239, the worker has elected to seek damages; [28]Defined as “Work Related Impairment”, sch 6; Reprint current as at 23 September 2013.(b) the worker, if the worker’s application for compensation was allowed and the injury has not been assessed for permanent impairment;(c) the worker, if— (i)the worker has lodged an application, for compensation for the injury, that is or has been the subject of a review or appeal under chapter 13; and (ii)the application has not been decided in or following the review or appeal; (d) the worker, if the worker has not lodged an application for compensation for the injury;(e) a dependant of the deceased worker, if the injury results in the worker’s death. (2) The entitlement of a worker, or a dependant of a deceased worker, to seek damages is subject to the provisions of this chapter. (3) If a worker— (a) is required under section 239 to make an election to seek damages for an injury; and (b) has accepted an offer of payment of lump sum compensation under chapter 3, part 10, division 3 for the injury; the worker is not entitled under subsection (1)(a)(ii) to seek damages. (4)However, subsection (3) does not prevent a worker from seeking damages under section 266.(5)To remove any doubt, it is declared that subsection (1) abolishes any entitlement of a person not mentioned in the subsection to seek damages for an injury sustained by a worker.”[29] (emphasis added)[29]Reprint current as at 23 September 2013.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Langridge submitted that where an assessment is made under s 179 for the purpose of a common law claim, s 237 is engaged, but, ultimately, questions as to whether the claimant is a “worker” who has suffered an “injury” are to be determined by the court who hears the action. This can be contrasted, it was submitted, to where the assessment is effected for the purposes of a lump sum compensation claim. There, he submitted, the determination of whether a claimant is a “worker” who has suffered an “injury” is determined as part of the assessment under s 180. This argument is strengthened, he submitted, by s 132A(12) as it appeared after the 2015 amendments. It is acknowledged by the Regulator that the assessment of entitlement to lump sum compensation is made under s 180, not s 132A or s 179.Consideration As earlier observed, the question is ultimately as to the proper construction of the relevant provisions of the WCR Act at the time of the injury to Mr Langridge.[44] That is a matter of law. As a matter of law there is only one proper construction of the provisions. It is therefore not necessary to identify how the Commission erred if it did. It is only necessary for this Court to properly construe the relevant provisions.[44]The provisions as appears in the Reprint current as at 29 October 2013. There is no contention as to the proper approach to statutory construction. The principles were authoritatively stated by the High Court in R v A2.[45] Those principles can be summarised by stating that the objective of statutory construction is to ascertain the meaning of the text adopted by the legislature, but read in the context of the statute as a whole against other relevant context and by reference to its purpose. Context includes relevant extrinsic material and legislative history. While it is ultimately the meaning of the actual words used by Parliament which is decisive, “[a] literal approach to construction, which requires the courts to obey the ordinary meaning or usage of the words of a provision even if the result is improbable, has long been eschewed by [the High Court]”.[46][45](2019) 269 CLR 507 at [32]-[37]; followed in Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Thornton (2023) 276 CLR 136 at [54].[46]R v A2 (2019) 269 CLR 507 at [32]. Section 132A(1), as it stood at the relevant time,[47] namely after the 2013 amendments, provides that the section applies to a “worker”. That term is defined by s 11.[48] By s 132A(2) the “worker” may apply to have the worker’s “injury” assessed. The term “injury” is defined by s 32.[49] [47]Appearing at paragraph [5] of these reasons.[48]Appearing at paragraph [16] of these reasons.[49]Appearing at paragraph [16] of these reasons. Reading the definitions of “worker” and “injury” into ss 132A(1) and (2) as it appeared after the 2013 amendments produces this result:Section 132A(1): “This section applies to a person who works under a contract and is an employee for the purpose of assessment for PAYG withholding, who has not made an application under s 132.” Section 132A(2): “The person who works under a contract and is an employee for the purposes of assessment for PAYG withholding may apply to the insurer to have [his] personal injury arising out of, or in the course of employment if the employment is a significant contributing factor to the injury, assessed under s 179 to decide if [his] injury has resulted in a DPI.”