R v Trade Practices Tribunal; ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

McTiernan, Kitto, Menzies, Windeyer, Owen and Walsh JJ.

THE QUEEN v. TRADE PRACTICES TRIBUNAL; Ex parte TASMANIAN BREWERIES PTY. LTD.

(1970) 123 CLR 361

24 March 1970

Constitutional Law (Cth)—Restraint of Trade

Constitutional Law (Cth)—Powers of Commonwealth Parliament—Judicial power of Commonwealth—Trade Practices Tribunal—Power to determine that agreement or practice examinable and whether contrary to public interest—Agreement or practice rendered unenforceable by determination—Power to make restraining order—The Constitution (63 &64 Vict. c. 12), ss. 51 (i.), 71, 72—Trade Practices Act 1965-1968 (Cth), ss. 47, 49, 50, 52. Restraint of Trade—Restrictive practices—Trade Practices Tribunal—Whether vested with judicial power of the Commonwealth—The Constitution (63 &64 Vict. c. 12), ss. 51 (i.), 71, 72—Trade Practices Act 1965-1968 (Cth), ss. 47, 49, 50, 52.

Decisions


1970, March 24.
The following written judgments were delivered:-
McTIERNAN J. In my opinion, none of the provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1965-1968 (Cth) is repugnant to Ch. III of the Constitution, and the establishment of the Trade Practices Tribunal is not open to attack on the ground that the members are not given by the Act the specific tenure enacted by s. 72 (ii.) of the Constitution. (at p370)

2. The proceedings to which the order nisi for prohibition relates were instituted under s. 47. The validity of this section is not impugned. The institution of proceedings under s. 47 is a ministerial act. The provisions of the Act which are called in question on the ground that they are repugnant to Ch. III begin with s. 49. In my view, the nature of the function assigned by this section cannot be properly understood without reading with it ss. 47 and 51. These sections are in Pt VI of the Act, the heading of which is : "Examination of Agreements and Practices by the Tribunal." Section 47 limits the Tribunal's function of "examination" to (1) agreements which the Commissioner has reason to believe are examinable agreements and which he is of opinion contain restrictions contrary to the public interest ; and (2) to practices which he has reason to believe are examinable and are contrary to the public interest. The proceedings now in question were instituted in respect of monopolization, a term defined by s. 37 and an examinable practice referred to in s. 36. The institution of the proceedings is within s. 7A of the Act. The effect of s. 49 is to interpose a quasi-judicial inquiry by the Tribunal between the Commissioner's consideration under s. 47 and the operation of s. 51 (which depends upon the determination under s. 49). The execution of the mandate given by the section to the Tribunal involves adjudication. But it is commonplace in the field of administrative law that adjudication is not distinctive of judicial power exclusively : and it is not necessarily inconsistent with true executive or administrative action.

"The power and function of finally determining matters of fact and even of discretion are not solely indicative of judicial action. That is an…
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Details
Case
[1970] HCA 8
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an application for a writ of prohibition brought by Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd against the Trade Practices Tribunal. The applicant sought to prohibit the Tribunal from proceeding with an inquiry into alleged contraventions of the *Trade Practices Act 1965* (Cth) by Tasmanian Breweries. The core of the dispute concerned the Tribunal's jurisdiction and the validity of certain actions taken by the Attorney-General in referring the matter for inquiry.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Attorney-General had properly exercised his discretion under section 15(1) of the *Trade Practices Act 1965* to refer the alleged contraventions to the Tribunal for inquiry. Specifically, the court had to determine if the Attorney-General had formed the necessary belief that the alleged contraventions had occurred and that it was desirable in the public interest to refer the matter to the Tribunal. The applicant contended that the Attorney-General had not satisfied these preconditions for referral.

The High Court, in a joint judgment, held that the Attorney-General's belief, as evidenced by his referral, was sufficient to found the Tribunal's jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the formation of the belief was a subjective matter for the Attorney-General, and the court would not inquire into the grounds upon which that belief was formed, provided there was some material upon which the belief could be based. The court found that the material before the Attorney-General was sufficient to support his belief that contraventions had occurred and that a reference was desirable in the public interest. Consequently, the application for prohibition was dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

In the case of R v Trade Practices Tribunal; ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd, the High Court was asked to consider the validity of certain sections of the Trade Practices Act 1965-1968 (Cth) and the establishment of the Trade Practices Tribunal under that Act. The central issue was whether the Tribunal was properly constituted and whether it had been unconstitutionally vested with judicial power. The case arose from an application by the Commonwealth Attorney-General seeking a prohibition to restrain the Trade Practices Tribunal from proceeding with certain investigations and determinations. The Tribunal had been established by Part II of the Trade Practices Act, with members holding office for a period not exceeding seven years, contrary to the requirement in section 72 of the Constitution for federal court judges to hold office during good behaviour. The Act also conferred upon the Tribunal various powers to examine agreements and practices, make determinations, and issue restraining orders. These provisions were challenged on the grounds that they vested the Tribunal with judicial power in an unconstitutional manner.

The proceedings before the Tribunal were initiated by the Commissioner of Trade Practices, who alleged that certain agreements and practices were contrary to the public interest. Upon such allegations, the Tribunal was required to make determinations regarding the existence of "examinable agreements" or "examinable practices" and whether these were contrary to the public interest. If the Tribunal found that an agreement or practice was contrary to the public interest, it could render the agreement unenforceable and issue restraining orders. The validity of these determinations and orders, and the power of the Tribunal to make them, were central to the legal dispute.

The Court examined whether the Trade Practices Tribunal, by virtue of the powers conferred upon it by the Act, was exercising judicial power in an unconstitutional manner. The judges considered whether the Tribunal's functions involved adjudication and the resolution of controversies concerning rights and obligations, which are hallmarks of judicial power. The Court also assessed whether the Tribunal's determinations and orders, which had legal consequences and could not be challenged except by prerogative writ, were exercises of judicial power. The majority of the Court concluded that the Tribunal's functions, while requiring judicial fairness and detachment, were primarily administrative in nature and did not involve adjudication on claims of right. Consequently, the Court held that the Trade Practices Tribunal was not vested with judicial power in an unconstitutional manner, and the order nisi for prohibition was discharged.

The matter before the High Court was an application for an order of prohibition brought by the Queen, represented by the Attorney-General for the Commonwealth, against the Trade Practices Tribunal, with Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd as the intervenor. The case originated from proceedings initiated by the Commissioner of Trade Practices under the Trade Practices Act 1965-1968 (Cth), which led to determinations made by the Trade Practices Tribunal that certain agreements and practices were contrary to the public interest. The primary issue was whether the Trade Practices Tribunal was validly constituted and whether it had the authority to make such determinations, as these actions allegedly involved the exercise of judicial power that should only be vested in federal courts as per Chapter III of the Constitution. The High Court heard arguments from both sides, with the Attorney-General contending that the Tribunal's powers were unconstitutional as they purported to confer judicial power on a non-federal court, while the respondents argued that the Tribunal's functions were administrative rather than judicial. The Court's decision turned on interpreting the nature of the powers exercised by the Tribunal and whether these powers involved the exercise of judicial functions as defined by the Constitution.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the Trade Practices Tribunal have the requisite tenure under s. 72 of the Constitution to exercise judicial power of the Commonwealth?
2. Is the Trade Practices Tribunal a federal court as required by s. 71 of the Constitution?
3. Do the powers conferred upon the Trade Practices Tribunal by the Trade Practices Act 1965-1968 constitute judicial power of the Commonwealth?
4. Does the Trade Practices Tribunal exercise judicial power when it makes a determination that an agreement or practice is examinable and contrary to the public interest?
5. Does the Trade Practices Tribunal exercise judicial power when it makes a restraining order under s. 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1965-1968?

Held
1. The Trade Practices Tribunal does not have the requisite tenure under s. 72 of the Constitution to exercise judicial power of the Commonwealth; the court held that the Tribunal's members do not hold office during good behaviour.
2. The Trade Practices Tribunal is not a federal court as required by s. 71 of the Constitution; the court held that the Tribunal does not meet the constitutional requirements for a federal court.
3. The powers conferred upon the Trade Practices Tribunal by the Trade Practices Act 1965-1968 do not constitute judicial power of the Commonwealth; the court held that the powers are essentially non-judicial and foreign to the concept of judicial power.
4. The Trade Practices Tribunal does not exercise judicial power when it makes a determination that an agreement or practice is examinable and contrary to the public interest; the court held that the determination is a decision that the Tribunal is satisfied, which may involve the application of judicial standards, but it does not constitute the exercise of judicial power.
5. The Trade Practices Tribunal does not exercise judicial power when it makes a restraining order under s. 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1965-1968; the court held that such an order is part of a legislative scheme for destroying existing rights and preventing the creation of new rights of a like character, and it lacks the quality of a judicial order.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The High Court of Australia, in R v Trade Practices Tribunal; ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd, comprehensively addressed the constitutionality of the Trade Practices Tribunal under the Trade Practices Act 1965-1968. The Court examined whether the Tribunal had the requisite tenure, was a federal court, exercised judicial power, and if certain powers conferred upon it constituted judicial power. The Court concluded that the Tribunal was not constitutionally established and did not exercise judicial power.

First, the Court ruled that the Trade Practices Tribunal does not have the requisite tenure under s. 72 of the Constitution. The members of the Tribunal were appointed for a period not exceeding seven years, which did not meet the requirement of being appointed during good behaviour. This was a critical issue as it directly contravened s. 72, which mandates life tenure for federal judges.

Second, the Court determined that the Trade Practices Tribunal was not a federal court as required by s. 71 of the Constitution. The Constitution vests the judicial power of the Commonwealth exclusively in the High Court, other federal courts created by Parliament, and courts invested with federal jurisdiction. The Tribunal did not fit into any of these categories.

Third, the Court concluded that the powers conferred upon the Trade Practices Tribunal by the Trade Practices Act 1965-1968 did not constitute judicial power of the Commonwealth. The Tribunal's functions, such as determining whether an agreement or practice was examinable and whether it was contrary to the public interest, did not involve adjudication in the traditional sense. Instead, these functions were administrative in nature, aimed at enforcing trade practices laws rather than resolving disputes between parties.

Fourth, the Court found that the Trade Practices Tribunal did not exercise judicial power when it made a determination that an agreement or practice was examinable and contrary to the public interest. The determination involved applying statutory criteria and making findings of fact, but it did not involve resolving an actual or potential controversy as to existing rights or obligations. The determination was a preliminary step that led to further action by the Tribunal, but it was not an adjudication.

Lastly, the Court held that the Trade Practices Tribunal did not exercise judicial power when it made a restraining order under s. 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1965-1968. The restraining order was part of a legislative scheme to alter existing rights and prevent the creation of new rights, rather than enforcing rights established by adjudication. The order was more akin to a regulatory measure than a judicial order.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that a tribunal established under statute must comply with the constitutional requirements for tenure and classification as a federal court to exercise judicial power. Additionally, the powers exercised by such a tribunal must align with the traditional understanding of judicial power, which involves resolving disputes by applying law to facts and establishing rights and obligations. Administrative functions, even if performed judicially, do not constitute judicial power.