MJZP v Director-General of Security

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GAGELER CJ,
GORDON, EDELMAN, STEWARD, GLEESON, JAGOT AND BEECH‑JONES JJ

MJZP  PLAINTIFF

AND

DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF SECURITY & ANOR              DEFENDANTS

MJZP v Director-General of Security

[2025] HCA 26

Date of Hearing: 12 & 13 December 2024 & 11 March 2025
Date of Judgment: 6 August 2025

S142/2023

ORDER

The questions stated for the opinion of the Full Court in the special case filed on 20 June 2024 be answered as follows:

Question (1): Is s 46(2) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) invalid on the basis that it infringes Ch III of the Constitution?

Answer:No.

Question (2): Who should pay the costs of the Special Case and of the proceeding?

Answer:The plaintiff.

Representation

C L Lenehan SC and T M Wood with S N Rajanayagam for the plaintiff (instructed by Corrs Chambers Westgarth)

S P Donaghue KC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth, with M A Hosking and P F Bristow for the second defendant (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

G J D del Villar KC, Solicitor-General of the State of Queensland, with F J Nagorcka and K J E Blore on behalf of the Attorney-General of the State of Queensland, intervening (instructed by Crown Law (Qld))

C S Bydder SC, Solicitor-General for the State of Western Australia, with J E Shaw SC and G M Mullins on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of Western Australia, intervening (instructed by State Solicitor's Office (WA))

J G Renwick SC with M F Caristo on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of New South Wales, intervening (instructed by Crown Solicitor for NSW)

J L Rudolf with E A Warner on behalf of the Attorney-General for the State of Tasmania, intervening (instructed by Solicitor-General (Tas))

Submitting appearance for the first defendant

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. GAGELER CJ, GORDON, STEWARD, GLEESON, JAGOT AND BEECH-JONES JJ. The special case filed in this proceeding posed one substantive question – is s 46(2) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ("the AAT Act") invalid on the basis that it infringes Ch III of the Constitution?

  2. Section 46(2) applies to an appeal referred to in s 46(1) of the AAT Act, which includes an appeal under s 44 of that Act to the Federal Court of Australia on a question of law. If there is in force a certificate as specified in s 46(2) certifying that the disclosure of matter contained in a document would be contrary to the public interest, the Federal Court must "do all things necessary to ensure that the matter is not disclosed to any person other than a member of the court as constituted for the purposes of the proceeding". For the purposes of s 46(2) of the AAT Act, such a certificate in accordance with s 39B(2) includes, relevantly, a certificate issued by the "ASIO Minister" certifying that the disclosure of…

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Details
Case
[2025] HCA 26
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The plaintiff, MJZP, sought a declaration from the High Court of Australia that section 46(2) of the *Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975* (Cth) was invalid as it infringed Chapter III of the Constitution. This provision requires the Federal Court to take all necessary steps to prevent disclosure of certain matters, contained in documents certified by the ASIO Minister as contrary to the public interest, to anyone other than the court members constituted for the proceeding. The plaintiff argued that this requirement compelled the Federal Court to depart from the general rule of procedural fairness more than was reasonably necessary to protect a compelling and legitimate public interest.

The High Court was required to determine whether section 46(2) of the *Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975* (Cth) was invalid on the grounds that it infringed Chapter III of the Constitution. This involved considering whether the previous High Court decision in *SDCV v Director-General of Security* (2022) 277 CLR 241, which upheld the validity of section 46(2), should be re-opened and overruled. The court also had to consider who should bear the costs of the special case and the proceeding.

The Court concluded that the principal submission of the Commonwealth, that *SDCV* provided a complete answer to the plaintiff's case and should not be re-opened, was correct. The majority in *SDCV* had held that section 46(2) was valid in its entirety, finding that the arguments for its invalidity involved a "fatal artificiality" and that the provision did not impose any practical injustice. While acknowledging that at lower levels of generality the decision in *SDCV* lacked a clear ratio decidendi, the Court determined that a clear restatement of the ratio would have to await another case. Consequently, the Court answered the questions posed in the special case.

The High Court ordered that section 46(2) of the *Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975* (Cth) is not invalid on the basis that it infringes Chapter III of the Constitution. The plaintiff was ordered to pay the costs of the Special Case and of the proceeding.

Orders

Orders of the court

The questions stated for the opinion of the Full Court in the special case filed on 20 June 2024 be answered as follows:

Question (1): Is s 46(2) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) invalid on the basis that it infringes Ch III of the Constitution?

Answer: No.

Question (2): Who should pay the costs of the Special Case and of the proceeding?

Answer: The plaintiff.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GAGELER CJ, GORDON, STEWARD, GLEESON, JAGOT AND BEECH-JONES JJ EDELMAN J (dissent)
The questions in the special case should therefore be answered:(1)Is s 46(2) of the AAT Act invalid on the basis that it infringes Ch III of the Constitution?Answer: No.(2) Who should pay the costs of the Special Case and of the proceeding?Answer: The plaintiff. Precedent and integrity in application of the decision in SDCV In SDCV v Director-General of Security,[38] this Court considered the effect of s 46(2) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ("the AAT Act") in circumstances where, on character grounds,[39] the (then) Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("the Tribunal") had upheld an adverse security assessment decision, which led to SDCV being stripped of his liberty to remain in Australia. The adverse security assessment decision had been made, and consequentially SDCV's visa cancelled, essentially for reasons which he was not given, based upon allegations about which he was not told and evidence which he did not see. [38](2022) 277 CLR 241. [39]Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 501(3). On SDCV's application to the Federal Court of Australia under s 44 of the AAT Act asserting an error of law, documents containing matter certified by the Minister ("the ASIO Minister") administering the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) ("the ASIO Act") were transmitted to the Federal Court from the Tribunal under s 46(1) of the AAT Act. The Federal Court, exercising original jurisdiction, was required by s 46(2) of the AAT Act to "do all things necessary to ensure that the [certified] matter is not disclosed to any person other than a member of the court as constituted for the purposes of the proceeding". Due to certification by the ASIO Minister,[40] the Federal Court followed the requirement of s 46(2) and had regard to the documents and the "closed" part of the reasons of the Tribunal, documents and reasons that SDCV and his legal representatives had not seen and which contained allegations and evidence about which SDCV and his legal representatives had not been told. A majority of this Court held that there was no practical injustice in this procedure. [40]AAT Act, s 39B(2)(a). The narrowest, and with respect most principled, approach taken in the majority in this Court in SDCV was that of Steward J. As explained in detail below, Steward J differed in his approach in significant respects from the other three members of the majority (Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ) because he recognised that, in some circumstances, practical injustice could arise from the operation of a provision that denied procedural fairness to an applicant even if the applicant had other, potentially less beneficial, routes of review. But Steward J considered that s 46(2) did not cause practical injustice because it was a beneficial provision within a scheme that provided for the possibility of amelioration of the denial of procedural fairness, albeit in ways not accepted by the plurality. At a high level of generality, it is possible to identify a ratio decidendi in SDCV. That ratio decidendi is capable of strong justification. But at low levels of generality, important to the procedure to be applied by lower courts when certified documents are transmitted to a court under s 46(1), the decision in SDCV has no ratio decidendi. In many cases, this might be a powerful reason to re-open a decision, even if only to re-explain the result in a way that would provide clarity and guidance for lower courts. Initially I was strongly inclined to do so if clear guidance could be provided. Ultimately, however, a clear restatement by this Court of the ratio decidendi of SDCV will have to await another case.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GAGELER CJ, GORDON, STEWARD, GLEESON, JAGOT AND BEECH-JONES JJ,

For the reasons which follow the Commonwealth's principal submission, that SDCV provides a complete answer to the plaintiff's case and should not be re-opened, is correct. The ratio of SDCV The Full Court of the Federal Court, from which the appeal was brought to this Court in SDCV, had declared that s 46(2) of the AAT Act "is a valid law of the Commonwealth".[4] The parties joined issue on the appeal to this Court as to whether: (a) s 46(2) of the AAT Act was valid or invalid in its entirety;[5] and (b) alternatively, s 46(2) was to be construed in accordance with s 15A of the Acts Interpretation Act1901 (Cth) to mean that the Federal Court must "do all things necessary in the due exercise of judicial power to ensure that the ... matter is not disclosed to any person" other than a member of the court as constituted for the purposes of the proceeding.[6] [4]SDCV v Director-General of Security (2021) 284 FCR 357.[5]See, eg, (2022) 277 CLR 241 at 278 [83]. [6](2022) 277 CLR 241 at 282 [96]. See also Residual Assco Group Ltd v Spalvins (2000) 202 CLR 629 at 644 [28]. Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ concluded that s 46(2) was valid in its entirety[7] and that the arguments in support of its invalidity involved a "fatal artificiality".[8] As their Honours put it, s 46 "considered as a whole, does not disadvantage a person in the position of the appellant: it simply offers that person a statutory remedy in addition to the remedies otherwise provided by law, that additional remedy being attended with forensic consequences different from those attending those other remedies".[9] In these circumstances, their Honours were satisfied that s 46(2) did not impose any practical injustice on the appellant and was valid. [7](2022) 277 CLR 241 at 278 [83], 281 [91]. [8](2022) 277 CLR 241 at 254 [12].[9](2022) 277 CLR 241 at 254 [12]. In contrast, Gageler J concluded that s 46(2) was invalid in its entirety on the basis that it compelled a court "never to disclose the certified information to a party or to a legal representative of a party irrespective of the degree of relevance or perceived relevance of the information to the resolution of an issue in the appeal and irrespective of the degree of prejudice to security or the defence or international relations of Australia that would result from disclosure to that party or legal representative".[10] Accordingly, his Honour concluded that "the blanket proscription by s 46(2) of the AAT Act of disclosure of information ... renders the process by which the Federal Court is to hear and determine an appeal under s 44 of the AAT Act procedurally unfair"[11] and thereby incompatible with Ch III of the Constitution and invalid in consequence.[12][10](2022) 277 CLR 241 at 298 [152].[11](2022) 277 CLR 241 at 286 [112].[12](2022) 277 CLR 241 at 301 [162]. Gordon J concluded that s 46(2) was "wholly invalid"[13] on the basis that the section "impermissibly excludes procedural fairness for a whole class of case by removing the ability of the Federal Court to respond to potential 'practical injustice'"[14] and forbids "the Court in any and every case from making any certified matter available to the applicant or any representative of the applicant".[15] [13](2022) 277 CLR 241 at 303 [170].[14](2022) 277 CLR 241 at 309 [179]. [15](2022) 277 CLR 241 at 312-313 [189].