HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GAGELER CJ,
GORDON, EDELMAN, JAGOT AND BEECH‑JONES JJPALMANOVA PTY LTD APPELLANT
AND
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA RESPONDENT
Palmanova Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia
[2025] HCA 35
Date of Hearing: 13 June 2025
Date of Judgment: 3 September 2025
S147/2024
ORDER
Appeal dismissed with costs.
On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia
Representation
R P L Lancaster SC with N A Wootton for the appellant (instructed by Simpsons Solicitors)
G T Johnson SC with N D J Swan for the respondent (instructed by HWL Ebsworth Lawyers)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
GAGELER CJ, GORDON, JAGOT AND BEECH-JONES JJ. This appeal turns on a question of statutory construction concerning the temporal operation of s 14(1) of the Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986 (Cth) ("the Act"). The question is whether s 14(1) of the Act renders liable to forfeiture, upon importation into Australia after the commencement of the Act, a protected object of a foreign country unlawfully exported from that foreign country before the commencement of the Act. The answer is that it does.
The majority of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia (Banks-Smith and Abraham JJ, Downes J dissenting) adopted that construction of s 14(1) of the Act in the judgment under appeal.[1] The Full Court in consequence ordered forfeiture of an archaeological artefact found by the primary judge (Perram J)[2] to be a protected object of Bolivia, having been manufactured by people of the Tiwanaku civilisation whose culture rose to prominence on the shore of Lake Titicaca between 600 and 1000 AD, and to have been unlawfully exported from Bolivia either in 1934 or around 1950 ("the Artefact").
The correctness of the construction adopted by the majority of the Full Court in the decision under appeal means that this appeal must be dismissed. The Artefact will remain forfeited.
Text and context
Statutory construction is the process of attributing meaning to statutory text.[3] The construction of a statutory provision begins and ends with the statutory text understood in context[4] and in light of the statutory purpose – being what the provision is designed to achieve in fact[5] – insofar as that purpose is discernible from the statutory text and context.[6] In the construction of a provision of a Commonwealth statute, the meaning that would best achieve the statutory purpose so discerned is to be preferred to each alternative meaning.[7]
[3]Thiess v Collector of Customs (2014) 250 CLR 664 at 671 [22].
[4]Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd (2012) 250 CLR 503 at 519 [39]; Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27 at 46-47 [47].
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- Case
- [2025] HCA 35
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether s 14(1) of the Act rendered liable to forfeiture a protected object of a foreign country that had been unlawfully exported from that country before the commencement of the Act. The appellant argued that the words "has been exported" in s 14(1)(a) should be interpreted to mean exported after the commencement of the Act, to avoid rendering those words redundant when read with other provisions of the Act.
The High Court, in dismissing the appeal, reasoned that the present perfect tense used in s 14(1)(a) and (2)(a) indicated that an object is liable to forfeiture if, at the time of its importation into Australia, it is a protected object of a foreign country and was previously exported from that country. This construction did not impose a temporal limitation on when the export must have occurred. The Court found that the text of s 14(1) and (2) did not involve surplusage or redundancy, as the phrase "has been exported" simply expressed the criterion that the object was previously exported from its country of origin, without further temporal restriction. The Court applied the modern approach to statutory interpretation, considering the ordinary meaning of the words, the syntax, and the statutory purpose, which included bringing Australia into conformity with its obligations under the UNESCO Convention.
The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: EDELMAN J