Palmanova Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia

Link copied
Case Copied 45 min read

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GAGELER CJ,
GORDON, EDELMAN, JAGOT AND BEECH‑JONES JJ

PALMANOVA PTY LTD  APPELLANT

AND

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA  RESPONDENT

Palmanova Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia

[2025] HCA 35

Date of Hearing: 13 June 2025

Date of Judgment: 3 September 2025

S147/2024

ORDER

Appeal dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation

R P L Lancaster SC with N A Wootton for the appellant (instructed by Simpsons Solicitors)

G T Johnson SC with N D J Swan for the respondent (instructed by HWL Ebsworth Lawyers)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. GAGELER CJ, GORDON, JAGOT AND BEECH-JONES JJ. This appeal turns on a question of statutory construction concerning the temporal operation of s 14(1) of the Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986 (Cth) ("the Act"). The question is whether s 14(1) of the Act renders liable to forfeiture, upon importation into Australia after the commencement of the Act, a protected object of a foreign country unlawfully exported from that foreign country before the commencement of the Act. The answer is that it does.

  2. The majority of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia (Banks-Smith and Abraham JJ, Downes J dissenting) adopted that construction of s 14(1) of the Act in the judgment under appeal.[1] The Full Court in consequence ordered forfeiture of an archaeological artefact found by the primary judge (Perram J)[2] to be a protected object of Bolivia, having been manufactured by people of the Tiwanaku civilisation whose culture rose to prominence on the shore of Lake Titicaca between 600 and 1000 AD, and to have been unlawfully exported from Bolivia either in 1934 or around 1950 ("the Artefact").

  3. The correctness of the construction adopted by the majority of the Full Court in the decision under appeal means that this appeal must be dismissed. The Artefact will remain forfeited.

    Text and context

  4. Statutory construction is the process of attributing meaning to statutory text.[3] The construction of a statutory provision begins and ends with the statutory text understood in context[4] and in light of the statutory purpose – being what the provision is designed to achieve in fact[5] – insofar as that purpose is discernible from the statutory text and context.[6] In the construction of a provision of a Commonwealth statute, the meaning that would best achieve the statutory purpose so discerned is to be preferred to each alternative meaning.[7]

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Palmanova Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2025] HCA 35
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The parties to this matter were Palmanova Pty Ltd (the appellant) and the Commonwealth of Australia (the respondent). The dispute concerned the recovery of an archaeological artefact imported into Australia, which had been seized by an inspector under the *Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986* (Cth) following a request for its return by the Government of Bolivia. Palmanova Pty Ltd sought to recover the artefact under s 37 of the Act. The case was heard in the High Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether s 14(1) of the Act rendered liable to forfeiture a protected object of a foreign country that had been unlawfully exported from that country before the commencement of the Act. The appellant argued that the words "has been exported" in s 14(1)(a) should be interpreted to mean exported after the commencement of the Act, to avoid rendering those words redundant when read with other provisions of the Act.

The High Court, in dismissing the appeal, reasoned that the present perfect tense used in s 14(1)(a) and (2)(a) indicated that an object is liable to forfeiture if, at the time of its importation into Australia, it is a protected object of a foreign country and was previously exported from that country. This construction did not impose a temporal limitation on when the export must have occurred. The Court found that the text of s 14(1) and (2) did not involve surplusage or redundancy, as the phrase "has been exported" simply expressed the criterion that the object was previously exported from its country of origin, without further temporal restriction. The Court applied the modern approach to statutory interpretation, considering the ordinary meaning of the words, the syntax, and the statutory purpose, which included bringing Australia into conformity with its obligations under the UNESCO Convention.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Upon forfeiture of a protected object by operation of s 9(1) of the Act or by order under s 37(3)(d), all title and interest in the object is vested in the Commonwealth by force of s 38(a) and the object is to be dealt with and disposed of in accordance with directions of the Minister administering the Act by force of s 38(b). Upon forfeiture, a protected object of a foreign country liable to be forfeited under s 14(1) is available to be returned at the direction of the Minister to the government of the foreign country which had made the request for the return of the object which had prompted the seizure of the object by an inspector as permitted by s 41(1).Facts and procedural history Palmanova Pty Ltd, an Australian company, purchased the Artefact online from the Artemis Gallery in Colorado on or about 5 June 2020 for a purchase price of USD17,340. As a result, the Artefact was shipped by FedEx to Melbourne on or about 24 June 2020. Customs officers intercepted the Artefact upon entry into Australia. Following receipt by the Government of Australia from the Government of Bolivia of a request for the return of the Artefact to Bolivia, a Customs officer on 17 May 2021 delivered the Artefact under s 203T of the Customs Act to an inspector appointed under s 28 of the Act as a consequence of which the Artefact was taken by operation of s 27(2) to have been seized by the inspector at that time. Palmanova subsequently commenced an action against the Commonwealth in the Federal Court for recovery of the Artefact under s 37 of the Act. At first instance, Perram J found on the balance of probabilities that the Artefact is pre-Columbian in origin, having been manufactured by people of the Tiwanaku civilisation whose culture centred around the ancient city of Tiwanaku on the shore of Lake Titicaca in what is now modern-day Bolivia and rose to prominence between 600 and 1000 AD. His Honour characterised the Artefact as "an exceptional and unique piece of archaeological significance".[31] On that basis, his Honour found the Artefact to form part of the "movable cultural heritage" of Bolivia and therefore to be a "protected object of a foreign country" within the meaning of the Act.[32] [31]Palmanova Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [2023] FCA 1391 at [211].[32]Palmanova Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [2023] FCA 1391 at [210]. Perram J further found on the balance of probabilities that the Artefact was removed from the ruins of the city of Tiwanaku in contravention of a Bolivian statute of 1906 entitled "Law of Property of the Nation, Ruins of Tiahuanaco and Lake Titicaca". The removal was either by an identified archaeologist in the course of excavating the site in 1934 or by looters in or around 1950. Whether removed in 1934 or in or around 1950, the Artefact had been exported from Bolivia to Argentina by some time in the 1950s.[33][33]Palmanova Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [2023] FCA 1391 at [341]. Notwithstanding those findings, Perram J held that the Artefact was not liable to forfeiture under s 14(1) of the Act. The reason was that his Honour considered that, properly construed, s 14(1) did not apply to a protected object of a foreign country exported from the foreign country before the commencement of the Act on 1 July 1987 at least where the exportation of the object from that foreign country was unconnected with the importation of the object into Australia after 1 July 1987.[34] [34]Palmanova Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [2023] FCA 1391 at [378], [380], [381].

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

GAGELER CJ, GORDON, JAGOT AND BEECH-JONES JJ (dissent) EDELMAN J
The text of s 14(1) and (2) of the Act therefore involves neither surplusage nor redundancy. In using the present perfect tense, s 14(1)(a) and (2)(a) each express the criterion of operation that an object which is at the time of importation into Australia a protected object of a foreign country is also an object that was previously exported from that foreign country. The use of the present perfect tense indicates no further temporal limitation as to when the object was exported from that foreign country.Conclusion The appeal is to be dismissed with costs. I agree with the reasons of Gageler CJ, Gordon, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ ("the joint reasons") and with their conclusion that the appeal should be dismissed with costs. I wish to address only two additional points. The first concerns a principle of statutory interpretation sometimes described as a presumption against surplusage or redundant language. The second concerns the relevance of extrinsic materials. One aspect of the clear and comprehensive submissions made by senior counsel for the appellant, relying upon the typically lucid reasons of the primary judge, was reliance upon an interpretive principle that has been described as a "presumption" against surplusage. The appellant's submission was that the words "has been exported" in s 14(1)(a) of the Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986 (Cth) ("the Act") would be redundant if they were given the meaning of "was exported" which, in effect, was the meaning attributed to those words by the majority in the Full Court of the Federal Court. The appellant argued that since s 14(1)(a) requires that the object liable to forfeiture be "a protected object of a foreign country", and since s 14(1)(c), read with the definition of "import" in s 3, imposes a requirement that the object is imported into Australia, the protected object must be one that was exported from the foreign country (directly to Australia or via another country to Australia). In short, an object of a foreign country that is imported must also have been exported. Hence, the appellant rightly argued, it would be surplusage to interpret the words "has been exported" in s 14(1)(a) to mean "was exported" from the foreign country. The appellant's alternative interpretation, which was preferred by the primary judge and the minority of the Full Court, was that the words in the present perfect tense—"has been exported"—meant that the object has been exported after the commencement date of the Act. Thus, on the appellant's alternative interpretation, s 14(1) would not apply to an object that was exported prior to the commencement of the Act from the foreign country in which it was protected, even if that object "is imported" into Australia after the commencement of the Act. In this way, the interpretation of "has been exported" would avoid the redundancy of those words that would arise if those words were taken to mean "was exported". As Professor Pearce rightly points out, a so-called "presumption against surplusage" has sometimes been treated as having the effect that courts "are not at liberty to consider any word or sentence as superfluous or insignificant. All words must prima facie be given some meaning and effect".[53] The force with which this interpretive principle has sometimes been expressed may have been a reason for the primary judge's avoidance of the interpretation involving redundant words by a heavy focus on the present perfect tense of s 14(1)(a). Although the approach of the primary judge was critically described by the majority of the Full Court as a construction that was "based almost entirely" upon the use of that tense,[54] that approach by the primary judge is consistent with those cases which have given great weight to interpretations which avoid redundant words.[55] [53]Pearce, Statutory Interpretation in Australia, 10th ed (2024) at 69 [2.44]. [54]The Commonwealth v Palmanova Pty Ltd (2024) 304 FCR 163 at 167 [18].[55]See, for instance, The Commonwealth v Baume (1905) 2 CLR 405 at 414, citing R v Berchet (1690) 1 Show 106 [89 ER 480].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: EDELMAN J