CHILDRENS COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Director of Child Protection Litigation v JT [2025] QChC 15
PARTIES:
DIRECTOR OF CHILD PROTECTION LITIGATION
(appellant)
v
JT
(respondent)
FILE NO:
BD 40/2025
PROCEEDING:
Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:
Childrens Court (magistrate) at Beenleigh
DELIVERED ON:
16 October 2025
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
28 August 2025; 19 September 2025; written submissions received 26 September 2025
JUDGE:
Rafter SC DCJ
ORDERS:
1. Order pursuant to r 31(2)(a) of the Childrens Court Rules 2016 that service of a copy of the notice of appeal on the respondent be dispensed with.
2. Appeal allowed.
3. Set aside the decision of the Childrens Court (magistrate) at Beenleigh on 11 December 2024.
4. Order pursuant to s 121A(2)(c)(ii) of the Child Protection Act 1999 that the matter be remitted to the Childrens Court (magistrate) that made the decision.
CATCHWORDS:
FAMILY LAW AND CHILD WELFARE - CHILD WELFARE UNDER STATE OR TERRITORY JURISDICTION AND LEGISLATION – PARENTAGE - JURISDICTION OF COURTS – where the Director of Child Protection Litigation (DCPL) made an application in the Childrens Court (magistrate) seeking a child protection order be granted to the chief executive for the long-term guardianship of the child – where the DCPL sought an order by the Childrens Court (magistrate) authorising the medical examination of the child for the purpose of DNA parentage testing - where the DCPL was unable to contact the respondent mother to obtain her consent for the DNA testing of the child - where the Childrens Court magistrate held that the Childrens Court (magistrate) did not have jurisdiction to make an order authorising a medical examination of the child for the purpose of DNA parentage testing - whether the Childrens Court magistrate erred at law in refusing to make an order pursuant to s 68(1)(b) of the Child Protection Act 1999 authorising a medical examination of the child for the purpose of DNA parentage testing.
Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld) s 4, s 5A, s 5B, s 59, s 68, s 97, s 110, s 118, s 121A, sch 3
Childrens Court Rules 2016 (Qld) r 31
COUNSEL: N A Miller, Director of Child Protection Litigation for the appellant
No appearance for the respondent
SOLICITORS: Director of Child Protection Litigation for the appellant
No appearance for the respondent
Introduction
The Director of Child Protection Litigation (DCPL) appeals against a decision made on a child protection application by the Childrens Court (magistrate) at Beenleigh on 11 December 2024 refusing to make an order pursuant to s 68(1)(b) of the Child Protection Act 1999 (the Act) authorising a medical examination for the purpose of DNA parentage testing.
The grounds of appeal are:
“That the learned magistrate erred at law in refusing to make an order authorising the medical examination of the child on the adjournment of the proceeding for the purpose of DNA parentage testing:
● The Court erred at law in finding that the Court does not validly hold jurisdiction to make an order for DNA…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Director of Child Protection Litigation v JT and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2025] QChC 15
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether the Childrens Court magistrate erred in law by refusing to make an order for a medical examination of the child to determine parentage. The court had to interpret the scope of the magistrate's powers under section 68(1)(b) of the Child Protection Act 1999, and consider whether DNA parentage testing fell within the definition of "medical examination". The court also had to consider whether there were other avenues available to the Director to obtain DNA testing, such as seeking an order from the Supreme Court under the Status of Children Act 1978 or relying on the chief executive's powers under section 97 of the Child Protection Act 1999.
The court found that the magistrate's reasons for refusing the medical examination were correct. The court found that DNA parentage testing did not fall within the definition of "medical examination" in the Act, as it was not for the benefit of the child and was not a treatment or assessment. The court also found that there were other avenues available to the Director to obtain DNA testing, such as seeking an order from the Supreme Court or relying on the chief executive's powers. The court found that the magistrate had declined to exercise jurisdiction that he did not validly hold, and had declined to interpret the legislation as empowering him to make the orders sought. The court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the Childrens Court magistrate.
The court made an order dispensing with service of a copy of the notice of appeal on the respondent, allowed the appeal, set aside the decision of the Childrens Court magistrate, and ordered that the matter be remitted to the Childrens Court magistrate.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Order pursuant to r 31(2)(a) of the Childrens Court Rules 2016 that service of a copy of the notice of appeal on the respondent be dispensed with.
2. Appeal allowed.
3. Set aside the decision of the Childrens Court (magistrate) at Beenleigh on 11 December 2024.
4. Order pursuant to s 121A(2)(c)(ii) of the Child Protection Act 1999 that the matter be remitted to the Childrens Court (magistrate) that made the decision.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The magistrate’s reasons for refusing the medical examination are as follows:“[T]he DCPL says that I have power under section… 68(1)(b). That power is directed at treatment and – medical treatment or medical examination of a child. Medical examination and treatment is defined in the … schedule, in the definitions. [M]edical examination is defined:‘medical examination means a physical, psychiatric or psychological or dental examination, assessment or procedure and includes forensic examination or an examination or assessment normally carried out by a health practitioner.’So it covers examination, assessment or procedure and it specifically includes a forensic examination. The term forensic examination there seems to me to apply to examining the child for the purposes of gathering evidence for court proceedings. However, it seems to me to be a reference to taking swabs of perhaps other peoples’ DNA and examination to see if violence or abuse has occurred against the child.It seems to me that … it was open to the drafters of the legislation to include specific reference to DNA testing. The testing here would not be – if I could put it this way – for the benefit of the child. And not all the things covered by the definition of medical examination are for the benefit of the child, particularly with a forensic examination. But it seems to me that a DNA procedure is something quite specific.I am also informed by, in my statutory interpretation, by section 97 subsection (8), which refers to the chief executive’s powers once a child is in their custody. And the medical … treatment under that provision is extended, it seems to me, to include vaccination. Now, that could simply be a clarifying feature. But vaccination has clearly been contemplated by the legislature and no one has turned their mind to the specifics of DNA. A vaccination would, I imagine, be much closer to a treatment than a DNA examination.I certainly do not say for a moment that … a DNA treatment would be prohibited, if it was necessary, for example, for treatment. So there is a suspicion that the child might have a genetic condition and therefore any necessary DNA testing … could occur as part of that treatment. Here, though, there is something quite different, it seems, is trying to be achieved. We are not trying to detect … particular abuse. We are not trying to treat the child and we are not examining the child to see whether treatment is needed.I am also concerned that this power exists elsewhere. So the power exists in two other places. The first is in the Status of Children Act 1978 at section 11. The Supreme Court can make an order requiring – or directing a named person to submit themselves or a child to … parentage testing. There is some limitations on that: a … parentage testing procedure cannot be carried out for a child … in this child’s circumstance, … that is the child is under 16 – without the consent of the parent.[A] parent or guardian or person exercising parental responsibility in relation to the child. It seems to me that the DCPL has an avenue. And that would be go to the Supreme Court and apply for an order that the child be tested. And they could then, as a person exercising parental responsibility, consent to the carrying out of the procedure.Alternatively, it seems to me that at section 97 of the Act, the chief executive has equivalent powers to the powers of the DCPL is asking the court to exercise to subject the child to DNA testing because the child is in custody. So … the definition there obviously is extended somewhat … by subsection (8), which I have already alluded to. But there is nothing in [section] 86(1) in terms of my powers that is any greater than … the powers in section 97.Therefore, it seems to me that an order is not necessary. [I]f the DCPL is correct in their interpretation, an order from me is not necessary. I should not, on that basis alone, decline jurisdiction to make the order. I am told that it is easier to get funding to do it if I do make the order. And I therefore should not, simply because there is another basis, decline to exercise the jurisdiction that I think I validly hold. However, I do not think I validly hold a jurisdiction. I have concerns that the statute does not include testing of this kind for this particular purpose, as it is neither an examination nor a treatment.And … in circumstances where the Parliament has specifically given a power of this precise kind that can be exercised by the chief executive under the Status of Children Act. And in those circumstances, … I find … when it comes to statutory interpretation, there is a specific power in our body of law. It usually applies within … an Act, but I do not think there is any prohibition on looking at this question of … the specific being ousting … a general power.And I think here we have an exact example of that, where there is a very specific power in the legislation open to the chief executive and I should not interpret my general powers as extending beyond their ordinary meaning in these circumstances. And so for that reason, I decline to make the order requiring DNA testing. And I will simply make an order adjourning the matter for the chief executive and the DCPL to consider their next steps.It seems to me – and it is part of my reasons – that it is also far from clear to me, from the affidavit material, that we are at the limit of what can be achieved in terms of identifying parentage without DNA testing. It is a matter … for other people, perhaps. But timings, evidence from the dad, who is happy to be tested, … there are other ways to prove parentage. But certainly, there is other ways to get DNA too. And for those reasons, … I do not interpret the legislation as empowering me to make the orders sought.”Consideration