Western Australian Planning Commission v Southregal Pty Ltd

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

KIEFEL, BELL, GAGELER, KEANE AND NETTLE JJ

Matter No P47/2016

WESTERN AUSTRALIAN PLANNING
COMMISSION  APPELLANT

AND

SOUTHREGAL PTY LTD & ANOR  RESPONDENTS

Matter No P48/2016

WESTERN AUSTRALIAN PLANNING
COMMISSION  APPELLANT

AND

TREVOR NEIL LEITH  RESPONDENT

Western Australian Planning Commission v Southregal Pty Ltd
Western Australian Planning Commission v Leith

[2017] HCA 7

8 February 2017

P47/2016 & P48/2016

ORDER

Matter No P47/2016

1.Appeal allowed.

2.Set aside orders (a) and (b) of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia made on 24 March 2016, and in their place order that:

(a)appeal allowed;

(b)the respondents pay the appellant's costs; and

(c)set aside orders 2, 3 and 4 of Beech J made on 22 December 2014, and in their place order that:

(i)the question of law be answered:  No; and

(ii)the plaintiffs are to pay the defendant's costs.

3.The respondents pay the appellant's costs of the appeal to this Court.

Matter No P48/2016

1.Appeal allowed.

2.Set aside orders (a) and (b) of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia made on 24 March 2016, and in their place order that:

(a)appeal allowed;

(b)the respondent pay the appellant's costs; and

(c)set aside orders 2, 3 and 4 of Beech J made on 22 December 2014, and in their place order that:

(i)the question of law be answered:  No; and

(ii)the plaintiff is to pay the defendant's costs.

3.The respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal to this Court.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of Western Australia

Representation

K M Pettit SC with T C Russell for the appellant in both matters (instructed by State Solicitor (WA))

D F Jackson QC with P McQueen for the respondents in both matters (instructed by Lavan)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

Town planning (WA) – Compensation – Where land reserved for public purpose under planning scheme – Where s 173 of Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA) makes provision for landowner to be compensated where land injuriously affected by making or amendment of planning scheme – Where, under s 177, compensation not payable until land first sold after reservation or responsible authority refuses development application or grants application on unacceptable conditions – Where landowners purchased land affected by planning scheme after date of reservation – Where purchasers applied to develop land and were refused – Whether purchasers entitled to compensation.

Words and phrases – "compensation", "injurious affection", "planning scheme", "reservation".

Metropolitan Region Town Planning Scheme Act 1959 (WA), s 36.
Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA), ss 171, 173, 174, 176, 177.
Town Planning and Development Act 1928 (WA), ss 11, 12.

  1. KIEFEL AND BELL JJ. The Peel Region Scheme is a planning scheme made pursuant to the provisions of the Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA) ("the PD Act").…

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Details
Case
[2017] HCA 7
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard appeals from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia concerning compensation for land injuriously affected by a planning scheme. The appellants were the Western Australian Planning Commission, and the respondents were landowners who had purchased land after it had been reserved for public purposes under a planning scheme. The dispute centred on whether these subsequent purchasers were entitled to compensation under the *Planning and Development Act 2005* (WA).

The legal issue before the High Court was whether section 177(2) of the *Planning and Development Act 2005* (WA) provided a right to compensation only to the landowner at the time of the reservation of the land for public purposes, or if it also extended to subsequent purchasers of that land who were refused development approval. The primary judge and the Court of Appeal had found in favour of the subsequent purchasers, holding that they were entitled to compensation.

The High Court allowed the appeals, reasoning that the right to compensation under section 177(2) of the Act was confined to the owner of the land at the time of the reservation. The Court found that while section 173 of the Act provided for compensation where land was injuriously affected by the making or amendment of a planning scheme, section 177 stipulated the specific circumstances and persons entitled to such compensation. The Court concluded that the wording of section 177(2)(b), which referred to the owner at the time of a development application, did not override the primary entitlement of the original owner at the time of reservation, and that the legislature's choice of words, while potentially confusing, should not be given a strained meaning that was at odds with the overall scheme of the statute. The Court noted that Parliament can sometimes include surplusage, and the perceived redundancy in section 177(2)(b) did not justify a literal interpretation that would alter the fundamental entitlement.

Consequently, the High Court set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal and ordered that the question of law be answered in the negative, meaning the respondents were not entitled to compensation. The appellants were awarded their costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Matter No P47/2016

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Set aside orders (a) and (b) of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia made on 24 March 2016, and in their place order that:

(a) appeal allowed;

(b) the respondents pay the appellant's costs; and

(c) set aside orders 2, 3 and 4 of Beech J made on 22 December 2014, and in their place order that:

(i) the question of law be answered: No; and

(ii) the plaintiffs are to pay the defendant's costs.

3. The respondents pay the appellant's costs of the appeal to this Court.

Matter No P48/2016

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Set aside orders (a) and (b) of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia made on 24 March 2016, and in their place order that:

(a) appeal allowed;

(b) the respondent pay the appellant's costs; and

(c) set aside orders 2, 3 and 4 of Beech J made on 22 December 2014, and in their place order that:

(i) the question of law be answered: No; and

(ii) the plaintiff is to pay the defendant's costs.

3. The respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal to this Court.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

KIEFEL AND BELL JJ GAGELER AND NETTLE JJ
Lastly, whilst it must be accepted that words chosen by the legislature should be given meaning and endeavours should be made to avoid them being seen as redundant, they should not be given a strained meaning, one at odds with the scheme of the statute. Moreover, it has been recognised more than once that Parliament is sometimes guilty of "surplusage" or even "tautology"[43]. The possibility that Parliament may not have appreciated that the reference in s 177(2)(b) was not necessary, and was liable to confuse, is not a reason for giving it a literal interpretation[44].[43]Leon Fink Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Film Commission (1979) 141 CLR 672 at 679; [1979] HCA 26; Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v Pemsel [1891] AC 531 at 589; see also Beckwith v The Queen (1976) 135 CLR 569 at 574; [1976] HCA 55.[44]See Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1 at 12; [1992] HCA 64.Conclusion The appeals should be allowed with costs. The orders of the Court of Appeal should be set aside and in lieu thereof it should be ordered that the appeals from the decision of Beech J made on 22 December 2014 be allowed with costs and the answer to the question of law for determination in each Special Case and the declarations made by his Honour be set aside. The question of law stated for determination in each Special Case should be answered "no". The respondents should pay the costs of the hearing before Beech J. Section 177(2) of the Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA) ("the PD Act") stipulates to whom compensation is payable if land is injuriously affected by the making or amendment of a planning scheme reserving land for public purposes. The issue in these appeals is whether s 177(2) of the PD Act affords a right of compensation only to the owner of the land at the time of the land's reservation under the planning scheme or whether s 177(2) also affords an alternative right of compensation to a subsequent purchaser of the injuriously affected land. The judge at first instance (Beech J) and the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia (Martin CJ, Newnes and Murphy JJA agreeing) held for the latter. For the reasons which follow, we consider that the right of compensation is confined to the former and, on that basis, that the appeals to this Court should be allowed. The facts and relevant legislation are as set out in the reasons of Kiefel and Bell JJ and need not be repeated.Proceedings at first instance At first instance, the following question of law was said to arise in each case from the special case[45]:"Whether a person to whom s 177(2)(b) of the [PD Act] would otherwise apply can be entitled to compensation pursuant to ss 173 and 177(1)(b) of the PD Act, in circumstances where the land has been sold following the date of the reservation, and where no compensation has previously been paid under s 177(1) of the PD Act." [45]Leith v Western Australian Planning Commission [2014] WASC 499 at [15]. In answering that question, Beech J acknowledged that, "considered in isolation", the natural reading of s 173 is that it provides compensation only to a person who owns land at the time that a planning scheme is made or amended and thereby injuriously affects the land, and requires that the injurious affection must arise from the making or amendment of the planning scheme, as opposed to its existence[46]. But, his Honour said, to read s 173 as so imposing an unqualified temporal restriction on the entitlement to compensation would be inconsistent with the terms of s 177(2)(b)[47]: "In defining, in s 177(2)(b), the class of persons entitled to make a claim under s 177(1)(b), Parliament has specifically, and unmistakeably, chosen to distinguish the position under s 177(1)(a). Under s 177(1)(a), it is those who own at the time of reservation who can claim. Under s 177(1)(b), it is those who own at the time of the development application. The legislature can be taken to know that most owners acquire title by purchase. One of the two alternative triggering events in s 177(1) is the first sale. In those circumstances, if the legislature had intended that:(1)upon the first of the alternative triggering events in s 177(1)(a) and s 177(1)(b), the single right to compensation is exhaustively activated; and(2)thus upon the first sale of the land no further claim for compensation could ever be made;I think it unlikely that the legislature would have chosen to define the class of persons upon whom the right to claim compensation under s 177(1)(b) was conferred by the general words 'the person who was the owner at the date of the application'. In my view, there is no sufficient foundation in s 177, or elsewhere in pt 11 of the PD Act, for treating the general words of s 177(2)(b) as intended to capture only a (relatively small) subset of those within the ambit of the words used, namely only those who acquired title other than by sale. For these reasons, I consider that the breadth and generality of the language of s 177(2)(b) provides strong support for [the respondents'] construction."[46]Leith [2014] WASC 499 at [42].[47]Leith [2014] WASC 499 at [44], [52].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KIEFEL AND BELL JJ, GAGELER AND NETTLE JJ