Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Te

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
GAUDRON, McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND CALLINAN JJ

RE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION  RESPONDENTS
AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
AND ANOR

EX PARTE MENG KOK TE   APPLICANT/PROSECUTOR

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs;

Ex parte Te

[2002] HCA 48

7 November 2002
M25/2001

ORDER

Application dismissed with costs.

Representation:

C M Maxwell QC with A F L Krohn for the applicant/prosecutor (instructed by Access Law Lawyers)

D M J Bennett QC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth with C Gunst QC, W S Mosley and P R D Gray for the first respondent (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

No appearance for the second respondent

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
GAUDRON, McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE AND CALLINAN JJ

RE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION   RESPONDENT
AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

EX PARTE DUNG CHI DANG  APPLICANT/PROSECUTOR

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Dang

7 November 2002
M118/2001

ORDER

1.   The question reserved for the decision of the Court be answered as follows:

Question: "Did section 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) validly authorise the respondent to cancel the applicant's visa on 27 June 2000?"

Answer: "Yes".

The matter is remitted to a single Justice for further consideration
and disposition.

2.   Costs of the case stated reserved to the Justice disposing of the cause.

Representation:

C M Maxwell QC with A F L Krohn for the applicant/prosecutor (instructed by Access Law Lawyers)

D M J Bennett QC, Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth with C Gunst QC, W S Mosley and P R D Gray for the respondent (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. This application, seeking orders for certiorari and prohibition, was referred to a Full Court.  It was heard together with the matter of Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Dung Chi Dang, and raises substantially the same issues.

  2. The applicant was born in Cambodia in 1967.  He entered Australia as a refugee in 1983, and was granted a permanent resident visa.  He has never become an Australian citizen.  He has been convicted of a number of criminal offences including trafficking in drugs.  For an offence committed in 1991, he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months.

  3. Pursuant to s 200 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) an order of deportation was made against the applicant. That provision applies to non-citizens convicted of various offences. The applicant claims that he is beyond the reach of s 200 and that it does not validly apply to him because he is no longer an alien. His reasons for that contention are the same as those advanced for the prosecutor in the case of Dung Chi Dang.  My reasons for rejecting the contention are the same as in that case.

  4. The…

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Details
Case
[2002] HCA 48
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involved applications for constitutional writs concerning the validity of provisions of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) that authorised the cancellation of visas and deportation of non-citizens. The primary applicant, Dang, challenged the Minister's decision to cancel his visa under s 501(2) of the Act, arguing that the section, as applied to him, was not supported by the constitutional powers of the Parliament, specifically s 51(xix) or s 51(xxvii). A second applicant, Te, sought to quash a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirming the Minister's order for his deportation under s 200 of the Act, contending that s 200 had no valid application to him as he was an "absorbed person" and not an "alien". The High Court of Australia, comprising Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, and Callinan JJ, considered these challenges.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether ss 200 and 501(2) of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth), in their application to the respective applicants, were valid laws of the Commonwealth, particularly whether they were supported by the constitutional power to make laws with respect to "aliens" under s 51(xix) of the Constitution. This involved determining the meaning of "alien" in the context of the Constitution and whether individuals who had resided in Australia for extended periods, had familial ties to Australian citizens, and had engaged in criminal conduct, could still be considered aliens for the purposes of federal legislative power. The Court also considered, but ultimately found it unnecessary to definitively resolve, whether the immigration power under s 51(xxvii) supported the provisions, and the relevance of an individual's "absorption" into the Australian community to their status as an alien.

The Court reasoned that each of the applicants was an alien within the meaning of s 51(xix) of the Constitution. This conclusion was based on the established understanding of the constitutional power to legislate with respect to aliens, which was not diminished by the applicants' length of residence in Australia, their familial connections, or their status as permanent residents. The Court affirmed that the concept of "absorption" into the community did not preclude a person from being an alien for constitutional purposes. Consequently, the provisions of the *Migration Act* authorising the cancellation of visas and deportation were validly supported by the aliens power.

The applications were dismissed with costs. The question posed in the case stated regarding the applicant Dang was answered in the affirmative, confirming the validity of the Minister's decision to cancel his visa. The application for orders nisi made by the applicant Te was also dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Application dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Meng Kok Te, born in Cambodia on 7 April 1967, arrived in Australia on 7 July 1983 and was granted a permanent resident visa upon arrival. He has not been naturalised and is not an Australian citizen. Te was convicted of trafficking in heroin on 5 June 1991, for which he was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of not less than one year. At the time of the offence, Te had been in Australia as a permanent resident for a period of less than 10 years or for periods which, when added together, totalled less than 10 years. This led to an order for his deportation under s 200 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which provides for the deportation of non-citizens convicted of crimes. Te argues that s 200 of the Act had no valid application to him at the time of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal's decision, as he was "an absorbed person" and "not an alien".

Dung Chi Dang was born in the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) in 1968. In 1980, he fled Vietnam with his family and entered Australia in July 1981 on a Class 302 Permanent Visa. Since his arrival, Dang has remained in Australia, save for brief visits to Vietnam in 1989 and 1990. Dang has a criminal history involving the use and dealing of prohibited drugs. He has spent a total of 663 days in prison serving sentences for various offences, 794 days in prison on remand in connection with charges that did not result in convictions, 76 days in prison on remand in connection with a charge that resulted in a conviction and a suspended sentence, 205 days in immigration detention, and a further period of remand in respect of unresolved charges that commenced in September 2001. On 27 June 2000, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs made a decision to cancel Dang's visa under s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which provides for the cancellation of a visa if the Minister reasonably suspects that the person does not pass the character test, and the person does not satisfy the Minister that the person passes the character test. Dang commenced proceedings seeking orders of certiorari and prohibition, claiming that s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) is not supported by par (xix) or par (xxvii) of s 51 of the Constitution.

The matter before the court originated from two separate proceedings brought by two non-citizens challenging the validity of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs' decisions to cancel their visas and order their deportation. The first case, Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Te, was brought by Meng Kok Te, a Cambodian national who had been in Australia since 1983 and was convicted of trafficking in heroin. Te sought an extension of time to commence the application, an order for certiorari to quash a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirming the Minister's order for his deportation, and an order for prohibition against the Minister taking any steps to deport him. The second case, Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Dang, was brought by Dung Chi Dang, a Vietnamese national who had been in Australia since 1981 and had a criminal history involving prohibited drugs. Dang sought orders of certiorari and prohibition against the Minister's decision to cancel his visa and order his deportation. The cases were heard together and involved a question about the validity of certain sections of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) under the Australian Constitution.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GLEESON CJ GAUDRON J HUGH J (dissent) GUMMOW J HAYNE J CALLINAN J
It is unnecessary to determine whether the applicants have become absorbed into the Australian community and passed beyond the reach of the immigration power conferred on the Parliament by s 51(xxvii) of the Constitution[74]. [74]R v Director-General of Social Welfare (Vict); Ex parte Henry (1975) 133 CLR 369.Conclusion Each of the applicants in these applications is an alien within the meaning of s 51(xix) of the Constitution and therefore is liable to the Minister's orders for cancellation of their visas and deportation. The question in the case stated regarding the applicant Dang should be answered "Yes". The application for orders nisi made by the applicant Te should be dismissed. Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs & Anor;Ex parte Meng Kok Te Pursuant to O 55 r 2 of the High Court Rules, a Justice has ordered that the applicant's application be made by notice of motion to a Full Court. The relief sought includes (i) an extension of time for commencing the application; (ii) an order for certiorari to quash the decision made on 22 September 2000 by the second respondent, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ("the AAT"), to affirm an order made by the first respondent, the Minister, under s 200 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act"); and (iii) an order for prohibition against the Minister taking any steps to deport the applicant or otherwise to give effect to the decision of the AAT. The ground upon which the relief is sought is that, at the time of the decision of the AAT, s 200 of the Act had no valid application to him. Section 200 states:"The Minister may order the deportation of a non‑citizen to whom [Div 9 of Pt 2 of the Act] applies."In support of that proposition it is contended that there was "no relevant nexus" between either the immigration power or the aliens power and the applicant, and that he was "an absorbed person" and "not an alien". Sections 201, 202 and 203 of the Act provide respectively for s 200 to apply to the deportation of non‑citizens in Australia for less than 10 years who are convicted of crimes, to the deportation of non‑citizens upon security grounds, and to the deportation of non‑citizens who are convicted of certain serious offences. It was s 201 which applied to the applicant. Within the meaning of that section, he was a non‑citizen convicted in Australia of an offence for which he was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of not less than one year, and when the offence was committed he had been in Australia as a permanent resident for a period of less than 10 years or for periods which, when added together, totalled less than 10 years. The deportable offence, concerned with trafficking in heroin, was committed on 5 June 1991. The applicant was born in Cambodia on 7 April 1967. He arrived in Australia on 7 July 1983. He was granted a permanent resident visa on arrival. The applicant has not been naturalised; he is not an Australian citizen. The extension of time should be granted but the application for orders absolute dismissed with costs. In its application to the applicant, s 200 of the Act was supported as a law with respect to aliens. It is not necessary to determine whether any further head of power supported the application of the provision.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GLEESON CJ, GAUDRON J, GUMMOW J, HAYNE J, CALLINAN J

The application should be dismissed with costs.Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs;Ex parte Dung Chi Dang The prosecutor was born in the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) in 1968. In 1980, in company with his mother and three of his sisters, he fled Vietnam and went to Malaysia. In July 1981, they entered Australia on a Class 302 Permanent Visa and went to live in Victoria, where the prosecutor attended school. After leaving school in 1985, the prosecutor took up various forms of employment. In 1989, he paid a brief visit to Vietnam, and returned to Australia. He did the same thing again in 1990. Save for those visits, he has remained in Australia since he first arrived. He is married. His wife has become an Australian citizen. They have a child who is an Australian citizen. Other close relatives of the prosecutor have also become Australian citizens. He has never done so. The prosecutor has a criminal history, involving the use of, and dealing in, prohibited drugs. Since he first entered Australia, he has spent 663 days in prison serving sentences for various offences, 794 days in prison on remand in connection with charges that did not result in convictions, 76 days in prison on remand in connection with a charge that resulted in a conviction and a suspended sentence, 205 days in immigration detention, and a further period of remand in respect of unresolved charges that commenced in September 2001. On 27 June 2000, the respondent made a decision, pursuant to s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), authorising the cancellation of the prosecutor's visa. The section provides:"501(2) The Minister may cancel a visa that has been granted to a person if:(a)the Minister reasonably suspects that the person does not pass the character test; and(b)the person does not satisfy the Minister that the person passes the character test." We are not presently concerned with the reasons for the Minister's decision, but with a claim that s 501(2), in its application to the prosecutor, is invalid, and, in particular, is not supported by par (xix) or par (xxvii) of s 51 of the Constitution. The prosecutor has commenced proceedings seeking orders of certiorari and prohibition. Hayne J has stated a case reserving for the consideration of the Full Court the following question:"Did section 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) validly authorise the respondent to cancel the applicant's visa on 27 June 2000?" That question is presently before the Court. There may be other issues relevant to the claim for constitutional writs, but, if there are, we are not now concerned with them. For the reasons that follow, I would answer the question in the affirmative, upon the basis that s 501(2), in its application to the prosecutor, is supported by s 51(xix). It is therefore unnecessary to consider s 51 (xxvii). Such an answer would plainly have been required by the decisions of this Court in Pochi v Macphee[1] and Nolan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs[2]. However, the reasoning of four members of the Court[3] in the recent case of Re Patterson; Ex parte Taylor[4] is said to have undermined the authority of Pochi and Nolan, and forms the basis of the prosecutor's arguments. That was reasoning with which I was unable to agree in Patterson; and nothing I have heard in argument in the present case has caused me to change my view.[1](1982) 151 CLR 101.[2](1988) 165 CLR 178.[3]Gaudron, McHugh, Kirby and Callinan JJ.[4](2001) 75 ALJR 1439; 182 ALR 657.