Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, AND CALLINAN JJ

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS  APPELLANT

AND

NAIMA KHAWAR & ORS  RESPONDENTS

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar
[2002] HCA 14
11 April 2002
S128/2001

ORDER

Appeal dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation:

N J Williams SC with J D Smith and M N Allars for the appellant (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

J Basten QC with S E Pritchard for the respondents (instructed by Coelho & Coelho)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. GLEESON CJ.   This appeal raises two issues concerning the definition of "refugee" incorporated into the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act") by s 36(2), which deals with the granting of protection visas, and provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant is a non-citizen "to whom … Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol."[1]  The definition appears in Art 1 of the Convention.  Article 1A(2) provides that the term "refugee" shall apply to any person who:

    "owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."

    [1]The Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951, as amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967, is referred to in these reasons as "the Convention".

  2. The substantive provisions of the Convention appear in a series of Articles which specify various obligations of a contracting state, being "the country in which he finds himself", to a refugee (Art 2).  These include obligations as to the juridical status to be accorded to the refugee (Ch II), as to rights of employment (Ch III), as to welfare (Ch IV), and as to rendering diplomatic and other assistance of the kind that might ordinarily be rendered by the country of nationality (Ch V).

  3. Article 33(1) of the Convention provides:

    "No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion."

  4. The issues arise in the context of applications for a protection visa by a married woman, Ms Khawar, a citizen of Pakistan, and her three children.  Ms Khawar's case is that she was a victim of serious and prolonged domestic violence on the part of her husband and members…

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Details
Case
[2002] HCA 14
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal from the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs concerning an application for a protection visa by Ms Khawar, a citizen of Pakistan. Ms Khawar alleged she was a victim of domestic violence perpetrated by her husband and his family, and that the Pakistani state failed to provide her with effective police protection. The Refugee Review Tribunal had affirmed the delegate's refusal of her visa application, without making findings on the alleged police indifference or the broader context of the position of women in Pakistan.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether a failure by a state to provide effective police protection against domestic violence, when perpetrated by non-state agents for non-Convention reasons, could constitute persecution for a Convention reason. The Court also considered whether the Convention requirement that a putative refugee be "unwilling to avail himself of the protection" of their country of nationality referred to protection within the country of origin or diplomatic/consular protection abroad. Finally, the Court examined whether a selective or discriminatory failure by the state to enforce criminal law against non-state actors assaulting members of a particular social group could amount to persecution under the Convention, and whether "women in Pakistan" constituted a particular social group for the purposes of the Convention.

The High Court reasoned that women, as a distinct and recognisable group, would constitute a particular social group regardless of how they are treated by males or governments. The alleged persecution, therefore, did not define the group. The Court held that the failure to make findings on the factual allegations, particularly regarding the police's indifference to Ms Khawar's complaints, meant the Tribunal had not properly considered her claim. The Court affirmed that a discriminatory failure by the state to enforce the law against perpetrators of violence against women could constitute persecution.

The High Court dismissed the appeal with costs, finding that the decision of the lower courts was correct. The matter was remitted to the Refugee Review Tribunal for further findings on the factual issues raised by Ms Khawar's claim.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The second issue is whether women (or, for present purposes, women in Pakistan) may constitute a particular social group within the meaning of the Convention.Facts and proceedings Ms Khawar and her children arrived in Australia in June 1997, and lodged applications for protection visas in September 1997. In February 1998, a delegate of the appellant refused the applications. The respondents sought review of that decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal"). In January 1999, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision. There was anonymous information before the Tribunal that Ms Khawar's claim that she was a victim of abuse, and that she had a fear of persecution, was bogus and, by implication, that she and her husband were colluding. The Tribunal did not make findings as to the truth of that information, and dealt with the matter upon the basis that the allegations of abuse were true. Because the Tribunal considered that, even on that basis, the claim to refugee status was fundamentally flawed, for reasons that will appear, it was regarded as unnecessary to make findings on the allegations of fabrication. There are two presently relevant factual issues, or potential issues, as to which the Tribunal received information, but about which it made no findings. The failure to make such findings was related to the legal approach which has given rise to the present appeal. First, Ms Khawar gave evidence of four occasions on which she approached the police, alone or together with a male relative, to complain of the violence from which she was suffering. On each occasion the police response, she said, was one of indifference and refusal to help. The Tribunal did not decide whether to accept that evidence. Secondly, Ms Khawar's solicitor filed a submission that included, under the heading "Country Context", material concerning "the position of women in Pakistani society and culture generally." That included extracts from reports of the United States State Department, the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board, Amnesty International, and the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Much of the information was to the same effect as the facts that were found, and were ultimately before the House of Lords, in R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Shah[3]. In that case, Lord Steyn said[4]:"Generalisations about the position of women in particular countries are out of place in regard to issues of refugee status. Everything depends on the evidence and findings of fact in the particular case. On the findings of fact and unchallenged evidence in the present case, the position of women in Pakistan is as follows. Notwithstanding a constitutional guarantee against discrimination on the grounds of sex a woman's place in society in Pakistan is low. Domestic abuse of women and violence towards women is prevalent in Pakistan. That is also true of many other countries and by itself it does not give rise to a claim to refugee status. The distinctive feature of this case is that in Pakistan women are unprotected by the state: discrimination against women in Pakistan is partly tolerated by the state and partly sanctioned by the state."[3][1999] 2 AC 629.[4][1999] 2 AC 629 at 635.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GLEESON CJ (dissent) HUGH AND GUMMOW JJ (dissent)
Women in any society are a distinct and recognisable group; and their distinctive attributes and characteristics exist independently of the manner in which they are treated, either by males or by governments. Neither the conduct of those who perpetrate domestic violence, or of those who withhold the protection of the law from victims of domestic violence, identifies women as a group. Women would still constitute a social group if such violence were to disappear entirely. The alleged persecution does not define the group.Conclusion The decision of Branson J and the Full Court was correct. The matter must go back to the Tribunal for further findings. The appeal should be dismissed with costs. Mc This is another appeal which turns upon the provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act") respecting the issue of protection visas. It is common ground that the appeal is to be determined by reference to the legislation as it stood before the commencement of the Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No 6) 2001 (Cth). Section 29(1) of the Act provides for the granting by the Minister, subject to the Act, of:"permission, to be known as a visa, to do either or both of the following:(a)travel to and enter Australia;(b)remain in Australia".Section 36(1) states that there is a class of visas to be known as "protection visas". Sub‑section (2) of s 36 states:"A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non‑citizen in Australia to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol." If, after considering a valid application for a protection visa, the Minister is satisfied that the criteria prescribed by the Act and the other requirements spelled out in par (a) of s 65(1) are met, the Minister is to grant the visa.The Convention The expression "a non‑citizen in Australia to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol" picks up the definition of "refugee" in Art 1 of these international instruments ("the Convention"). In particular, attention is focused by the submissions in this appeal upon a particular portion of the lengthy definition in Art 1 of the Convention. This is the first paragraph in sub‑s (2) of s A:"[Any person who] owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country". The term "asylum" does not appear in the main body of the text of the Convention; the Convention does not impose an obligation upon Contracting States to grant asylum or a right to settle in those States to refugees arriving at their borders[18]. Nor does the Convention specify what constitutes entry into the territory of a Contracting State so as then to be in a position to have the benefits conferred by the Convention[19]. Rather, the protection obligations imposed by the Convention upon Contracting States concern the status and civil rights to be afforded to refugees who are within Contracting States. The obligations include such matters as juridical status (Ch II) including "free access to the courts of law" (Art 16), and gainful employment (Ch III) and welfare (Ch IV). The provisions of Ch III and Ch IV confer rights by reference to various stipulated standards, including "the same treatment as is accorded to" nationals of the Contracting State, "the most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country in the same circumstances", and treatment "not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances".[18]Hyndman, "Refugees Under International Law with a Reference to the Concept of Asylum", (1986) 60 Australian Law Journal 148 at 152‑154.[19]Blay and Piotrowicz, "The case of MV Tampa: state and refugee rights collide at sea", (2002) 76 Australian Law Journal 12 at 15.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

In the case of Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar, the Federal Court of Australia considered several issues related to the applicant's claim for a protection visa under the Convention. Firstly, the court examined whether the failure of the State to provide effective police protection against domestic violence, when the violence is perpetrated by non-State actors for non-Convention reasons, can constitute persecution for a Convention reason. The court found that the failure to provide protection may constitute persecution, but the circumstances must be examined in light of the Convention’s definition of persecution and the particular circumstances of the applicant.

Secondly, the court deliberated on the interpretation of the Convention requirement that a putative refugee be "unwilling to avail himself of the protection" of the country of nationality. The court clarified that this refers to protection by the State within the country of origin rather than diplomatic or consular protection available to citizens outside the country. The court relied on the principle that the Convention is concerned with the status and civil rights of refugees within Contracting States and did not impose an obligation to grant asylum or a right to settle.

The third issue was whether the selective or discriminatory failure by the State to enforce the criminal law against non-State actors who assault members of a particular social group can constitute persecution under the Convention. The court held that such failure, when it amounts to State-endorsed or State-tolerated persecution, can indeed constitute persecution. The court underscored that the State's inaction or discriminatory conduct can be considered persecution if it meets the threshold set by the Convention.

Fourthly, the court addressed whether "women in Pakistan" constitute a particular social group within the meaning of the Convention. The court determined that women in any society are a distinct and recognisable group, and their membership in a social group does not depend on the manner in which they are treated by others. The court emphasized that the characteristics of the group exist independently of the treatment by the State or non-State actors.

Lastly, the court considered whether the applicant might fall within a more narrowly defined social group. The court did not make specific findings on this issue but noted that such determinations would depend on the individual circumstances of the applicant and the evidence presented.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the State's failure to provide protection against persecution, when it amounts to State-endorsed or State-tolerated persecution, can constitute persecution under the Convention. Furthermore, the court distinguished the requirement for "unwillingness to avail oneself of the protection" of the country of nationality, clarifying it pertains to State protection within the country of origin. The court also confirmed that women can constitute a particular social group for the purposes of the Convention, irrespective of the State's treatment or the actions of non-State actors.