Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar - [2002] HCA 14

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GLEESON CJ,
McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, AND CALLINAN JJ
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS APPELLANT
AND
NAIMA KHAWAR & ORS RESPONDENTS
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar
[2002] HCA 14
11 April 2002
S128/2001
ORDER
Appeal dismissed with costs.
On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia
Representation:
N J Williams SC with J D Smith and M N Allars for the appellant (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
J Basten QC with S E Pritchard for the respondents (instructed by Coelho & Coelho)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

CATCHWORDS
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar
Immigration – Refugees – Application for protection visa – Well-founded fear of persecution – Applicant, a citizen of Pakistan, allegedly victim of domestic violence at the hands of her husband and his family – Whether failure by State to provide effective police protection against domestic violence capable of constituting persecution for a Convention reason where the feared violence is perpetrated by non-State agents for non‑Convention reasons – Whether Convention requirement that putative refugee be "unwilling to avail himself of the protection" of the country of nationality refers to protection by the State within the country of origin or to diplomatic or consular protection available to citizens who are outside the country of origin – Whether selective or discriminatory failure by State to enforce the criminal law against non-State actors who assault members of a particular social group capable of constituting persecution under the Convention.
Immigration – Refugees – Application for protection visa – Membership of a particular social group – Applicant, a citizen of Pakistan, allegedly victim of domestic violence at the hands of her husband and his family – Whether "women in Pakistan" a particular social group – Whether applicant may fall within a more narrowly defined social group.
Words and phrases – "persecution", "particular social group".
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 36(2).
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, art 1A(2).

GLEESON CJ. This appeal raises two issues concerning the definition of "refugee" incorporated into the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act") by s 36(2), which deals with the granting of protection visas, and provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant is a non-citizen "to whom … Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol."[1] The definition appears in Art 1 of the Convention. Article 1A(2) provides that the term "refugee" shall apply to any person who:
"owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."
[1]The Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951, as amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967, is referred to in these reasons as "the Convention".
The substantive provisions of the Convention appear in a series of Articles which specify various obligations of a contracting state, being "the country in which he finds himself", to a refugee (Art 2). These include obligations as to the juridical status to be accorded to the refugee (Ch II), as to rights of employment (Ch III), as to welfare (Ch IV), and as to rendering diplomatic and other assistance of the kind that might ordinarily be rendered by the country of nationality (Ch V).
Article 33(1) of the Convention provides:
"No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion."
The issues arise in the context of applications for a protection visa by a married woman, Ms Khawar, a citizen of Pakistan, and her three children. Ms Khawar's case is that she was a victim of serious and prolonged domestic violence on the part of her husband and members of his family, that the police in Pakistan refused to enforce the law against such violence or otherwise offer her protection, and that such refusal is part of systematic discrimination against women which is both tolerated and sanctioned by the state[2]. Those allegations are not admitted to be true; and the allegations as to police inaction, and state policy, in Pakistan have not yet been the subject of findings. This Court is concerned only with legal issues that arise from the nature of the case Ms Khawar seeks to make, and from the way in which her case was dealt with in the Refugee Review Tribunal.
[2]cf R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Shah [1999] 2 AC 629 at 635 per Lord Steyn.
The first issue is whether the failure of a country of nationality to provide protection against domestic violence to women, in circumstances where the motivation of the perpetrators of the violence is private, can result in persecution of the kind referred to in Art 1A(2) of the Convention.
The second issue is whether women (or, for present purposes, women in Pakistan) may constitute a particular social group within the meaning of the Convention.
Facts and proceedings
Ms Khawar and her children arrived in Australia in June 1997, and lodged applications for protection visas in September 1997. In February 1998, a delegate of the appellant refused the applications. The respondents sought review of that decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal"). In January 1999, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision.
There was anonymous information before the Tribunal that Ms Khawar's claim that she was a victim of abuse, and that she had a fear of persecution, was bogus and, by implication, that she and her husband were colluding. The Tribunal did not make findings as to the truth of that information, and dealt with the matter upon the basis that the allegations of abuse were true. Because the Tribunal considered that, even on that basis, the claim to refugee status was fundamentally flawed, for reasons that will appear, it was regarded as unnecessary to make findings on the allegations of fabrication.
There are two presently relevant factual issues, or potential issues, as to which the Tribunal received information, but about which it made no findings. The failure to make such findings was related to the legal approach which has given rise to the present appeal.
First, Ms Khawar gave evidence of four occasions on which she approached the police, alone or together with a male relative, to complain of the violence from which she was suffering. On each occasion the police response, she said, was one of indifference and refusal to help. The Tribunal did not decide whether to accept that evidence.
Secondly, Ms Khawar's solicitor filed a submission that included, under the heading "Country Context", material concerning "the position of women in Pakistani society and culture generally." That included extracts from reports of the United States State Department, the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board, Amnesty International, and the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Much of the information was to the same effect as the facts that were found, and were ultimately before the House of Lords, in R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Shah[3]. In that case, Lord Steyn said[4]:
"Generalisations about the position of women in particular countries are out of place in regard to issues of refugee status. Everything depends on the evidence and findings of fact in the particular case. On the findings of fact and unchallenged evidence in the present case, the position of women in Pakistan is as follows. Notwithstanding a constitutional guarantee against discrimination on the grounds of sex a woman's place in society in Pakistan is low. Domestic abuse of women and violence towards women is prevalent in Pakistan. That is also true of many other countries and by itself it does not give rise to a claim to refugee status. The distinctive feature of this case is that in Pakistan women are unprotected by the state: discrimination against women in Pakistan is partly tolerated by the state and partly sanctioned by the state."
[3][1999] 2 AC 629.
[4][1999] 2 AC 629 at 635.
Again, the Tribunal made no findings as to whether that information was true, because it considered that, even if it were true, the claim to refugee status must fail.
The Tribunal's decision was given before the House of Lords decided Ex parte Shah. The essence of the Tribunal's reasoning was that, even if Ms Khawar's claims as to her treatment by her husband and his family were true, those harming her were not motivated by her membership of any particular social group, but by purely personal considerations related to the circumstances of her marriage, the fact that she brought no dowry to the family, and their dislike of her as an individual. The reasoning proceeded on the assumption that the alleged persecution, if any, consisted solely of the conduct towards Ms Khawar of her husband and his relatives. That conduct was not for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a particular social group, even if women constituted such a group. It was for personal reasons. On that approach, the attitude of the Pakistani police, or of the Pakistani state, was incapable of turning the inflicting of harm for reasons having nothing to do with any of the grounds set out in Art 1A(2) into persecution for one of the reasons stated.
There was an appeal to the Federal Court of Australia, which came before Branson J, who concluded that the Tribunal had erred in law in its interpretation of the Convention definition of refugee and in its failure to make findings on the two issues of fact earlier mentioned[5]. The matter was referred back to the Tribunal for further consideration according to law. The Minister appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court. By majority (Mathews and Lindgren JJ; Hill J dissenting), the appeal was dismissed[6].
[5]Khawar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 168 ALR 190.
[6]Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar (2000) 101 FCR 501.
In this Court, with reference to the first of the two legal issues earlier identified, the appellant's counsel argued, as his "central proposition", that persecution and protection are distinct concepts in the Convention definition of refugee, and that it is impermissible to treat absence of state protection as a factor capable of converting private harm, based upon a motivation other than one of the Convention reasons, into persecution within the Convention definition. It was acknowledged that, if that proposition were wrong, and if the second legal issue were also decided in favour of the respondents, the orders of Branson J must stand, and the matters would need to go back to the Tribunal for further findings of fact.
Since the first issue turns largely upon the concepts of state protection and persecution, and upon whether, as the respondents contend, they are interrelated, or whether, as the appellant insists, they must be considered separately, it is necessary to examine those concepts.
Protection
There is a broader sense, and a narrower sense, in which the term "protection" is used in the present context.
An example of the broader sense is to be found in the following passage in the judgment of Brennan CJ in Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs[7]:
"The feared 'persecution' of which Art 1A(2) speaks exhibits certain qualities. The first of these qualities relates to the source of the persecution. A person ordinarily looks to 'the country of his nationality' for protection of his fundamental rights and freedoms but, if 'a well-founded fear of being persecuted' makes a person 'unwilling to avail himself of the protection of [the country of his nationality]', that fear must be a fear of persecution by the country of the putative refugee's nationality or persecution which that country is unable or unwilling to prevent."
[7](1997) 190 CLR 225 at 233.
The relationship between persecution as the inflicting of serious harm in violation of fundamental rights and freedoms, and the responsibility of a country of nationality, or state, as the primary protector of fundamental rights and freedoms, has been taken up in the interpretation of the Convention[8]. It is reflected in what was said by Lord Hope of Craighead in Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department[9]:
"I would hold therefore that, in the context of an allegation of persecution by non-state agents, the word 'persecution' implies a failure by the state to make protection available against the ill-treatment or violence which the person suffers at the hands of his persecutors. In a case where the allegation is of persecution by the state or its own agents the problem does not, of course, arise. There is a clear case for surrogate protection by the international community. But in the case of an allegation of persecution by non-state agents the failure of the state to provide the protection is nevertheless an essential element. It provides the bridge between persecution by the state and persecution by non-state agents which is necessary in the interests of the consistency of the whole scheme."
[8]See, for example, R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Adan [2001] 2 AC 477 at 491-492, and the cases there cited.
[9][2001] 1 AC 489 at 497-498.
His Lordship went on to quote Dawson J in Applicant A[10], who said that it was a well-accepted fact that international refugee law was meant to serve as a substitute for national protection where such protection was not provided due to discrimination against persons on grounds of their civil or political status.
[10](1997) 190 CLR 225 at 248.
The narrower sense in which "protection" is used is that of diplomatic or consular protection extended abroad by a country to its nationals. As Professor Kälin has demonstrated[11], the history of the Convention and textual considerations suggest that, in Art 1A(2), in the expression "the protection of that country", the word "protection" is used in this sense. The historical background to the Convention includes the 1946 Constitution of the International Refugee Organisation, which referred to external protection and viewed a refugee as a person having no consul or diplomatic mission to whom to turn. The drafting history appears to support Professor Kälin's view. And the inability or unwillingness of the refugee referred to in Art 1A(2) to avail himself of the protection of his country, by hypothesis, occurs when he is outside his country. It does not follow, however, that the broader sense of protection is irrelevant to Art 1A(2).
[11]Kälin, "Non-State Agents of Persecution and the Inability of the State to Protect", (2001) 15 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 415 at 426. See also Fortin, "The Meaning of 'Protection' in the Refugee Definition", (2001) 12 International Journal of Refugee Law 548.
It is accepted in Australia, and it is widely accepted in other jurisdictions[12], that the serious harm involved in persecution may be inflicted by persons who are not agents of the government of the country of nationality referred to in Art 1A(2). However, the paradigm case of persecution contemplated by the Convention is persecution by the state itself. Article 1A(2) was primarily, even if not exclusively, aimed at persecution by a state or its agents on one of the grounds to which it refers. Bearing that in mind, there is a paradox in the reference to a refugee's inability or unwillingness to avail himself of the protection of his persecutor. But accepting that, at that point of the Article, the reference is to protection in the narrower sense, an inability or unwillingness to seek diplomatic protection abroad may be explained by a failure of internal protection in the wider sense, or may be related to a possibility that seeking such protection could result in return to the place of persecution. During the 1950s, people fled to Australia from communist persecution in Hungary. They did not, upon arrival, ask the way to the Hungarian Embassy.
[12]Kälin, "Non-State Agents of Persecution and the Inability of the State to Protect", (2001) 15 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 415 at 415-416.
The opening portion of Art 1A(2) postulates that a putative refugee is outside the country of his nationality owing to a fear of persecution. That contemplates a fear of persecution within the country of his nationality. It is "such fear" that makes the person unwilling to avail himself of the protection of his country. It is not a fear of being persecuted by the country's diplomats that causes the unwillingness; although the possibility that if he puts himself in their hands he may be returned to his own country may be a consideration.
When a national of another country applies, under the Act, for a "protection visa", claiming that Australia "has protection obligations" under the Convention, and contends that his or her case falls within Art 1A(2), unwillingness to seek the diplomatic protection of the country of nationality may be self-evident. But on the questions whether persecution is a threat, (which usually involves consideration of what has occurred in the past as a basis for looking at the future), and whether such persecution is by reason of one of the Convention grounds, and whether fear of persecution is well-founded, the obligation of a state to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of those who are entitled to its protection may be of significance. The reasons for this will be considered in dealing with the concept of persecution.
In the present case, Ms Khawar does not rely upon mere inability of the police and other authorities of Pakistan to protect her against personally motivated violence. She claims that the violence is tolerated and condoned; not merely at a local level by corrupt, or inefficient, or lazy, or under-resourced police, but as an aspect of systematic discrimination against women, involving selective enforcement of the law, which amounts to a failure of the state of Pakistan to discharge its responsibilities to protect women. She may not be able to make good her claim. The Tribunal has not yet found the necessary facts. But, as the case of Ex parte Shah shows, it is possible that she might be able to establish the facts she alleges.
As her case is argued, and as a matter of principle, it would not be sufficient for Ms Khawar to show maladministration, incompetence, or ineptitude, by the local police. That would not convert personally motivated domestic violence into persecution on one of the grounds set out in Art 1A(2). But if she could show state tolerance or condonation of domestic violence, and systematic discriminatory implementation of the law, then it would not be an answer to her case to say that such a state of affairs resulted from entrenched cultural attitudes. An Australian court or tribunal would need to be well-informed about the relevant facts and circumstances, including cultural conditions, before reaching a conclusion that what occurs in another country amounts to persecution by reason of the attitude of the authorities to the behaviour of private individuals; but if, after due care, such a conclusion is reached, then there is no reason for hesitating to give effect to it.
Persecution

Article 1A(2) does not refer to any particular kind of persecutor. It refers to persecution, which is conduct of a certain character. I do not see why persecution may not be a term aptly used to describe the combined effect of conduct of two or more agents; or why conduct may not, in certain circumstances, include inaction.
Whether failure to act amounts to conduct often depends upon whether there is a duty to act. Sometimes, for example, silence, where there is an obligation to speak, might bear a positive as well as a negative aspect. In some circumstances, silence in the face of an accusation can amount to an admission. Or failure to contradict what somebody else says might, in some circumstances, involve a representation that what is said is true. It depends upon the circumstances; and a relevant circumstance might be what would ordinarily be expected, or whether the person who remains silent has a legal or moral duty to speak. Similarly, the legal quality of inaction in the face of violence displayed by one person towards another might depend upon whether there is a duty to intervene. If X sees A assaulting B, then there may be no duty upon X to intervene, and the mere failure to do so might not amount to conduct of any description. But if A and B are schoolchildren, and X is a teacher responsible for their supervision, the failure to intervene will take on a different complexion.
If there is a persecutor of a person or a group of people, who is a "non-state agent of persecution", then the failure of the state to intervene to protect the victim may be relevant to whether the victim's fear of continuing persecution is well-founded. That would be so whether the failure resulted from a state policy of tolerance or condonation of the persecution, or whether it resulted from inability to do anything about it. But that does not exhaust the possible relevance of state inaction.
The references in the authorities to state agents of persecution and non-state agents of persecution should not be understood as constructing a strict dichotomy. Persecution may also result from the combined effect of the conduct of private individuals and the state or its agents; and a relevant form of state conduct may be tolerance or condonation of the inflicting of serious harm in circumstances where the state has a duty to provide protection against such harm. As was noted earlier, this is not a case in which it is necessary to deal with mere inability to provide protection; this is a case of alleged tolerance and condonation. In Ex parte Shah[13], Lord Hoffmann, in giving the example of the Jewish shopkeeper set upon with impunity by business rivals in Nazi Germany, referred to the failure of the authorities to provide protection, based upon race, as an "element in the persecution"[14]. The same expression was used by Lord Hope of Craighead in the passage from Horvath quoted above.
[13][1999] 2 AC 629.
[14][1999] 2 AC 629 at 654.
Where persecution consists of two elements, the criminal conduct of private citizens, and the toleration or condonation of such conduct by the state or agents of the state, resulting in the withholding of protection which the victims are entitled to expect, then the requirement that the persecution be by reason of one of the Convention grounds may be satisfied by the motivation of either the criminals or the state. In relation to the case which Ms Khawar seeks to make out, the decision in Ex parte Shah in this respect is directly in point[15]. If her contentions, as to which no findings have yet been made, are correct, then Ms Khawar was being abused by her husband and his relatives for personal reasons, but her likely subjection to further abuse without state protection is by reason of her membership of a particular social group, if it be the case that women in Pakistan may be so described.
[15][1999] 2 AC 629 at 646 per Lord Steyn.
A particular social group
In my view, it would be open to the Tribunal, on the material before it, to conclude that women in Pakistan are a particular social group.
The size of the group does not necessarily stand in the way of such a conclusion. There are instances where the victims of persecution in a country have been a majority. It is power, not number, that creates the conditions in which persecution may occur. In some circumstances, the large size of a group might make implausible a suggestion that such a group is a target of persecution, and might suggest that a narrower definition is necessary. But I see nothing inherently implausible in the suggestion that women in a particular country may constitute a persecuted group, especially having regard to some of the information placed before the Tribunal on behalf of Ms Khawar. And cohesiveness may assist to define a group; but it is not an essential attribute of a group. Some particular social groups are notoriously lacking in cohesiveness.
In Applicant A[16], McHugh J explained why the persecutory conduct itself cannot define the particular social group in question for the purposes of Art 1A(2), but went on to add that the actions of the persecutors may serve to identify or even cause the creation of such a group[17]. He held that couples in China who want to have more than one child, contrary to the one child policy, were not a particular social group, as there was no social attribute or characteristic which linked them independently of the alleged persecutory conduct.
[16](1997) 190 CLR 225 at 263.
[17](1997) 190 CLR 225 at 264.
Women in any society are a distinct and recognisable group; and their distinctive attributes and characteristics exist independently of the manner in which they are treated, either by males or by governments. Neither the conduct of those who perpetrate domestic violence, or of those who withhold the protection of the law from victims of domestic violence, identifies women as a group. Women would still constitute a social group if such violence were to disappear entirely. The alleged persecution does not define the group.
Conclusion
The decision of Branson J and the Full Court was correct. The matter must go back to the Tribunal for further findings.
The appeal should be dismissed with costs.
McHUGH AND GUMMOW JJ. This is another appeal which turns upon the provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act") respecting the issue of protection visas. It is common ground that the appeal is to be determined by reference to the legislation as it stood before the commencement of the Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No 6) 2001 (Cth).
Section 29(1) of the Act provides for the granting by the Minister, subject to the Act, of:
"permission, to be known as a visa, to do either or both of the following:
(a)travel to and enter Australia;
(b)remain in Australia".
Section 36(1) states that there is a class of visas to be known as "protection visas". Sub‑section (2) of s 36 states:
"A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non‑citizen in Australia to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol."
If, after considering a valid application for a protection visa, the Minister is satisfied that the criteria prescribed by the Act and the other requirements spelled out in par (a) of s 65(1) are met, the Minister is to grant the visa.
The Convention
The expression "a non‑citizen in Australia to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol" picks up the definition of "refugee" in Art 1 of these international instruments ("the Convention"). In particular, attention is focused by the submissions in this appeal upon a particular portion of the lengthy definition in Art 1 of the Convention. This is the first paragraph in sub‑s (2) of s A:
"[Any person who] owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country".
The term "asylum" does not appear in the main body of the text of the Convention; the Convention does not impose an obligation upon Contracting States to grant asylum or a right to settle in those States to refugees arriving at their borders[18]. Nor does the Convention specify what constitutes entry into the territory of a Contracting State so as then to be in a position to have the benefits conferred by the Convention[19]. Rather, the protection obligations imposed by the Convention upon Contracting States concern the status and civil rights to be afforded to refugees who are within Contracting States. The obligations include such matters as juridical status (Ch II) including "free access to the courts of law" (Art 16), and gainful employment (Ch III) and welfare (Ch IV). The provisions of Ch III and Ch IV confer rights by reference to various stipulated standards, including "the same treatment as is accorded to" nationals of the Contracting State, "the most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country in the same circumstances", and treatment "not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances".
[18]Hyndman, "Refugees Under International Law with a Reference to the Concept of Asylum", (1986) 60 Australian Law Journal 148 at 152‑154.
[19]Blay and Piotrowicz, "The case of MV Tampa: state and refugee rights collide at sea", (2002) 76 Australian Law Journal 12 at 15.
However, the provisions in Ch V (Arts 25‑34) are significant. In particular, Art 31 provides that, even if refugees entered a Contracting State illegally, it is not to impose penalties upon them on account of their illegal entry or presence; Art 32 imposes an obligation not to expel a refugee lawfully in the country of a Contracting State "save on grounds of national security or public order"; and Art 33 contains the non‑refoulement provision[20].
[20]Article 33(1) states:
"No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion."
Although none of the provisions in Ch V gives to refugees a right to enter the territory of a Contracting State, in conjunction they provide some measure of protection. Nevertheless, it remains the case, to repeat one commentator[21]:
"States the world over consistently have exhibited great reluctance to give up their sovereign right to decide which persons will, and which will not, be admitted to their territory, and given a right to settle there. They have refused to agree to international instruments which would impose on them duties to make grants of asylum.[22]
Today, the generally accepted position would appear to be as follows: States consistently refuse to accept binding obligations to grant to persons, not their nationals, any rights to asylum in the sense of a permanent right to settle. Apart from any limitations which might be imposed by specific treaties, States have been adamant in maintaining that the question of whether or not a right of entry should be afforded to an individual, or to a group of individuals, is something which falls to each nation to resolve for itself.[23]"
[21]Hyndman, "Refugees Under International Law with a Reference to the Concept of Asylum", (1986) 60 Australian Law Journal 148 at 153.
[22]For a comprehensive description of the attempts to reach agreement on a Convention on Territorial Asylum, see A Grahl-Madsen, Territorial Asylum, (1980), and for a note on the abortive Geneva Conference of 1977 on Territorial Asylum, see (1977) 51 Australian Law Journal 330.
[23]S Prakash Sinha, Asylum and International Law, (1971) at 108. However, it should be noted that on the municipal plane States have been willing to assume obligations which they have so far been loath to undertake on the international level. A Grahl-Madsen, Territorial Asylum, (1980) at 24.
Several further points should be made here. The first is that the Act is not concerned to enact in Australian municipal law the various protection obligations of Contracting States found in Chs II, III and IV of the Convention. The scope of the Act is much narrower. In providing for protection visas whereby persons may either or both travel to and enter Australia, or remain in this country, the Act focuses upon the definition in Art 1 of the Convention as the criterion of operation of the protection visa system.
Secondly, the drawing of the definition of "refugee" into municipal law itself involves the construction of that definition and that in turn may require attention to the text, scope and purpose of the Convention as a whole. In particular, it would be erroneous to construe the passage set out above from sub‑s (2) of s A of Art 1 in isolation from the rest of the Convention.
Thirdly, the Convention is not to be approached with any preconceptions as to the preference of a "broad" to a "narrow" construction, or vice versa. Observations to like effect made in DP v Commonwealth Central Authority[24] respecting legislation based on the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction are in point here.
[24](2001) 75 ALJR 1257 at 1266 [41]-[45]; 180 ALR 402 at 414‑415.
Fourthly, the scope of the Convention was deliberately confined. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Haji Ibrahim[25], in the course of reasons for judgment with which Gleeson CJ[26] and Hayne J[27] agreed, Gummow J said[28]:
"The provisions in the Act respecting protection visas have to be construed in the context of the legislation as a whole. This shows that the provisions in question are not the only mechanism for giving effect to the calls of international humanitarianism. Further, the Convention was adopted against a particular background of customary international law concerning the consequences of delinquency in the exercise of State responsibility for the welfare of its own nationals and the acceptance by asylum States of responsibilities under their municipal laws towards those they accepted as refugees. The Convention was not designed to confer any general right of asylum upon classes or groups of persons suffering hardship and was deliberately confined in its scope. Whether there is a need for revision of the Convention and whether this should be promoted by the other branches of government is not a matter that arises for this Court. Its mandate is to construe and apply the Act. The interpretation of the protection visa provisions in the Act should not be strained to meet a judicially perceived mischief in the delayed development of customary or other international law."
[25](2000) 204 CLR 1.
[26](2000) 204 CLR 1 at 4 [1].
[27](2000) 204 CLR 1 at 72 [203].
[28](2000) 204 CLR 1 at 50 [143].
The litigation
The first respondent, Mrs Khawar, is a citizen of Pakistan. She arrived in Australia with her three children, the second, third and fourth respondents, on 17 June 1997. The respondents had been issued Australian visitor visas on 5 June 1997 which permitted a single entry to, and a three-month stay in, Australia. On 16 September 1997, the day prior to the expiry of that three-month period, the first respondent lodged an application for protection visas for herself and her children. On 4 February 1998 a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the protection visas sought. Mrs Khawar then applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal") for review of that decision. The decision of the Tribunal affirming the decision of the delegate was given on 11 January 1999.
The issue before the Tribunal was whether Mrs Khawar possessed a well‑founded fear of persecution for reasons of membership of a particular social group. Mrs Khawar claimed that in Pakistan she was a target of domestic violence at the hands of her husband and, to a more limited extent, of his family. Mrs Khawar married in 1980. She completed about 11 years schooling, and speaks, reads and writes Urdu, and also reads and writes some English. Her evidence detailed instances of abuse beginning in about 1986 and increasing in severity over a period of years. It is sufficient to note that the abuse included slappings, beatings which led to her hospitalisation, a threat to throw acid on her and a threat to kill her by setting fire to her. On one occasion her husband had doused her with petrol, an activity which had ceased only when a neighbour had arrived in response to the screams of Mrs Khawar and her children.
The Tribunal referred to two letters, written anonymously, which alleged that Mrs Khawar's case was false, and that her husband had followed her to Australia in August 1997 and was on good terms with her. Mrs Khawar denied these allegations but the Tribunal did not express any conclusion on the matter. However, the Tribunal stated that it was "willing to accept that [Mrs Khawar's] claims about the violence she suffered at the hands of her husband [were] true".
Nevertheless, the Tribunal found that Mrs Khawar's husband "was not motivated to harm her because she was a member of a particular social group". In particular, the Tribunal found that "[s]he was not harmed because she was a member of any of the particular social groups proposed by [Mrs Khawar's] adviser: 'women'; 'married women in Pakistan'; 'married women in Pakistan without the protection of a male relative'; 'married women in Pakistan separated from one's husband and without the protection of a male relative'; 'married women in Pakistan suspected of adultery'; or 'women who have transgressed the mores of Pakistani society'". The Tribunal found that she had been harmed because the family of Mrs Khawar's husband:
"were angry or shamed by the fact that he married her for love when he was already engaged to a relative and because she brought no dowry to the family. She was also seen as being responsible for her husband being estranged from his family for five years."
The Tribunal therefore found that Mrs Khawar "was not harmed for a Convention reason". It should be noted that the Tribunal appears to have considered that the harm suffered by Mrs Khawar was of sufficient severity to come within the meaning of the expression "persecution". However, the Tribunal did not indicate whether it accepted material put forward by Mrs Khawar's solicitor which would tend to show a systemic failure by police authorities in Pakistan to investigate or lay charges in respect of complaints by women of domestic violence against them.
Mrs Khawar applied to the Federal Court for review of the Tribunal's decision on the ground that that decision involved an error of law within the meaning of s 476(1)(e) of the Act[29]. That error of law was said to arise from the failure of the Tribunal to make findings of fact respecting the claims made by Mrs Khawar that she had reported incidents of the domestic violence to the police and that "the police failed to provide any, or any effective protection". Mrs Khawar had claimed that she had been to the police to report the incidents of violence on four occasions and that on each occasion the police either had refused to take the complaint or had failed to take the complaint seriously. The notion of failure by State authorities to provide "protection" to their nationals whilst they are within the territory of the State is important for this litigation.
[29]Section 476(1)(e) provided that an application might be made for review by the Federal Court of a judicially reviewable decision on any one or more of the following grounds:
"that the decision involved an error of law, being an error involving an incorrect interpretation of the applicable law or an incorrect application of the law to the facts as found by the person who made the decision, whether or not the error appears on the record of the decision".
The decision of the Tribunal was a judicially reviewable decision within the meaning of s 475(1)(b) of the Act.

The Federal Court (Branson J) set aside the decision of the Tribunal and referred the matter to the Tribunal "for further consideration according to law". In her reasons for judgment[30], her Honour found that the Tribunal had made "no findings of fact concerning [Mrs Khawar's] claim that she was unable to obtain police protection in respect of the violence experienced by her". Branson J also found that the Tribunal had failed to determine whether Mrs Khawar was a member of a particular social group in Pakistan within the meaning of the Convention and said[31]:
"Had the [T]ribunal made a finding that [Mrs Khawar] was a member of a social group in Pakistan which was comprised of Pakistani women, or alternatively married Pakistani women, it may well have concluded, as Lord Steyn did on the evidence in [R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shah[32]] that:
'Given the central feature of state-tolerated and state-sanctioned gender discrimination, the argument that the appellants fear persecution not because of their membership of a social group but because of the hostility of their husbands is unrealistic.'"
Branson J expressed her conclusion as follows[33]:
"I conclude that in considering the question of the motivation of [Mrs Khawar's] husband in harming her, the [T]ribunal made an error of law involving an incorrect interpretation of the applicable law (ie the phrase 'a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of … membership of a particular social group'). First, the [T]ribunal failed to construe the phrase as a whole having regard to the purposes of the Convention and s 36 of the Act. Concomitantly, the [T]ribunal reached a conclusion on the question of whether [Mrs Khawar's] fear of persecution was for reason of her membership of a particular social group without first identifying the relevant social group, if any, of which [Mrs Khawar] was a member. The matter will be remitted to the [T]ribunal for further consideration according to law."
[30]Khawar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 168 ALR 190 at 192.
[31](1999) 168 ALR 190 at 197.
[32][1999] 2 AC 629 at 646.
[33](1999) 168 ALR 190 at 197.
An appeal by the Minister to the Full Court was dismissed, by majority (Mathews and Lindgren JJ; Hill J dissenting)[34].
[34]Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar (2000) 101 FCR 501.
On further appeal to this Court, the Minister challenges what he sees as the basis of the decision of the majority in the Full Court. The Minister seeks orders which would have the effect of setting aside the orders made by Branson J and dismissing the application for review of the decision of the Tribunal.
The Minister puts his case by urging a negative answer to what is framed as two issues. The first is whether the failure of the country of nationality of an applicant for a protection visa to provide effective police protection against domestic violence to members of a particular social group is capable itself of constituting persecution for reasons of a ground stated in sub‑s (2) of s A of Art 1 of the Convention where the violence feared by the applicant is directed at that person for non‑Convention reasons.
The second is whether fear of harm directed at the applicant by a non‑State agent for non‑Convention reasons, together with or in the knowledge of the failure of the State of nationality to provide effective police protection against such harm to members of a particular social group to which the applicant belongs, "is capable of giving rise to protection obligations" to the applicant. It will be apparent that the two issues are interrelated.
The Convention definition
The references to "protection" and "protection obligations" invite attention to the construction of s A of Art 1 of the Convention and, in particular, to the passage "[any person who] owing to well‑founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of … membership of a particular social group … is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country".
This passage presents two cumulative conditions, the satisfaction of both of which is necessary for classification as a refugee. The first condition is that a person be outside the country of nationality "owing to" fear of persecution for reasons of membership of a particular social group, which is well founded both in an objective and a subjective sense[35]. The second condition is met if the person who satisfies the first condition is unable to avail himself or herself "of the protection of" the country of nationality. This includes persons who find themselves outside the country of their nationality and in a country where the country of nationality has no representation to which the refugee may have recourse to obtain protection. The second condition also is satisfied by a person who meets the requirements of the first condition and who, for a particular reason, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of the country of nationality; that particular reason is that well-founded fear of persecution in the country of nationality which is identified in the first condition.
[35]Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379.
The definition of "refugee" is couched in the present tense and the text indicates that the position of the putative refugee is to be considered on the footing that that person is outside the country of nationality. The reference then made in the text to "protection" is to "external" protection by the country of nationality, for example by the provision of diplomatic or consular protection, and not to the provision of "internal" protection provided inside the country of nationality from which the refugee has departed.
Further, it is significant that sub‑s (2) of s A of Art 1 of the Convention goes on to deal specifically with the situation of persons who lack a nationality. The requirement is stated as applying to one:
"who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it".
Thus, the Convention does not speak of the protection of stateless persons by their country of habitual residence. Nevertheless, the definition does speak of such persons being unable to return to the country of former habitual residence or being unwilling to do so owing to a well-founded fear of persecution.
The immediate origins of these provisions of s A of Art 1 are found[36] in the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization[37]. That Organization was concerned to treat as a refugee[38]:
"a person who has no consul or diplomatic mission to whom to turn, and who does not benefit from reciprocal agreements between countries maintaining friendly relations which protect the nationals of one country living on the territory of another".
[36]Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225 at 279‑280.
[37]Australian Treaty Series 1948, No 16, signed by Australia on 13 May 1947 with effect from 20 August 1948.
[38]Holborn, The International Refugee Organization, A Specialized Agency of the United Nations, Its History and Work 1946-1952, (1956) at 311.
Writing of the Convention, Grahl-Madsen pointed out that protection referred to the possibility of the refugee to enlist[39]:
"the services of the authorities of his home country in some way or other in order to reap some benefit due to nationals of that country. He may do this by applying for and receiving a national passport … or a certificate of nationality, for the purpose of regularizing his stay in a foreign country on the basis thereof, in order to be able to invoke a treaty of reciprocity, or to claim other benefits due to persons of his nationality, or for some similar reason. In more rare cases he may request his national authorities to intervene in his favour with the authorities of another State."
The travaux préparatoires of the Convention strongly supports these views[40].
[39]The Status of Refugees in International Law, vol 1, (1966) at 255; see also at 261.
[40]Kälin, "Non-State Agents of Persecution and the Inability of the State to Protect", (2001) 15 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 415 at 426; Fortin, "The Meaning of 'Protection' in the Refugee Definition", (2001) 12 International Journal of Refugee Law 548 at 558‑563.
Against the background and text of the Convention, it would be an error to inject the notion of "internal protection" into the first condition mentioned above, namely that the person in question be outside the country of nationality by reason of a fear of persecution which is well founded both in an objective and a subjective sense. Hence the statement by the Senior Legal Adviser to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees[41]:
"[T]he inconsistency of the 'internal protection' theory with the inner coherence of the definition is evident from a tendency to misread or misunderstand the words of the Convention."
[41]Fortin, "The Meaning of 'Protection' in the Refugee Definition", (2001) 12 International Journal of Refugee Law 548 at 564.
However, the assumption that the notion of "protection" is to be read back into the first condition underlies the following statement by Lord Hope of Craighead in Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department[42]:
"The general purpose of the Convention is to enable the person who no longer has the benefit of protection against persecution for a Convention reason in his own country to turn for protection to the international community."
[42][2001] 1 AC 489 at 495.
In our opinion, the reference to "protection" in this passage is apt to mislead and to distort the construction of the first condition. The reference to "protection [by] the international community" is also apt to mislead. The Convention is concerned with the status and civil rights to be afforded to refugees who, relevantly, are outside the country of nationality and within the territory of a State Party to the Convention. The Parties to the Convention are a narrower class than the "international community" and, in any event, the Convention represents a significant but qualified limitation upon the absolute right of the member States to admit those whom they choose[43].
[43]Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Haji Ibrahim (2000) 204 CLR 1 at 45‑46 [137].
Similar statements to that of Lord Hope have been made in the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal[44]. The New Zealand Court of Appeal (Richardson P, Henry, Keith, Tipping and Williams JJ) said in Butler v Attorney-General[45]:
"Central to the definition of 'refugee' is the basic concept of protection – the protection accorded (or not) by the country of nationality or, for those who are stateless, the country of habitual residence. If there is a real chance that those countries will not provide protection, the world community is to provide surrogate protection either through other countries or through international bodies. So both paragraphs of art 1A(2) define refugees in part by reference to their ability or willingness to avail themselves of the protection of their country of nationality or of habitual residence."
[44]Zalzali v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1991] 3 FC 605 at 609-610.
[45][1999] NZAR 205 at 216‑217.
The source of the construction indicated by these Courts appears to be found in the writings of a Canadian scholar, Professor Hathaway concerning "surrogate" or "substitute" protection. In Horvath, Lord Hope said[46]:
"As Professor James C Hathaway in The Law of Refugee Status[47] has explained, 'persecution is most appropriately defined as the sustained or systemic failure of state protection in relation to one of the core entitlements which has been recognised by the international community'. [H]e refers^[[48]^] to the protection which the Convention provides as 'surrogate or substitute protection', which is activated only upon the failure of protection by the home state. On this view the failure of state protection is central to the whole system. It also has a direct bearing on the test that is to be applied in order to answer the question whether the protection against persecution which is available in the country of his nationality is sufficiently lacking to enable the person to obtain protection internationally as a refugee. If the principle of surrogacy is applied, the criterion must be whether the alleged lack of protection is such as to indicate that the home state is unable or unwilling to discharge its duty to establish and operate a system for the protection against persecution of its own nationals." (original emphasis)
[46][2001] 1 AC 489 at 495.
[47](1991) at 112.
[48]The Law of Refugee Status, (1991) at 135.
Lord Hope also referred[49] to what he regarded as the "helpful and instructive" analysis of Art 1 by Lord Lloyd of Berwick in Adan v Secretary of State for the Home Department[50]. His Lordship had there referred to sub‑s (2) of s A of Art 1 as including as categories of refugee:
"(1) nationals who are outside their country owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason, and are unable to avail themselves of the protection of their country; (2) nationals who are outside their country owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason, and, owing to such fear, are unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of their country".
That classification which his Lordship said was common ground between the parties in Adan is, with respect, unobjectionable. The difficulty arises from the statement then made by Lord Lloyd that in each of the two categories[51]:
"the asylum-seeker must satisfy two separate tests: what may, for short, be called 'the fear test' and 'the protection test'".
[49][2001] 1 AC 489 at 497.
[50][1999] 1 AC 293 at 304.
[51][1999] 1 AC 293 at 304.
The difficulties which are provoked by the reasoning in Adan and Horvath are discussed in a recent publication of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees[52]. It is said in pars 35 and 36 of that publication:
"35. The meaning of this element of the definition has recently been much debated. According to one view, it refers to protection by the state apparatus inside the country of origin, and forms an indispensable part of the test for refugee status, on an equal footing with the well-founded fear of persecution test. According to others, this element of the definition refers only to diplomatic or consular protection available to citizens who are outside the country of origin. Textual analysis, considering the placement of this element, at the end of the definition and following directly from and in a sense modifying the phrase 'is outside his country of nationality,' together with the existence of a different test for stateless persons, suggests that the intended meaning at the time of drafting and adoption was indeed external protection. Historical analysis leads to the same conclusion. Unwillingness to avail oneself of this external protection is understood to mean unwillingness to expose oneself to the possibility of being returned to the country of nationality where the feared persecution could occur.
36. Despite this apparent clarity, there now exists jurisprudence that has attributed considerable importance in refugee status determination to the availability of state protection inside the country of origin, in line with the first view described above. This somewhat extended meaning may be, and has been, seen as an additional – though not necessary – argument in favour of the applicability of the Convention to those threatened by non‑state agents of persecution." (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added)
[52]Interpreting Article 1 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, (April 2001).
The "internal" protection and "surrogacy" protection theories as a foundation for the construction of the Convention add a layer of complexity to that construction which is an unnecessary distraction. The preferable position is that indicated in the above publication of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in the passage[53]:
"As pointed out in the final paragraphs of [Fortin[54]], it may surely be legitimate for a person who fears non‑state agents not to accept diplomatic protection outside the country as this would provide the country of origin with the possibility of lawfully returning him or her to that country. This would expose the refugee to the feared harm and therefore would make his or her unwillingness to avail of such external protection both reasonable and 'owing to such fear' of persecution."
[53]Interpreting Article 1 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, (April 2001), fn 81.
[54]"The Meaning of 'Protection' in the Refugee Definition", (2001) 12 International Journal of Refugee Law 548.
In opposition to the "protection" theory, there is what is called the "accountability" theory of interpretation of the Convention. In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Adan, the English Court of Appeal said of the latter theory[55]:
"Put shortly the 'accountability' theory limits the classes of case in which a claimant might obtain refugee status under the [Convention] to situations where the persecution alleged can be attributed to the state. German law requires an asylum seeker to show that he fears persecution (on a Convention ground) by the state, or by a quasi-state authority. If he relies on persecution by non‑state agents, it must be shown to be tolerated or encouraged by the state, or at least that the state is unwilling to offer protection against it."
[55][2001] 2 AC 477 at 491.
In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Haji Ibrahim, Callinan J[56] and Gummow J[57] left open the question whether the "accountability" theory should be accepted. The submissions by the Minister in this case, to which reference already has been made, to a degree seek an acceptance of that theory. However, it is again unnecessary to determine whether the theory should be accepted. The reasons why that is so and the path to be taken for the resolution of the present dispute when it is returned to the Tribunal now follow.
[56](2000) 204 CLR 1 at 80‑81 [228].
[57](2000) 204 CLR 1 at 53‑55 [151]-[155].
Persecution and discrimination
In Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs[58], Mason CJ pointed out that (i) the Convention necessarily contemplates in the definition of "refugee" that there is a real chance that the person in question will suffer "some serious punishment or penalty or some significant detriment or disadvantage" if that person returns to the country of nationality; (ii) some forms of selective or discriminatory treatment by a State of its citizens will not amount to persecution; (iii) harm or threat of harm "as part of a course of selective harassment of a person, whether individually or as a member of a group subjected to such harassment by reason of membership of the group, amounts to persecution if done for a Convention reason"; and (iv) such harm or threat of harm may be constituted by the "denial of fundamental rights or freedoms otherwise enjoyed by nationals of the country concerned". In Haji Ibrahim[59], McHugh J again made the point that, whilst persecution involves discrimination that results in harm to an individual, not all discrimination will amount to persecution.
[58](1989) 169 CLR 379 at 388.
[59](2000) 204 CLR 1 at 18‑19 [55].
In a number of previous cases in this Court, in particular Chan, Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs[60] and Chen Shi Hai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs[61], the issues have turned significantly upon the application to the persons claiming refugee status of certain laws of the country of their nationality and the existence of well-founded fears as to the enforcement against them of those laws. Here, the situation is rather different. The laws of Pakistan which are involved have not specifically been identified but may be taken to be criminal laws of a general application respecting serious assault by one individual upon another. Mrs Khawar complains not of her harassment by the selective enforcement against her of those laws but, to the contrary, of the significant detriment or disadvantage she suffers from the alleged failure by the Pakistani police authorities to enforce the criminal law against those who break those laws, in particular against those who inflict domestic violence upon her. In that sense, she complains of discrimination which amounts to persecution.
[60](1997) 190 CLR 225.
[61](2000) 201 CLR 293.

I would doubt whether there is any such characteristic, attribute, activity, belief, interest or goal here[122]. What there is here is what sadly occurs from time to time everywhere, as any experienced lawyer knows: violent family discord of which the unfortunate first respondent is the victim and in respect of which the police are reluctant interveners. Nor would I be confident that any of the other suggested categories could meet the criteria for membership of a social group in Pakistan. Some measure of precision must exist as to the criteria. I would doubt very much whether "all married women in that country" does so. And as to women married to abusive husbands, or women without the protection of male relatives, there will always be questions as to the efficacy and availability of local measures to prevent the abuse.
[122]See also R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shah [1999] 2 AC 629 at 662-663 per Lord Millett.
The first basis upon which the appeal succeeds is that there is no finding of fact by the Tribunal that the government of Pakistan was complicit in violence to women in abusive relationships. The evidence fell short of that: inactivity or inertia of itself does not constitute persecution. It is very difficult, indeed probably impossible, for an Australian court to assess according to our own standards or the standards of other countries the policing priorities of those countries. There needs to be, for persecution to have occurred, elements of deliberation and intention on the part of the State, which involve, at the very least, a decision not to intervene or act.
The majority in the Full Court (as with Branson J) were of the opinion that it was necessary for the Tribunal, in effect, as a starting point, to decide whether the first respondent was a member of a particular social group, and that had the Tribunal held that there was such a group, comprised, for example, of Pakistani women, or, alternatively, married Pakistani women, the Tribunal might well have concluded as Lord Steyn did in R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shah[123], that it was unrealistic to say that the persecution stemmed from her husband's hostility rather than membership of a social group. I cannot regard it as erroneous for the Tribunal, and indeed Hill J, to approach the case upon the basis that, however the social group might be defined, another cause was identified, and in my opinion correctly identified, as the reason for the abuse. What the Tribunal did was to identify the actual cause of the violence. Once it had done so, it was apparent that it was a different cause, or, that it occurred for a different reason, from any Convention reason. And that cause, coupled with reluctance, rather than deliberate abstention, by the police, still could not amount to a Convention reason. It was not erroneous for the Tribunal to approach the matter in the way that it did. Courts frequently proceed upon the basis that because one element of a cause of action, for example, causation, cannot be made out, whatever may have been the detriment to the plaintiff or the conduct of the alleged wrongdoer, the case cannot succeed because the necessary relationship between them has not been established[124]. The Tribunal conducted an exercise of exactly that kind in this case, and did not do so improperly. This is another basis upon which the appeal succeeds.
[123][1999] 2 AC 629 at 646.
[124]Palmer Bruyn & Parker Pty Ltd v Parsons (2001) 76 ALJR 163; 185 ALR 280 is the most recent case to be resolved at all levels, including this Court, on the issue of causation alone.
I would accordingly allow the appeal.