HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GLEESON CJ,
McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY, AND CALLINAN JJMINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS APPELLANTAND
NAIMA KHAWAR & ORS RESPONDENTS
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar
[2002] HCA 14
11 April 2002
S128/2001ORDER
Appeal dismissed with costs.
On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia
Representation:
N J Williams SC with J D Smith and M N Allars for the appellant (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
J Basten QC with S E Pritchard for the respondents (instructed by Coelho & Coelho)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
GLEESON CJ. This appeal raises two issues concerning the definition of "refugee" incorporated into the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act") by s 36(2), which deals with the granting of protection visas, and provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant is a non-citizen "to whom … Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol."[1] The definition appears in Art 1 of the Convention. Article 1A(2) provides that the term "refugee" shall apply to any person who:
"owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."
[1]The Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951, as amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967, is referred to in these reasons as "the Convention".
The substantive provisions of the Convention appear in a series of Articles which specify various obligations of a contracting state, being "the country in which he finds himself", to a refugee (Art 2). These include obligations as to the juridical status to be accorded to the refugee (Ch II), as to rights of employment (Ch III), as to welfare (Ch IV), and as to rendering diplomatic and other assistance of the kind that might ordinarily be rendered by the country of nationality (Ch V).
Article 33(1) of the Convention provides:
"No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion."
The issues arise in the context of applications for a protection visa by a married woman, Ms Khawar, a citizen of Pakistan, and her three children. Ms Khawar's case is that she was a victim of serious and prolonged domestic violence on the part of her husband and members…
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- Case
- [2002] HCA 14
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the High Court were whether a failure by a state to provide effective police protection against domestic violence, when perpetrated by non-state agents for non-Convention reasons, could constitute persecution for a Convention reason. The Court also considered whether the Convention requirement that a putative refugee be "unwilling to avail himself of the protection" of their country of nationality referred to protection within the country of origin or diplomatic/consular protection abroad. Finally, the Court examined whether a selective or discriminatory failure by the state to enforce criminal law against non-state actors assaulting members of a particular social group could amount to persecution under the Convention, and whether "women in Pakistan" constituted a particular social group for the purposes of the Convention.
The High Court reasoned that women, as a distinct and recognisable group, would constitute a particular social group regardless of how they are treated by males or governments. The alleged persecution, therefore, did not define the group. The Court held that the failure to make findings on the factual allegations, particularly regarding the police's indifference to Ms Khawar's complaints, meant the Tribunal had not properly considered her claim. The Court affirmed that a discriminatory failure by the state to enforce the law against perpetrators of violence against women could constitute persecution.
The High Court dismissed the appeal with costs, finding that the decision of the lower courts was correct. The matter was remitted to the Refugee Review Tribunal for further findings on the factual issues raised by Ms Khawar's claim.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by:
In the case of Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar, the Federal Court of Australia considered several issues related to the applicant's claim for a protection visa under the Convention. Firstly, the court examined whether the failure of the State to provide effective police protection against domestic violence, when the violence is perpetrated by non-State actors for non-Convention reasons, can constitute persecution for a Convention reason. The court found that the failure to provide protection may constitute persecution, but the circumstances must be examined in light of the Convention’s definition of persecution and the particular circumstances of the applicant.
Secondly, the court deliberated on the interpretation of the Convention requirement that a putative refugee be "unwilling to avail himself of the protection" of the country of nationality. The court clarified that this refers to protection by the State within the country of origin rather than diplomatic or consular protection available to citizens outside the country. The court relied on the principle that the Convention is concerned with the status and civil rights of refugees within Contracting States and did not impose an obligation to grant asylum or a right to settle.
The third issue was whether the selective or discriminatory failure by the State to enforce the criminal law against non-State actors who assault members of a particular social group can constitute persecution under the Convention. The court held that such failure, when it amounts to State-endorsed or State-tolerated persecution, can indeed constitute persecution. The court underscored that the State's inaction or discriminatory conduct can be considered persecution if it meets the threshold set by the Convention.
Fourthly, the court addressed whether "women in Pakistan" constitute a particular social group within the meaning of the Convention. The court determined that women in any society are a distinct and recognisable group, and their membership in a social group does not depend on the manner in which they are treated by others. The court emphasized that the characteristics of the group exist independently of the treatment by the State or non-State actors.
Lastly, the court considered whether the applicant might fall within a more narrowly defined social group. The court did not make specific findings on this issue but noted that such determinations would depend on the individual circumstances of the applicant and the evidence presented.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the State's failure to provide protection against persecution, when it amounts to State-endorsed or State-tolerated persecution, can constitute persecution under the Convention. Furthermore, the court distinguished the requirement for "unwillingness to avail oneself of the protection" of the country of nationality, clarifying it pertains to State protection within the country of origin. The court also confirmed that women can constitute a particular social group for the purposes of the Convention, irrespective of the State's treatment or the actions of non-State actors.