Lee and Minister for Home Affairs (Citizenship) [2019] AATA 3365 (29 August 2019)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number: 2018/3984
Re:Poh Kait Lee
APPLICANT
AndMinister for Home Affairs
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Senior Member Linda Kirk
Date:29 August 2019
Place:Sydney
The decision under review is affirmed.
.............................[sgd].............................
Senior Member Linda Kirk
CATCHWORDS
CITIZENSHIP – application for citizenship by conferral – whether Applicant satisfies the special residence requirement under section 22B of the Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) – whether Applicant engaged in the work of ‘a member of the crew of an aircraft’ – statutory construction – legislative purpose and context of special resident requirement – decision under review affirmed
LEGISLATION
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 15AA, 15AB
Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) ss 21, 22, 22A, 22B, 22C, 24
Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth)
Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (Cth)
Legislation Act 2003 (Cth) s 13CASES
HLLL and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] AATA 771
Re Owoeye and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] AATA 72SECONDARY MATERIALS
Australian Citizenship Amendment (Citizenship Test Review and Other Measures) Bill 2009, Second Reading, Tuesday 15 September 2009, Senate Hansard
Macquarie Dictionary, Seventh Edition (2017)
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, Australian Citizenship Act 2007 - Special Residence Requirement (Section 22C), Legislative Instrument IMMI 13/056, 29 May 2013
Second Reading Speech to the Australian Citizenship Amendment (Citizenship Test Review and Other Measures) Bill 2009
The Hon. Michael Kirby, ‘Statutory Interpretation: The Meaning of Meaning’ (2011) 35(1) Melbourne University Law Review 113
REASONS FOR DECISION
Senior Member Linda Kirk
29 August 2019
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Mr Poh Kait Lee (‘the Applicant’), a citizen of Malaysia, first entered Australia on 1 April 2000 as the holder of a visitor (subclass 976) visa. The Applicant is a permanent resident, and was most recently granted a subclass 186 (permanent) visa on 3 August 2015.
On 21 October 2017, the Applicant applied for Australian citizenship by conferral (‘citizenship application’)[1] under s 21 of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) (‘the Act’). Relevantly, in his citizenship application, the Applicant stated that he sought an exemption from the general residence requirement on the basis of being “engaged in work of a particular kind requiring regular travel outside of Australia”.[2]
[1] T-documents T4 at p. 43.
[2] T-documents T4 at p. 47.
On 17 February 2018, a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs (‘the Respondent’) refused the citizenship application on the basis that the Applicant did not meet the general residence requirement under s 22(1) of the Act, as he was present in Australia for:
a)less than 4 years immediately before the day he made the application (per s 22(1)(a)); and
b)less than 12 months as a permanent resident immediately before the day he made the application (per s 22(1)(c)).
The delegate did not accept that the Applicant satisfied the special residence requirement under s 22B of the Act, in particular on the basis that the Applicant was not “engaged in a…
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- Case
- [2019] AATA 3365
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the Applicant was engaged in work of a kind specified under section 22C(3) of the Act, and specifically, whether his role constituted being a "member of the crew of an aircraft" for the purposes of the special residence requirement. The court was required to interpret the meaning of "member of the crew of an aircraft" within the context of the Act and relevant regulations, and to determine if the Applicant's duties met the statutory criteria.
The court applied principles of statutory construction, emphasising that the text of the legislation, its purpose, and context are paramount. It noted that section 22B provides an exhaustive list of qualifying work, and there is no discretion to consider other factors like economic contribution. The court found that the Applicant's role with Air Canada did not fall within the specified categories of work, as neither Air Canada nor Malaysia Airlines were listed on the ASX. Furthermore, the court determined that the ordinary meaning of "member of the crew of an aircraft," supported by definitions in aviation safety regulations, refers to individuals directly involved in the operation or safety of the aircraft during flight, such as pilots or cabin crew. The Applicant's duties, while involving travel and interaction with crew and passengers, did not align with these definitions.
Consequently, the decision under review was affirmed, meaning the Applicant did not satisfy the special residence requirement. The court noted that the Applicant, as a permanent resident, remained eligible to re-apply for citizenship in the future should he meet the general or special residence requirements and other criteria.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Section 22B provides an exhaustive list of the kinds of work that fulfil that criteria, and there is no discretion to have regard to other matters such as the Applicant’s contribution to the Australian economy or culture. CONSIDERATION AND REASONSIs the Applicant engaged in work of a kind specified under s 22C(3) of the Act? The primary question for determination is whether the Applicant was during the relevant period engaged in work of a kind specified under s 22C(3). The Instrument relevantly specifies in Schedule C that the kinds of work that satisfy s 22B(1)(a) of the Act include (b) a member of the crew of an aircraft; and (d) a Chief Executive Officer of an S&P/ASX All Australian 200 listed company; or (e) an Executive Manager of an S&P/ASX All Australian 200 listed company. The Schedule provides an exhaustive list of the kinds of work specified for the purposes of s 22B(1)(a) of the Act, and there is no discretion to have regard to other factors, such as the Applicant’s economic or other contributions to Australia. Neither Air Canada nor Malaysia Airlines are listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) and they are not ASX200 listed companies for the purposes of sub-paragraphs (1)(d) and (e) of the Instrument. Accordingly, the Applicant cannot meet the special residence requirement in s 22B on the basis that he is engaged in work of the kind specified in these sub-paragraphs.Is the Applicant engaged in the work of ‘a member of the crew of an aircraft’?What is the meaning of ‘a member of the crew of an aircraft’? The phrase ‘a member of the crew of an aircraft’ is not defined in the Act or in the Instrument. In accordance with the general rules of statutory interpretation, it is appropriate for the Tribunal in construing this phrase to consider the ordinary and everyday meaning of the phrase, but also to have regard to the intent and context of the provision. The Macquarie Dictionary defines ‘crew’ as:Noun3. The persons operating an aircraft in flight. In the context of aircraft and crew licensing and safety regulation, the Aviation Safety Regulations provide the following definitions in Part 1:Cabin crew member, in relation to an aircraft, means a crew member, other than a flight crew member, who performs, in the interests of the safety of the aircraft’s passengers, duties assigned by the operator or the pilot in command of the aircraft.Flight crew member means a crew member who is a pilot or flight engineer assigned to carry out duties essential to the operation of an aircraft during flight time. Approach to statutory construction Former Justice of the High Court of Australia, the Hon. Michael Kirby, extra-judicially outlined the High Court’s elaboration of the principles relevant to statutory construction.[13] These include:·where the applicable law is expressed in legislation the correct starting point for analysis is the text of the legislation and not judicial statements of the common law or even judicial elaborations of the statute;[14] ·the overall objective of statutory construction is to give effect to the purpose of Parliament as expressed in the text of the statutory provisions;[15] and·in deriving meaning from the text, so as to fulfil the purpose of Parliament, it is a mistake to consider statutory words in isolation. The proper approach demands the derivation of the meaning of words from the legislative context in which those words appear. Specifically, it requires the interpreter to examine at the very least the sentence, often the paragraph, and preferably the immediately surrounding provisions (if not a wider review of the entire statutory context) to identify the meaning of the words in the context in which they are used.[16] [13] The Hon. Michael Kirby, ‘Statutory Interpretation: The Meaning of Meaning’ (2011) 35(1) Melbourne University Law Review 113, 116.[14] See, eg, Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 277, 304 (O’Connor J); Bropho v Western Australia (1990) 171 CLR 1, 17–18 (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ); Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427, 437 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ); R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 130 (Lord Steyn).[15] See, eg, ProjectBlueSkyIncvAustralianBroadcastingAuthority (1998) 194 CLR 355, 381[69](McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). Cf Justice Michael Kirby, ‘Towards a Grand Theory of Interpretation: The Case of Statutes and Contracts’ (2003) 24 Statute Law Review 95, 99.[16] [54] Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 389, 396–7 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ), quoting R v Brown [1996] 1 AC 543, 561 (Lord Hoffmann); Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar (2002) 210 CLR 1, 36 [109] (Kirby J); SGH Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 210 CLR 51, 91[88] (Kirby J).