Khawar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Khawar v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1529

MIGRATION - Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) – applicant target of domestic violence in Pakistan – failure of law enforcement officers to provide protection –- whether Tribunal’s consideration of the husband’s motivation for harming the applicant involved an incorrect interpretation of the applicable law (ie, the phrase “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of membership of a particular social group”) – whether Tribunal failed to construe the phrase as a whole, having regard to the purposes of the Refugees Convention - whether failure of state to protect applicant from non-Convention based persecution can amount to persecution

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 476(1)(e)
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Art 1A(2)

Islam v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1999] 2 WLR 1015, considered
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Sarrazola [1999] FCA 1134, followed
Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225, applied
Chan v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379, considered

Refugee and Humanitarian Visa Applicants Guidelines on Gender Issues for Decision Makers, Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 1996

NAIMA KHAWAR & ORS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N 102 of 1999

BRANSON J
SYDNEY
5 NOVEMBER 1999


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 102 of 1999

BETWEEN:

NAIMA KHAWAR and OTHERS
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

BRANSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 NOVEMBER 1999

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal be set aside.

2.The matter be referred to the Refugee Review Tribunal for further consideration according to law.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 102 of 1999

BETWEEN:

NAIMA KHAWAR and OTHERS
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

BRANSON J

DATE:

5 NOVEMBER 1999

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an application under s 476(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) for review by the Court of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”). By its decision the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the respondent not to grant the applicant Naima Khawar (“Ms Khawar”) and her three children protection visas (s 36 of the Act).

  2. A criterion for a protection visa is that the decision-maker is satisfied that the applicant is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (hereafter together referred to as “the Convention”) (Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994…

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Details
Case
[1999] FCA 1529
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Khawar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, a Pakistani citizen, sought protection visas for herself and her three children. The Tribunal rejected her application, prompting an appeal to the court. The central issue was whether the applicant qualified as a person to whom Australia owes protection obligations under the Refugees Convention due to her alleged suffering from domestic violence in Pakistan and the state's failure to provide protection. The applicant argued that the state's failure to protect married women from domestic violence constituted an absence of effective protection by the state on the basis of her membership of a particular social group, namely married women in Pakistan.

The court focused on whether persecutory conduct could be considered Convention-based persecution even if the persecutor had no discriminatory motive, provided that the state withheld effective protection on a Convention ground. The applicant's counsel identified four scenarios in which persecution might occur under the Convention: direct persecution by the state, state condoning or ignoring persecution by non-state actors, persecution by non-state actors with unavailable state protection, and persecution not for a Convention reason but with unavailable state protection. The respondent did not dispute that women in Pakistan could constitute a particular social group for Convention purposes but contended that this was a factual matter for the Tribunal.

The court held that the Tribunal had erred in not considering whether the state authorities' failure to provide protection constituted an absence of effective protection by the state on account of the applicant's membership in a particular social group. The court found that this was a question of law and fact that the Tribunal needed to address. Consequently, the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Tribunal for further consideration according to law.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal be set aside.

2. The matter be referred to the Refugee Review Tribunal for further consideration according to law.

Background

Background to the litigation

As it was only Ms Khawar who made specific claims under the Convention, it is convenient to refer to her as “the applicant”.FACTS The applicant is a citizen of Pakistan who arrived in Australia with her three children on 17 June 1997. On 16 September 1997 she lodged an application for protection visas for herself and her children. On 4 February 1998 a delegate of the respondent refused to grant the protection visa sought. The applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of that decision. The applicant’s claim to be a person to whom Australia owes protection obligations under the Convention is based on allegations made by her that she was in Pakistan a target of domestic violence at the hands of her husband and, to a more limited extent, her husband’s family. It is not necessary to set out in detail the factual claims made by the applicant. The Tribunal, for the purposes of its decision, accepted the applicant’s claims concerning the violence that she had suffered at the hands of her husband. That violence included slappings, beatings including beatings which led to her hospitalisation, threats to throw acid on her and threats to kill her by burning. The applicant also claims that on four occasions she went to the police to lodge reports about her husband’s violence towards her. Her evidence in this regard was as follows. On the first occasion she informed a police officer that her husband was beating her and the officer responded that “[t]his is happening all over the country in all houses and that if [the police] had to do something about all the similar complaints it would take all their time.” The officer refused to take her complaint. On the second occasion that the applicant approached the police, she went with her brother-in-law (her sister’s husband). She told a police officer of her problems with her husband but the police officer did not make an accurate report and did not take her seriously. On the evening of the day of this visit to the police, her husband came home and told her that he knew of her visit to the police but that the police could no nothing. Her husband and his brother said:“We are standing in front of you what did you think the police could do to us?”They also said words to the effect that they were kings and they had power over her and the police could do nothing. On this occasion her husband, along with his brother, beat her with the result that she was hospitalised for seven days and diagnosed as having a depressive disorder. The applicant was also accompanied by her brother-in-law on her third visit to a police station. They saw there the same police officer that she had spoken to on the previous occasion. Again the police officer wrote an inaccurate report. He did not offer her any assistance. The final occasion on which the applicant approached the police followed an incident in which her husband and his brother co-operated in pouring petrol on her clothing, but desisted from their attack when neighbours responded to the screaming of the applicant and her children. On this occasion a police officer said to the applicant “that women always tried to blame [their] husbands when [they] were the ones who were the cause of the problem” and that she should “go and do [her] own work.” The applicant claims that following this experience she knew that she would never get any help from the police.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

BRANSON J

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: BRANSON J

The only ground of review relied upon by the applicant is as follows:“The Tribunal erred in law within the terms of s 476(1)(e) of the Migration Act 1958PARTICULARSHaving found that:(a)the Applicant suffered violence at the hands of her husband (Decision, pp 15.5), but(b)the violence was not by reason of a Convention ground, namely her membership of a particular social group, (Decision, pp 15.6 and 16.6)the Tribunal erred in failing to consider whether –(c)the claims that she reported the violence to the police, but that the police failed to provide any, or any effective protection, (Decision, pp 6.6 – 7.2 and 7.5) were true;and, if the claims were true, whether -(d)the violence was inflicted by the husband because the state authorities condoned or tolerated such conduct, and(e)the state authorities thus failed to provide protection under the law to married women who suffered violence at the hands of their husbands, and(f)such a failure constituted an absence of effective protection by the state by reason of the Applicant’s membership of a particular social group namely, married women in Pakistan, and(g)the Applicant was, in those circumstances, a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations under the Refugees Convention.”CONSIDERATION The applicant advanced two principal contentions before the Court. First, that persecutory conduct can qualify as Convention based persecution even though the persecutor as an individual has no discriminatory motive, so long as the state withholds effective protection on a Convention ground. Secondly, that a group defined according to gender, such as married women in Pakistan, can qualify as “a particular social group” for the purposes of the Convention. The respondent did not challenge the contention that as a matter of law women in Pakistan could be “a particular social group” within the meaning of the Convention. He submitted that as it is not inevitable that a tribunal of fact would find that women in Pakistan were a particular social group, this would be an issue for the Tribunal to determine if the matter were remitted to the Tribunal. The Court’s attention may thus be concentrated on the first of the applicant’s principal contentions. Mr Basten QC, appearing on behalf of the applicant, submitted that there are four categories of case in which one might find persecution within the meaning of Article 1A of the Convention:1.Where the state or its agents are directly responsible for persecuting a claimant on Convention based grounds;2.Where the state either condones or ignores persecution by individuals for whom it is not responsible, but both the state and the individual share the discriminatory motive;3.Where a non-state agent persecutes for a Convention reason and, although the state is not in sympathy with the motivation of the persecutor, it cannot protect the victim; and4.Where a non-state agent persecutes, not for a Convention reason but, for a Convention reason, state protection is not available.