STCB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
GUMMOW, KIRBY, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJ

STCB  APPELLANT

AND

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS
AFFAIRS & ANOR  RESPONDENTS

STCB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs
[2006] HCA 61
14 December 2006
A5/2006

ORDER

Appeal dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation

S D Ower for the appellant (instructed by McDonald Steed McGrath)

C Gunst QC with M J Roder for the first respondent (instructed by Sparke Helmore)

Submitting appearance for the second respondent

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

CATCHWORDS

STCB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

Immigration – Refugees – Application for protection visa – Fear of persecution – Persecution for reason of membership of particular social group – Family – Fear of persecution because of family involvement in blood feud – Whether decision-maker required by s 91S of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to disregard fear of persecution – Albanian citizens subject to customary law – Whether a "particular social group".

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 91S.
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 1951, Art 1A(2).

  1. GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJ.   The appellant is a citizen of Albania who claims to be a refugee. 

    The appellant's application for a visa

  2. On 7 November 2000 the appellant applied to the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (the first respondent) for a Protection (Class XA) visa.  His application was based on the claim that in 1944-1945 his grandfather had killed a member of the Paja family; that the Paja family was therefore obliged by the customary law of Albania known as the Kanun or Code of Lekë Dukagjini ("the Kanun")[1] to kill a male member of the appellant's family; that he feared that he would be killed by the Paja family if he returned to Albania; and that the Albanian police were powerless to stop this. 

    [1]In order to avoid misunderstanding, it is desirable to say that the Kanun appears to deal with many subjects innocuously; only small parts of it concern blood feuds, and even these provisions are directed in some measure to the peaceful resolution of quarrels.

  3. By reason of s 36(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act"), the appellant's claim to a protection visa depended on his establishing that he was a non-citizen to whom Australia owed protection obligations under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951 as amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967 ("the Convention"). Article 1A(2) of the Convention provides that a necessary condition of refugee status is having a "well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion". In this appeal the appellant contended that he had a well-founded fear of persecution…

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Details
Case
[2006] HCA 61
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal from STCB concerning an application for a protection visa. The appellant, an Albanian citizen, claimed a fear of persecution due to his family's involvement in a blood feud with the Paja family, stemming from an act committed by his grandfather decades prior. The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs had refused the visa, relying on section 91S of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth).

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether section 91S of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) required the decision-maker to disregard the appellant's fear of persecution. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the appellant's fear, arising from a family blood feud and his status as an Albanian citizen subject to customary law, constituted persecution for a Convention reason, and if section 91S precluded such a claim.

The majority of the High Court, comprising Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, and Heydon JJ, dismissed the appeal. Their reasoning focused on the purpose of section 91S, which was introduced to prevent individuals from claiming refugee status based on fears arising from personal debts or criminal acts, even if framed as membership of a particular social group. The Explanatory Memorandum indicated that while a family could still be a particular social group, section 91S aimed to exclude claims where the persecution was motivated by non-Convention reasons, such as revenge for a criminal act. The Tribunal had found that the motivation of the Paja family was revenge for a past murder, and that fear of such revenge was not a Convention reason. Furthermore, the Tribunal found that Albanian authorities were willing to address blood feuds, diminishing the likelihood of persecution by the state. Kirby J dissented. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs by majority (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ), Kirby J dissenting.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant has obtained special leave to appeal to this Court against the Full Court's orders. For the reasons given below, that appeal should be dismissed.The background to s 91S In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Sarrazola (No 2)[9] Merkel J (Heerey and Sundberg JJ concurring) held that a family was capable of constituting a particular social group for Convention purposes. It was also held that a Colombian threatened with murder if a debt contracted to underworld figures by her subsequently assassinated brother were not repaid by her could be seen as being persecuted for a Convention reason, namely membership of a particular social group comprising her family.[9](2001) 107 FCR 184 at 192-193 [28]-[33] and 199 [52]. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No 6) 2001, which, on enactment, inserted s 91S into the Act, said that s 91S[10]:"addresses a recent court finding that a relative of a person facing persecution for a non-Refugees Convention reason, such as pursuit by criminal elements for repayment of debts, is themselves [sic] facing persecution for the Convention ground of membership of a particular social group when the attentions of the agents of persecution turn to them, for example for repayments of the debts. This type of situation falls outside the range of grounds for persecution covered in the Refugees Convention."The Explanatory Memorandum then gave a summary of s 91S, and concluded[11]: "The above provisions do not prevent a family, per se, being a particular social group for the purpose of establishing a Convention reason for persecution. However, they prevent the family being used as a vehicle to bring with [sic] the scope of the Convention persecution motivated for non-Convention reasons."[10]Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No 6) 2001 (Cth), Explanatory Memorandum at 10 [28].[11]Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No 6) 2001 (Cth), Explanatory Memorandum at 11 [31]. In the Second Reading Speech the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs said[12]:"The convention was not designed to protect people who fear persecution for personal reasons that have little or nothing to do with the convention – for example, because they have failed to pay their family's debts.Yet a recent Federal Court case provides for this very scenario.The legislation will also prevent people from using elaborate constructs to claim that they are being persecuted as a member of a family and thus under the convention ground of a particular social group, when there is no convention related reason for the persecution.This will remove a potential avenue for criminal families to claim protection on the basis of gang wars – not those that the government would see as warranting international protection."[12]Australia, House of Representatives, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 28 August 2001 at 30422. Gang wars have resemblances with blood feuds, and it is plain that the Minister's intention was to restrict the capacity to claim visas on grounds of these kinds. The question here, however, is simply whether the language of s 91S applies to the present appellant.Application of s 91S

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJ KIRBY J
On 30 January 2002 the first respondent's delegate refused the appellant's application for a protection visa. The reasoning of the delegate centred on what the Decision Record described as the "definition" of "membership of a particular social group" in s 91S. The delegate said: "While the definition does not exclude a family from being regarded as a particular social group for the purposes of the Convention, it does not provide for protection to persons with derivative claims. It does not provide that protection responsibilities are owed to a person whose claims to protection derive from his association with another person, where the other person would not be a Convention refugee. From the information provided by the claimant, it is clear that after the claimant's grandfather had allegedly killed a member of the Paja family in 1944-45 he did not experience any fear of persecution or any persecution from the Paja family for reasons of one or more of the Convention grounds. Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that the fear of persecution or persecution the claimant has experienced from the Paja family would not exist as his grandfather's fear or persecution for the reason of a Convention reason had never existed. In other words, the claimant's grandfather would not have been a Convention refugee himself and the fact that the claimant is related to his grandfather would not make him a Convention refugee now. Having examined the claimant's circumstances overall, I find that any harm that the claimant might be subjected to if he returns to Albania cannot be seen to be for reasons of his membership of a particular social group."The Refugee Review Tribunal's decision Before the delegate of the first respondent the appellant apparently relied only on membership of one social group – his family. Before the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal"), as in the Federal Court and as in this Court, he relied on membership of a second social group – "Albanian citizens who are subject to the customary law". It is no doubt not a coincidence that the appellant first came to rely on the second social group after s 91S was enacted and after the first respondent's delegate had applied s 91S to reject the appellant's claim to a protection visa based upon his membership of the first social group. In this appeal the appellant has relied on both social groups. On 15 September 2003 the Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision not to grant a protection visa. The Tribunal accepted the appellant's claim that his family was involved in a blood feud with the Paja family because the appellant's grandfather had killed a member of the Paja family in 1944-1945. It also found that there was a tradition of blood feuds in Albania, particularly in the north, and that these feuds had revived after many years of repression by the Communist regime in power until 1991-1992. However, it found that the Albanian authorities had recognised, and shown willingness to address, the problems presented by blood feuds. Further, the Tribunal found that the motivation of the Paja family to harm a member of the appellant's family was revenge for the murder committed by the appellant's grandfather, and that fear of revenge for a criminal act was not fear of persecution for a reason falling within the Convention definition of persecution. The Tribunal considered that s 91S prevented it from having regard to any fear of persecution on the appellant's part arising from the fact that he was a member of a family, another member of which feared, or had feared, persecution for a non-Convention reason.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GLEESON CJ, GUMMOW, CALLINAN AND HEYDON JJ, KIRBY J