SBRF v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SBRF v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 712

MIGRATION – s 425 invitation to hearing – when necessary on remitter after invalidation of a Tribunal decision

MIGRATION – jurisdictional error – discretion to refuse relief

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 91S, 417(1), 424A, 425
Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No 6) 2001 (Cth)

SBRF v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FMCA 163 affirmed
STCB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 231 ALR 556 cited
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 cited
SZEPZ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2006) 159 FCR 291 cited
SZILQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 163 FCR 304 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Wang (2003) 215 CLR 518 cited
SZHLM v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 98 ALD 567 cited
NBKM v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1413 cited
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 applied
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609 applied
Lee v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 159 FCR 181 cited

SBRF v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP AND REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

SAD 19 OF 2008

FINN J
21 MAY 2008
ADELAIDE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

SAD 19 OF 2008

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SBRF
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FINN J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 MAY 2008

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

SAD 19 OF 2008

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

SBRF
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FINN J

DATE:

21 MAY 2008

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This appeal raises two issues on both of which the appellant must succeed if the appeal is to be allowed and the matter remitted ultimately to the Refugee Review Tribunal. Put shortly, the first issue is whether the Tribunal in further conducting a review of a delegate’s decision – the previous decision of a differently constituted Tribunal having been set aside by a decision of a Federal Magistrate – complied in the circumstances with the obligation imposed on it by s 425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), notwithstanding that the appellant was only invited to appear at the hearing of the invalid decision. No subsequent hearing was held. The second issue is whether, if there was a jurisdictional error so committed, should relief be refused on the ground that it would be inevitable that the appellant’s application for a protection visa would fail because of s 91S of the Act. The second Tribunal…

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Details
Case
[2008] FCA 712
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SBRF v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship involved an appeal against a decision made by the Federal Magistrate regarding the appellant’s application for judicial review. The appellant, who had previously been denied a protection visa, argued that he was not given the opportunity to provide evidence and arguments before the Tribunal as required by s 425. Additionally, he claimed that the Tribunal should not have refused relief on discretionary grounds. The Federal Court was required to determine whether the Tribunal had erred in not inviting the appellant to present evidence and arguments under s 425 and whether relief should have been granted on discretionary grounds.

The court examined the appellant’s arguments and found that the Tribunal’s decision was indeed affected by jurisdictional error. The court determined that the Tribunal should have issued a further hearing invitation to the appellant as there had been a sufficient change in circumstances. Furthermore, the court held that the appellant’s claim lacked the requisite Convention nexus due to the applicability of s 91S, rendering the claim invalid. Therefore, the court concluded that the Federal Magistrate did not err in dismissing the application for judicial review.

Based on the findings, the court ordered that the appeal be dismissed with costs. The court emphasized that the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error, and the appellant’s claim was invalid due to the applicability of s 91S. As such, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs associated with the proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Though I will express a view on the first issue, I am satisfied that the appeal must fail in any event on the second.BACKGROUND This is set out conveniently in [3] to [17] of the decision of the Federal Magistrate whose orders are the subject of the present appeal: SBRF v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FMCA 163. The following is an adaptation of those paragraphs. I should indicate at the outset that the Tribunal has made three decisions in relation to review applications of the appellant. Though it is technically inaccurate, I will for ease in exposition differentiate between what I will call the “first Tribunal”, “the second Tribunal” and the “third Tribunal”. The Tribunal decision, the subject of the present judicial review proceedings, is in fact the third decision of the Tribunal in relation to the appellant. The first review was conducted in 2000. The appellant was unsuccessful, both before the delegate of the Minister and before the Tribunal at that time and for reasons of lack of credibility in each instance. In the claim advanced by the appellant in 2000 he and his wife used false identities. His claimed entitlement to a protection visa and to refugee status under the Refugee Convention arose from a fear of his being persecuted by Serbs, arising out of what he said was his forced conscription into the Kosovo Liberation Army. Notwithstanding the lack of success of their application, in 2001 the Minister exercised his discretion under s 417(1) of the Act and provided the appellant and his wife with three year protection visas on humanitarian grounds. In 2004 the appellant and his wife re-applied for protection visas using the same false identities and asserting the same grounds as in 2000. In 2006 their false identities were uncovered. The Minister’s second delegate refused their application again for reasons of lack of credibility. No claim under their real identities was pursued before the delegate at that time. This delegate’s decision is the operative one for the Tribunal decision which gave rise to the judicial review application which is the subject of this appeal. The appellant and his wife again sought Tribunal review of the delegate’s decision. For the first time, I would emphasise, the appellant pursued a claim arising from his membership of a particular social group, said to be constituted by his family. This was a similar claim to that which had been successfully made by his brother in 2000. At the second Tribunal hearing, the appellant said that his and his wife’s use of false names upon their arrival in Australia was related to their fear as to what would happen to them if they were to return to Albania under their real names. A blood feud was now said to give rise to the Convention related fear. It was contended that in June 1999 the appellant’s cousin killed someone by the name of Fran Kola. His family invoked the traditional laws of the Kanun. The appellant’s cousin disappeared and hence other males of his family were at risk. The appellant’s brother Leke left Albania in December of 1999 and both he and his son made successful claims for protection when they arrived in Australia.

Decision

Reasons for decision

FINN J
Though the appellant has not addressed, and has not been asked to address, the application of s 91S to his claim, he so founded and formulated it that the section applied inevitably and inexorably as to ordain that that claim “lacked the requisite Convention nexus”: SZBYR at [29]. I am, in consequence, satisfied the Federal Magistrate did not err in dismissing the application for judicial review.CONCLUSION I will order that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FINN J

The appellant, as I earlier noted, raises two grounds of appeal. The first is that, since the second delegate’s decision, two issues have been raised concerning his visa application in respect of which he should have received, but did not receive, an invitation to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments under s 425. These were (i)the applicability of s 91S to his claim – a matter not dealt with by the Tribunal at the second hearing though, as Brown FM held, it was raised by his application; and (ii)the allegations raised against him in the s 424A letters sent him by the third Tribunal. The second ground is that the present is not a case where relief should be refused on discretionary grounds.CONSIDERATION(i) The s 425 appeal(a) Credibility and the s 424A letters What makes this ground of appeal distinctive is that the second delegate’s decision (which is “the decision under review”) was made in respect of a protection visa application that was different in character and context to that before both the second and third Tribunal. It was made under a false name and it related to the appellant’s alleged fear of persecution by Serbs arising from his conscription into the Kosovo Liberation Army. When the delegate’s decision was made – it was founded on the claims made not being credible – the appellant’s false identity had been discovered. Clearly when the second Tribunal issued its invitation to attend the hearing on the review of the second delegate’s decision, the appellant’s credibility was an “issue arising” in relation to that decision. In the second Tribunal decision that issue was decided favourably to the appellant, but in the quite different setting of the blood feud claim. That claim alone continued to be advanced. When the third Tribunal recommenced the conduct of its review of the second delegate’s decision, it early indicated in a s 424A letter to the appellant that in light both of the false claims made and false documents submitted by him and his wife, and of information since acquired that they had police records in Italy and Switzerland, his truthfulness and the reliability of documents he submitted were in issue in relation to the blood feud claims he was advancing. Later s 424A correspondence concerning alleged criminal activity heightened the issue. In a sense, it can be said that the third Tribunal was doing no more than enlarging the information base upon which a judgment could properly be made of the appellant’s credibility. Nonetheless, I am satisfied that in taking the particular course that it did in relation to the appellant’s criminal record, the Tribunal was identifying an “additional issue” not before the delegate in the sense that it was garnering a corpus of distinct evidence to justify rejection of the blood feud claim which itself had a different evidentiary and documentary base to that of the abandoned claim. There was, in my view, a sufficient change in circumstances from those obtaining when the second Tribunal issued its hearing invitation as to necessitate the issuing of a further hearing invitation if there was to be compliance with s 425. The issue at the second Tribunal hearing may have been the same, ie the appellant’s credibility. The context was not. In consequence, I am satisfied that the third Tribunal decision was infected by jurisdictional error. If, as the decision under appeal seems to suggest, his Honour was of the view that no further invitation was required in the circumstances, I equally am satisfied an appellable error has been made out.(b) The s 91S Appeal