FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SCAL v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 548
MIGRATION – Refugee Review Tribunal – whether the applicant is a refugee – Albanian national – claim based on fear of revenge killing under blood feud – particular social group – whether the social group is the applicant’s family or some wider group – whether applicant’s fear to be disregarded under s 91S of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 91S
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar (2002) 187 ALR 574 cited
SDAR v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1102 followed
SAAS v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 726 cited
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Applicants S 134/2002 (2003) 195 ALR 1 cited
Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225 considered
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Sarrazola (1999) 166 ALR 641 considered
Bank of Western Australia Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1994) 55 FCR 233 cited
SBBS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 194 ALR 749
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v SBAN [2002] FCAFC 431 cited
SCAS v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 397 citedSCAL v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
S 60 of 2002
von DOUSSA J
ADELAIDE
5 JUNE 2003
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
S 60 OF 2002
BETWEEN:
SCAL
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
von DOUSSA J
DATE OF ORDER:
5 JUNE 2003
WHERE MADE:
ADELAIDE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. Application dismissed.
2. Applicant to pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
S 60 OF 2002
BETWEEN:
SCAL
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
von DOUSSA J
DATE:
5 JUNE 2003
PLACE:
ADELAIDE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) made on 14 January 2002 and handed down on 1 February 2002 which affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
Background
The applicant is a citizen of Albania. He arrived in Australia on 20 September 1999. On 2 November 1999 he lodged an application for a protection visa. By operation of s 65(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) the applicant is entitled to a protection visa if the Minister, or on review the Tribunal, is satisfied that the applicant meets the relevant criteria. One criterion is set out in s 36(2), namely that the Minister is satisfied that Australia has protection…
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- Case
- [2003] FCA 548
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue was whether the applicant's claim of belonging to a particular social group, which was not previously made in his application for a protection visa or before the Tribunal, could be considered by the Court. Additionally, the Court had to determine if the applicant's re-cast claim of belonging to a group comprising ‘citizens of Albania who are subject to the operation of the customary law Code of Leke Dukagjini’ constituted a particular social group as defined by the Refugees Convention. The Court needed to consider whether the customary law applied generally to all citizens of Albania and whether it created a group of people with a shared characteristic or element that could be set apart from society at large.
The Court held that neither the delegate nor the Tribunal is obliged to consider claims that have not been made in the visa application or before the Tribunal. Even if the applicant could make good his claim that he belonged to a different particular social group, it was doubtful that this would constitute an error justifying intervention by the Court. The Court noted that a particular social group must be defined in a way that includes numerous members who share a certain characteristic or element that unites them and enables them to be set apart from society at large. However, a law or practice that, although persecutory, applies to all members of society cannot create a particular social group consisting of all those who fall within its terms. The Court concluded that the applicant's claim did not constitute an error on the part of the Tribunal justifying intervention by the Court.
The Court dismissed the application and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Application dismissed.
2. Applicant to pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the application.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
At the conclusion of the oral argument it was necessary to stand the matter over with leave to the applicant to commit in writing to the description of the ‘particular social group’ for which he contended, and to allow both the applicant and the respondent to file further submissions addressed to that topic. Consideration I shall first consider the applicant’s re-cast submissions on the topic of the particular social group. The applicant now contends that the social group to which he belongs is a group comprising ‘citizens of Albania who are subject to the operation of the customary law Code of Leke Dukagjini (“the Kanun”)’. The first thing to be noted about the re-cast submission is that the claim now made was not made either in the visa application or before the Tribunal. Neither the delegate nor the Tribunal is obliged to consider claims that have not been made: see Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Applicants S134/2002 (2003) 195 ALR 1 at [31] – [32]. Even if the applicant can now make good his claim that he belonged to a particular social group other than the one put forward in support of his application, it is doubtful that this would constitute an error on the part of the Tribunal justifying intervention by this Court. Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225 (Applicant A) establishes that a ‘particular social group’ is a collection of persons who share a certain characteristic or element which unites them and enables them to be set apart from society at large. The size of the collection is immaterial, but the uniting characteristic or element cannot include a common fear of persecution: see 241 – 242 per Dawson J, 263 per McHugh J and 285 per Gummow J. See also Khawar at [33] – [34] per Gleeson CJ and [82] – [83] per McHugh and Gummow JJ. However, whilst the particular social group may be defined in a way that includes numerous members, a law or practice which, although in a sense persecutory, applies to all members of society cannot create a particular social group consisting of all those who bring themselves within its terms. For example, in Applicant A Dawson J at 243 instanced a law which persecuted persons who committed contempt of Court or who broke traffic laws and observed that such a law would not be one that persecuted persons by reason of their membership of a particular social group. And Gummow J at 285 said:‘I would assume, for the purposes of the determination of this appeal, that the PRC has a “one child policy”, infringement of which attracts, as a matter of governmental decision, the sanctions feared by the appellants. I assume therefore that there exists a policy which is being implemented in a fashion which engulfs a number of persons for whom the PRC is their country of nationality. On that footing, a disparate collection of parents, and those desiring to be parents, who do not accept and have difficulties in complying with a “one child policy” are at risk of the application of a general law of conduct required by the state and, on the assumptions I have made, brutally enforced. But they are not members of a particular social group with a fear of persecution by reason of membership thereof.’