SZOYH v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZOYH v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 713

Citation: SZOYH v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 713
Appeal from: SZOYH v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2011] FMCA 1001
Parties: SZOYH v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 16 of 2012
Judge: REEVES J
Date of judgment: 5 July 2012
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Magistrate upholding an application for review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal) – Tribunal to deal with the claim actually raised by the material – consideration of whether the Tribunal and Federal Magistrate failed to have regard to integer of applicant’s claim – infant appellant – claimed persecutory repercussions if parents returned to China – consideration of “serious harm” to infant appellant – inferences to be drawn from failure to advert to particular contention and evidence in reasons – appeal allowed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited: ApplicantWAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 75 ALD 630; [2003] FCAFC 184
Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 194 ALR 244; [2001] FCA 1802
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v MZYHS (2011) 119 ALD 534; [2011] FCA 53
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNPG (2010) 115 ALD 303; [2010] FCAFC 51
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2005) 144 FCR 1; [2004] FCAFC 263
Re Woolley; Ex parte Applicants M276/2003 (2004) 225 CLR 1; [2004] HCA 49
SXOVB v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 125 ALD 38; [2011] FCA 1462
SXRB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1222
SZLSM v Minister for Immigration [2008] FMCA 1172
SZLSM v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 176 FCR 539; [2009] FCA 537
SZOYH v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2011] FMCA 1001
Date of hearing: 6 March 2012 and 26 June 2012
Place: Brisbane (Heard in Sydney)
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 50
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr L Karp
Solicitor for the Appellant: Kinslor Prince Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent did not appear

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 16 of 2012

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZOYH
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

REEVES J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 JULY 2012

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE (HEARD IN SYDNEY)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The orders made by the Federal Magistrates Court on 19 December 2011 be set aside, and in lieu thereof, the following orders be made:

(a)an order in the nature of a writ of certiorari to quash the decision of the second respondent…

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Details
Case
[2012] FCA 713
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This appeal concerns an infant who sought a review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal). The Tribunal had earlier dismissed the infant's application for a protection visa. The Federal Magistrates Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, leading to this appeal. The central issue was whether the Tribunal and the Federal Magistrate failed to properly consider the infant's claim of persecutory repercussions if his parents returned to China. The court was tasked with determining whether the Tribunal and the Federal Magistrate appropriately assessed the infant's claim and the evidence presented. In particular, the court had to examine whether the Tribunal's decision overlooked significant aspects of the infant's claim and whether the Federal Magistrate correctly upheld the Tribunal's decision.

The court held that the Tribunal and the Federal Magistrate did not adequately consider the infant's claim. The Tribunal focused on specific incidents but failed to fully address the infant's overall claim that his parents would face persecution if they returned to China, which would indirectly harm him. The Federal Magistrate, in turn, did not sufficiently challenge the Tribunal's decision, accepting its findings without critical analysis. The court found that the Tribunal's failure to consider the integer of the infant's claim, particularly the potential for indirect harm through his parents' persecution, constituted a material error. The court also noted the significance of the infant's mother's testimony, which the Tribunal did not fully explore.

The appeal was allowed, and the orders of the Federal Magistrates Court were set aside. The court issued an order for a writ of certiorari to quash the Tribunal's decision and a writ of mandamus to direct the Tribunal to reconsider the infant's application for review according to law. Additionally, the court ordered the infant to be compensated for the costs of the appeal and the proceedings before the Federal Magistrates Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders made by the Federal Magistrates Court on 19 December 2011 be set aside, and in lieu thereof, the following orders be made:

(a) an order in the nature of a writ of certiorari to quash the decision of the second respondent signed 10 December 2010;

(b) an order in the nature of a writ of mandamus, directing the second respondent to hear and determine the appellant’s application for review according to law.

3. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and of the proceedings before the Federal Magistrates Court.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In SXRB, Lander J described the difference between an integer and evidence in these terms (at [32]–[33]) as follows:32.The failure to consider a piece of evidence does not necessarily amount to a failure to consider an integer of an applicant’s claim for an entitlement to a visa. Whether it will or not will depend upon whether it is the only or the overwhelming evidence relating to that integer.33.Any integer of any applicant’s claim may well be made up of various pieces of evidence; sometimes direct, sometimes circumstantial. The failure to consider any one piece of evidence does not necessarily amount to a failure to consider the integer itself. It will only mean a failure to consider the integer if that evidence, either by itself or coupled with other evidence whether direct or circumstantial, would have affected or might have affected the result of which the RRT arrived...(Emphasis added) It follows that whether a piece of evidence is of the kind that has to be considered by the Tribunal, depends on the nature of the evidence concerned, either considered alone, or in combination with other evidence, and its significance in terms of the possible effect it may have on the result of the Tribunal’s deliberations. Of the four incidents relied upon by the appellant, there can be no doubt that the Tribunal considered the 2003 incident. It considered that incident notwithstanding the “considerable doubts” it had about the reliability of the appellant’s parents’ evidence. As it noted at [142] of its Reasons (see at [19] above), those doubts were engendered by: the long delay in their application for a protection visa after their arrival in Australia in 2006; the tenuous nature of their evidence about their church attendance in Australia before August 2008; and the late introduction of their claim in relation to the 2003 incident itself. Nonetheless, the Tribunal took account of the “considerable scarring” the appellant’s father had on his back which it thought was consistent with the 2003 incident and the “reasonably convincing manner” in which the appellant’s father described his detention during that incident. Having decided to accept the appellant’s father’s evidence, the Tribunal then decided it was “most straightforward to consider the consequences for the applicant if his parents were indeed involved with an unregistered Christian family church in China, and if they were to resume that involvement on returning to Jilin Province”. It follows from this that the Tribunal did not limit its consideration to the 2003 incident itself, but rather proceeded on the basis that the 2003 incident supported the appellant’s parents’ claims that they were involved in an unregistered Christian church in China. On that basis, the Tribunal proceeded to consider what was likely to happen if the appellant and his parents were to return to China and his parents were to resume their involvement with an unregistered Christian church there. Having done so, it rejected the appellant’s claims on two bases:(a)It was not persuaded that the appellant’s parents would be detained as a result of attending an unregistered Christian church because there was no independent evidence of such detentions occurring in Jilin Province in the recent past and independent country evidence indicated that the government in China allowed people to meet at home for Christian worship: Reasons at [143] (see at [19] above).(b)Even if the appellant’s parents were detained by police for attending an unregistered Christian church, the evidence showed that there were family members in China who would take care of the appellant and any separation from his parents caused by their arrest and detention could not be considered to constitute serious harm, particularly in view of the fact that the appellant’s sister, who was four and a half years of age at the time, had remained in China with a member of the family: Reasons at [144] (see at [19] above).

Decision

Reasons for decision

In the concluding paragraphs of her lengthy statement, under the heading “What I fear would happen if I am returned to China”, the appellant’s mother made (among others) the following claims:253.If my family are (sic) forced to return to China we would certainly suffer further assaults from the Chinese authorities for our Christian beliefs. I am certain that if we were caught worshipping in the family home again, we would be sent to a re-education camp or detained. I have no doubt that it is not safe to bring up my son, Tony, as a Christian in China. The extent of the risk that we face as a Christian family in China is evidenced by the recent death of my aunt from violent acts of the PSB when they discovered my family worshipping at home.THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION Before going to the crucial paragraphs of the Tribunal’s decision that deal with these four incidents, it is appropriate to set out the relevant parts of the “Findings and Reasons” section of the appellant’s Tribunal’s reasons where it disposed of any suggestion the appellant would suffer any direct persecution in China because of his religious or political beliefs, as claimed by the appellant’s legal advisers (see at [10] above). At the outset of its “Findings and Reasons” section, the Tribunal noted that the appellant’s mother had agreed with it that “in fact she did not think [the appellant] would be arrested, but was simply concerned about him if she and her husband were arrested”. In the immediately succeeding paragraph, the Tribunal agreed with this assessment saying (at [139]) that:In my view, as the applicant is a very young child and plainly could not realistically be perceived by the Chinese authorities to pose a challenge to their power for any reason associated with religion, I am satisfied that the chance of his being arrested, detained and imprisoned in China in the reasonably foreseeable future is remote in the extreme. The Tribunal then turned to deal with the claim that the appellant would be denied the right to follow his religious beliefs in China if he were to go there with his parents. About this claim, the Tribunal said this (at [140]):… The applicant is 26 months old and thus plainly has no religious beliefs of his own at present. As to whether he might adopt any religious beliefs in future and, if so, what those beliefs might be, cannot possibly be reliably foreseen by either his parents or this Tribunal. For that reason (sic “I”) consider the chance remote that, in the reasonably foreseeable future, he will be denied the right to follow his religious beliefs. Having disposed of the claims that the appellant would suffer direct persecution in China, in the sense that he would be arrested, or would be persecuted for his religious beliefs, the Tribunal then turned to consider what it described as “the other claims”. The appellant’s Tribunal had earlier summarised those claims (insofar as they are being pursued in this appeal) in the following terms (at [136]):It has been claimed that the applicant will face various forms of harm because his parents are known to have been members of an underground Christian church in China and would continue to attend an underground Christian church in Shenyang, their place of household registration, if they returned to China. This harm may manifest in his parents being jailed, as a result of which he would be separated from them. It is claimed that this enforced separation would amount to persecution.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established