FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNPG [2010] FCAFC 51
Citation: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNPG [2010] FCAFC 51 Appeal from: SZNPG v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2009] FMCA 1033 Parties: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP v SZNPG and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number: NSD 1442 of 2009 Judges: NORTH, LANDER AND KATZMANN JJ Date of judgment: 4 June 2010 Catchwords: MIGRATION – review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) – Federal Magistrate quashing a decision of the RRT and requiring the RRT to review the application according to law – claim that the decision maker was biased or that there might be apprehension of bias was based upon the decision maker’s refusal to give certain evidence sufficient weight to overcome concerns arising from consideration of all other evidence – no merits review of the RRT’s decision – wrong finding of fact is not an error of law – unsound reasoning is not an error of law – brevity with which the RRT dealt with the corroborative evidence is unsatisfactory but it did not fall into jurisdictional error Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Cases cited: Anderson v Director General of the Department of Environmental and Climate Change [2008] NSWCA 337; (2008) 251 ALR 633
Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 75 ALD 630
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321
Belmorgan Property Development Pty Ltd v GP Re Ltd [2007] NSWCA 171; (2007) 153 LGREA 450
Bruce v Cole (1998) 45 NSWLR 163 cited
Greyhound Racing Authority (NSW) v Bragg [2003] NSWCA 388
Kindimindi Investments Pty Ltd v Lane Cove Council [2006] NSWCA 23; (2006) 142 LGREA 277
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Anthonypillai [2001] FCA 274; (2001) 106 FCR 426
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Re; Ex parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1; (2000) 168 ALR 407
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Re; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; (2003) 198 ALR 59
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1
Refugee Review Tribunal, Re; Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28; (2001) 179 ALR 425
Reg v The District Court; Ex parte White (1966) 116 CLR 644
Rezaei v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1294
SBBS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Afffairs (2002) 194 ALR 749
Smith v New South Wales Bar Association (1992) 176 CLR 256
Thirukkumar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 268
WAIJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNPG and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2010] FCAFC 51
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue the court had to address was whether the RRT's decision to not sufficiently weight the baptismal certificate amounted to a jurisdictional error. The court considered whether the RRT’s conclusion that the applicant had not been baptised was open to it based on the evidence, and if the RRT's handling of the baptismal certificate constituted an error of law or merely an error in reasoning. The applicant argued that the RRT was biased or there was an apprehension of bias due to the inadequate consideration of the baptismal certificate.
The court found that it was open to the RRT to conclude that the applicant had not been baptised, given his inconsistent evidence and lack of knowledge about the Baptist Church and Christianity. The RRT did not disregard the baptismal certificate but gave it insufficient weight due to inconsistencies in the applicant’s story and oral evidence. The court held that the brevity with which the RRT dealt with the certificate was unsatisfactory but did not amount to jurisdictional error. The Federal Magistrate had overstepped in conducting a merits review instead of assessing whether the RRT had made an error of law.
The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Federal Magistrate's orders and reinstating the RRT’s decision. The first respondent’s application in the Federal Magistrates Court was dismissed, and the first respondent was ordered to pay the appellant’s costs of that application and the appeal. The decision underscores the distinction between jurisdictional error and errors in reasoning or fact-finding, and highlights the importance of proper judicial review boundaries.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The orders of Driver FM of 25 November 2009 be set aside and in lieu thereof:
(a) The first respondent’s application in the Federal Magistrates Court be dismissed; and
(b) The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of that application in the Federal Magistrates Court.
3. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I acknowledge there is a distinction between referring to something and taking it into account. However, there is no justification for concluding that the baptismal “certificate” was merely adverted to and then discarded as irrelevant. Similarly, it would be wrong to characterise the Tribunal’s reason for according insufficient weight to the baptismal certificate as “bootstrapping”. The Tribunal did not rely on its conclusion that the first respondent was not a Christian to dismiss evidence that he had been baptised as a Christian. It pointed out that the evidence about his baptism was all over the place. It pointed to evidence inconsistent with the statement in the certificate that he had been baptised. There is no reason to suppose that it did otherwise than what it said it did, namely accord the document some, but insufficient, weight to overcome its concerns with the first respondent’s unsatisfactory oral evidence. It is true that a genuine certificate attesting to a fact would generally be decisive proof of that fact. However, the Tribunal made no finding about the authenticity of the certificate. On the contrary, it referred to it as an alleged certificate. Counsel for the first respondent accepted that the Tribunal could legitimately conclude that his client’s story was so implausible or so full of problems that it could not be satisfied of the authenticity of the baptismal certificate and for that reason could not give it sufficient weight. In my view, there is no other way to read the Tribunal’s decision. Whilst it might have been preferable that the Tribunal made this clear, such a deficiency in the expression of its reasons does not constitute jurisdictional error: Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs: Ex parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1; (2000) 168 ALR 407. Decision not manifestly unreasonable or irrational Counsel for the respondent submitted that, even if it were accepted that the Tribunal had done as it said and given the baptismal certificate some weight, the weight it gave it was so inadequate that the resulting decision displayed the kind of unreasonableness identified by Mason J in Peko-Wallsend. In other words, the weight given to the document was such that the decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker could have reached it. In my opinion, the better view is that, where the substance of an applicant’s grievance is, as here, that the decision-maker has made a factual determination after giving inadequate consideration to some or all of the evidence before it, the proper review ground is the kind of irrationality identified in Applicant S20: see Santow JA’s discussion in Greyhound Racing Authority (NSW) v Bragg [2003] NSWCA 388 at [58]-[59]. Perhaps this accounts for the way the notice of contention was framed. As Crennan and Bell JJ recently observed in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16 at [130], “not every lapse of logic will give rise to jurisdictional error”. No matter how the ground of review is framed, if reasonable minds might differ in the result, the decision cannot be set aside for jurisdictional error as illogical, irrational or unreasonable merely because one conclusion has been preferred to another.