ANE18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia

(DIVISION 2)

ANE18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 995

File number(s): SYG 277 of 2018
Judgment of: JUDGE HUMPHREYS
Date of judgment: 28 November 2022 
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – Protection visa – whether decision unreasonable, irrational or illogical – whether there was jurisdictional error.
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 5
Cases cited:

AAI20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 1252

Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 51

ABT18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] HCA 3

AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 133

BAO18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 965

Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 3

DVO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] HCA 12

Foroghi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1875

Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS (2013) 230 FCR 431

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNPG [2010] FCAFC 51

Minister for Immigration v Li (2013) 297 ALR 225

NAIS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 470

Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437

Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 34 ALD 347

W168/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 538

W375/01A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 89

WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593

WZAVW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 760

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 88
Date of last submission/s: 8 November 2022
Date of hearing: 8 November 2022
Place: Parramatta
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Albert
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr Reilly

ORDERS

SYG 277 of 2018

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

ANE18

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

order made by:

JUDGE HUMPHREYS

DATE OF ORDER:

28 november 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.A writ of certiorari issue, quashing the decision of the Second Respondent dated 17 July 2017.

2.A writ of mandamus issue, directing that the Second Respondent re-determine the decision made on 17 July 2017 according to law.

3.A writ of prohibition, restraining the First Respondent, or the First Respondent’s employees, officers, delegates or agents, from acting upon or giving effect to the Second Respondent’s decision of 17 July 2017.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division…

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Details
Case
[2022] FedCFamC2G 995
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of ANE18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, ANE18, sought judicial review of the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) to reject her claims for a protection visa. The AAT had found that ANE18 was not a credible witness and that her claims of fearing serious harm in Lebanon were contrived to achieve a migration outcome. The applicant's claims had shifted over time, from fear of harm due to sectarian violence to concerns about her family in Lebanon disapproving of her relationship and having a child out of wedlock. The AAT found these claims implausible and concluded that ANE18's sole purpose was to achieve a migration outcome in Australia.

The legal issues before the court involved determining whether the AAT's decision was legally unreasonable. The court had to consider whether the AAT's findings were based on a rational foundation, had an evident or intelligible justification, and whether they were plainly unjust, arbitrary, capricious, or lacking common sense. The court had to avoid the trap of undertaking merits review and focus on the legality of the AAT's decision, ensuring that it was within the scope of the statutory power exercised. The applicant argued that the AAT's decision was unreasonable, but the court found that the AAT had properly evaluated ANE18's credibility and the plausibility of her claims. The court concluded that the AAT's decision was not legally unreasonable and dismissed the application for judicial review.

The court's reasoning was grounded in the principle that the AAT is not required to accept uncritically any claims made by an applicant and that it is for the applicant to satisfy the decision-maker that they meet the criteria for being a refugee. The court found that the AAT's decision was supported by the evidence and that the AAT had properly exercised its discretion. The court emphasized that judicial review is not a means for challenging a decision on the basis that the court disagrees with the consideration of matters or the evaluative judgments made by the decision-maker. The court concluded that the AAT's decision was lawful and within the scope of its statutory power, and therefore, the application for judicial review was dismissed.

The final orders of the court were that the application for judicial review be dismissed with costs. The court found that the AAT's decision was not legally unreasonable and that the applicant had not demonstrated that the AAT had made an error of law. The court also noted that the applicant's submissions involved a detailed refutation of the AAT's factual conclusions, which had the potential to invite the court to undertake merits review rather than judicial review. The court emphasized the importance of distinguishing between merits review and judicial review and ensuring that the court does not become immersed in the minutiae of the decision-making process.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Leave for an extension of time for the filing of the application for judicial review was previously granted by the Court (differently constituted) on 23 August 2022.The ADMINISTRATIvE APPEALS Tribunal Decision The Tribunal noted at paragraph 21 of the decision record that the basis of the applicant’s claims to fear harm had shifted over time. The applicant’s initial claim, lodged in July 2014, was that she feared serious harm if returned from Alawi and Sunni Muslims because of ongoing sectarian violence in her neighbourhood Tripoli. At the applicant’s Departmental interview in November 2014, she claimed it would be the Alawi’s who would harm her as she was Sunni Muslim. The Tribunal found that the applicant also introduced new claims that she needed protection as she had no family in Lebanon to support her and ‘life would be hell’ as she was a divorced woman. At the Tribunal, the applicant’s claims centred on fear from her family in Lebanon over her unmarried relationship with her current partner and having his child out of wedlock. The applicant’s complicated relationship history is set out at various places within the decision record. The applicant arrived in Australia on a Spouse visa. After arriving in Australia, she decided not to proceed with that marriage. On 9 November 2010, she applied for a Partner visa with another man, FA. No legal marriage ceremony or wedding took place but they had a ‘family gathering or religious wedding’. This marriage lasted only one month or so until they separated. In April 2013, while awaiting the outcome of her Partner visa application with FA, the applicant legally married AS. She became pregnant to him, but later miscarried. In late 2014, the applicant claimed that she was violently attacked by her husband AS. She reported the matter to police and received a court protection Apprehended Violence Order against AS. The applicant separated from AS, and shortly thereafter but gave birth to a daughter to AS in October 2015. There are Court orders in respect of that child, who is an Australian citizen, regarding parenting. The applicant and AS divorced in October 2016. In June 2016, the applicant entered into a new relationship with GB, three months after meeting him. She gave birth to a son with GB in December 2016. The Tribunal was not prepared to accept the applicant’s claim to fear harm in Lebanon due to her having a child out of wedlock and that she was not willing to remarry because of the experience of violence in her first marriage. At paragraph 20, the Tribunal found that the applicant was not a truthful and credible witness. In reaching that conclusion, the Tribunal had regard to inconsistencies in her evidence, the implausible nature of key aspects of her claims. The Tribunal found the applicant’s claims for protection were contrived to achieve a migration outcome Again at paragraphs 31 to 32, the Tribunal found that it ‘considered together’ that the applicant was not a truthful and credible witness. Rather, her sole purpose has been to achieve a migration outcome. The Tribunal was not satisfied that if she returned to Lebanon she would face a risk of serious harm from her family or anyone else over her relationship with her current partner, being a divorced woman or any other reason.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It is to be noted that the submissions involve a paragraph by paragraph detailed refutation as to every factual conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal. Such an approach has dangers in that it implicitly invites the Court to undertake merits review rather than judicial review. Such an approach also involves a consideration of the Tribunal decision record with an ‘eye keenly attuned to error’: (see; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259).Consideration The Court, in considering the matter, was very mindful not to fall into the trap of impermissible merits review and to read the Tribunals decision record as a whole and not seek to become immersed in the minutiae of every word and sentence of the Tribunal in an effort to discern jurisdictional error. In Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 3 at [17], the task of a Court conducting judicial review was described in this manner:… an application for judicial review is one in which the judicial branch of government reviews, by reference to legality or lawfulness, the decision or decisions of the executive branch of government, here in the form of a decision of the Minister. The court does not consider the merits or wisdom the decision; nor does it remake the decision. The task of the court is to rule upon the lawfulness or legality the decision by reference to the complaints made about it. It is well established that the Tribunal is not required to accept uncritically any and all claims made by an applicant: (see; Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437 at [451]). Nor does the Tribunal have to possess rebutting evidence before holding that a particular assertion was not made out: (see; Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 34 ALD 347 at [348]). It is for the applicant to satisfy the Tribunal, being the relevant decision maker, that the applicant meets the criteria for being a refugee: (see; Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510 at [187] (“Abebe”)). Unreasonableness is where a decision-maker has come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker could have come to it: (see; Minister for Immigration v Li (2013) 297 ALR 225 (“Li”) at [28]), or where a decision has been made that lacks an “evident and intelligible justification”; (Li) at [76]. The test for unreasonableness is “stringent” and will only arise in rare cases. Unreasonableness is not a means for challenging a decision on the basis that the Court disagrees with the consideration of matters or the evaluative judgements made by the decision-maker: (see; Li at [30] and [113]). In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11 (“Stretton”) at [9]-[11] Allsop CJ said the following concerning a review of a decision for legal unreasonableness:[9] … The terms, scope and policy of the statute and the fundamental values that attend the proper exercise of power – a rejection of unfairness, of unreasonableness and of arbitrariness; equality; and the humanity and dignity of the individual – will inform the conclusion, necessarily to a degree evaluative, as to whether the decision bespeaks an exercise of power beyond its source.[10] This concept of legal unreasonableness is not amenable to minute and rigidly‑defined categorisation or a precise textual formulary…[11] … The task is not definitional, but one of characterisation: the decision is to be evaluated, and a conclusion reached as to whether it has the character of being unreasonable, in sufficiently lacking rational foundation, or an evident or intelligible justification, or in being plainly unjust, arbitrary, capricious, or lacking common sense having regard to the terms, scope and purpose of the statutory source of the power, such that it cannot be said to be within the range of possible lawful outcomes as an exercise of that power. The descriptions of the lack of quality used above are not exhaustive or definitional, they are explanations or explications of legal unreasonableness, of going beyond the source of power.