BAO18 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BAO18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 965

Appeal from: BAO18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCCA 2347
File number: NSD 1615 of 2018
Judge: MURPHY J
Date of judgment: 20 June 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court dismissing application for review of Immigration Assessment Authority’s decision not to grant appellant a protection visa – credibility findings – whether made on rational and logical basis – appeal upheld
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited:

ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 250 FCR 109; [2016] FCAFC 174

AVQ15v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 361 ALR 227; [2018] FCAFC 133

BAO18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCCA 2347

CGA15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 46

CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 253 FCR 496; [2016] FCAFC 146

CWR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 859

DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 353 ALR 641; [2018] FCAFC 2

FKO17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 98

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 92 ALJR 780; [2018] FCA 24

John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Rivkin (2003) 201 ALR 77; [2003] HCA 50

Konneh v NSW [2013] NSWSC 390

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 74 ALJR 405; [2000] HCA 1

SZLGP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1198

SZTFQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 562

Date of hearing: 15 February 2019
Date of last submissions: 17 May 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 64
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr D Godwin, Ms A Rao and Mr M Cobb-Clark
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr C Lenehan
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

NSD 1615 of 2018
BETWEEN:

BAO18

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MURPHY J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 JUNE 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The orders of the Federal Circuit Court on 15 August 2018 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, the Court makes the following orders:

(a)an order to quash the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority dated 7 February 2018 and to remit the Appellant’s visa application to the Authority to be re-determined according to law;

(b)there be no order as to costs of the proceeding before the Federal Circuit Court; and

(c)the First Respondent pay the Appellant’s costs of the appeal.

3.The parties have liberty to file short submissions in relation to costs, within seven days.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 965
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of BAO18 v Minister for Home Affairs involved an appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court, which had dismissed the appellant's application for review of the Immigration Assessment Authority's decision not to grant him a protection visa. The appellant, a Tamil Hindu from Sri Lanka, claimed that he was being persecuted by the Sri Lankan authorities due to his perceived connections with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The appellant's application for a protection visa was dismissed by the Authority, which found that the appellant was not recalling a genuine personal experience in relation to his circumstances and the events that led to his decision to leave Sri Lanka. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the appellant's appeal, but the appellant sought further review in this Court.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the Authority's credibility findings were made on a rational and logical basis. The Court considered the evidence presented by the appellant, including his statements in his SHEV statement and SHEV interview, and the inconsistencies identified by the Authority. The Court also examined the Authority's reasons for its decision and whether they were based on a logical and rational assessment of the evidence.

The Court found that the Authority's credibility findings were not made on a rational and logical basis. The Court held that the Authority erred in finding inconsistencies in the appellant's evidence, and that the inconsistencies identified did not undermine the credibility of his claims. The Court found that the appellant's evidence was consistent and convincing, and that the Authority had failed to properly consider the appellant's claims. The Court also held that the Authority's concerns about a letter purportedly written by the appellant's mother were not well-founded.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court, and remitted the appellant's visa application to the Authority to be re-determined according to law. The Court further ordered that the Minister pay the appellant's costs of the appeal. The parties were given liberty to file short submissions in relation to costs. This decision highlights the importance of ensuring that credibility findings are made on a rational and logical basis, and that the primary decision-maker properly considers all of the evidence before them.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court on 15 August 2018 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, the Court makes the following orders:

(a) an order to quash the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority dated 7 February 2018 and to remit the Appellant’s visa application to the Authority to be re-determined according to law;

(b) there be no order as to costs of the proceeding before the Federal Circuit Court; and

(c) the First Respondent pay the Appellant’s costs of the appeal.

3. The parties have liberty to file short submissions in relation to costs, within seven days.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow I have made orders to allow the appeal, to set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court, and to remit the appellant’s visa application to the Authority to be re-determined according to law.THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The appellant arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival on 3 November 2012. He was transferred into immigration detention on Christmas Island and was interviewed (entry interview). On 3 March 2016 the appellant lodged an application for a protection visa. In the entry interview, the statement accompanying his application (SHEV statement) and a subsequent interview with a delegate of the Minister on 25 January 2017 (SHEV interview) the appellant made claims which may be broadly summarised as follows:(a)he is of Tamil ethnicity and Hindu religion, and was born in a village controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Trincomalee District in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka. He lived there until 2006 when he and his family were displaced by the civil war. Several members of the village died during the civil war; (b)he was not an LTTE member but has been perceived or suspected by Sri Lankan authorities of being an LTTE member, and/or knowing the whereabouts of LTTE members;(c)on one occasion he was taken from the area where he lived to a police station, on suspicion that he was a supporter or member of the LTTE, and held overnight;(d)in 2006 his family fled to an Internally Displaced Person (IDP) camp. During the one month period he was at the camp he was interrogated and assaulted;(e)in 2006 he was detained for one day and one night by army officers at an army camp near the IDP camp. During this time a pistol was put inside his mouth by army officers and threats made that he would be shot if he did not tell the truth. He was also sexually assaulted by army officers at the camp;(f)he left the IDP camp after one month because it was not safe to remain there, and he went to live with a family friend in a nearby village. He would return to the camp from time to time to visit his parents, usually on weekends, but he would not stay long as the authorities there would question and beat him, a circumstance that got worse over time;(g)the Sri Lankan authorities would question his parents about his whereabouts after he left the camp. On one occasion when he went to visit his parents they told him the authorities had said that they intended to jail him;(h)the appellant fled to Australia in 2012. Since arriving in Australia he has been informed that the Sri Lankan authorities continue to search for him;(i)he has visible scarring from a shelling attack; and(j)if he is returned to Sri Lanka he fears harm because he is perceived to have LTTE connections and because he departed Sri Lanka illegally. As a victim of previous sexual assault, members of the Sri Lankan authorities may look to him for sexual favours. Further, he may become socially ostracised if information about the past sexual assault he suffered becomes known.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Ground 1 of the appeal is as follows:The [Authority’s] finding at [21] that the appellant was not recalling a genuine personal experience in relation to his circumstances and the events that led to his decision to leave Sri Lanka was reached without a logical, rational or probative basis. It was based on five purported “inconsistencies” in the appellant’s evidence [at [16]-[20] of the Authority’s decision] that were either (when properly analysed) not inconsistencies, or which were insufficiently significant to justify the [Authority’s] conclusion that the appellant had fabricated his claim for protection.The first inconsistency: the appellant’s evidence as to why he was being pursued by Sri Lankan authorities At [16] of its decision, the Authority set out what it considered to be inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence as to why he was being pursued by Sri Lankan authorities, as follows:Firstly, there were inconsistencies in the applicant’s evidence as to why he was being pursued by the Sri Lankan authorities between 2006 and 2012. In his SHEV statement, the applicant claimed that the authorities believed him to be a member of the LTTE and that he was mistreated for this reason. However, in the SHEV interview, he advised the delegate that the authorities did not suspect that he was in the LTTE, and that he was only pursued because he formerly lived in an LTTE controlled area and the authorities believed that he could provide the names of senior LTTE members. In an earlier interview with the Department on 13 January 2013 (entry interview), the applicant provided a different account, stating that the authorities came to question him because they were seeking the whereabouts of his cousin. In submissions the Minister accepted that the Authority was wrong in the last sentence in this paragraph. In fact the entry interview records that the Sri Lankan authorities had come to question the appellant both because they were seeking the whereabouts of his cousin, and because “[t]hey are looking for people who are supporting the movement or the LTTE”. There is no inconsistency between this statement and the appellant’s evidence that he was pursued by Sri Lankan authorities because they believed him to be a member of the LTTE. The Authority erred in finding that there was. The Minister submitted, however, that there is no error in the balance of the Authority’s reasons at [16]. In his SHEV statement the appellant said “I was not a member of the LTTE, however as I originate from an LTTE controlled area the authorities perceive me to be a member of the LTTE” and “the authorities believed I was a member of the LTTE”. The Minister argued that this is inconsistent with the appellant’s statement in his SHEV interview, as noted by the delegate, that “the authorities did not believe he was actually involved with the LTTE himself”. The Minister submitted that, understood in context, these statements by the appellant were inconsistent alternative reasons for his interrogation. The Minister contended that the statement that the authorities did not actually believe the appellant was involved in the LTTE, made no sense unless it is understood as an implicit disavowal of the earlier evidence in his SHEV statement.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The transcript of the appellant’s SHEV interview was part of the materials provided by the Secretary to the Authority pursuant to s 473CB of the Act, but for reasons which are not clear it was not before the Federal Circuit Court. It is plain from the Authority’s decision that it had regard to the transcript, and both parties seek to rely on parts of it. It is appropriate to admit into evidence the transcript, as annexed to the affidavit of Mr White made 17 April 2019.THE AUTHORITY’S DECISION The Authority accepted the appellant’s claim that he and his family were affected by the civil war and forced to move to an IDP camp in 2006. However it found that key parts of his evidence about events leading up to his leaving Sri Lanka were inconsistent and unconvincing. It identified five inconsistencies that it said undermined the credibility of his claims, leading to a finding that he “was not recalling a genuine personal experience in relation to his circumstances and the events that he claims led to his decision to leave Sri Lanka”. In summary, the Authority found:(a)inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence as to why he was being pursued by Sri Lankan authorities between 2006 and 2012;(b)inconsistency in his evidence as to the difficulties he faced in the IDP camp, including details of the sexual assault;(c)that his evidence was “vague and inconsistent” regarding his interactions with authorities after he stopped living in the camp;(d)that it had concerns about a letter purportedly written by the appellant’s mother to the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka (HRCSL) recording a complaint made to the HRCSL on 19 January 2011. A translation of the letter, by a qualified translator, from Tamil to English was before the Authority; and(e)inconsistencies in his evidence about what he was doing in the years prior to his departure from Sri Lanka in 2012.The appeal centrally relates to these findings.THE APPEAL TO THIS COURTRelevant principles In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 74 ALJR 405; [2000] HCA 1 at [67] McHugh J described credibility findings as a function par excellence of the primary decision-maker. Even so, as the Full Court in CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 253 FCR 496; [2016] FCAFC 146 at [37]-[38] (McKerracher, Griffiths and Rangiah JJ) observed: …Nothing said by McHugh J suggests that the Tribunal’s adverse findings on credibility are not amenable to judicial review on jurisdictional error grounds. There is a risk that a mechanical use of the phrase “par excellence” as a formula fails sufficiently to appreciate this important reality. The fact that credibility is a matter for the Tribunal to determine as a question of fact does not mean that challenges to credibility are not open….There are several other potential bases upon which credit findings can be challenged. Recitation of the expression that credibility is a matter par excellence should not be understood as precluding challenges to credibility or, indeed, other findings of fact on any basis. While there is no suggestion in this case that this is what has occurred, the frequency of adoption of the expression should not obscure the availability of challenges on recognised grounds, such as:(a)failure to afford procedural fairness;(b)reaching a finding without any logical or probative basis;(c)unreasonableness; and/or(d)jurisdictional error as discussed by Flick J in SZVAP.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.