FKO17 v Minister For Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FKO17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 98

Appeal from:  FKO17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 1772
File number(s): NSD 1283 of 2018
Judge(s): WHEELAHAN J
Date of judgment: 12 February 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court – leave to rely on new grounds of appeal granted – new information provided to the Immigration Assessment Authority by the appellant, his wife and children – Authority’s reasons indicate that no further information had been provided –failure of Authority to consider new information – failure to consider credibility of new information – appeal allowed.
Legislation:

Federal Court Rules 2011 39.32,

Migration Act (Cth) Part 7AA, 473CA, 473CB, 473CC, 473DB, 473DC(3), 473DD(a), (b), (b)(i), (b)(ii), 473EA(1), 473FA(1)

Cases cited:

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration (2003) 236 FCR 593

AQU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 111

ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 250 FCR 109

BCQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 365

BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 114

CIH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1317

Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1

CVS16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 951

EMJ17 v Minister For Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1462

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 359 ALR 1

John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Rivkin (2003) 201 ALR 77

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 (2017) 257 FCR 111

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CQW17 [2018] FCAFC 110

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 353 ALR 600

Soliman v University of Technology, Sydney (2010) 207 FCR 277

VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588

WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2015) 236 FCR 593

Date of hearing: 22 November 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 66
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr D. Godwin
Solicitor for the Appellant: Stephen Hodges Solicitor
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr C. Lenehan
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

NSD 1283 of 2018
BETWEEN:

FKO17

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

WHEELAHAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

12 FEBRUARY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appellant have leave to file an amended notice of appeal in the form of the proposed amended notice of appeal dated 7 November 2018 and filed with the appellant’s outline of submissions, and that the proposed notice attached to the appellant’s submissions stand as the amended notice of appeal.

2.The appellant have leave to rely upon the grounds in the amended notice of appeal.

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 98
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of FKO17 v Minister For Home Affairs, the appellant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, appealed against the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) to affirm the delegate’s decision to refuse his application for a Safe Haven Enterprise visa. The appellant, his wife, and their four children arrived in Australia by boat in 2012, and the appellant had applied for a visa in 2016. The delegate's decision was referred to the IAA, which subsequently affirmed the delegate's decision. The appellant and his family had claimed that they had been targeted by the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) party, and that they feared for their lives. The IAA did not accept the appellant’s claims and affirmed the delegate’s decision to refuse the visa application.

The central legal issues before the Court were whether the appellant should be granted leave to rely on new grounds of appeal, and whether the IAA had erred in its consideration of new information provided by the appellant, his wife, and children. The Court had to determine if the IAA had failed to consider the new information, and whether it had failed to consider the credibility of this information. The Court examined whether there was any prejudice to the Minister if the new grounds were allowed, and whether it was in the interests of justice to permit the new arguments.

The Court found that the appellant should be granted leave to rely on the new grounds of appeal as it was in the interests of justice to do so. The Court held that the IAA had failed to consider the new information provided by the appellant and his family, and had not considered the credibility of this information. The Court concluded that the IAA had erred in its consideration of the new information, and that this amounted to jurisdictional error. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court, quashed the IAA's decision, and issued a writ of mandamus requiring the IAA to review the appellant's application according to law. The Minister was ordered to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

This case highlights the importance of ensuring that all relevant information is considered by the IAA when reviewing visa applications, and the need for the IAA to properly assess the credibility of any new information provided by the applicants. The Court’s decision reinforces the principle that it is in the interests of justice to allow new arguments to be raised on appeal if it is expedient to do so, and if there is no prejudice to other parties.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appellant have leave to file an amended notice of appeal in the form of the proposed amended notice of appeal dated 7 November 2018 and filed with the appellant’s outline of submissions, and that the proposed notice attached to the appellant’s submissions stand as the amended notice of appeal.

2. The appellant have leave to rely upon the grounds in the amended notice of appeal.

3. The appeal is allowed.

4. The orders numbered 2 and 3 of the Federal Circuit Court made 2 July 2018 are set aside.

5. A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the second respondent dated 22 November 2017.

6. A writ of mandamus issue requiring the second respondent to undertake a review of the appellant’s referred application for a protection visa according to law.

7. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, to be assessed in default of agreement.

8. There be no order as to the costs of the proceeding before the Federal Circuit Court.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Before this Court, the appellant and the Minister were represented by counsel. The Authority filed a notice submitting to any order of the Court save as to costs. Counsel for the appellant, who did not appear below, relied upon a proposed amended notice of appeal which raised arguments that were not put before the primary judge. It shall be necessary to consider whether the appellant should have leave to rely on the amended notice of appeal, and upon the new arguments that were put to this Court.Background The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka, and is a Hindu of Tamil ethnicity. The appellant travelled to Australia with his wife and four children by boat, and arrived at Christmas Island in November 2012. In November 2016, the appellant applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise visa. Included in that application were the appellant, his wife, and their four children, who were all minors at that time. In April 2017, a delegate of the Minister refused the application. The delegate’s decision was treated as a “fast track reviewable decision” for the purposes of Part 7AA of the Migration Act, and was referred to the Authority as required by s 473CA of the Act. In November 2017, the Authority affirmed the delegate’s decision to refuse the application for a visa. In support of his application for a visa the appellant claimed that from 2000 he and his wife had owned and managed a grocery shop in Sri Lanka, and that from 2004 he also operated an auto-rickshaw. The appellant claimed that his business was targeted by the Sri Lankan authorities and by the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal party (TMVP), as they wanted him to support the TMVP. The appellant claimed that in March 2008, he ran in a local election as an independent candidate, and was elected. He claimed that this required him to move away from his home town to another town, while his family stayed in the home town. The appellant claimed that while away, he was protected by local police but that the police could not protect his wife and children as that was beyond their responsibility. The appellant claimed that while he was away, the TMVP visited his wife, and threatened his and his family’s lives, and that he continued to receive these threats for five years. The appellant claimed that in May 2008, the TMVP asked him to run in a provincial election on their behalf. He stated that groups such as the TMVP were unable to win seats on their own, and used violence to gain control of candidates. The appellant stated that he refused to run on behalf of the TMVP because they were a corrupt and violent group. The appellant claimed that the TMVP threatened his life and safety, including by holding weapons, and threatening to shoot him without warning. The appellant claimed that he was then approached by the Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) who offered him protection from the TMVP if he joined them. The appellant claimed that he accepted their offer as he was scared for himself and for his family’s safety and believed that their political position was allied with his own. In May 2008, the appellant ran as an EPDP candidate in the provincial election but was unsuccessful. The appellant claimed that on the night of the provincial election, the TMVP brutally attacked and beat his wife at their home. He claimed that the TMVP had come to kill him, but that he was away. The appellant’s wife registered a complaint about the attack with the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant’s wife made a statement in support her own application for a visa by which, subject to one clarification, she confirmed that the claims by the appellant were true and correct to the best of her knowledge.The delegate’s decision The delegate refused the applications for protection visas because the delegate was not satisfied that the appellant held a well-founded fear of persecution, and because there were no complementary protection grounds that were engaged. In consequence of the rejection of the appellant’s application, those of his wife and children were also rejected Material to the arguments presented on appeal, the delegate accepted that the appellant was elected to the local council on 10 May 2008 and that the appellant’s wife was subject to an attack on 10 May 2008. The delegate also accepted that the appellant’s wife sustained an injury to her knee in July 2008 that required a knee reconstruction that was undertaken in Australia. The delegate did not accept that the TMVP had targeted the appellant to get him to support their party, and in particular did not accept that the TMVP attempted forcibly to recruit the appellant. The delegate stated that the appellant was asked several times in the visa interview whether anything happened to the appellant between 2008 and 2012 and in the absence of an answer concluded that nothing happened to him. The delegate noted that the appellant himself was not harmed in the period 2008 to 2012, and did not accept that the appellant himself was of interest to the TMVP. While the delegate acknowledged the incidents involving the appellant’s wife, the delegate did not accept that the TMVP had attacked the appellant’s wife or family, or that they were threatened as claimed in 2012. The delegate further found that even if the appellant’s claims were accepted, the TMVP and EPDP were now politically aligned, and did not accept that the appellant would now face harm for having supported one party over the other in 2008.New information Upon the delegate’s decision being referred to the Authority, the Authority sent a copy of its Practice Direction to the appellant. The Practice Direction provided that the appellant might provide to the Authority submissions and new information. The appellant subsequently made a submission to the Authority which was in the form of a signed statement and some attachments. By his own statement the appellant stated that he had concealed facts and not given a full account of his involvement with the EPDP, because it had been involved in atrocities. The appellant denied any personal involvement in such atrocities, but stated that he was concerned that he would be seen as a former member of EPDP responsible for such atrocities. The appellant then provided in his statement further information about his membership of and involvement with the EPDP. The appellant also submitted to the Authority a statement of his wife dated 23 May 2017, and statements of each of his two eldest children. The statement of the appellant’s wife referred to the TMVP verbally abusing her in 2008 after the appellant had left their home town –At that time I and my three children were alone. TMVP member came and verbally abused me. They said: Your husband is not with you. We will come and stay with you.I had to open the door of the house whenever they came. Otherwise they threatened that they would shoot my children.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In relation to paragraph [37] of the Authority’s reasons, counsel for the Minister submitted that the Authority should be understood as stating that in the context of the limitations in s 473DD, the Authority did not have within its permissible field of information any claim by the appellant that the TMVP ever attempted to kidnap his children. Counsel submitted that in considering paragraph [37] of the Authority’s reasons the Court should have regard to the structure of the reasons, which commenced with the Authority’s determination of what “new information” it could consider, and that having identified that information, paragraph [37] should be understood as being referrable to the information that the Authority was permitted to consider.ConsiderationLeave to amend the notice of appeal and to raise new arguments Leave is required to raise a new argument on appeal. The reasons for this practice include the distinct roles of a court exercising original jurisdiction, and a court exercising appellate jurisdiction: Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 at 7. Leave to raise a new argument may be granted if it is expedient in the interests of justice to do so: VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588 at [46]. Typically, in considering whether it is expedient in the interests of justice to allow a new point to be raised on appeal, the Court may consider any explanation for the point not having been raised at first instance, the merit of the point, and whether there is any prejudice to other parties in allowing the point to be raised on appeal: VUAX at [48]. Counsel for the Minister fairly stated that the new grounds did not cause any prejudice. As to the explanation for the failure to present the new arguments to the primary judge, the appellant’s solicitor by an affidavit affirmed 7 November 2018 deposed that the involvement of counsel in presenting the appellant’s case before this Court led to the formulation of the new grounds. For the reasons that I shall develop further, I consider that the proposed grounds have merit. In these circumstances, the interests of justice favour giving leave to the appellant to rely upon the new arguments within the amended grounds because, upon the hypothesis that there is jurisdictional error attending the Authority’s decision, the appellant will suffer substantial injustice if he is unable to obtain a remedy.The appeal In my view, the Authority’s reasons disclose two material errors. It is convenient to commence with paragraph [37] of the Authority’s reasons which I have set out under paragraph [30] above. The Authority referred to a claim made by the appellant in his interview that he was scared for his children because the TMVP kidnaps children. The Authority did not accept that claim for reasons including that “[h]e has not provided any further information or evidence, nor has he claimed that the TMVP ever attempted to kidnap his children”. Sections 473DC and 473DD of the Act refer to the Authority getting, requesting, accepting and inviting new information, and to a referred applicant giving or proposing to give new information to the Authority. The restrictions that are imposed by s 473DD are not directed to the Authority’s power to invite, get, request, or accept new information, or upon a referred applicant’s ability to give the Authority new information. Rather, the restrictions are imposed on the Authority’s ability to consider new information: EMJ17 v Minister For Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1462 at [60] (Thawley J).