FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
FKO17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 98
ORDERS
NSD 1283 of 2018 BETWEEN: FKO17
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
WHEELAHAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
12 FEBRUARY 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appellant have leave to file an amended notice of appeal in the form of the proposed amended notice of appeal dated 7 November 2018 and filed with the appellant’s outline of submissions, and that the proposed notice attached to the appellant’s submissions stand as the amended notice of appeal.
2.The appellant have leave to rely upon the grounds in the amended notice of appeal.
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 98
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the Court were whether the appellant should be granted leave to rely on new grounds of appeal, and whether the IAA had erred in its consideration of new information provided by the appellant, his wife, and children. The Court had to determine if the IAA had failed to consider the new information, and whether it had failed to consider the credibility of this information. The Court examined whether there was any prejudice to the Minister if the new grounds were allowed, and whether it was in the interests of justice to permit the new arguments.
The Court found that the appellant should be granted leave to rely on the new grounds of appeal as it was in the interests of justice to do so. The Court held that the IAA had failed to consider the new information provided by the appellant and his family, and had not considered the credibility of this information. The Court concluded that the IAA had erred in its consideration of the new information, and that this amounted to jurisdictional error. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court, quashed the IAA's decision, and issued a writ of mandamus requiring the IAA to review the appellant's application according to law. The Minister was ordered to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
This case highlights the importance of ensuring that all relevant information is considered by the IAA when reviewing visa applications, and the need for the IAA to properly assess the credibility of any new information provided by the applicants. The Court’s decision reinforces the principle that it is in the interests of justice to allow new arguments to be raised on appeal if it is expedient to do so, and if there is no prejudice to other parties.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appellant have leave to file an amended notice of appeal in the form of the proposed amended notice of appeal dated 7 November 2018 and filed with the appellant’s outline of submissions, and that the proposed notice attached to the appellant’s submissions stand as the amended notice of appeal.
2. The appellant have leave to rely upon the grounds in the amended notice of appeal.
3. The appeal is allowed.
4. The orders numbered 2 and 3 of the Federal Circuit Court made 2 July 2018 are set aside.
5. A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the second respondent dated 22 November 2017.
6. A writ of mandamus issue requiring the second respondent to undertake a review of the appellant’s referred application for a protection visa according to law.
7. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, to be assessed in default of agreement.
8. There be no order as to the costs of the proceeding before the Federal Circuit Court.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In relation to paragraph [37] of the Authority’s reasons, counsel for the Minister submitted that the Authority should be understood as stating that in the context of the limitations in s 473DD, the Authority did not have within its permissible field of information any claim by the appellant that the TMVP ever attempted to kidnap his children. Counsel submitted that in considering paragraph [37] of the Authority’s reasons the Court should have regard to the structure of the reasons, which commenced with the Authority’s determination of what “new information” it could consider, and that having identified that information, paragraph [37] should be understood as being referrable to the information that the Authority was permitted to consider.ConsiderationLeave to amend the notice of appeal and to raise new arguments Leave is required to raise a new argument on appeal. The reasons for this practice include the distinct roles of a court exercising original jurisdiction, and a court exercising appellate jurisdiction: Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 at 7. Leave to raise a new argument may be granted if it is expedient in the interests of justice to do so: VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588 at [46]. Typically, in considering whether it is expedient in the interests of justice to allow a new point to be raised on appeal, the Court may consider any explanation for the point not having been raised at first instance, the merit of the point, and whether there is any prejudice to other parties in allowing the point to be raised on appeal: VUAX at [48]. Counsel for the Minister fairly stated that the new grounds did not cause any prejudice. As to the explanation for the failure to present the new arguments to the primary judge, the appellant’s solicitor by an affidavit affirmed 7 November 2018 deposed that the involvement of counsel in presenting the appellant’s case before this Court led to the formulation of the new grounds. For the reasons that I shall develop further, I consider that the proposed grounds have merit. In these circumstances, the interests of justice favour giving leave to the appellant to rely upon the new arguments within the amended grounds because, upon the hypothesis that there is jurisdictional error attending the Authority’s decision, the appellant will suffer substantial injustice if he is unable to obtain a remedy.The appeal In my view, the Authority’s reasons disclose two material errors. It is convenient to commence with paragraph [37] of the Authority’s reasons which I have set out under paragraph [30] above. The Authority referred to a claim made by the appellant in his interview that he was scared for his children because the TMVP kidnaps children. The Authority did not accept that claim for reasons including that “[h]e has not provided any further information or evidence, nor has he claimed that the TMVP ever attempted to kidnap his children”. Sections 473DC and 473DD of the Act refer to the Authority getting, requesting, accepting and inviting new information, and to a referred applicant giving or proposing to give new information to the Authority. The restrictions that are imposed by s 473DD are not directed to the Authority’s power to invite, get, request, or accept new information, or upon a referred applicant’s ability to give the Authority new information. Rather, the restrictions are imposed on the Authority’s ability to consider new information: EMJ17 v Minister For Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1462 at [60] (Thawley J).