CIH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CIH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1317

Appeal from: CIH16 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2018] FCCA 246
File number: NSD 165 of 2018
Judge: DERRINGTON J
Date of judgment: 7 September 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether Immigration Assessment Authority applied the correct test for ascertaining under s 473DD as to whether exceptional circumstances existed to justify the consideration of new information – failure to consider whether essential information in medical report satisfied the requirements of s 473DD(b)(ii) – whether the error was material and amounted to a jurisdictional error – appeal allowed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)

Cases cited:

AQU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 111

AUH17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 388

BCQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 365

BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 114

BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 958

CHF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 192

CVS16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 951

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CQW17 [2018] FCAFC 110

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 353 ALR 600

R v Kelly [2000] QB 198

Date of hearing: 28 August 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 72
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr P Bodisco
Solicitor for the Appellant: Shelly Legal
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms R Graycar
Solicitor for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

NSD 165 of 2018
BETWEEN:

CIH16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

DERRINGTON J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 SEPTEMBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Leave to file an amended notice of appeal be granted.

2.The appeal be allowed.

3.The orders of the primary judge be set aside and in lieu thereof it is ordered that:

(a) a writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the second respondent made on 8 April 2017;

(b) the matter is remitted to the second respondent for determination according to law.

4.The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

DERRINGTON J:

Introduction

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCC), delivered on 1 February 2018. That decision dismissed an application pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act) for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (the IAA) made on 8 April 2017.

  2. The grounds in the original Notice of Appeal were, it appears, drafted by a person unfamiliar with the requirements of this Court.…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1317
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of CIH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection concerns a challenge to a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) not to consider a medical letter provided by the appellant, a Tamil asylum seeker from Sri Lanka, in his bid to avoid deportation. The appellant had sought to have additional information and documents considered by the IAA, which had the power to do so only if "exceptional circumstances" existed under s 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appellant's appeal was heard after the Full Court of the Federal Circuit of Australia had quashed the IAA's decision and remitted the case for redetermination. The appellant's appeal to the Federal Court centred on a single ground: whether the Federal Circuit Court had erred in not finding that the IAA had failed to properly apply s 473DD in its consideration of the medical letter.

The primary issue before the Federal Court was whether the IAA had correctly assessed whether "exceptional circumstances" existed under s 473DD to warrant the consideration of the medical letter. Specifically, the court needed to determine whether the IAA had failed to take into account certain matters under s 473DD(b)(ii) of the Act in its assessment. The appellant argued that the IAA's failure to consider these matters constituted a jurisdictional error. The Minister, on the other hand, contended that the IAA's decision was correct and that the Federal Circuit Court had properly assessed the IAA's application of s 473DD.

The Federal Court found that the Federal Circuit Court had indeed erred in its assessment of the IAA's application of s 473DD. The Court held that the IAA had failed to consider certain matters under s 473DD(b)(ii) and that this omission constituted a jurisdictional error. The Court also found that the error was material and amounted to a failure to correctly apply the statutory test. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court, and remitted the matter to the IAA for redetermination according to law. Additionally, the Court ordered the Minister to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave to file an amended notice of appeal be granted.

2. The appeal be allowed.

3. The orders of the primary judge be set aside and in lieu thereof it is ordered that:

(a) a writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the second respondent made on 8 April 2017;

(b) the matter is remitted to the second respondent for determination according to law.

4. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

At the hearing of the appeal Mr Bodisco, for the appellant, sought leave to file an amended Notice of Appeal containing a single ground. That was not opposed by the Minister, leave was given and the appeal was fought solely on that ground.Background It is necessary to set out in some detail the decision of the IAA. This arises because the appellant complains the IAA failed to find there were “exceptional circumstances” such that certain information and documents, which were not before the delegate, could be received and considered. The appellant is a person of Tamil ethnicity and of the Hindu faith. He comes from Batticaloa District in Sri Lanka. He arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival on 17 August 2012 and applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV) on 13 September 2015. On 27 May 2016, a delegate of the Minister declined to grant him a visa because he did not meet the requisite criteria. That decision was reviewed and affirmed by the IAA. However, on 9 February 2017 the FCC, with the consent of the parties, declared the IAA’s decision to be void and of no effect. It was quashed and the matter remitted to the IAA for redetermination according to law. Prior to the second determination of the IAA, the appellant was once against invited to submit any additional material on which he relied. He was informed that additional material would only be considered if the requirements of s 473DD of the Migration Act were satisfied. Pursuant to that invitation the appellant, by his representatives, sent several documents containing further information. The present appeal concerns the determination by the IAA not to consider one of those documents; being a letter from a Dr Hughes of 28 February 2017.Second Decision of the IAA The appellant advanced a number of claims for protection to the IAA, which can be summarised as follows:(a)That he faced a real chance of serious harm if he were forced to return to Sri Lanka because of his past political involvement in the activities of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), his previous arrests at the hands of the Criminal Investigation Department or Karuna Group, the association of his relatives in that group or his relatives’ political activities, the authority’s view that he comes from an LTTE family, or his political opinions regarding support for and commemorating Tamil martyrs.(b)In the alternative, that all of those factors place him at risk of facing serious harm as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to Sri Lanka. In accordance with the orders of the FCC, the IAA reconsidered the decision of the Minister/delegate and, on 18 April 2017, affirmed it. The reasons given by the IAA were of considerable length, running to 114 paragraphs of careful analysis of the material and claims before it. Those reasons show the existence of the following events relevant to the matters in issue:(a)That the IAA had before it the material referred by the Secretary under s 473CB of the Migration Act, which included submissions provided by the appellant’s former representatives dated 26 May 2016.(b)It had obtained the most recent DFAT country report for Sri Lanka. It was acknowledged this was not available at the time of the decision of the delegate. However, because it was from an authoritative source, the delegate had relied upon an earlier DFAT report, and DFAT’s assessment was prepared specifically for the purpose of protection status determination, it was accepted these were “exceptional circumstances” justifying consideration of it as “new information” pursuant to ss 473DC and 473DD of the Migration Act.(c)The IAA received a submission and further information from the appellant’s then representative and, to the extent to which the submissions discussed the evidence, before the delegate, including Country Information and responded to the delegate’s decision, those documents were not held to constitute “new information” and could be considered.(d)The IAA considered that new Country Information was provided to it by the appellant in the form of photographs, records and a report but decided it had not been established that this information could not have been provided to the delegate. Further, it had not been shown the information could be regarded as credible personal information not known prior to the delegate’s decision, nor was it established that, if it had been known, it may have affected the consideration of the appellant’s claims (see s 473DD). For that reason, “exceptional circumstances” had not been established justifying its reception.(e)The IAA rejected various photographs sent by the appellant who said he believed they had been destroyed, but were subsequently located. These were said to be relevant to the claim that he had been involved with the LTTE. However, the IAA determined he had not explained why, given he knew the delegate had concerns about his alleged political activities, they could not have been supplied between the SHEV interview in November 2015 and the delegate’s decision six months later. Moreover, the photographs did not appear to assist the appellant’s case. (f)On 10 March 2017, the appellant’s representative emailed further information to the IAA. Specifically, photographs of persons the appellant claimed were related to him and members of the LTTE, a photograph of the appellant at an LTTE event, various other documents in Tamil, some with accompanying English translations, a complaint made recently to the Sri Lankan police in Tamil, evidence of complaints made to the New South Wales Police regarding threats to the appellant, a statutory declaration from the appellant dated 25 February 2017, letters issued by the TMVP, with accompanying English translations, and a letter from a Dr Hughes dated 28 February 2017.(g)The IAA accepted further submissions from the appellant dated 12 March 2017. On the basis that they discussed the evidence, including Country Information, which had been before the delegate and in response to the delegate’s decision based on that material, they were not “new information”. They also responded to the DFAT 2017 report which came into existence after the initial decision and so could not previously have been provided to the delegate. The IAA held there were “exceptional circumstances” to justify reception of the submissions.(h)The photographs and accompanying information all related to events prior to the appellant’s arrival in Australia. The IAA decided that because the appellant was aware of the need to provide all information to the delegate, it was not satisfied the information was credible personal information, or that it could not have been provided prior to the delegate’s decision. It followed that there were no “exceptional circumstances” to justify its reception and consideration.(i)The IAA held that the letter from Dr Hughes dated 28 February 2017, was new information which post-dated the delegate’s decision. The letter referred to an examination of the appellant on the day it was dated and recorded he had scarring on his arms and in his anus consistent with his history. The letter also set out the history given to the doctor – claims made by the appellant that pre-dated the delegate’s decision. The IAA identified the history recited in the letter was inconsistent with the appellant’s claims and he had not explained why the examination by Dr Hughes could only take place after the delegate’s decision. It was not satisfied there were “exceptional circumstances” to justify consideration of the letter.(j)The IAA accepted information from the appellant in the form of a statutory declaration concerning threats of violence against him when he was in Sri Lanka and threats of violence against him in Australia. There is no challenge to the acceptance of this information. (k)English translations of letters written in Bengali on TMVP letterhead, which were before the delegate on 10 March 2007, were not regarded as new information.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Prior to the second determination of the IAA, the appellant was once against invited to submit any additional material on which he relied. He was informed that additional material would only be considered if the requirements of s 473DD of the Migration Act were satisfied. Pursuant to that invitation the appellant, by his representatives, sent several documents containing further information. The present appeal concerns the determination by the IAA not to consider one of those documents; being a letter from a Dr Hughes of 28 February 2017.Second Decision of the IAA The appellant advanced a number of claims for protection to the IAA, which can be summarised as follows:(a)That he faced a real chance of serious harm if he were forced to return to Sri Lanka because of his past political involvement in the activities of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), his previous arrests at the hands of the Criminal Investigation Department or Karuna Group, the association of his relatives in that group or his relatives’ political activities, the authority’s view that he comes from an LTTE family, or his political opinions regarding support for and commemorating Tamil martyrs.(b)In the alternative, that all of those factors place him at risk of facing serious harm as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to Sri Lanka. In accordance with the orders of the FCC, the IAA reconsidered the decision of the Minister/delegate and, on 18 April 2017, affirmed it. The reasons given by the IAA were of considerable length, running to 114 paragraphs of careful analysis of the material and claims before it. Those reasons show the existence of the following events relevant to the matters in issue:(a)That the IAA had before it the material referred by the Secretary under s 473CB of the Migration Act, which included submissions provided by the appellant’s former representatives dated 26 May 2016.(b)It had obtained the most recent DFAT country report for Sri Lanka. It was acknowledged this was not available at the time of the decision of the delegate. However, because it was from an authoritative source, the delegate had relied upon an earlier DFAT report, and DFAT’s assessment was prepared specifically for the purpose of protection status determination, it was accepted these were “exceptional circumstances” justifying consideration of it as “new information” pursuant to ss 473DC and 473DD of the Migration Act.(c)The IAA received a submission and further information from the appellant’s then representative and, to the extent to which the submissions discussed the evidence, before the delegate, including Country Information and responded to the delegate’s decision, those documents were not held to constitute “new information” and could be considered.(d)The IAA considered that new Country Information was provided to it by the appellant in the form of photographs, records and a report but decided it had not been established that this information could not have been provided to the delegate. Further, it had not been shown the information could be regarded as credible personal information not known prior to the delegate’s decision, nor was it established that, if it had been known, it may have affected the consideration of the appellant’s claims (see s 473DD). For that reason, “exceptional circumstances” had not been established justifying its reception.(e)The IAA rejected various photographs sent by the appellant who said he believed they had been destroyed, but were subsequently located. These were said to be relevant to the claim that he had been involved with the LTTE. However, the IAA determined he had not explained why, given he knew the delegate had concerns about his alleged political activities, they could not have been supplied between the SHEV interview in November 2015 and the delegate’s decision six months later. Moreover, the photographs did not appear to assist the appellant’s case. (f)On 10 March 2017, the appellant’s representative emailed further information to the IAA. Specifically, photographs of persons the appellant claimed were related to him and members of the LTTE, a photograph of the appellant at an LTTE event, various other documents in Tamil, some with accompanying English translations, a complaint made recently to the Sri Lankan police in Tamil, evidence of complaints made to the New South Wales Police regarding threats to the appellant, a statutory declaration from the appellant dated 25 February 2017, letters issued by the TMVP, with accompanying English translations, and a letter from a Dr Hughes dated 28 February 2017.(g)The IAA accepted further submissions from the appellant dated 12 March 2017. On the basis that they discussed the evidence, including Country Information, which had been before the delegate and in response to the delegate’s decision based on that material, they were not “new information”. They also responded to the DFAT 2017 report which came into existence after the initial decision and so could not previously have been provided to the delegate. The IAA held there were “exceptional circumstances” to justify reception of the submissions.(h)The photographs and accompanying information all related to events prior to the appellant’s arrival in Australia. The IAA decided that because the appellant was aware of the need to provide all information to the delegate, it was not satisfied the information was credible personal information, or that it could not have been provided prior to the delegate’s decision. It followed that there were no “exceptional circumstances” to justify its reception and consideration.(i)The IAA held that the letter from Dr Hughes dated 28 February 2017, was new information which post-dated the delegate’s decision. The letter referred to an examination of the appellant on the day it was dated and recorded he had scarring on his arms and in his anus consistent with his history. The letter also set out the history given to the doctor – claims made by the appellant that pre-dated the delegate’s decision. The IAA identified the history recited in the letter was inconsistent with the appellant’s claims and he had not explained why the examination by Dr Hughes could only take place after the delegate’s decision. It was not satisfied there were “exceptional circumstances” to justify consideration of the letter.(j)The IAA accepted information from the appellant in the form of a statutory declaration concerning threats of violence against him when he was in Sri Lanka and threats of violence against him in Australia. There is no challenge to the acceptance of this information. (k)English translations of letters written in Bengali on TMVP letterhead, which were before the delegate on 10 March 2007, were not regarded as new information.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The ground of appeal is stated in the amended Notice of Appeal and reads:His Honour erred in failing to discern jurisdictional error in circumstances where the IAA breached s 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in dealing with the letter of Dr Hughes of 28 February 2017 when determining whether “exceptional circumstances” existed by effectively failing to take into account the matters referred to in s 473DD(b)(ii) of the ActConsideration Correction of error It is to be kept steadily in mind that this Court has no original jurisdiction in most matters arising under the Migration Act and, especially, in relation to the decisions of the IAA. As Bromwich J eloquently put it in CVS16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 951, [15] (CVS16):While this Court may be called upon to form its own view as to what transpired before the Authority, this may only be done in the context of the need to find error on the part of the primary judge. This Court has no original jurisdiction in most migration matters, including judicial review of decisions of the Authority, and therefore no business reconsidering the Authority’s reasons as though it was conducting judicial review at first instance, effectively overlooking the vitally important role of the primary judge. This particularly important manifestation of the role of this Court in migration appeals from the Federal Circuit Court is supported by both long-standing and current authority: see the Full Court decision in Sathiyanathan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 210 at [10]; see also SZJHE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1771 at [6]–[8]; CNN15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 579 at [13]–[14]; and DPE16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 61 at [11]. As Flick J pointed out in BGZ15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2017] FCA 1095 at [8], taking such an approach impermissibly reduces proceedings before the Federal Circuit Court to a “preliminary skirmish”, as decried in Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 at 7. The decision of the primary judge disclosed a clear error, being the failure to provide any reasons for the conclusion that the IAA had correctly applied s 473DD when refusing to take into consideration Dr Hughes’ letter. That issue was an important part of the appellant’s case and he was entitled to be provided with reasons as to why it did not succeed. The Minister adopted the very proper position of not suggesting the decision of the FCC contained any such reasons and it was accepted by all parties that a sufficient error existed so as to enliven the power of the Court to consider the correctness of the IAA’s reasons. The manner in which the primary judge dealt with this issue is set out in more detail below. Further, and regardless of the question of the adequacy of the reasons on this topic, the primary judge also erred in accepting the IAA had applied the correct test under s 473DD when determining whether exceptional circumstances applied in relation to Dr Hughes letter.The statutory scheme