AUH17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUH17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 388

Appeal from: AUH17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2017] FCCA 2537
File number(s): NSD 1852 of 2017
Judge(s): MORTIMER J
Date of judgment: 23 March 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court – appellant claiming a fear of harm in Sri Lanka – whether Federal Circuit Court should have identified jurisdictional error in Immigration Assessment Authority’s decision – whether Authority failed to consider “new information” – construction of ss 473DC and 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 473DB, 473DC, 473DD, 473DE
Cases cited:

AUH17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2017] FCCA 2537

BRA16 v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCA 127

BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 958

CHF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 192

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611

Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 195

Date of hearing: 27 February 2018
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 56
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr S Hodges
Solicitor for the Appellant: Stephen Hodges Solicitor
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G Johnson
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

NSD 1852 of 2017
BETWEEN:

AUH17

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MORTIMER J

DATE OF ORDER:

23 MARCH 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, fixed in the lump sum of $4,100.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MORTIMER J:

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court made on 19 October 2017, whereby the court dismissed the appellant’s application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority made on 1 February 2017: see AUH17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2017] FCCA 2537.

  2. The appellant was represented before the Federal Circuit Court, but unrepresented on his appeal until shortly before the hearing of the appeal. There is one generalised ground of appeal. Appropriately, the Minister took this as a generalised challenge to the reasoning of the Federal Circuit Court on the three grounds of judicial review advanced before the Federal Circuit Court, and the Minister’s submissions dealt with the Federal Circuit Court decision in that context. There was an additional argument put at the hearing of the appeal, and I discuss this in more detail below.

    BACKGROUND

    The Immigration Assessment Authority decision

  3. The background to the appellant’s claims and the…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 388
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of AUH17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, who had been represented before the Federal Circuit Court but was unrepresented on his appeal, contested the Federal Circuit Court's rejection of his claims for protection against potential harm in Sri Lanka. The Federal Circuit Court had ruled against his claims on the basis of credibility issues, changes in political circumstances, and the passage of time. The appellant's appeal focused on whether the Federal Circuit Court should have identified a jurisdictional error in the Immigration Assessment Authority's decision, particularly regarding the consideration of new information under sections 473DC and 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

The central legal issues before the court involved the proper interpretation and application of sections 473DC and 473DD of the Migration Act, and whether the Immigration Assessment Authority had failed to consider the new information as required. The court examined whether the Federal Circuit Court should have found a jurisdictional error in the Immigration Assessment Authority’s decision. Additionally, the court considered whether the appellant's claims warranted a reassessment under the statutory provisions in question.

The court concluded that the Federal Circuit Court had correctly rejected the ground of review and dismissed the appeal. It found that the Immigration Assessment Authority's decision was not flawed and that the appellant's claims, while serious, did not necessitate a finding of a real chance of persecution. The court emphasized that the statutory framework, which generally precludes interviews and limits the consideration of new information, should be adhered to. The court also highlighted that representatives of applicants in such proceedings must ensure that their clients present comprehensive accounts within the prescribed processes. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, fixed in the lump sum of $4,100.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant was represented before the Federal Circuit Court, but unrepresented on his appeal until shortly before the hearing of the appeal. There is one generalised ground of appeal. Appropriately, the Minister took this as a generalised challenge to the reasoning of the Federal Circuit Court on the three grounds of judicial review advanced before the Federal Circuit Court, and the Minister’s submissions dealt with the Federal Circuit Court decision in that context. There was an additional argument put at the hearing of the appeal, and I discuss this in more detail below.BACKGROUND The Immigration Assessment Authority decision The background to the appellant’s claims and the process until the Immigration Assessment Authority stage is set out in the Federal Circuit Court reasons and need not be repeated here. The appellant’s claims for protection were set out by the Immigration Assessment Authority at [10] of its reasons:ŸIn the 1990s, one of his sisters was conscripted into the LTTE and his father died from injuries received after being beaten in a Sri Lankan Army (SLA) controlled camp. His sister died in action in 2000. Around 2000 the applicant, his mother and four siblings moved to Vavuniya. They were continually harassed and forced to report monthly to Vavuniya Police Station to renew their permit to remain there.ŸThe applicant studied in Vavuniya and was once was once [sic] shot at by the SLA while in the playground but was not injured. He was beaten by SLA personnel.ŸIn early 2009 the applicant’s friend [A] was taken into custody by officers from the police Criminal Intelligence Division (CID). He believes [A] was shot by Sri Lankan authorities.ŸAround March 2009 while studying at [TW], the applicant was approached by CID officers seeking someone known as ‘[redacted]’. The officers also approached [TW] reception and visited the applicant’s house. He thinks they were looking for him because he is known to friends and family as [redacted]. This caused him to fear for his safety so he went into hiding.ŸIn 2013 his mother was taken into custody by the authorities and appeared in court. She was released on payment of a Rs10,000 security. The Immigration Assessment Authority accepted some of these claims, particularly those concerning what had happened to the appellant’s father, mother and sister. However, based on matters that included the passage of time, some credibility concerns, changes in political circumstances in Sri Lanka and (in relation to his mother) the failure of the appellant to provide any evidence about why his mother was detained, it did not accept that the appellant faced a real chance of persecution were he to be compelled to return to Sri Lanka. It also rejected his complementary protection claim for the same reasons. The Immigration Assessment Authority did not accept the appellant’s narrative about his friend A, on the basis of inconsistencies in the appellant’s accounts of those events. It also did not accept the appellant’s claims about the incident at TW, for the same reason.The Federal Circuit Court

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Federal Circuit Court was correct to reject this ground of review.Conclusion The appeal must be dismissed. However, a number of observations should be made. Under Pt 7AA, there are limited circumstances in which the Immigration Assessment Authority may decide to conduct an interview with an applicant: see s 473DE. The premise of Pt 7AA appears to be that decisions will be made without an interview: see s 473DB(1)(b). Even if the Immigration Assessment Authority does conduct an interview, although s 473DE(1)(c)(ii) contemplates an interview could be in person or by telephone, the Immigration Assessment Authority’s policies and procedures, which were in evidence before the Court, indicate the Immigration Assessment Authority generally conducts interviews by telephone. There is no doubt that, in any given review, the absence of an oral hearing and in particular an “in person” oral hearing, may be capable of affecting both the quality of decision-making, and the ability of an applicant to explain her or his circumstances in a way which may satisfy a decision-maker more than bare written statements are capable of doing. The Immigration Assessment Authority’s decision in this case suffers in its quality, it seems to me, because the appellant was not given an interview. The absence of an interview is, however, a feature of the Pt 7AA process and the Court must deal with the process as the legislature has prescribed it. Nevertheless, it may assist Immigration Assessment Authority decision-makers to consider the possible effects on the quality and reliability of their decision-making from not having the benefit of being able to engage with an applicant in a direct way, and in some cases this consideration might inform the approach of Immigration Assessment Authority decision-makers to the documentary material before them. There are also lessons for those representing applicants in Immigration Assessment Authority review proceedings from what occurred in the appellant’s review proceeding. The compressed processes, the prohibitions on new information except in certain circumstances, the general unavailability of interviews, all mean that representatives of applicants have an additional responsibility to ensure that their clients present fulsome accounts in accordance with the processes for which Pt 7AA provides. The appellant in this proceeding made serious claims before the delegate and the Immigration Assessment Authority, which were accepted, about his father’s death at the hands of the Sri Lankan military, his sister being a “martyr” to the LTTE cause and his family being publicly identified as the family of such a martyr, as well as historic claims about his own assault by the Sri Lankan military. While I have found it was open to the Immigration Assessment Authority to reach the conclusion it did, and while it should be noted that the Immigration Assessment Authority found on the basis of country information that the situation had improved for Tamils in the circumstances of the appellant, it may nevertheless be appropriate for further consideration to be given to what differential risks, if any, might be faced by the appellant if he is to be forcibly returned to Sri Lanka. Whether or not any further investigation is appropriate is not a matter for the Court, but the accepted evidence of the appellant in this case may raise factual issues about his return to Sri Lanka that the material in most other cases does not.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established