FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BOS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCA 75
Appeal from: BOS17 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2019] FCCA 285 File number: VID 182 of 2019 Judge: O'BRYAN J Date of judgment: 7 February 2020 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) affirmed decision of delegate refusing application for safe haven enterprise visa – whether IAA erred in finding that information provided by the appellant was not “credible personal information” for the purposes of s 473DD(b)(ii) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether any such error by IAA was material to its decision – appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 473DC(2), 473DD(a), 473DD(b)(i), 473DD(b)(ii) Cases cited: ABC17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 254
AQU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 162 ALD 442
AUH17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 388
BHM17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1396
BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 254 FCR 221
CSR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 474
Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 123
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 (2017) 257 FCR 111
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CLV16 (2018) 260 FCR 1783
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CPA16 (2019) 163 ALD 469
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 163 ALD 1
Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 217
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476
Dates of hearing: 7 August, 20 September 2019 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 61 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Krohn Solicitor for the Appellant: Mano Associates Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Goodwin Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs ORDERS
VID 182 of 2019 BETWEEN: BOS17
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
O'BRYAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
7 FEBRUARY 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appellant be granted leave to rely on the amended notice of appeal filed 30 August 2019.
2.The appeal be dismissed.
3.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
O’BRYAN J:
Introduction
This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dated 12 February 2019 published as BOS17 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2019] FCCA 285. The primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read BOS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2020] FCA 75
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court held that the IAA did not err in finding that the information provided by the appellant was not “credible personal information” for the purposes of s 473DD(b)(ii) of the Migration Act. The Court found that the IAA was entitled to consider whether there were exceptional circumstances justifying the consideration of the new information, and whether the new information was credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the appellant’s claims. The Court found that the IAA was not required to consider the information provided by the appellant’s wife, as it did not raise any new claims, and that the information provided by the appellant did not meet the threshold of being credible personal information. The Court also found that even if there was an error in the application of s 473DD(b)(ii), it was not material to the decision of the IAA.
The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appellant be granted leave to rely on the amended notice of appeal filed 30 August 2019.
2. The appeal be dismissed.
3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Fourth, even if there was a failure in the application of s 473DD(b)(ii), the information was not sufficiently material to form the basis for a finding of jurisdictional error. In relation to the letter from the appellant’s wife, the Minister reiterated that its contents did not raise any new claims. In relation to the country information, the Minister argued that the Authority had relied on more current country information in the form of a DFAT report.Consideration of appealSome general matters Section 473DC(2) of the Act stipulates that the Authority does not have a duty to get, request or accept any new information whether the Authority is requested to do so by an applicant or by any other person, or in any other circumstances. Notwithstanding that section, and as noted earlier, on 23 January 2017 the Authority wrote to the appellant and provided him with a copy of its Practice Direction. In relation to the provision of new information to the Authority, the Practice Direction stated that the Authority could only consider new information if there are exceptional circumstances and instructed the appellant that, if he wished the Authority to consider new information, he must also provide an explanation of the matters referred to in s 473DD(b)(i) or (ii). Section 473DD of the Act places a statutory limitation on the Authority’s ability to consider new information in making its decision under Part 7AA. The section provides as follows:Considering new information in exceptional circumstancesFor the purposes of making a decision in relation to a fast track reviewable decision, the Immigration Assessment Authority must not consider any new information unless:(a)the Authority is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information; and(b)the referred applicant satisfies the Authority that, in relation to any new information given, or proposed to be given, to the Authority by the referred applicant, the new information:(i)was not, and could not have been, provided to the Minister before the Minister made the decision under section 65; or(ii)is credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant’s claims. As is made clear by the section, the Authority must not consider new information unless satisfied of the matter in s 473DD(a) and one of the two matters stated in s 473DD(b): Plaintiff M174/2016 at [31] per Gageler, Keane and Nettle JJ, at [78] per Gordon J and at [100] per Edelman J; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 (2017) 257 FCR 111 (BBS16) at [102]; AQU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 162 ALD 442 at [13]. In the present case, the Authority did not consider limb (a) of s 473DD (whether it was satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information) with respect to either category of new information. The primary judge’s contrary finding at [15] (in relation to the letter from the appellant’s wife) had no basis and was erroneous. It is not an error for the Authority to confine its consideration to limb (b) of s 473DD if it comes to the view that neither of the two matters stated in that limb are satisfied (AUH17 at [33]) (whereas the Authority may err if it confines its consideration to limb (a) of s 473DD without considering the matters referred to in limb (b), for the reasons explained in BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 254 FCR 221, which reasons were approved and followed in BBS16 at [102]-[112]). In any case, the result in the present case is that there was no finding by the Authority on limb (a).