BOS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BOS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCA 75

Appeal from: BOS17 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2019] FCCA 285
File number: VID 182 of 2019
Judge: O'BRYAN J
Date of judgment: 7 February 2020
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) affirmed decision of delegate refusing application for safe haven enterprise visa – whether IAA erred in finding that information provided by the appellant was not “credible personal information” for the purposes of s 473DD(b)(ii) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether any such error by IAA was material to its decision – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 473DC(2), 473DD(a), 473DD(b)(i), 473DD(b)(ii)
Cases cited:

ABC17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 254

AQU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 162 ALD 442

AUH17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 388

BHM17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1396

BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 254 FCR 221

CSR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 474

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 123

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 (2017) 257 FCR 111

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CLV16 (2018) 260 FCR 1783

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CPA16 (2019) 163 ALD 469

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 163 ALD 1

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 217

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476

Dates of hearing: 7 August, 20 September 2019
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 61
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Krohn
Solicitor for the Appellant: Mano Associates
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Goodwin
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 182 of 2019
BETWEEN:

BOS17

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

O'BRYAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 FEBRUARY 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appellant be granted leave to rely on the amended notice of appeal filed 30 August 2019.

2.The appeal be dismissed.

3.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

O’BRYAN J:

Introduction

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dated 12 February 2019 published as BOS17 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2019] FCCA 285. The primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 75
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, applied for a safe haven enterprise visa following his arrival on Christmas Island as an unauthorised maritime arrival. The application was refused, and the delegate’s decision was affirmed by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA). The appellant appealed to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which referred questions to the High Court. The primary issue before the High Court was whether the IAA erred in finding that the information provided by the appellant was not “credible personal information” for the purposes of s 473DD(b)(ii) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), and whether any such error was material to its decision.

The High Court held that the IAA did not err in finding that the information provided by the appellant was not “credible personal information” for the purposes of s 473DD(b)(ii) of the Migration Act. The Court found that the IAA was entitled to consider whether there were exceptional circumstances justifying the consideration of the new information, and whether the new information was credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the appellant’s claims. The Court found that the IAA was not required to consider the information provided by the appellant’s wife, as it did not raise any new claims, and that the information provided by the appellant did not meet the threshold of being credible personal information. The Court also found that even if there was an error in the application of s 473DD(b)(ii), it was not material to the decision of the IAA.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appellant be granted leave to rely on the amended notice of appeal filed 30 August 2019.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, I dismiss the appeal.Background The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. He arrived on Christmas Island as an unauthorised maritime arrival on 2 October 2012. By letter dated 10 December 2015, the Department advised the appellant that the Minister had determined, pursuant to s 46A(2) of the Act, that s 46A(1) would not apply and invited the appellant to apply for a temporary protection visa or a safe haven enterprise visa. On 28 February 2016, the appellant lodged an application for a safe haven enterprise visa. In support of his application, the appellant made the following claims:(a)He was born in the north of Sri Lanka in 1985.(b)He is a national of Sri Lanka and of no other country, and has no right to enter and to reside in any other country.(c)He is of Tamil ethnicity and at risk for this reason.(d)His family was displaced during the civil war and also lost their possessions in the tsunami in 2004.(e)In 2006, the appellant was near a bomb blast. He was detained and tortured by the Sri Lankan Army (SLA), and the SLA confiscated his National Identity Card. After this, he was required to go regularly to a SLA camp, and he was tortured and harassed regularly.(f)At about that time, the appellant’s uncle (his father’s younger brother) was arrested by the SLA and his whereabouts, and whether he is alive or dead, is unknown.(g)The appellant stopped his education and married in 2007, hoping this would afford him some protection, but he continued to be harassed.(h)During the war, the appellant was subject to torture and harassment in SLA camps.(i)After the end of the war, the appellant had to report to an SLA camp every week or two weeks.(j)Another of the appellant’s uncles, one who had been living with the appellant’s family, was detained in 2012.(k)The appellant was subjected to continuing torture and harassment and went into hiding. Subsequently, the appellant fled by boat from Sri Lanka to Australia, on the advice of his family. (l)Since then, intelligence personnel have visited his home in Sri Lanka and intimidated his family. On 15 August 2016 the appellant attended an interview with a delegate of the Minister. On 18 January 2017, the delegate refused to grant the appellant a safe haven enterprise visa on the basis that the delegate was not satisfied that the appellant faced a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm upon return to Sri Lanka. On 23 January 2017, the delegate’s decision was referred to the Authority for review under Part 7AA of the Act. On the same day, the Authority wrote to the appellant informing him of the referral and provided him with a copy of its Practice Direction. In relation to the provision of new information to the Authority, the Practice Direction stated that the Authority could only consider new information (information that was not before the Department) if there were exceptional circumstances and, if the appellant wanted the Authority to consider new information, he must also provide an explanation of the matters referred to in s 473DD(b)(i) or (ii) of the Act.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 22 March 2017, the Authority affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the appellant a safe haven enterprise visa.Authority’s decision At the commencement of its reasons, the Authority considered whether it was permitted, under s 473DD of the Act, to have regard to the materials submitted by the appellant on 17 February and 14 March 2017. As the Authority’s decision on that question is central to the appeal, it is convenient to reproduce the Authority’s reasons in full:Information before the Authority3. I have had regard to the material referred by the Secretary under s.473CB of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).4. On 17 February 2017 the Authority received a submission from the applicant's representative. The submission in part comprises argument that responds to issues arising from the delegate's assessment, which I consider does not constitute new information.5. The representative has also provided new information that was not before the delegate. He has submitted a letter, dated 20 December 2016, from the applicant's wife discussing her situation in Sri Lanka, which reiterates claims already made by the applicant. The representative has also provided new country information and referred to country information in the submission that was not before the delegate. The representative's submission also states that if the applicant returns to Sri Lanka he 'will continue to live in extreme debt ... '.6. The Authority must not consider any new information from an applicant unless satisfied exceptional circumstances justify considering the new information and the new information was not and could not have been provided to the Minister, or is credible personal information which was not previously known and had it been known may have affected the consideration of the applicant's claims.7. The letter dated 20 December 2016 pre-dates the delegate's decision and there are no reasons given as to why this information could not have been provided to the delegate or why it may be considered credible personal information. In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that this letter could not have been provided before the delegate's decision was made. Nor am I satisfied the new information is credible personal information.8. The country information referred to or provided that was not before the delegate all pre-dates the delegate's decision and there are no reasons given as to why this information could not have been provided to the delegate or why it may be considered credible personal information. In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that this information could not have been provided before the delegate's decision was made. Nor am I satisfied the new information is credible personal information.9. In his submission, the representative indicates that if the applicant returns to Sri Lanka he will continue to live in 'extreme debt ... '. In reviewing the referred materials, I note the applicant made no such claim in his SHEV application or during his SHEV interview and as such I consider this to be a new claim. There is no further information provided by the representative explaining this assertion and no reasons as to why this this (sic) information was not previously raised. In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that this information could not have been provided before the delegate's decision was made. Nor am I satisfied the new information is credible personal information.10. I have obtained new information, specifically information on the treatment of Sri Lankans of Tamil ethnicity and citizens who have departed Sri Lanka illegally and sought asylum abroad (information not specifically about the applicants (sic) but about a class of persons of which the applicants (sic) are a member) from the most recent Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) country report for Sri Lanka which was published on 24 January 2017. The delegate relied on the 18 December 2015 DFAT report for Sri Lanka which the 24 January 2017 report updates. I am satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering this new information.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Fourth, even if there was a failure in the application of s 473DD(b)(ii), the information was not sufficiently material to form the basis for a finding of jurisdictional error. In relation to the letter from the appellant’s wife, the Minister reiterated that its contents did not raise any new claims. In relation to the country information, the Minister argued that the Authority had relied on more current country information in the form of a DFAT report.Consideration of appealSome general matters Section 473DC(2) of the Act stipulates that the Authority does not have a duty to get, request or accept any new information whether the Authority is requested to do so by an applicant or by any other person, or in any other circumstances. Notwithstanding that section, and as noted earlier, on 23 January 2017 the Authority wrote to the appellant and provided him with a copy of its Practice Direction. In relation to the provision of new information to the Authority, the Practice Direction stated that the Authority could only consider new information if there are exceptional circumstances and instructed the appellant that, if he wished the Authority to consider new information, he must also provide an explanation of the matters referred to in s 473DD(b)(i) or (ii). Section 473DD of the Act places a statutory limitation on the Authority’s ability to consider new information in making its decision under Part 7AA. The section provides as follows:Considering new information in exceptional circumstancesFor the purposes of making a decision in relation to a fast track reviewable decision, the Immigration Assessment Authority must not consider any new information unless:(a)the Authority is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information; and(b)the referred applicant satisfies the Authority that, in relation to any new information given, or proposed to be given, to the Authority by the referred applicant, the new information:(i)was not, and could not have been, provided to the Minister before the Minister made the decision under section 65; or(ii)is credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant’s claims. As is made clear by the section, the Authority must not consider new information unless satisfied of the matter in s 473DD(a) and one of the two matters stated in s 473DD(b): Plaintiff M174/2016 at [31] per Gageler, Keane and Nettle JJ, at [78] per Gordon J and at [100] per Edelman J; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 (2017) 257 FCR 111 (BBS16) at [102]; AQU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 162 ALD 442 at [13]. In the present case, the Authority did not consider limb (a) of s 473DD (whether it was satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information) with respect to either category of new information. The primary judge’s contrary finding at [15] (in relation to the letter from the appellant’s wife) had no basis and was erroneous. It is not an error for the Authority to confine its consideration to limb (b) of s 473DD if it comes to the view that neither of the two matters stated in that limb are satisfied (AUH17 at [33]) (whereas the Authority may err if it confines its consideration to limb (a) of s 473DD without considering the matters referred to in limb (b), for the reasons explained in BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 254 FCR 221, which reasons were approved and followed in BBS16 at [102]-[112]). In any case, the result in the present case is that there was no finding by the Authority on limb (a).