BHM17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BHM17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1396

Appeal from: BHM17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3452
File number: NSD 2342 of 2018
Judge: O'BRYAN J
Date of judgment: 30 August 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) affirmed decision of delegate refusing application for safe haven enterprise visa – whether IAA erred in finding untranslated French document attached to appellant’s submission did not meet criteria in section 473DD(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether any such error by IAA was material to its decision – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 473DD(b)(i), 473DD(b)(ii)
Cases cited:

AQU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 162 ALD 442

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 359 ALR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 (2017) 257 FCR 111

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 163 ALD 38

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 353 ALR 600

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476

Date of hearing: 16 May 2019
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 42
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr G Foster
Solicitor for the Appellant: Sentil Solicitor & Barrister
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr M Hosking
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 2342 of 2018
BETWEEN:

BHM17

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

O'BRYAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

30 AUGUST 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

O’BRYAN J:

Introduction

  1. By notice of appeal filed on 18 December 2018, the appellant appeals from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 20 November 2018 in BHM17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3452. The appeal is brought under s 24 of the Federal Court of Australia Act1976 (Cth).

  2. The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. In 1997, when the appellant was about seven years old, his family departed Sri Lanka and travelled to India. Between 1997 and 2012, the appellant resided in refugee camps in India. In 2012, the appellant departed India and travelled to Australia. The appellant arrived in Australia in November 2012 as an unauthorised maritime arrival. On 14 January 2016, the Minister notified the appellant that the statutory bar in s 46A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) had been lifted and invited the appellant to apply for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa, which the appellant did on 21 March…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1396
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of BHM17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the court was called upon to review the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) affirming the delegate's refusal of the appellant's application for a safe haven enterprise visa. The primary issue before the court was whether the IAA erred in finding that the untranslated French document attached to the appellant's submission did not meet the criteria under section 473DD(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), and if such an error was material to the IAA's decision.

The court found that the IAA had incorrectly concluded that the appellant had not provided any explanation as to why the new information was not and could not have been provided to the delegate. In fact, the appellant had provided such an explanation through emails and his submission, indicating that he did not have the French document in his possession as of the date of the delegate's decision. However, the court held that this error was not material to the IAA's decision, as the IAA was not satisfied that the appellant faced a real chance of harm from Sri Lankan authorities due to imputed links with the LTTE. Consequently, the primary judge was correct in dismissing the application for review.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant, a Sri Lankan citizen of Tamil ethnicity, originally resided in the Vanni district in Sri Lanka's north. His family, including his parents and relatives, were associated with the LTTE, with some being forced to work for them. In 1997, the appellant and his family illegally left Sri Lanka by boat and traveled to India, where they stayed in refugee camps until 2012. In 2007, the appellant's maternal uncle was abducted in Sri Lanka and presumed dead. The appellant's brother-in-law, Yogaraja, was accused by the Indian police of being an LTTE member, arrested, and later acquitted by the Madras High Court. The appellant applied for a safe haven enterprise visa, which was refused by a delegate. The Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) affirmed the delegate's decision, leading to the appellant's appeal.

The matter began when the appellant applied for a safe haven enterprise visa, which was refused by a delegate. The appellant appealed this decision to the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA). The IAA affirmed the delegate's decision, prompting the appellant to further appeal to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissed the appeal, leading to the appellant's subsequent appeal to a higher court.

Decision

Reasons for decision

For the reasons that follow, I find that the appeal should be dismissed.Decision of the Authority The Authority summarised the appellant’s claims as follows (at [8] of its reasons): • The applicant lived originally in the Vanni district in Sri Lanka's north. Many of his relatives joined the LTTE. His father was forced to join the LTTE, but as he was not willing to take up military training, he was forced to work for the LTTE. His mother was also forced to work for the LTTE.• In 1997 when he was aged around seven, the applicant and his family left Sri Lanka illegally by boat and travelled to India. They were held initially at Mandapam Ceylon Refugee Camp in Tamil Nadu and three years later were moved to Valavanthan Kottai Camp.• In 2007 the applicant's maternal uncle was abducted in Sri Lanka in a white van and has not been seen since.• The applicant's brother-in-law, Yogaraja, who was also in India, was accused by the Q Branch of the Indian police to be a member of the LTTE. Yogaraja was arrested and then acquitted by the Madras High Court. Authorities in Sri Lanka may be aware of the applicant's connection with Yogaraja because although it is not widely known, Q Branch exchanges information with Sri Lankan authorities. The Authority accepted that the appellant is a Sri Lankan citizen of Tamil ethnicity and that he resided in a refugee camp in India from 1997 to 2012 (at [11] of its reasons). The Authority accepted that the appellant’s maternal uncle may have disappeared in 2007 and is presumed dead but did not accept that the appellant now, some 10 years later, faces a real chance of harm as a result (at [13] of its reasons). The Authority accepted that the appellant originates from an area of Sri Lanka previously controlled by the LTTE, was displaced from his home area during Sri Lanka’s civil conflict and that he experienced personal upheaval. The Authority also accepted that the appellant’s parents were under pressure to perform work for the LTTE (at [14] of its reasons). However, the Authority recorded that, at the protection visa interview, the appellant had clarified that while his parents were under pressure from the LTTE to work for them, his parents did not actually do so. It was the pressure that was the catalyst for the family’s departure from Sri Lanka to India. On that basis, the Authority found that the appellant’s parents did not work for the LTTE, were not associated with the LTTE and there was no evidence that they were imputed to have worked for or been associated with the LTTE (at [16] of its reasons). In relation to the appellant’s claims concerning his brother in law, Yogaraja, the Authority was not satisfied that Sri Lankan authorities would impute the appellant with an LTTE profile or links by association with his brother in law given his acquittal of charges by the Madras High Court (at [19] of its reasons). The Authority concluded that the available evidence gives no indication that the appellant has any links to the LTTE and it was not satisfied that the appellant has any imputed LTTE links through family members to the extent that his profile would fall within any of the categories that the country information suggests would make him a potential person of interest. For that reason, the Authority considered that the appellant did not face a real chance of harm from Sri Lankan authorities due to any imputed links to the LTTE (at [21] of its reasons).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

For the reasons discussed below, in my view the appellant had provided an explanation in relation to the matters raised by s 473DD(b)(i), but not (ii). The explanation may not have satisfied the Authority as to those matters, but the Authority was wrong to proceed on the basis that the appellant had not provided any explanation. However, as discussed below, I do not consider that that error was material to the outcome and for that reason I do not consider that the Authority’s decision involved jurisdictional error. On that basis, the primary judge was correct to dismiss the application for review.Consideration of the appeal Section 473DC(2) of the Act stipulates that the Authority does not have a duty to get, request or accept any new information whether the Authority is requested to do so by an applicant or by any other person, or in any other circumstances. Notwithstanding that section, acting in accordance with its Practice Direction, the Authority informed the appellant that he may provide a written submission. The Practice Direction also advised the appellant that the Authority could only consider new information (information that was not before the Department) in very limited circumstances as set out in s 473DD, but if the appellant wanted to give the Authority new information, he must also provide an explanation of the matters referred to in s 473DD(b)(i) or (ii). As set out above, on 16 February 2017 the appellant provided a submission to the Authority which included new information, and specifically the French document. Having invited the submission, the Authority was required to consider whether to take the submission and attached new information into account, and for that purpose it was required to comply with s 473DD. It was common ground that the Authority may not consider new information unless satisfied of the matter in s 473DD(a) and one of the two matters stated in s 473DD(b): Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 353 ALR 600 at [31] per Gageler, Keane and Nettle JJ, [78] per Gordon J and [100] per Edelman J; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 (2017) 257 FCR 111 at [102]; AQU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 162 ALD 442 at [13]. As noted earlier, the Authority concluded (at [6]) that it was not satisfied of either of the limbs of s 473DD(b) in relation to the French document because that document pre-dated the delegate’s decision and the appellant had not provided any explanation as to why the new information was not and could not have been provided to the delegate, or why it may be regarded as credible personal information that was not known, and had it been known may have affected the consideration of the appellant’s claims. In my view, the Authority’s conclusion that the appellant had not provided any explanation as to why the new information was not and could not have been provided to the delegate (being the consideration referred to in s 473DD(b)(i) of the Act) was wrong. I accept the appellant’s submission that he had provided an explanation by the combined effect of the emails sent to the Authority on 7 February 2017 and the submission made on 16 February 2017. The clear inference to be drawn from the emails and submission is that, as at 7 February 2017 (and therefore as at the date of the delegate’s decision on 12 January 2017), the appellant did not have the French document in his possession and was therefore unable to provide it to the delegate. Indeed, the Authority acknowledged this clear inference when, in its letter to the appellant sent later the same day as the emails, the Authority asked the appellant when he expected to receive the documents referred to in his emails.