FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BHM17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1396
Appeal from: BHM17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3452 File number: NSD 2342 of 2018 Judge: O'BRYAN J Date of judgment: 30 August 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) affirmed decision of delegate refusing application for safe haven enterprise visa – whether IAA erred in finding untranslated French document attached to appellant’s submission did not meet criteria in section 473DD(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether any such error by IAA was material to its decision – appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 473DD(b)(i), 473DD(b)(ii) Cases cited: AQU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 162 ALD 442
Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 359 ALR 1
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 (2017) 257 FCR 111
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 163 ALD 38
Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 353 ALR 600
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476
Date of hearing: 16 May 2019 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 42 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr G Foster Solicitor for the Appellant: Sentil Solicitor & Barrister Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr M Hosking Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 2342 of 2018 BETWEEN: BHM17
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
O'BRYAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
30 AUGUST 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
O’BRYAN J:
Introduction
By notice of appeal filed on 18 December 2018, the appellant appeals from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 20 November 2018 in BHM17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3452. The appeal is brought under s 24 of the Federal Court of Australia Act1976 (Cth).
The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. In 1997, when the appellant was about seven years old, his family departed Sri Lanka and travelled to India. Between 1997 and 2012, the appellant resided in refugee camps in India. In 2012, the appellant departed India and travelled to Australia. The appellant arrived in Australia in November 2012 as an unauthorised maritime arrival. On 14 January 2016, the Minister notified the appellant that the statutory bar in s 46A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) had been lifted and invited the appellant to apply for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa, which the appellant did on 21 March…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 1396
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the IAA had incorrectly concluded that the appellant had not provided any explanation as to why the new information was not and could not have been provided to the delegate. In fact, the appellant had provided such an explanation through emails and his submission, indicating that he did not have the French document in his possession as of the date of the delegate's decision. However, the court held that this error was not material to the IAA's decision, as the IAA was not satisfied that the appellant faced a real chance of harm from Sri Lankan authorities due to imputed links with the LTTE. Consequently, the primary judge was correct in dismissing the application for review.
The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter began when the appellant applied for a safe haven enterprise visa, which was refused by a delegate. The appellant appealed this decision to the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA). The IAA affirmed the delegate's decision, prompting the appellant to further appeal to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissed the appeal, leading to the appellant's subsequent appeal to a higher court.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
For the reasons discussed below, in my view the appellant had provided an explanation in relation to the matters raised by s 473DD(b)(i), but not (ii). The explanation may not have satisfied the Authority as to those matters, but the Authority was wrong to proceed on the basis that the appellant had not provided any explanation. However, as discussed below, I do not consider that that error was material to the outcome and for that reason I do not consider that the Authority’s decision involved jurisdictional error. On that basis, the primary judge was correct to dismiss the application for review.Consideration of the appeal Section 473DC(2) of the Act stipulates that the Authority does not have a duty to get, request or accept any new information whether the Authority is requested to do so by an applicant or by any other person, or in any other circumstances. Notwithstanding that section, acting in accordance with its Practice Direction, the Authority informed the appellant that he may provide a written submission. The Practice Direction also advised the appellant that the Authority could only consider new information (information that was not before the Department) in very limited circumstances as set out in s 473DD, but if the appellant wanted to give the Authority new information, he must also provide an explanation of the matters referred to in s 473DD(b)(i) or (ii). As set out above, on 16 February 2017 the appellant provided a submission to the Authority which included new information, and specifically the French document. Having invited the submission, the Authority was required to consider whether to take the submission and attached new information into account, and for that purpose it was required to comply with s 473DD. It was common ground that the Authority may not consider new information unless satisfied of the matter in s 473DD(a) and one of the two matters stated in s 473DD(b): Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 353 ALR 600 at [31] per Gageler, Keane and Nettle JJ, [78] per Gordon J and [100] per Edelman J; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 (2017) 257 FCR 111 at [102]; AQU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 162 ALD 442 at [13]. As noted earlier, the Authority concluded (at [6]) that it was not satisfied of either of the limbs of s 473DD(b) in relation to the French document because that document pre-dated the delegate’s decision and the appellant had not provided any explanation as to why the new information was not and could not have been provided to the delegate, or why it may be regarded as credible personal information that was not known, and had it been known may have affected the consideration of the appellant’s claims. In my view, the Authority’s conclusion that the appellant had not provided any explanation as to why the new information was not and could not have been provided to the delegate (being the consideration referred to in s 473DD(b)(i) of the Act) was wrong. I accept the appellant’s submission that he had provided an explanation by the combined effect of the emails sent to the Authority on 7 February 2017 and the submission made on 16 February 2017. The clear inference to be drawn from the emails and submission is that, as at 7 February 2017 (and therefore as at the date of the delegate’s decision on 12 January 2017), the appellant did not have the French document in his possession and was therefore unable to provide it to the delegate. Indeed, the Authority acknowledged this clear inference when, in its letter to the appellant sent later the same day as the emails, the Authority asked the appellant when he expected to receive the documents referred to in his emails.