FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BTA18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1272
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- Case
- [2023] FCA 1272
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the appeals should be allowed. The court found that the primary judge erred in not recognising that the IAA misconceived its task under section 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The IAA had a duty to consider the new information and to determine whether it was credible personal information that could not have been provided to the Minister before the decision was made. The court also found that the primary judge erred in finding that there was only one fast-track decision referred to the IAA for review and that BTB18 did not make his own protection claim. The IAA should have considered BTB18’s protection claim separately from BTA18’s claim. The court concluded that the IAA’s failure to do so was a jurisdictional error.
The court set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia and allowed the appeals. The decisions of the IAA in relation to BTA18 and BTB18 were quashed, and their applications were remitted to the IAA, differently constituted, to be re-determined according to law. The Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs was ordered to pay the costs of the appellants.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The name of the First Respondent be changed to “Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs”.
2. Each of BTA18 and BTB18 be given leave to rely on the amended notice of appeal in the form attached to their respective interlocutory applications dated 28 and 29 July 2023.
3. The appeal by BTA18 be allowed. Orders 2 and 4 of the orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (as it was then known) (FCC) made on 18 September 2020 be set aside, and in lieu thereof the Court orders that:
(a) the decision of the Second Respondent in relation to BTA18 dated 16 March 2018 be quashed;
(b) the referred application in relation to BTA18 be remitted to the Second Respondent, differently constituted, to be re-determined according to law; and
(c) the First Respondent pay BTA18’s costs of and incidental to the application before the FCC and of and incidental to his appeal, to be taxed by a Registrar in default of agreement.
4. The appeal by BTB18 be allowed. Orders 3 and 5 of the orders of the FCC made on 18 September 2020 be set aside, and in lieu thereof the Court orders that:
(a) the decision of the Second Respondent in relation to BTB18 dated 16 March 2018 be quashed;
(b) the referred application in relation to BTB18 be remitted to the Second Respondent, differently constituted, to be re-determined according to law; and
(c) the First Respondent pay BTB18’s costs of and incidental to the application before the FCC and of and incidental to his appeal, to be taxed by a Registrar in default of agreement.
5. The parties have liberty to apply.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister contends that Ground 2 of BTA18’s appeal and Ground 6 of BTB18’s appeal are no more than an impermissible attempt at merits review and cannot succeed.Consideration This Court has said many times that adverse credibility findings may involve jurisdictional error on recognised grounds such as legal unreasonableness or reaching a finding without a logical, rational or probative basis: see, for example, CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146; 253 FCR 496 at [38] (McKerracher, Griffiths and Rangiah JJ); ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174; 250 FCR 109 at [83(d)] (Griffiths, Perry and Bromwich JJ); DAO16 at [30]; DYS16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 33; 260 FCR 260 at [20] (Tracey, Murphy and Kerr JJ); BZD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 94; 263 FCR 292 at [33]-[34] (Perram, Perry and O’Callaghan JJ); BFH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCAFC 54 at [34] (Murphy and O’Bryan JJ). The relevant principles in relation to legal unreasonableness were usefully summarised in DAO16 (at [30]). The Full Court explained:(1) While findings as to credit are generally matters for the administrative decision maker, this does not mean that such findings as to credit are beyond scrutiny on judicial review: CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146 (CQG15) at [37]-[38] (the Court). The question of whether a credibility finding is tainted by jurisdictional error is a case specific inquiry, and is not assessed by reference to fixed categories or formulae (ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174; (2016) 250 FCR 109 (ARG15) at [83](b)). In each case it is necessary to analyse in detail what the decision-maker has decided: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; (2013) 212 FCR 99 (SZRKT) at [77] (Robertson J).(2) Without derogating from the case specific nature of the inquiry, adverse credibility findings may involve jurisdictional error on recognised grounds such as legal unreasonableness or reaching a finding without a logical, rational or probative basis (ARG15 at [83](d)). In this regard, Crennan and Bell JJ explained in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611 (SZMDS) that:135. … A decision might be said to be illogical or irrational if only one conclusion is open on the evidence, and the decision maker does not come to that conclusion, or if the decision to which the decision maker came was simply not open on the evidence or if there is no logical connection between the evidence and the inferences or conclusions drawn.(Emphasis added)(3) By way of example, in SZRKT at [78], Robertson J considered that jurisdictional error may be established where a finding on credit on an objectively minor matter of fact constitutes the basis on which the decision-maker rejects the entirety of an applicant’s evidence and claims. Furthermore, as Flick J explained in SZVAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1089; (2015) 233 FCR 451 (SZVAP) at [22] (in a passage on which the appellant particularly relied), “[u]nwarranted assumptions by a Tribunal as to matters relevant to the formation of a view on the credibility of a corroborative witness may cause the Tribunal to disbelieve and disregard that evidence and may constitute a failure duly to consider the question raised by the material put before it: WAGO of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 194 ALR 676 at [54].” Equally jurisdictional error may be established by “a process of reasoning which damns a man’s credibility by reference, materially, to a false factual premise concerning a critical document”: SZLGP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 1470; (2009) 181 FCR 113 at [37].(4) Findings or reasoning along the way to reaching a conclusion by the decision-maker that are illogical or irrational may establish jurisdictional error (SZMDS at [132] (Crennan and Bell JJ)). In this regard, with respect to the significance of an illogical or irrational finding as to credit to the administrative decision necessary to establish jurisdictional error, Wigney J explained in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN [2016] FCA 516 (in a passage approved in CQG15 at [60]) that:56 An irrational or illogical finding, or irrational or illogical reasoning leading to a finding, by the Tribunal that the review applicant was not a credible or honest witness may in some circumstances lead to a finding of jurisdictional error. That would particularly be the case where the adverse credibility finding was critical to the Tribunal’s decision that it was not satisfied that the applicant met the criteria for the grant of a visa. Whilst it is frequently said that findings as to credit are entirely matters for the Tribunal, such findings do not shield the Tribunal’s decision-making processes from scrutiny…(citations omitted)(5) A high degree of caution must, however, be exercised before finding that adverse findings as to credit expose jurisdictional error in order to ensure that the Court does not embark impermissibly upon merits review: SZMDS at [96]; SZVAP at [14]-[15]. As such, to establish jurisdictional error based on illogical or irrational findings of fact or reasoning, “extreme” illogicality must be demonstrated “measured against the standard that it is not enough for the question of fact to be one on which reasonable minds may come to different conclusions” (SZRKT at [148]; see also SZMDS at [135] and CQG15 at [60]). Thus, “[e]ven emphatic disagreement with the Tribunal’s reasoning would not be sufficient to make out illogicality”: CQG15 at [61].