BTA18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BTA18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1272

Appeal from: BTA18 and Anor v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCCA 2626
File number(s): NSD 1143 of 2020
NSD 1142 of 2020
Judgment of: MURPHY J
Date of judgment: 25 October 2023
Catchwords: MIGRATION – two appeals from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing applications for judicial review – principles relevant to leave to raise a ground for the first time on appeal – whether the Immigration Assessment Authority engaged in irrational reasoning that amounted to legal unreasonableness – whether the primary judge erred in failing to find that the Authority misconceived its task under s 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the primary judge erred in finding that there was only one fast track decision referred to the Authority for review and that the second appellant did not make his own protection claim – whether the Authority erred by not separately considering the two appellants’ protection claims – appeals allowed.
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 5AA, 5H, 35A, 36, 46A, 473BB, 473CA, 473CC, 473DD
Cases cited:

AAM15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 804; 231 FCR 452

Ali v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 140

ALJ18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 491

Applicant NAFF of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 221 CLR 1

ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174; 250 FCR 109

ARK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 825

ASB17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 38; 268 FCR 271

AUS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] HCA 37

AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 133; 361 ALR 227

AWU16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCA 513

AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 89; 261 FCR 503

Basra v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 422

BFH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCAFC 54

BJK17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCAFC 171; 272 FCR 15

BOS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCA 75; 170 ALD 1

BZD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 94; 263 FCR 292

CAQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 203

CFC16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1003

CGA15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 46; 268 FCR 362

Chan v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1323

CHFI6 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 192; (2017) 257 FCR 148

Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1

CPE15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 591

CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 1272
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, BTA18 and BTB18 appealed against the decisions of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which dismissed their applications for judicial review of the decisions of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA). The appellants sought review of the IAA’s refusal to consider new information in relation to their applications for protection visas. The primary judge dismissed their applications, holding that the IAA’s failure to consider the new information did not amount to jurisdictional error or legal unreasonableness. The appellants sought to rely on new grounds of appeal for the first time on appeal. The central issue before the court was whether the primary judge erred in not finding that the IAA engaged in irrational reasoning that amounted to legal unreasonableness. Additionally, the court had to determine whether the primary judge erred in finding that there was only one fast-track decision referred to the IAA for review and that BTB18 did not make his own protection claim.

The court held that the appeals should be allowed. The court found that the primary judge erred in not recognising that the IAA misconceived its task under section 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The IAA had a duty to consider the new information and to determine whether it was credible personal information that could not have been provided to the Minister before the decision was made. The court also found that the primary judge erred in finding that there was only one fast-track decision referred to the IAA for review and that BTB18 did not make his own protection claim. The IAA should have considered BTB18’s protection claim separately from BTA18’s claim. The court concluded that the IAA’s failure to do so was a jurisdictional error.

The court set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia and allowed the appeals. The decisions of the IAA in relation to BTA18 and BTB18 were quashed, and their applications were remitted to the IAA, differently constituted, to be re-determined according to law. The Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs was ordered to pay the costs of the appellants.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The name of the First Respondent be changed to “Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs”.

2. Each of BTA18 and BTB18 be given leave to rely on the amended notice of appeal in the form attached to their respective interlocutory applications dated 28 and 29 July 2023.

3. The appeal by BTA18 be allowed. Orders 2 and 4 of the orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (as it was then known) (FCC) made on 18 September 2020 be set aside, and in lieu thereof the Court orders that:

(a) the decision of the Second Respondent in relation to BTA18 dated 16 March 2018 be quashed;

(b) the referred application in relation to BTA18 be remitted to the Second Respondent, differently constituted, to be re-determined according to law; and

(c) the First Respondent pay BTA18’s costs of and incidental to the application before the FCC and of and incidental to his appeal, to be taxed by a Registrar in default of agreement.

4. The appeal by BTB18 be allowed. Orders 3 and 5 of the orders of the FCC made on 18 September 2020 be set aside, and in lieu thereof the Court orders that:

(a) the decision of the Second Respondent in relation to BTB18 dated 16 March 2018 be quashed;

(b) the referred application in relation to BTB18 be remitted to the Second Respondent, differently constituted, to be re-determined according to law; and

(c) the First Respondent pay BTB18’s costs of and incidental to the application before the FCC and of and incidental to his appeal, to be taxed by a Registrar in default of agreement.

5. The parties have liberty to apply.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons I explain, it is appropriate to allow both appeals.THE FACTS In January 2013, BTA18 was interviewed by an officer of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship and his responses recorded in a document titled “Irregular Maritime Arrival Entry Interview” (the arrival interview). Arriving in Australia as they did, each of the appellants was an “unlawful maritime arrival” as that term is defined in the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) and therefore unable to validly apply for any visa unless the Minister exercised the discretion under s 46A of the Act to permit them to do so.The first visa application On 13 September 2013 BTA18 made an application for a protection visa for himself and for BTB18 as a member of the same family unit. The application was accompanied by a Statement of Claims dated 5 September 2013 (the 2013 statement) in which BTA18 detailed his claims that he faced a real chance of suffering serious harm if returned to Sri Lanka because he would be imputed to have an affiliation with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). BTA18 did not state that BTB18 also faced a real chance of suffering serious harm in Sri Lanka for that reason, but did say the following:I fear for the future of my son. As a TAMIL he is discriminated against and doesn’t have a good future. There is no support for TAMIL people and the government treats us badly. That visa application was invalid because the appellants were unable to validly apply for any visa unless the Minister exercised the discretion under the Act to permit them to do so.The second visa application By letters dated 29 June 2015 and 8 July 2015 the Department informed the appellants that the Minister had exercised his discretion under s 46A(2) of the Act to lift the bar which otherwise prevented them from validly applying for a protection visa. The letters invited the appellants to lodge a valid application for a Temporary Protection (subclass 785) visa or a Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visa. On 21 August 2015 BTA18 made an application for a Safe Haven Enterprise visa, a type of protection visa, for himself and for BTB18 as a member of the same family unit, doing so through a registered migration agent. The application forms lodged with the Department on his behalf had several relevant parts. BTA18 completed and lodged a Part B (Form 790B) on 21 August 2015, which carried the heading “Persons included in this application and family composition”. Under the heading “Details of persons included in this application” he included BTB18’s details. A note on that page of the form states: “Each applicant who is raising their own claims for protection must complete Questions 89 to 97 when they complete Part C”. BTA18 included BTB18’s details and indicated by ticking the relevant boxes that BTB18 was not raising his own claims for protection, but that BTA18 was. The form included a declaration signed by both BTA18 and BTB18 dated 6 August 2015 to the effect that the information set out in Part B was true and correct.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 21 March 2017, the appellants appealed that judgment to this Court. On 29 November 2017, the Full Court upheld the appeal and made orders to remit the appellants’ visa applications to the Authority for re-determination according to law: CHFI6 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 192; (2017) 257 FCR 148 (Gilmour, Robertson and Kerr JJ). The 2018 Authority decision The Authority reconsidered the appellants’ visa applications on remittal. On 16 March 2018 the Authority again declined to consider the new information, albeit for different reasons. The Authority again affirmed the decision of the delegate not to grant visas to the appellants.The second application for judicial review On 6 April 2018, the appellants applied to the FCC for judicial review of the 2018 Authority decision. On 18 September 2020 the primary judge dismissed both applications for review.THE APPEALS TO THIS COURT On 16 October 2020 each of BTA18 and BTB18 filed notices of appeal to this Court. By interlocutory application dated 28 and 29 July 2023 they each seek leave to amend their notices of appeal. BTA18 seeks leave to withdraw the existing grounds and instead to allege two grounds, being that:(1)the primary judge erred (at [70]) in failing to find that the Authority misconstrued s 473DD(b)(ii) of the Act when deciding whether to consider the new information; and (2)in reasoning to a conclusion that the appellant had fabricated his central claim to have been abducted in 2008 at [52], the Authority made findings that were unsupported by or misconstrued, evidence such that the decision was seriously lacking in foundation, rationality, and logical coherence in a way that was legally unreasonable. BTA18 did not advance Ground 2 before the FCC and he requires leave before he may do so for the first time on appeal. The Minister opposes a grant of leave. BTB18 seeks leave to amend his notice of appeal to advance two further grounds, so that it advances the following seven grounds. He alleges that the primary judge erred:(1)in failing to find that the Authority failed to take account of a mandatory relevant consideration in the purported application of the criterion in s 473DD(a) of the Act;(1A)in finding that there is no claim for protection by BTB18 raised clearly or squarely on the material before the Authority;(2)in failing to find that the Authority made an error of law in that it misconstrued the concept of “credible personal information” under s 473DD(b)(ii) of the Act;(3)in failing to find that the Authority made an error of law in that it misconstrued the concept of information that “could not have been” provided to the Minister before the Minister made the decision under s 65 for the purposes of s 473DD(b)(i) of the Act;(4)in failing to find that the Authority made a jurisdictional error in the manner in which it determined its obligations under s 473CC of the Act by failing to separately consider his claim from that of BTA18;(5)at [70] in failing to find that the Authority misconstrued s 473DD(b)(ii) of the Act when deciding whether to consider the new information;(6)in reasoning to a conclusion that BTA18 had fabricated his central claim to have been abducted in 2008 at [52], the Authority made findings that were unsupported by or misconstrued, evidence such that the decision was seriously lacking in foundation, irrationality, and logical coherence in a way that was legally unreasonable.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister contends that Ground 2 of BTA18’s appeal and Ground 6 of BTB18’s appeal are no more than an impermissible attempt at merits review and cannot succeed.Consideration This Court has said many times that adverse credibility findings may involve jurisdictional error on recognised grounds such as legal unreasonableness or reaching a finding without a logical, rational or probative basis: see, for example, CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146; 253 FCR 496 at [38] (McKerracher, Griffiths and Rangiah JJ); ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174; 250 FCR 109 at [83(d)] (Griffiths, Perry and Bromwich JJ); DAO16 at [30]; DYS16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 33; 260 FCR 260 at [20] (Tracey, Murphy and Kerr JJ); BZD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 94; 263 FCR 292 at [33]-[34] (Perram, Perry and O’Callaghan JJ); BFH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCAFC 54 at [34] (Murphy and O’Bryan JJ). The relevant principles in relation to legal unreasonableness were usefully summarised in DAO16 (at [30]). The Full Court explained:(1) While findings as to credit are generally matters for the administrative decision maker, this does not mean that such findings as to credit are beyond scrutiny on judicial review: CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146 (CQG15) at [37]-[38] (the Court). The question of whether a credibility finding is tainted by jurisdictional error is a case specific inquiry, and is not assessed by reference to fixed categories or formulae (ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174; (2016) 250 FCR 109 (ARG15) at [83](b)). In each case it is necessary to analyse in detail what the decision-maker has decided: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; (2013) 212 FCR 99 (SZRKT) at [77] (Robertson J).(2) Without derogating from the case specific nature of the inquiry, adverse credibility findings may involve jurisdictional error on recognised grounds such as legal unreasonableness or reaching a finding without a logical, rational or probative basis (ARG15 at [83](d)). In this regard, Crennan and Bell JJ explained in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611 (SZMDS) that:135. … A decision might be said to be illogical or irrational if only one conclusion is open on the evidence, and the decision maker does not come to that conclusion, or if the decision to which the decision maker came was simply not open on the evidence or if there is no logical connection between the evidence and the inferences or conclusions drawn.(Emphasis added)(3) By way of example, in SZRKT at [78], Robertson J considered that jurisdictional error may be established where a finding on credit on an objectively minor matter of fact constitutes the basis on which the decision-maker rejects the entirety of an applicant’s evidence and claims. Furthermore, as Flick J explained in SZVAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1089; (2015) 233 FCR 451 (SZVAP) at [22] (in a passage on which the appellant particularly relied), “[u]nwarranted assumptions by a Tribunal as to matters relevant to the formation of a view on the credibility of a corroborative witness may cause the Tribunal to disbelieve and disregard that evidence and may constitute a failure duly to consider the question raised by the material put before it: WAGO of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 194 ALR 676 at [54].” Equally jurisdictional error may be established by “a process of reasoning which damns a man’s credibility by reference, materially, to a false factual premise concerning a critical document”: SZLGP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 1470; (2009) 181 FCR 113 at [37].(4) Findings or reasoning along the way to reaching a conclusion by the decision-maker that are illogical or irrational may establish jurisdictional error (SZMDS at [132] (Crennan and Bell JJ)). In this regard, with respect to the significance of an illogical or irrational finding as to credit to the administrative decision necessary to establish jurisdictional error, Wigney J explained in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN [2016] FCA 516 (in a passage approved in CQG15 at [60]) that:56 An irrational or illogical finding, or irrational or illogical reasoning leading to a finding, by the Tribunal that the review applicant was not a credible or honest witness may in some circumstances lead to a finding of jurisdictional error. That would particularly be the case where the adverse credibility finding was critical to the Tribunal’s decision that it was not satisfied that the applicant met the criteria for the grant of a visa. Whilst it is frequently said that findings as to credit are entirely matters for the Tribunal, such findings do not shield the Tribunal’s decision-making processes from scrutiny…(citations omitted)(5) A high degree of caution must, however, be exercised before finding that adverse findings as to credit expose jurisdictional error in order to ensure that the Court does not embark impermissibly upon merits review: SZMDS at [96]; SZVAP at [14]-[15]. As such, to establish jurisdictional error based on illogical or irrational findings of fact or reasoning, “extreme” illogicality must be demonstrated “measured against the standard that it is not enough for the question of fact to be one on which reasonable minds may come to different conclusions” (SZRKT at [148]; see also SZMDS at [135] and CQG15 at [60]). Thus, “[e]ven emphatic disagreement with the Tribunal’s reasoning would not be sufficient to make out illogicality”: CQG15 at [61].