FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
BSR18 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1072
File number(s): SYG 940 of 2018 Judgment of: JUDGE MANSINI Date of judgment: 21 October 2024 Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection visa – application for review of decision of the then Immigration Assessment Authority – failure to consider new information that was not before the delegate – whether Authority misconstrued or misapplied the test for consideration of new information pursuant to s.473DD – jurisdictional error established – application allowed. Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss. 36, 65, 473BA, 473DA, 473DB, 473DD, 473EA, 474, 476
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r.12.01
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg. 1.12
Cases cited: AUS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] HCA 37
BIJ18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 443
BTA18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1272
Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
CSR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 474
DSC22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 530
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 62 Date of last submissions: 10 September 2024 Date of hearing: 2 September 2024 Place: Sydney Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr Hodges of Hodges Legal Counsel for the Respondents: Mr Cleary Solicitor for the Respondents: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers ORDERS
SYG 940 of 2018 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: BSR18
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE MANSINI
DATE OF ORDER:
21 OCTOBER 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the Second Respondent be amended in the title of the proceeding to Administrative Review Tribunal.
2.A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority made on 8 March 2018 in file IAA17/03952.
3.A writ of mandamus issue directed to the Administrative Review Tribunal requiring it to reconsider and determine the matter according to law.
4.The First Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs fixed in the amount of $8,371.30.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Judge Mansini
IN SUMMARY
The Applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka of Tamil ethnicity who sought a protection visa on the basis of claims to fear harm due to her past involvement with a militant group, by reference to past harm she has…
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- Case
- [2024] FedCFamC2G 1072
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the statutory framework under which the Authority operated, emphasizing that the decision-making process must adhere to the requirements of section 473EA, which mandates that a written statement accompany the Authority's decision on review, detailing both the decision and the reasons for it. The Authority had noted that the applicant had provided new information about their LTTE involvement but failed to consider this information adequately. Instead, the Authority concluded that the applicant's failure to provide the information earlier meant that the test under section 473DD was not satisfied. The applicant claimed that they had not disclosed this information earlier due to instructions from their former representative, who warned them that their application would be refused on the grounds that they were a "dangerous terrorist".
The court found that the Authority's interpretation of the test for considering new information was flawed. It held that the Authority did not properly apply the principles established by the High Court in AUS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, which outline that the Authority must first determine whether the new information meets the criteria in section 473DD(b) and, if so, then consider whether there are exceptional circumstances warranting its inclusion as per section 473DD(a). The Authority's narrow interpretation and failure to consider other factors led to a jurisdictional error. Consequently, the court allowed the application for review, finding that the Authority's decision was flawed and required correction.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
By s.473EA of the Act, a decision of the Authority on Part 7AA review was required to be accompanied by a written statement which set out both “the decision” on review and “the reasons for the decision”. CONSIDERATION At the time of hearing, there was one ground of review pressed by the Applicant in the following terms: 1.The Authority committed jurisdictional error by incorrectly applying the test for the consideration of new information pursuant to s 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).PARTICULARSa.At paragraph 17, the Authority noted that the applicant had provided what it considered to be 'new information' about her involvement with the L TTE in a statement dated October 2017.b.The Authority noted that the applicant was given opportunities to provide any further infom1ation and considered that the applicant's failure to do so meant that the test set out in s 473DD was not satisfied.c.In her statement, the applicant explained that she had not provided this information because her former representative instructed her and warned her that the Australian government would refuse her application on the basis that she was a 'dangerous terrorist'.d.The Authority noted, at paragraph 17, that it did not accept this assertion.e.At paragraph 18, the Authority reasoned that the applicant and her parents had already disclosed that her two siblings were part of the LTTE and that they may be considered to be LTTE since they were detained in a rehabilitation camp. This finding assumes that making a claim about having imputed links to the L TTE is not different from making a claim about a deep connection to the LTTE that ranges all the way back to the age of 15.f.In addition, it should be noted that the applicant's siblings are not making a claim for protection in Australia so it does not follow that the Authority considered that the fact that the applicant had disclosed their involvement and not hers was a reason to reject the applicant’s submission that she has not provided the information out of fear that her application for protection would not be accepted. g.The Authority adopted a nan-ow interpretation of 'exceptional circumstances' and failed to consider factors other than the applicant's prior lack of disclosure.(sic.)Applicable principles The established principles have developed since the Authority’s decision in this matter, but nonetheless apply to the present case and were not contentious. The High Court of Australia in AUS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] HCA 37 (AUS17) outlined the proper approach to the assessment at s.473DD. The Authority was first to determine whether either of the limbs to s.473DD(b) were engaged and, only in the event of an affirmative engagement, may it have turned to consider whether it was satisfied that there were “exceptional circumstances” for purposes of s.473DD(a) and as to justify its consideration of the “new information”. In undertaking the assessment of whether new information was “credible personal information” for purposes of s.473DD(b)(ii), the authorities make it clear that the threshold for what is “credible” is a relatively low bar - all that was required was that the Authority reach the state of satisfaction that the new information was information which was capable of being accepted as truthful or accurate or genuine, as distinct from an assessment of whether the new information was true: CSR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 474 (CSR16) at [40]; subsequently endorsed by a majority of the Full Court in Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v BTW17 (2020) 294 FCR 150 (BTW17) at [75]-[77] and since applied in DSC22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 530 at [57]. In BTW17, at [76]-[77], the Full Court included the following explanation of the task which is apt to the present case:[76] Particularly in a scheme premised on a review “on the papers”, there is a real difficulty with the Authority undertaking some kind of substantively evaluative process at this point, and weighing the new information, the visa applicant’s explanation of why it should be considered, and the existing review material together, and then reaching some relatively definitive findings about the credibility of the visa application (which would occur in deciding if the new information were “true”). That difficulty is that the Authority is, in substance, taking into account material that is not before it on the review in determining the credibility of the visa applicant. That is neither what the legislative scheme of Pt 7AA contemplates nor what it permits. Fresh decisions on the review must be based on the review material before the Authority; they cannot be based on extraneous material, which is what “new information” is, until it is admitted. That, in our opinion, is an important reason why the approach identified by Bromberg J in CSR16 is correct. [77] Viewed in its context, as Bromberg J identified at [42], the terms of s 473DD(b)(ii) operate as a filter, which the Authority is required to apply to “new information” proposed to be presented by a visa applicant. The subsection sets a threshold, requiring a visa applicant to satisfy the Authority that new information has that character, or, if it does not have that character, that it was not and could not have been provided to the Minister or his delegate prior to the s 65 decision (s 473DD(b)(i)). In either case the Authority must still be satisfied there are “exceptional circumstances” justifying including the new information in the material to be considered by the Authority on its review. Considering s 473DD as a whole, there is no basis to suppose Parliament intended some kind of intensive and final analysis of the probative value of new information to occur within the confines of s 473DD(b)(ii). As the Full Court observed in BDY18 at [23]-[26], there is some overlap, and the factors in (b) may well inform the factors in (a).