FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
CAQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 203
Appeal from: CAQ17 & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 1807 File number: VID 792 of 2019 Judges: MORTIMER, DERRINGTON AND STEWARD JJ Date of judgment: 25 November 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court dismissing application for judicial review of decision of Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) – where IAA affirmed decision of delegate of the first respondent not to grant appellants protection visas – whether second appellant’s personal claim raised before IAA was “new information” for purposes of s 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether IAA adopted unduly narrow approach to meaning of “exceptional circumstances” in s 473DD – whether Authority must consider criteria in subss (b)(i) or (ii) of s 473DD in reaching satisfaction in relation to “exceptional circumstances” in subs (a) – appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 473DC, 473DD, Pt 7AA Cases cited: AQU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 162 ALD 442
Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1949) 78 CLR 353
BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 93 ALJR 1091
BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 254 FCR 221
CMY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1333
DNA17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 146
EHF17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1681
Foster v Minister for Customs and Justice (2000) 200 CLR 442
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CLV16 [2018] FCAFC 80; 260 FCR 482
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; 163 ALD 38
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 61
Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16; 264 CLR 217
Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 258 CLR 173
R v Connell; Ex parte The Hetton Bellbird Collieries Ltd (1944) 69 CLR 407
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 77 ALJR 1165
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Applicants S134/2002 (2003) 211 CLR 411
Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252
Date of hearing: 14 November 2019 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 130 Counsel for the Appellants: Mr E White with Mr A Aleksov Solicitor for the Appellants: Hall & Wilcox Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G T Johnson SC with Mr N D J Swan Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs ORDERS
VID…
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- Case
- [2019] FCAFC 203
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the second appellant's personal claims constituted "new information" under section 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), and whether the IAA adopted an unduly narrow approach to the meaning of "exceptional circumstances" in that section. The court considered whether the IAA was required to consider criteria in subsections (b)(i) or (ii) of section 473DD in reaching satisfaction in relation to "exceptional circumstances" in subsection (a). The court also examined whether the IAA's failure to consider the second appellant's claims was a jurisdictional error.
The court found that the second appellant did not raise any new facts or information before the IAA, and the IAA's finding that her claims constituted new information was not a jurisdictional error. Furthermore, the court held that the IAA's decision not to consider the second appellant's claims due to a lack of exceptional circumstances was not an error, as the IAA made a finding under section 473DD(b)(i) that the second appellant had not made any personal claims at the time of the decision. The court also found that even if there was an error, it was not material to the outcome of the review. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
The court ordered that the appeal be dismissed, and the first and second appellants pay the costs of the first respondent, to be fixed by way of a lump sum. The parties were required to file any agreed proposed minute of orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the first respondent's costs by 4 pm on 9 December 2019. If no agreement was reached, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the first respondent's costs would be referred to a Registrar for determination.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The first and second appellants pay the costs of the first respondent, to be fixed by way of a lump sum.
3. On or before 4 pm on 9 December 2019, the parties file any agreed proposed minute of orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the first respondent’s costs.
4. In the absence of any agreement having been reached, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the first respondent’s costs be referred to a Registrar for determination.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Section 473DE(1) is also relevant. It provides:473DE Certain new information must be given to referred applicant(1)The Immigration Assessment Authority must, in relation to a fast track reviewable decision:(a)give to the referred applicant particulars of any new information, but only if the new information:(i)has been, or is to be, considered by the Authority under section 473DD; and(ii)would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the fast track reviewable decision; and(b)explain to the referred applicant why the new information is relevant to the review; and(c)invite the referred applicant, orally or in writing, to give comments on the new information:(i) in writing; or(ii)at an interview, whether conducted in person, by telephone or in any other way.ConsiderationOperation of ss 473DC and 473DD Limited attention was paid by the parties to the manner in which ss 473DC and 473DD operated, either individually or together. As the heading to Subdivision C (“Additional information”) suggests, both provisions are concerned with further information which may be obtained and considered by the Authority. Section 473DC affords to the Authority a discretion to “get” any documents or information which were not before the Minister when the relevant decision was made and which the Authority considers may be relevant. Other than those two requirements the discretion is otherwise unconfined. However, s 473DD restricts the type of information which the Authority may “consider”. It does that by prohibiting the Authority from considering new information unless it satisfies the criteria prescribed in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of s 473DD. However, the tests are not wholly objective. Whether any piece of new information passes the test is dependent upon the Authority reaching a state of satisfaction about it. In sub-paragraph (a) the Authority must be “satisfied” that there are exceptional circumstances to justify consideration of the new information. The cumulative requirement in sub-paragraph (b) is that the Authority be “satisfied” either that the new information was not and could not have been provided to the Minister when the initial decision was made, or that it is credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the appellants’ claim. The issue on appeal is whether the Authority’s non-satisfaction that there were exceptional circumstances to justify the receipt of the submissions on behalf of the second appellant was vitiated by error. In other words, was the Authority’s lack of satisfaction as to the requirement in sub-paragraph (a) validly formed as required by the Act? In many ways, as a matter of substance, the requirements of s 473DD(a) and (b) are or are analogous to jurisdictional facts on which the discretion to consider further information is conditioned. Moreover, there is no real difference in the principles by which a Court might identify an error in the formation of a state of mind necessary for the vitiation of a subjective jurisdictional fact and those applicable to the state of satisfaction or non-satisfaction of the matters in s 473DD(a) and (b).