CAQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CAQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 203

Appeal from: CAQ17 & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 1807
File number: VID 792 of 2019
Judges: MORTIMER, DERRINGTON AND STEWARD JJ
Date of judgment: 25 November 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court dismissing application for judicial review of decision of Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) – where IAA affirmed decision of delegate of the first respondent not to grant appellants protection visas – whether second appellant’s personal claim raised before IAA was “new information” for purposes of s 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether IAA adopted unduly narrow approach to meaning of “exceptional circumstances” in s 473DD – whether Authority must consider criteria in subss (b)(i) or (ii) of s 473DD in reaching satisfaction in relation to “exceptional circumstances” in subs (a) – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 473DC, 473DD, Pt 7AA
Cases cited:

AQU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 162 ALD 442

Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1949) 78 CLR 353

BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 93 ALJR 1091

BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 254 FCR 221

CMY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1333

DNA17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 146

EHF17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1681

FBR18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCA 1620

Foster v Minister for Customs and Justice (2000) 200 CLR 442

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CLV16 [2018] FCAFC 80; 260 FCR 482

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; 163 ALD 38

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 61

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16; 264 CLR 217

Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 258 CLR 173

R v Connell; Ex parte The Hetton Bellbird Collieries Ltd (1944) 69 CLR 407

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 77 ALJR 1165

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Applicants S134/2002 (2003) 211 CLR 411

Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252

Date of hearing: 14 November 2019
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 130
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr E White with Mr A Aleksov
Solicitor for the Appellants: Hall & Wilcox Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G T Johnson SC with Mr N D J Swan
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

VID…
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Details
Case
[2019] FCAFC 203
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The five appellants, all Tamil Hindus from the Batticaloa district of Sri Lanka, sought protection visas in Australia. The first appellant, a father and husband, and the second appellant, his wife, along with their three children, arrived in Australia as unauthorised maritime arrivals in 2012 and applied for visas in 2016. The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection refused their applications, finding that the second appellant had no personal claims and was relying on the first appellant's claims. The appellants sought judicial review of the decision, arguing that the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) erred in its handling of the second appellant's claims. The IAA found that the second appellant's claims were new information, and there were no exceptional circumstances to justify their consideration.

The legal issues before the court were whether the second appellant's personal claims constituted "new information" under section 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), and whether the IAA adopted an unduly narrow approach to the meaning of "exceptional circumstances" in that section. The court considered whether the IAA was required to consider criteria in subsections (b)(i) or (ii) of section 473DD in reaching satisfaction in relation to "exceptional circumstances" in subsection (a). The court also examined whether the IAA's failure to consider the second appellant's claims was a jurisdictional error.

The court found that the second appellant did not raise any new facts or information before the IAA, and the IAA's finding that her claims constituted new information was not a jurisdictional error. Furthermore, the court held that the IAA's decision not to consider the second appellant's claims due to a lack of exceptional circumstances was not an error, as the IAA made a finding under section 473DD(b)(i) that the second appellant had not made any personal claims at the time of the decision. The court also found that even if there was an error, it was not material to the outcome of the review. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

The court ordered that the appeal be dismissed, and the first and second appellants pay the costs of the first respondent, to be fixed by way of a lump sum. The parties were required to file any agreed proposed minute of orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the first respondent's costs by 4 pm on 9 December 2019. If no agreement was reached, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the first respondent's costs would be referred to a Registrar for determination.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The first and second appellants pay the costs of the first respondent, to be fixed by way of a lump sum.

3. On or before 4 pm on 9 December 2019, the parties file any agreed proposed minute of orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the first respondent’s costs.

4. In the absence of any agreement having been reached, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the first respondent’s costs be referred to a Registrar for determination.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

There are five appellants in this matter. They were all applicants for protection visas. The father and husband in the group was the first applicant and his wife the second. Their three children were respectively the third, fourth and fifth applicants. They will be collectively referred to as the appellants. Background The appellants are all Tamil Hindus from the Batticaloa district, in the east of Sri Lanka. They arrived in Australia (on the Cocos Islands) on 4 November 2012 as unauthorised maritime arrivals. On 29 March 2016, the appellants applied for Safe Haven Enterprise (Sub-class 790) Visas. The first appellant indicated in his application form that he was raising his own claim for protection. The second appellant did not specifically indicate whether she was or not, but did indicate in the Form 790C that her story was “attached”. However, no statement or story by the second appellant was attached to the visa application. The only statement attached to the applications was the first appellant’s, which articulated his claims for protection. On 26 October 2016, the Minister’s delegate sent an email to the appellants’ legal representative inquiring as to whether the second appellant was making her own claims. It was indicated that the Department did not then have a copy of a statement from her. The legal representatives were asked to clarify whether her claims were actually those of her husband. In his statement, the first appellant had claimed that, as a result of his involvement in political activities, some men, said to be from a rival political faction, came to his home whilst he was not there, pushed their way in, held a gun to his wife’s head and threatened to kill the first appellant. By correspondence in reply on 2 November 2016, the appellants’ solicitors advised the delegate that the second appellant had made claims based on the first appellant’s statement and the problems that she suffered given his profile. It was then said that her claims “relate to the threats, harassment and treatment she received, based on her husband’s circumstances”. That was somewhat unhelpful in the context of the claim now sought to be advanced by the second appellant. On 3 November 2016, the delegate responded and sought clarification as to whether the second appellant was intending to be interviewed. There was no response to that email. There was no explanation why the migration agent for the second appellant did not respond to the delegate’s email. The first appellant was interviewed by the delegate on 7 February 2017. The appellants’ representative was also in attendance but they did not ask that the second appellant be interviewed. No correspondence or further submissions were provided to the delegate after the hearing. On 1 March 2017, the delegate refused to grant the appellants the visas which they had sought. In the light of the correspondence entered into between the delegate and the appellants’ representative, the delegate formally dealt with the matter before her on the basis that the first appellant was advancing the substantive claims and the other appellants claimed to be members of the family unit. However, substantively, the delegate identified that the first appellant expressed fear that his family and, in particular, his wife and children, would be sexually abused were they to return to Sri Lanka. It was concluded that the second appellant was never exposed to sexual abuse in Sri Lanka and the assertion that there was a fear of sexual harassment or abuse was considered to be speculative. The delegate considered the country information relating to the sexual abuse of women in Sri Lanka and determined that the second appellant was not within the category of persons who would have a reason to fear sexual harassment or abuse were she to return, and that she had not ever encountered such abuse of that nature. The delegate held that she was “therefore satisfied all of the applicants do not hold a well-founded fear of persecution for this reason.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

The term “Main Applicant” here refers to the first appellant.Conclusion on the factual premise As the Minister submitted, the Federal Circuit Court was correct in its factual conclusions at [43]-[49] of its reasons, and at [46] in particular. There were no new facts put before the Authority in the agent’s written submissions, nor in the email extracted at [17] above. The “fear” identified in the last sentence of the extract at [24] above was a fear of the kind which had already been outlined in the material before the delegate, such as it was. Even the agent admitted that beyond this was only speculation. Therefore, the factual premise of ground one of the appeal is not made out. The second appellant did not put forward any new facts, or factual information, even if it could be said she made a “claim” before the Authority. All of the facts and factual information were contained in the material which was before the delegate, such as it was. The agent’s submissions added nothing in a factual sense to what was already there. The Authority was incorrect in its factual finding at [18] of its reasons to find that the second appellant was now asserting personal claims for the first time, and that they constituted “new information”. However, there is no jurisdictional error in that factual finding by the Authority, nor was it contended by the appellants that there could be. Ground one must fail on this basis alone. However, even if I am wrong, and the Authority was correct in its finding at [18] of its reasons to identify “new information” in what was contained in the agent’s written submissions, I would not uphold the ground of appeal, for the following reasons.Other reasons not to uphold the ground of appeal There are three other reasons why I would not, in any event, uphold the ground of appeal:(a)the Authority made a finding under s 473DD(b)(i) and that was sufficient to justify its refusal to accept the “new information”;(b)there was no error in its approach to exceptional circumstances under s 473DD(a); and(c)even if there was an error, it was not material to the outcome of the review.A finding made under s 473DD(b)(i) First, in my opinion, a fair reading of [18] of the Authority’s reasons, in the context of the whole of the reasons, discloses that it made two, separate, findings in that paragraph. It is as well to repeat [18]:Having considered all of the evidence before me, I am satisfied that at the time of the decision, the second applicant had not made any personal claims and was relying on the claims of the primary applicant. I am therefore satisfied that the assertion of personal claims now is new information. For the reasons I have set out above, I am satisfied that the second applicant and her lawyer were given many opportunities to raise these claims before the decision was made and did not do so. I am not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering this new information and I have not done so.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Section 473DE(1) is also relevant. It provides:473DE Certain new information must be given to referred applicant(1)The Immigration Assessment Authority must, in relation to a fast track reviewable decision:(a)give to the referred applicant particulars of any new information, but only if the new information:(i)has been, or is to be, considered by the Authority under section 473DD; and(ii)would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the fast track reviewable decision; and(b)explain to the referred applicant why the new information is relevant to the review; and(c)invite the referred applicant, orally or in writing, to give comments on the new information:(i) in writing; or(ii)at an interview, whether conducted in person, by telephone or in any other way.ConsiderationOperation of ss 473DC and 473DD Limited attention was paid by the parties to the manner in which ss 473DC and 473DD operated, either individually or together. As the heading to Subdivision C (“Additional information”) suggests, both provisions are concerned with further information which may be obtained and considered by the Authority. Section 473DC affords to the Authority a discretion to “get” any documents or information which were not before the Minister when the relevant decision was made and which the Authority considers may be relevant. Other than those two requirements the discretion is otherwise unconfined. However, s 473DD restricts the type of information which the Authority may “consider”. It does that by prohibiting the Authority from considering new information unless it satisfies the criteria prescribed in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of s 473DD. However, the tests are not wholly objective. Whether any piece of new information passes the test is dependent upon the Authority reaching a state of satisfaction about it. In sub-paragraph (a) the Authority must be “satisfied” that there are exceptional circumstances to justify consideration of the new information. The cumulative requirement in sub-paragraph (b) is that the Authority be “satisfied” either that the new information was not and could not have been provided to the Minister when the initial decision was made, or that it is credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the appellants’ claim. The issue on appeal is whether the Authority’s non-satisfaction that there were exceptional circumstances to justify the receipt of the submissions on behalf of the second appellant was vitiated by error. In other words, was the Authority’s lack of satisfaction as to the requirement in sub-paragraph (a) validly formed as required by the Act? In many ways, as a matter of substance, the requirements of s 473DD(a) and (b) are or are analogous to jurisdictional facts on which the discretion to consider further information is conditioned. Moreover, there is no real difference in the principles by which a Court might identify an error in the formation of a state of mind necessary for the vitiation of a subjective jurisdictional fact and those applicable to the state of satisfaction or non-satisfaction of the matters in s 473DD(a) and (b).