FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Singh v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 7
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- Case
- [2020] FCAFC 7
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had correctly applied the law in refusing to grant the visa, particularly whether the Tribunal was required to consider the best interests of the appellant’s child as a primary consideration when determining if there were compelling reasons to waive the Schedule 3 criteria. The court also had to consider if the Tribunal had erred in finding that the appellant and his partner had attempted to have a child for the purposes of bolstering the appellant’s visa prospects.
The court found that the Tribunal was not required to take into account the interests of the appellant’s child as a primary consideration, and that the authorities were clear on this point. The court further found that the Tribunal had not erred in its determination that the appellant and his partner had attempted to have a child for the purposes of the visa, even if such an error had occurred, it was not material to the Tribunal’s decision. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal to be taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It followed that the requirements which were to be satisfied at the time of the application might only have been met if the Minister was “satisfied that there are compelling reasons for not applying those [Schedule 3] criteria”.CONSIDERATIONIdentification of the nature of the determination As s 65 makes clear, the Minister’s obligation when considering an application for a visa is to ascertain whether he is satisfied the applicant meets the relevant criteria. If so satisfied he is obliged to grant the visa sought and, if not so satisfied, to refuse to grant it. The authority to ascertain his state of satisfaction is not discretionary but is circumscribed by the requirements inherent in it, as are discussed below. The structure which the legislature has employed in s 65 is one where the jurisdictional fact, being the Minister’s satisfaction or non-satisfaction that the relevant criteria are met, dictates the exercise of power. It was articulated by Gummow and Hayne JJ in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 78 ALJR 992 (SGLB) at 998 [37] in the following terms:The satisfaction of the Minister is a condition precedent to the discharge of the obligation to grant or refuse to grant the visa, and is a “jurisdictional fact” or criterion upon which the exercise of that authority is conditioned (Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540 at 609 [183]). The nature of the subjective jurisdictional fact on which the power in s 65 is conditioned was discussed at length in EHF17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1681 (EHF17), as were the grounds on which the state of mind formed by the Minister might be examined by the Court. Those grounds were originally formulated by Dixon J in Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1949) 78 CLR 353 (Avon Downs) at 360 and have developed since. (See also CAQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 203.) Although not articulated in this manner by the appellant, the gravamen of his complaint is that the Minister’s state of mind — that the criteria for the grant of the partner visa were not satisfied — was vitiated by reason of an error or errors in its formation. Somewhat curiously, in this particular case, s 65 requires that one of the criteria which the Minister must be satisfied of is his satisfaction that there are compelling reasons for not applying the Schedule 3 criteria, although that does not require him to consider the issue twice. Again, the authority to determine whether the state of satisfaction is reached is not in the nature of a discretionary power. Ground 1 — the Minister failed to take into account the best interests of the child The appellant argued the primary judge misapplied the decision of the Full Court in Kaur and that the Tribunal, in ascertaining for the purposes of cl 820.211(2)(d)(ii) whether compelling reasons existed, failed to take into account that the interests of the rights of the child should be a primary consideration.The decision in Kaur