Singh v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Singh v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 7

Appeal from: Singh v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3180
File number: QUD 859 of 2018
Judges: LOGAN, REEVES AND DERRINGTON JJ
Date of judgment: 7 February 2020
Catchwords: MIGRATION – partner visa – onshore application not made in time to comply with Schedule 3 criteria – Tribunal determined that no “compelling reasons” to waive criteria – appellant father of citizen child of sponsor – relevance of UN Convention on the Rights of the Child – whether rights of the child “as a primary consideration” is a mandatory relevant consideration – whether Peko-Wallsend test applied based on particular circumstances of particular case – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)

Migration Regulations (Amendment) 1996 (No 75)

Cases cited:

AB v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 96 ALD 53

Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510

Applicant M38/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 458

Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1949) 78 CLR 353

Avon Downs; Buck v Bavone (1976) 135 CLR 110

Babicci v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 141 FCR 285

CAQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 203

Chang v Neill [2019] VSCA 151

Cheedy on behalf of the Yindjibarndi People v Western Australia [2010] FCA 690

Christoforidis v Cygnet Bulk Carriers SA (2002) 122 FCR 1

CQG15 v Minister of Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 253 FCR 496

D’Amore v Independent Commission Against Corruption [2012] NSWSC 473

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Truhold Benefit Pty Ltd [1985] 2 Qd R 88

EHF17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1681

Enfield City Corporation v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135

Fastbet Investments Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (No 5) [2019] FCA 2073

Golovcenco v Centrelink [2003] FCA 527

Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 263 CLR 1

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 123

JJ Richards & Sons Pty Ltd v Fair Work Australia (2012) 201 FCR 297

Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 256 FCR 235

Le v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 875

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN (2016) 69 AAR 210

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

Minister for Immigration andMulticultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507

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Details
Case
[2020] FCAFC 7
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Singh v Minister for Home Affairs, the appellant, who had arrived in Australia on a Student visa, challenged the Tribunal’s decision to affirm the Minister’s refusal to grant him a Partner visa on the basis that he had not met the relevant criteria, specifically the requirement that he be the holder of a substantive visa at the time of application. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had failed to consider the rights of his child as a primary consideration, in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.

The primary issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had correctly applied the law in refusing to grant the visa, particularly whether the Tribunal was required to consider the best interests of the appellant’s child as a primary consideration when determining if there were compelling reasons to waive the Schedule 3 criteria. The court also had to consider if the Tribunal had erred in finding that the appellant and his partner had attempted to have a child for the purposes of bolstering the appellant’s visa prospects.

The court found that the Tribunal was not required to take into account the interests of the appellant’s child as a primary consideration, and that the authorities were clear on this point. The court further found that the Tribunal had not erred in its determination that the appellant and his partner had attempted to have a child for the purposes of the visa, even if such an error had occurred, it was not material to the Tribunal’s decision. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal to be taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Whilst the precise nature of the appellant’s ambiguous grounds of appeal were, at times, somewhat difficult to discern, ultimately a few major points emerged. Nevertheless, for the reasons which follow, the appeal cannot succeed. The authorities establish that the Tribunal was not required to take into account the interests of the appellant’s child as a primary consideration, and the appellant was unable to distinguish those authorities from the present facts. Further, the Tribunal made no error in finding that the appellant and his partner, the sponsor, had successfully attempted to have a child for the purposes of bolstering the appellant’s prospects of obtaining the visa. Even if an error had occurred, it was not “material” to the Tribunal’s decision, in the sense that it did not deprive him of a possibility of a different outcome. BACKGROUND The appellant arrived in Australia on 8 May 2009 on a Student (Subclass 572) visa. That visa expired on 1 September 2011. On 22 July 2011, he made an application for a Skilled (Provisional) (Subclass 485) (Temporary Graduate) visa. This application was refused and he appealed that decision to the Tribunal on 19 February 2015. On 12 January 2016, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision. The appellant then applied for a protection visa on 12 April 2013. This application was also refused and he then sought review of that decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal on 10 March 2014. That tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision to refuse the protection visa on 22 September 2014. On 28 October 2014, the appellant sought ministerial intervention in relation to the refusal of the protection visa, but, on 9 March 2015, this request received an outcome of “inappropriate to consider”. He again applied for ministerial intervention on 4 February 2016, but again, on 11 April 2016, this request was also found to be “inappropriate to consider”. The appellant’s last substantive visa, being his student visa, expired on 1 September 2011. His application for the current visa was not made within 28 days of the “relevant day”, being the date of expiration, such that he does not satisfy criterion 3001 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). The appellant applied for the partner visa on 23 June 2016 on the basis of his relationship with the sponsor. At that time, the Class UK visa contained only one subclass, being Subclass 820 (Partner (Temporary)). On 20 October 2016, the delegate refused to grant the visa because the appellant did not satisfy cl 820.211(2)(d), as he had not been the holder of a substantive visa when he lodged his application (as required by the Schedule 3 criteria in the Regulations), and the delegate determined that there were no “compelling reasons” to waive that requirement. On 4 November 2016, the appellant sought review of the decision from the Tribunal. A hearing was held on 27 October 2017, at which the appellant attended and he and his sponsor both gave evidence. He was assisted at the hearing by a registered migration agent. The Tribunal’s reasons

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The starting point of any analysis is s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act), which provides:65 Decision to grant or refuse to grant visa (1)Subject to sections 84 and 86, after considering a valid application for a visa, the Minister: (a) if satisfied that: (i) the health criteria for it (if any) have been satisfied; and (ii) the other criteria for it prescribed by this Act or the regulations have been satisfied; and (iii) the grant of the visa is not prevented by section 40 (circumstances when granted), 91W (evidence of identity and bogus documents), 91WA (bogus documents and destroying identity documents), 91WB (applications for protection visas by members of same family unit), 500A (refusal or cancellation of temporary safe haven visas), 501 (special power to refuse or cancel) or any other provision of this Act or of any other law of the Commonwealth; and (iv) any amount of visa application charge payable in relation to the application has been paid; is to grant the visa; or (b) if not so satisfied, is to refuse to grant the visa. The structure of the Act requires that the Minister be satisfied of the requirements in sub-paragraph (a) and, relevantly for the purposes of this case, that the visa applicant meets the criteria for a partner visa which have been prescribed by the Act or the Regulations. They are specified in the provisions of Subclass 820 of the Regulations. Clause 820.211 identified the criteria which must be satisfied as at the time of application:820.21 — Criteria to be satisfied at time of application820.211(1) The applicant:(a) is not the holder of a Subclass 771 (Transit) visa; and(b) meets the requirements of subclause (2), (5), (6), (7), (8) or (9).(2) An applicant meets the requirements of this subclause if:(a) the applicant is the spouse or de facto partner of a person who:(i) is an Australian citizen, an Australian permanent resident or an eligible New Zealand citizen; and(ii) is not prohibited by subclause (2B) from being a sponsoring partner; and(c) the applicant is sponsored:(i) if the applicant’s spouse or de facto partner has turned 18—by the spouse or de facto partner; or(ii) if the applicant’s spouse has not turned 18—by a parent or guardian of the spouse who:(A) has turned 18; and(B) is an Australian citizen, an Australian permanent resident or an eligible New Zealand citizen; and(d) in the case of an applicant who is not the holder of a substantive visa—either:(i) the applicant:(A) entered Australia as the holder of a Subclass 995 (Diplomatic) visa or as a special purpose visa holder who at the time of entry met the requirements of subclause (2A); and(B) satisfies Schedule 3 criterion 3002; or(ii) the applicant satisfies Schedule 3 criteria 3001, 3003 and 3004, unless the Minister is satisfied that there are compelling reasons for not applying those criteria. It was not in contention that the appellant was not the holder of a substantive visa when he made his application for a partner visa.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It followed that the requirements which were to be satisfied at the time of the application might only have been met if the Minister was “satisfied that there are compelling reasons for not applying those [Schedule 3] criteria”.CONSIDERATIONIdentification of the nature of the determination As s 65 makes clear, the Minister’s obligation when considering an application for a visa is to ascertain whether he is satisfied the applicant meets the relevant criteria. If so satisfied he is obliged to grant the visa sought and, if not so satisfied, to refuse to grant it. The authority to ascertain his state of satisfaction is not discretionary but is circumscribed by the requirements inherent in it, as are discussed below. The structure which the legislature has employed in s 65 is one where the jurisdictional fact, being the Minister’s satisfaction or non-satisfaction that the relevant criteria are met, dictates the exercise of power. It was articulated by Gummow and Hayne JJ in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 78 ALJR 992 (SGLB) at 998 [37] in the following terms:The satisfaction of the Minister is a condition precedent to the discharge of the obligation to grant or refuse to grant the visa, and is a “jurisdictional fact” or criterion upon which the exercise of that authority is conditioned (Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540 at 609 [183]). The nature of the subjective jurisdictional fact on which the power in s 65 is conditioned was discussed at length in EHF17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1681 (EHF17), as were the grounds on which the state of mind formed by the Minister might be examined by the Court. Those grounds were originally formulated by Dixon J in Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1949) 78 CLR 353 (Avon Downs) at 360 and have developed since. (See also CAQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 203.) Although not articulated in this manner by the appellant, the gravamen of his complaint is that the Minister’s state of mind — that the criteria for the grant of the partner visa were not satisfied — was vitiated by reason of an error or errors in its formation. Somewhat curiously, in this particular case, s 65 requires that one of the criteria which the Minister must be satisfied of is his satisfaction that there are compelling reasons for not applying the Schedule 3 criteria, although that does not require him to consider the issue twice. Again, the authority to determine whether the state of satisfaction is reached is not in the nature of a discretionary power. Ground 1 — the Minister failed to take into account the best interests of the child The appellant argued the primary judge misapplied the decision of the Full Court in Kaur and that the Tribunal, in ascertaining for the purposes of cl 820.211(2)(d)(ii) whether compelling reasons existed, failed to take into account that the interests of the rights of the child should be a primary consideration.The decision in Kaur