Din20 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DIN20 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCA 331

Appeal from: DIN20 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2020] FCCA 2117
File number: QUD 258 of 2020
Judgment of: DERRINGTON  J
Date of judgment: 9 April 2021
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for Safe Haven Protection Visa – appellant claimed Immigration Assessment Authority’s conclusion that Sri Lankan authorities did not believe him to be affiliated with LTTE to be illogical or irrational – whether Authority’s state of non-satisfaction vitiated by illogicality or irrationality – whether Authority overlooked appellant’s contention or important evidence – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 65
Cases cited:

ADU18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 366

Ali v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 109

ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 250 FCR 109

AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 261 FCR 503

EHF17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 272 FCR 409

Hinton v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 146 ALD 184

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611

Okoh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 84

Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 77 ALJR 1165

Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 34 ALD 347

Sing v Minister for Home Affairs (2020) 274 FCR 506

Division: General Division
Registry: Queensland
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 64
Date of hearing: 7 April 2021
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Psaltis
Solicitor for the Appellant: Refugee & Immigration Legal Service
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Byrnes
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

QUD 258 of 2020
BETWEEN:

DIN20

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

DERRINGTON  J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 APRIL 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

DERRINGTON J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCC) which dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (the Authority).  By its decision, the Authority affirmed a decision of the delegate of the first respondent, the Minister for Home Affairs (the Minister), not to grant the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa. 

  2. The appellant’s sole ground of appeal is that a finding by the Authority that he was not…

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Details
Case
[2021] FCA 331
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Din20 v Minister for Home Affairs, the appellant, a Tamil from Sri Lanka, sought judicial review of the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority) to affirm the delegate’s decision to refuse his application for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa. The appellant argued that the Authority’s conclusion that Sri Lankan authorities did not believe him to be affiliated with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was illogical or irrational, and that this error vitiated the Authority’s lack of satisfaction that he met the criteria for the visa. The appellant submitted that the Authority had either overlooked his contention or important evidence, which would have led to a different outcome.

The central legal issue in this appeal was whether the Authority’s conclusion that the appellant was not considered by the Sri Lankan authorities to be a member or an affiliate of the LTTE was based on an illogical or irrational fact-finding process, and whether such an error necessarily vitiated the Authority’s lack of satisfaction and led to a jurisdictional error. The court acknowledged that the states of mind required under s 65 of the Act are jurisdictional facts that are subject to review. It noted that irrationality or illogic in the decisional process may vitiate the formation of the required state of mind, potentially leading to a jurisdictional error.

The court found that the appellant’s argument was premised on the notion that the Authority’s conclusion was based on an illogical or irrational fact-finding process, which would vitiate the Authority’s state of non-satisfaction. However, the court held that even if the Authority’s conclusion was illogical or irrational, this alone does not lead to jurisdictional error. Instead, the issue was whether the Authority’s conclusion was based on an incomplete or imperfect formation of the required state of mind. The court found that the Authority had carefully considered the appellant’s claims and the available country information, and had reached its conclusion based on a rational and logical process. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant’s sole ground of appeal is that a finding by the Authority that he was not considered by the Sri Lankan authorities to be a member or an affiliate of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) was illogical or irrational, or in some way involved a fundamental misconstruction or misunderstanding of the evidence. It is submitted that this error vitiated the Authority’s lack of satisfaction that the appellant satisfied the criteria for the grant of the visa. BACKGROUND The appellant is a Tamil who was born in Chettikulam, Vavuniya, Northern Province, Sri Lanka. He claimed that in the troubles which occurred in that country, culminating in a civil war which ended in 2009, his father had been killed by a paramilitary group and his uncle had been murdered by the Criminal Investigation Department (the CID). It should be observed that the Authority was not satisfied on the appellant’s evidence that those were the circumstances of his father’s and uncle’s deaths. He also claimed, although it was also not accepted by the Authority, that he began working for an LTTE managed forest conservation organisation in 2002. He said that this organisation consisted of about 10 people whose job it was to protect the forests by preventing illegal logging and that it handed over paramilitary group members who had stolen timber to the LTTE which imposed significant fines on them. The appellant said that he ceased working for the conservation organisation in 2004 and returned to his mother’s house in Chettikulam, however, a week later the paramilitary group came to question him because they were bitter about being fined and losing money. He further said that the paramilitary group worked with the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) which required him to attend an army camp for questioning. He alleged that he went there every week and was assaulted during his interrogations. In his evidence to the Authority, he further said that after about 4 months he decided to flee and went to live with his uncle in Mannar where he again worked for the forest conservation organisation. He returned to Chettikulam in 2006 to register his marriage and he lived there at his wife’s house. Towards the end of January 2007, he was caught in a “round up” by the CID and SLA in Vavuniya. He claimed that SLA officers and a masked assessor identified him along with another nine men as being LTTE members. After being questioned for two hours, he was told to attend the local CID office to retrieve his identity card but, on his way there, he was forced into a white van and driven to an army camp where he says he was blindfolded, chained, mistreated and questioned. In particular, he claimed that he was questioned about his sports club’s coach, T, whom the army said they knew to be an LTTE member. He says he told the officers that T was not a member of that organisation. The appellant was released the following morning and was collected by a priest and T who told him that they had organised for his release.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 1 February 2019, the Authority affirmed the delegate’s decision to refuse to grant the visa. The Authority’s decision It is not necessary to set out the Authority’s decision in great detail. However, given the issues raised in his appeal, some attention needs to be given to part of it. After setting out the background and the appellant’s claim for protection, the Authority considered what appeared to be the essence of the appellant’s case; namely that he had worked for an LTTE managed forest conservation group with the consequence that he would have imputed political opinions. The Authority considered his evidence concerning his alleged employment by that organisation including his failure to mention it during his arrival interview and the unimpressive oral evidence he gave at his SHEV interview regarding his claimed role in the organisation. It found his evidence to be vague and unconvincing, and parts of it were implausible. In the result it did not accept he worked for the forest conservation organisation. Further, it did not accept that he had come to the attention of the SLA as a consequence of his involvement with the organisation. This finding was not challenged on appeal to the FCC or to this Court. A further essential element of the appellant’s claim was his detention by the SLA. He claimed that in January 2007 he had been caught in a round up by the CID and SLA because, so he said, he was suspected of being an LTTE member by reason of his Tamil ethnicity and the SLA and CID regarded Tamils as the enemy. He also claimed that because he was engaged in forest conservation he was regarded as the enemy. As the Authority had rejected his assertion that he had worked for any such organisation, it concluded the SLA’s suspicion of him as having an association with the LTTE stemmed only from him being a Tamil. The Authority considered in detail the available Country Information which indicated that during the period when the appellant had claimed to be detained, the SLA frequently carried out arrests and detentions during “cordon and search” operations. These were conducted in areas with concentrated Tamil populations, particularly in Colombo and the Northern and Eastern provinces. The Authority noted that, although extensive powers were given for the arrest and detention of persons under the Public Security Ordinance Act or the Prevention of Terrorism Act, unlawful and arbitrary arrests were carried out by members of the security forces including the CID and SLA. It noted that there was a standard method of unlawful arrest and detention involving abductions using white vans and hooded men and noted that the length of any detention varied from days to months or years. It referred to the DFAT reports which indicated that the authorities detained more Tamils under the Prevention of Terrorism Act than any other ethnic group. The Country Information generally indicated that suspects detained under that Act were subjected to mistreatment and torture and, in that respect, the Authority accepted that the appellant may have been physically mistreated during this detention.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It is not necessary to consider the other grounds of review raised before the FCC which are not the subject of this appeal. CONSIDERATIONContext of decision The decision which was the subject of review by the Authority was that of a delegate, tasked with considering the appellant’s application for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa. That task was carried out pursuant to s 65 of the Act. In particular, the delegate was obliged to perform the statutory function of being either satisfied or not satisfied the appellant met the statutory criteria for the grant of the relevant visa. In this case, the delegate concluded that he was “not satisfied”, as a result of which s 65(1)(b) of the Act obliged him to refuse to grant the visa. As both counsel before the Court acknowledged, the structure of s 65 is that the power to grant or refuse a visa is conditioned upon the existence of a particular state of mind. If the Minister is satisfied the visa applicant meets the relevant criteria, the power to grant the visa is enlivened. If the Minister is “not satisfied”, the power to refuse is enlivened. It is now well recognised that those states of mind are jurisdictional facts of a subjective nature which condition the visa granting or refusing powers: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611, 654 – 655 [138] – [139]; Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 77 ALJR 1165, 1176 [59] – [60]; EHF17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 272 FCR 409 (EHF17); Okoh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 84 [23]; Ali v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 109 [39] – [44]. Although the appellant’s ground of appeal is articulated as being founded upon the proposition that the Authority’s illogicality or irrationality in reaching its conclusion necessarily gave rise to a jurisdictional error, the path is not quite as direct as that. The true essence of the appellant’s complaint is that, in conducting its review of the delegate’s decision, the Authority concluded that it was not satisfied that the appellant met the statutory criteria in circumstances where it reached that state of a lack of satisfaction by proceeding upon an erroneous basis. The error relied upon is characterised as illogicality or irrationality in the fact finding process which must necessarily vitiate the putative formed state of non-satisfaction. If correct, that of itself does not lead to jurisdictional error. However, as the Authority concluded that the application for a visa must be refused pursuant to s 65(1)(b), that conclusion would, on the assumption that the appellant’s submissions are correct, be based upon an incomplete or imperfect formation of the required state of mind. On that basis, the purported exercise of power to refuse the visa would be affected by jurisdictional error. There is no doubt that the state of mind on which the power under s 65 is considered is examinable: Migrating Towards a Principled Approach to Reviewing Jurisdictional Facts (2020) 27 AJ Admin L 70. In particular, the putative state of mind may be vitiated by irrationality or illogicality in the decisional process: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 (SZMDS).