EHF17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

EHF17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1681

Appeal from: EHF17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 499
File number: WAD 165 of 2019
Judge: DERRINGTON J
Date of judgment: 14 October 2019
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal – citizen of Egypt – Coptic Christian – whether conclusion concerning whether the applicant has no well-founded fear of persecution having regard to evidence of unrest and violence in Egypt against Coptic Christians – no jurisdictional error arising from unreasonable finding of fact – finding not unreasonable in any event

MIGRATION – alleged factual error in formation of state of satisfaction for the purposes of s 65 of Migration Act –review of subjective jurisdictional fact – illogicality, irrationality or reliance on inferences or findings of fact not supported by logical grounds or probative evidence – allegations of jurisdictional error not relevant to alleged erroneous fact finding in relation to visa criteria

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – factual error by Administrative Appeals Tribunal in application of s 65 of Migration Act – error relevant to formation of subjective jurisdictional fact – review of subjective jurisdictional fact wider than judicial review for “unreasonableness” – conflation in authorities of principles relating to jurisdictional error and review of jurisdictional fact

Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 65
Cases cited:

AEX15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 821

ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 250 FCR 109

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223

Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321

Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1949) 78 CLR 353

Brennan v New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation (2011) 83 NSWLR 23

Buck v Bavone (1976) 135 CLR 110

Caledonian Collieries Ltd v Australasian Coal and Shale Employees’ Federation (No 1) (1930) 42 CLR 527

Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379

CHW16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 762

Corporation of the City of Einfield v Development Assessment Commissioner (2000) 199 CLR 135

CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 253 FCR 496

Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163

D’Amore v Independent Commission Against Corruption [2012] NSWSC 473

DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 258 FCR 175

EVA17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 262 FCR 304

Gedeon v Commissioner of New South Wales Crime Commission (2008) 236 CLR 120

Hossam v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 70 AAR 320

Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531

McStravick v Western Australia [2001] WASCA 398

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Pandey (2014) 143 ALD 640

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2016] FCA 575

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN (2016) 69 AAR 210

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1681
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In EHF17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant, an Egyptian citizen and Coptic Christian, challenged the Administrative Appeals Tribunal’s (AAT) decision to refuse her application for a protection visa. The AAT found that the applicant lacked credibility and that, based on the available country information, Australia did not owe her protection obligations as a Coptic Christian. The case primarily revolved around whether the AAT's conclusion that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution was reasonable and logically founded on the evidence presented.

The legal issues before the court included whether the AAT had made a jurisdictional error by unreasonably finding facts and whether there was an alleged factual error in the formation of the state of satisfaction under section 65 of the Migration Act. The applicant argued that the AAT's conclusions were unreasonable and illogical, and that it had failed to consider relevant information about the risk of harm she faced as a Coptic Christian in Egypt.

The court examined the AAT's reasoning and found that its conclusion was logical, rational, and based on findings that were logically founded on probative evidence. The court held that the AAT had considered the available country information, which indicated that conditions for Coptic Christians had improved in Egypt, particularly in cities like Alexandria. The AAT's reliance on the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade report, which suggested that the situation for Coptic Christians was relatively secure, was deemed reasonable. The court concluded that the AAT's decision was within the range of possible conclusions properly open on the evidence and materials before it, and thus there was no jurisdictional error.

The appeal was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal. The court found that the AAT's decision was reasonably and logically within the range of possible conclusions properly open on the evidence and materials before it.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

However, whether the appellant’s complaint is considered as the non-existence of a jurisdictional fact or the occurrence of a jurisdictional error in the exercise of power, it cannot succeed. The question for the Tribunal was whether the appellant’s fear of harm because she was a Coptic Christian was well-founded, given her particular circumstances. Those circumstances were that she lived in the city of Alexandria which was a generally safe part of Egypt for Copts, and that was so even though there had been a violent and fatal attack on a Coptic Church in that city in 2017. On any view of the material before the Tribunal, its conclusion that the appellant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution was logical, rational and based on findings which were logically founded on probative evidence, and (if it be relevant) had an evident and intelligible justification. Whilst it may be that others might have reached a different conclusion to the Tribunal based on the same material, that is not determinative. Background The appellant, who was born in Kuwait, is an Egyptian citizen. Her birth in Kuwait did not afford her citizenship of that country and she remains a citizen of Egypt and of no other country. She applied for a visitor’s visa on 21 March 2013 purportedly for the purposes of visiting her sister who resides in Australia. She was granted a TR-676 tourist visa on 26 March 2013 which remained valid until 23 July 2013. She arrived in Australia with her two year old son on 23 April 2013, and on 28 May 2013 applied to the Department of Immigration and Border Protection for a protection visa. She provided a number of documents in support of her application. On 17 July 2015, the delegate determined to refuse to grant a protection visa, with the consequence that, on 22 July 2015, she sought review of that decision by lodging an application with the Tribunal. The Tribunal conducted two hearings in relation to the application, one on 29 March 2017 and the other on 24 May 2017. On both occasions the appellant was assisted by an interpreter in the Arabic and English languages. Subsequent to the hearing the appellant sent to the Tribunal a number of news items which reported on the occurrence of recent deadly attacks on Coptic Christians in Egypt around Easter that year. On 7 September 2017, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant a protection visa. The Tribunal’s decision The Tribunal dismissed the appellant’s application for two main reasons. First, it concluded she lacked credibility in relation to the circumstances which she had advanced as indicating she was specifically targeted as a Copt in Egypt. Secondly, it concluded from the available country information that Australia did not owe her protection obligations under s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) of the Act merely on the basis that she was a Coptic Christian. The Tribunal considered a substantial number of documents which the appellant had provided and made a variety of findings concerning the veracity of her claim. A summary of the Tribunal’s reasons is as follows:(a)the Tribunal did not believe the appellant’s capacity to provide information to the Department was affected by any mental health issue;(b)the Tribunal developed a number of concerns with inconsistencies in the her evidence and that of a supporting witness which led it to conclude she was not a witness of truth;(c)the Tribunal concluded it was not satisfied the appellant was truthful as her comments and responses to questions put to her were not plausible. It was found that she had created her claims in order to support her visa application. The rejection of her credibility led to a rejection of the key claims for protection on the Convention grounds or pursuant to the complementary protection grounds;(d)having rejected the appellant’s credibility the Tribunal did not accept that:(i)she had helped her father-in-law to reconvert to Christianity and as a consequence the Muslim brotherhood or other groups had repeatedly threatened her or sent her messages threatening to kidnap her son;(ii)she had proselytised or was perceived to proselytise in Egypt;(iii)she and her husband were targeted or threatened or harmed for the reconversion to Christianity of her father-in-law or that her husband had received more threats or was attacked or kidnapped;(iv)that she fled Egypt fearing harm; (e)on the basis of country information reviewed by the Tribunal, it accepted that there were tensions and potential for sectarian violence in Egypt, but that the overall situation for Coptic Christians had improved since 2013 and it was relatively secure, particularly for those who resided in Cairo and Alexandria;(f)in reliance on the recent DFAT report on Egypt of 19 May 2017, the Tribunal did not accept the appellant would face a real chance of serious harm by reason of her religion or any other Convention ground, were she to return to Egypt; (g)the Tribunal also did not accept that there were substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the appellant being returned to Egypt, there was a real risk that she would suffer significant harm;(h)it followed that the Tribunal did not accept that the appellant or her son were persons in respect of whom Australia owed protection obligations.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 7 September 2017, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant a protection visa. The Tribunal’s decision The Tribunal dismissed the appellant’s application for two main reasons. First, it concluded she lacked credibility in relation to the circumstances which she had advanced as indicating she was specifically targeted as a Copt in Egypt. Secondly, it concluded from the available country information that Australia did not owe her protection obligations under s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) of the Act merely on the basis that she was a Coptic Christian. The Tribunal considered a substantial number of documents which the appellant had provided and made a variety of findings concerning the veracity of her claim. A summary of the Tribunal’s reasons is as follows:(a)the Tribunal did not believe the appellant’s capacity to provide information to the Department was affected by any mental health issue;(b)the Tribunal developed a number of concerns with inconsistencies in the her evidence and that of a supporting witness which led it to conclude she was not a witness of truth;(c)the Tribunal concluded it was not satisfied the appellant was truthful as her comments and responses to questions put to her were not plausible. It was found that she had created her claims in order to support her visa application. The rejection of her credibility led to a rejection of the key claims for protection on the Convention grounds or pursuant to the complementary protection grounds;(d)having rejected the appellant’s credibility the Tribunal did not accept that:(i)she had helped her father-in-law to reconvert to Christianity and as a consequence the Muslim brotherhood or other groups had repeatedly threatened her or sent her messages threatening to kidnap her son;(ii)she had proselytised or was perceived to proselytise in Egypt;(iii)she and her husband were targeted or threatened or harmed for the reconversion to Christianity of her father-in-law or that her husband had received more threats or was attacked or kidnapped;(iv)that she fled Egypt fearing harm; (e)on the basis of country information reviewed by the Tribunal, it accepted that there were tensions and potential for sectarian violence in Egypt, but that the overall situation for Coptic Christians had improved since 2013 and it was relatively secure, particularly for those who resided in Cairo and Alexandria;(f)in reliance on the recent DFAT report on Egypt of 19 May 2017, the Tribunal did not accept the appellant would face a real chance of serious harm by reason of her religion or any other Convention ground, were she to return to Egypt; (g)the Tribunal also did not accept that there were substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the appellant being returned to Egypt, there was a real risk that she would suffer significant harm;(h)it followed that the Tribunal did not accept that the appellant or her son were persons in respect of whom Australia owed protection obligations.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The first particular of that ground was that the “Authority” (which may be taken to refer to the Tribunal) erred in concluding that the appellant, as a practising Coptic Christian, did not face a real chance of serious harm for reasons of her religion if she returned to Egypt when the Tribunal found that she did face a real chance of serious harm due to her practices and societal discrimination. The second particular relied upon was that the Tribunal had regard to country information and unreasonably and illogically found that the appellant would not be targeted for serious harm if she returned, and unreasonably concluded and failed to identify that there was a real risk of serious harm.The consideration by the FCC The primary judge held (at [29]) that the Tribunal had regard to the material before it prior to arriving at its conclusion that the appellant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution and that it weighed the material as it was required to do: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272, 281-282; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS (2010) 243 CLR 164 at 176 [33]; SZRTN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 141 ALD 395 at [81]-[82]. The primary judge then said:The material to which the Tribunal had regard contains material which might justify a range of conclusions, but in this case it can be inferred that the Tribunal placed more weight on the DFAT material which indicates that, not only have conditions improved for Coptic Christians in Egypt since the election of President Sisi, and that widespread attacks have ceased, but that most Coptic Christians are able to live peacefully, including peacefully with their Muslim neighbours, and that there has been a restoration of police presence and authority in Egypt, and that overall the situation for Coptic Christians is “… relatively secure, particularly for those who reside in … Alexandria”: CB 350 at [96]. His Honour found (at [30]) that, having regard to the DFAT reports, the conclusion that the appellant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution was open to the Tribunal and was neither unreasonable nor illogical on the basis of the principles in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Pandey (2014) 143 ALD 640 or Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611. His Honour also said that it was fair to observe that it would have been open to a differently constituted Tribunal to arrive at a different decision but that was beside the point because the conclusion actually reached was “reasonably and logically within the range of possible conclusions properly open on the evidence and materials before the Tribunal.” It followed that the unreasonableness ground failed. The affidavit material filed by the parties in April and June 2018 referring to the comments of the Prime Minister and a member of the Opposition was found by the primary judge not to be relevant to the determination. Although the material was referred to in the appellant’s written outline filed in this Court, during oral addresses all reliance upon it and on any ground associated with it was abandoned.