FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AEX15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 821
ORDERS
NSD 2076 of 2016 BETWEEN: AEX15
First Applicant
AEY15
Second Applicant
AEZ15
Third Applicant
AFA15
Fourth Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
O'CALLAGHAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
25 JULY 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicants be granted leave to appeal limited to the question of whether the primary judge erred by not finding that the Tribunal erred in its treatment of the applicants’ documentary evidence, being the evidence referred to at [65] and [190] of the Tribunal’s reasons.
2.The costs of the application…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 821
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues revolved around whether the applicants could successfully argue that the Tribunal misapplied the tests for refugee and complementary protection claims, and whether the Tribunal erred in its assessment of the documentary evidence. The court also considered if procedural fairness was compromised in the Tribunal's decision-making process.
The court found that the applicants' arguments about the misapplication of the refugee and complementary protection tests were misconceived as the Tribunal correctly identified and applied the relevant tests. Regarding the documentary evidence, the court found that the Tribunal did not adequately consider the documentary evidence presented by the applicants, which included evidence of the first applicant's affiliation with the BNP and the harm he suffered. This was a critical error that warranted reconsideration. Therefore, the court granted leave to appeal on limited terms, specifically focusing on the Tribunal's treatment of the documentary evidence. The court also ruled that the costs of the application would be costs in the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicants be granted leave to appeal limited to the question of whether the primary judge erred by not finding that the Tribunal erred in its treatment of the applicants’ documentary evidence, being the evidence referred to at [65] and [190] of the Tribunal’s reasons.
2. The costs of the application be costs in the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The applicants initially applied to the Migration Review Tribunal for refugee status and complementary protection, which was dismissed. They then appealed the Tribunal's decision to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA). The FCCA dismissed the appeal, prompting the applicants to seek leave to appeal to the Federal Court. The applicants filed an application for leave to appeal, arguing that the FCCA erred in not finding that the Tribunal erred in its treatment of their documentary evidence. The Federal Court granted the applicants leave to appeal on limited terms, focusing on the documentary evidence issue.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
For the applicants’ benefit, those claims that are framed as a challenge to the Tribunal’s decision have been understood by the Court as seeking to challenge the primary judge’s failure to identify or accept the relevant errors.CONSIDERATION In order for the applicants to obtain leave to appeal, I must be satisfied that in all the circumstances, the decision of the FCCA is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration on appeal and, assuming that the decision is wrong, that substantial injustice would result if leave were refused: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-9.Application for leave to appeal groundsThe test for s 36(2)(a) and/or (aa) The applicants’ claim that the Tribunal applied the incorrect test for, and failed to separate, their refugee and complementary protection claims is misconceived. The Tribunal correctly identified the tests for s 36(2)(a) and s 36(2)(aa) and separately applied each test: Tribunal’s reasons at [192]-[193] and [194], respectively. No error arises from the same factual findings (namely, the Tribunal’s assessment of the first applicant’s credit) forming the basis of each assessment.Reliance on DFAT country information The applicants take issue with the Tribunal’s reliance on DFAT country information and its failure to have regard to other country information, such as the “Amnesty international report regarding Bangladesh”. The Tribunal’s reasons contain a detailed survey of country information relating to the political situation, including the treatment of BNP supporters, in Bangladesh. The survey is 105 paragraphs long and devotes careful consideration to various media reports, reports of international and domestic non-government organisations, reports of government bodies and academic articles. The Tribunal’s reasons also indicate that the applicants’ representative provided the Tribunal will various pieces of country information, including “from the UNHRC and other sources”, and that the Tribunal considered all of that information: Tribunal’s reasons at [67]. Although the Tribunal’s reasons do not expressly refer to the “Amnesty international report regarding Bangladesh”, it is clear that the Tribunal considered a broad range of country information, including that provided by the applicants’ representative. The choice and the assessment of the accuracy and weight of country information is a matter for the Tribunal: NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [10]-[11]. Moreover, except in respect of the applicants’ documentary evidence (considered further below), the country information considered by the Tribunal in this matter ultimately did not bear on the Tribunal’s decision because, as the primary judge observed at [28], the Tribunal did not accept that the first applicant was affiliated with the BNP or that he had suffered harm at the hands of the Awami League. The proposed ground of appeal is unsustainable.Procedural fairness